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## DEDICATION

*This 113th issue of the Darshana International  
is most respectfully dedicated to*



### **Prof. Hajime Nakamura**

*Founder Director The Eastern Institute, INC,  
Soto-Kanda 2-17-2, Chiyoda-Ku, Tokyo 101 (Japan).*

Dr. Nakamura is author of a more than 1000 papers and books on Indian Philosophy, Sanskrit, History of India, Jaina Studies, Buddhism, Tibetan Studies, Chinese Ways of Thinking, Japanese Thought, Comparative Philosophy, Comparative History of Ideas, Interchange of Culture, Contemporary Eastern Thought, Report on Indian Studies in Japan, Prefaces and Recommendations in English and more than 800 publications in Japanese to his credit. He is one of the greatest living Japanese scholar of the world devoted all his life for the cause of Philosophy and Culture. We wish him a long life to serve Internationalism, Philosophy and culture.

**ANURAG ATREYA**  
Managing Editor



**DARSHANA INTERNATIONAL****An International Quarterly****OF****Philosophy, Psychology, Psychical  
Research, Religion, Mysticism  
& Sociology****VOL. XXIX****JANUARY 1989****NUMBER 1****CONTENTS**

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## The Twenty-ninth Year of the DARSHANA INTERNATIONAL

*Darshana International* has completed Twenty eight years of its existence with this number and entering in its 29th year. *Darshana International* served the cause of Philosophy and its allied disciplines for a long period of 28 years. It is all due to sincere and untiring efforts of the distinguished scholars on the Editorial Board, Contributors, Subscribers who are taking been interest in bringing *Darshana International* to the lime light, who deserve our appreciation. This Journal has achieved rare distinction in the realm of the philosophical journals of the world.

The General Editor Dr. J.P. Atreya deserves much more appreciation for his efforts to continue this Journal which is run by him single handedly for the last 28 years.

Mr. B.V.S.S.Mani, the Hony. Managing Director of the Swadharma Swaarajya Sangha, Madras in enabling us to send *Darshana International* to several institutions. Mr. Mani has been a great source and solace of inspiration and motivation for us to promote philosophical undertaking to continue this venture of ours. His continuance of financial assistance to promote the publication of the *Darshana International* for so many years without any other help from other sources.

We are really sorry on account of financial difficulties the Journal is behind schedule. We hope by the end of the next year the journal will be upto date. By June 1991 all the issues of 1989 will be released.

Prof. J. P. Atreya, the editor of this Journal went to Brighton (U. K.) in August 1988 to attend the XVIII World Congress of Philosophy and organised there the 1300 Birth Anniversary of Shankaracharya, Birth Centenary of Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, and Session of Indian Contemporary Thinkers and the Session of the International Society for Neoplatonic Studies (Asia). All these sessions organised during the World Congress of Philosophy were very well attended by large numbers of scholars both from the East and the West. Prof. Atreya went to attend the Second International Conference of IPPNO (International Philosophers for the Prevention of Nuclear Omnicide) in May-June, 1990, at Moscow.



Dr. Atreya was also invited to attend and participate in the two International Seminars organised by Government of India and Indian Council of Philosophical Research on Dr. S. Radhakrishnan and Shankaracharya.

**Darshana Printers** and its staff under the able leadership of Mr. S. K. Agrawal is doing work with sincerity and devotion. They deserve our heartfelt thanks for bringing out this Journal. Without their active interest and efforts it was not possible to continue this journal so long.

We are conscious of the shortcomings of our journal. It is all due to financial difficulties. The cost has gone enormously high and the regular publication is being delayed. We have published large number of articles of high standard to attract more and more scholarly readers.

We are happy that on our General Editor's request some eminent personalities of International repute have given their consent to serve on the Editorial Board of the *Darshana International*. We welcome them in our midst. They include: Dr. Marietta Stepaniants and Dr. E. N. Anikeeva (U.S.S.R.), Dr. Jerze Pelc (Poland) and Feng Yu (China). This Journal has occupied a key position in the philosophical map of the world.

We wish our Readers to introduce this Journal and recommend *Darshana International* to their friends and libraries in their vicinity to subscribe.

We wish all our Readers, Subscribers, Members of the Editorial Board, and Contributors a *VERY HAPPY AND PROSPEROUS NEW YEAR*.

**ANURAG ATREYA**  
Managing Editor



# I

## Knowledge, Problems and Forecasting

*Jerzy A. Wojciechowski*

### I

#### Introduction

Forecasting and thinking about forecasting are two different problems. The present paper is concerned with the latter. Namely, its purpose is to reflect on the relationship which exists between the level of complexity of problems to be solved and forecasting. To be meaningful, the discussion has to take into account the continuously changing conditions in which forecasters have to work. Generally speaking, the change is twofold: Intellectual and material. Knowledge, humanity and problems expand ever more rapidly affecting the need and art of forecasting. Knowledge, problems and forecasting form a system, therefore their mutual relationships are systemic and have to be treated as such. The three elements of the system are interdependent and have impact on each other. The system is obviously eminently dynamic and difficult to grasp in its totality.

Many questions can be asked about this system, among them those about the causes and consequences of the system. Central to the understanding of this problem is the perception of the role which knowledge plays in human life and the consequences of the development of knowledge. Although the fact of the existence of knowledge is evident, and so is its importance, not enough attention is paid to the complexity of the impact of knowledge on humans and their lives. The problems which forecasters encounter and the increasing complexity of their work are among the consequences of the development of knowledge. It is this issue which will be discussed in the following pages.

Philosophers have studied knowledge for over twenty-five centuries without exhausting the topic. More over, their fine analyses do not throw much light on the problem before us. The fact is that knowledge and its development is a dynamic process.



Ecology of Knowledge (Eok) developed by this writer. The theory examines the relationships existing between knowers and the body of knowledge, the knowledge construct (KC). The KC is viewed as an entity distinct from knowers and a growing element of the human environment exercising an increasing influence on humans and their mode of life. One of the consequences of the development of knowledge discussed by the EoK is the growth of the complexity of problems which humanity has to deal with. In light of the situation which forecasters find themselves in, the above statement is obviously directly relevant for the present topic and will be analyzed further in this paper.

## II

### About the conditions of forecasting

Technological forecasters cannot complain about lack of work. They have enough problems to solve to keep them busy all their lives. Interestingly enough, the more forecasts they make and the more sophisticated their art and science becomes, the more forecasts are required. It is rather obvious that in the future the need of planning ahead in all spheres of life will be greater than now. In view of this situation, one may ask what generates the increasing demand for more forecasting? Is forecasting itself not responsible, at least partially, for this growing demand? The latter question may sound preposterous but cannot be easily dismissed. Whatever is the answer, one thing is certain—the age of forecasting is upon us and a growing number of individuals and institutions are involved in it. This journal is the best illustration of this fact.

Let us put the present situation in proper perspective. Looking into the future is nothing new. As soon as humans began to think and were able to form the notion of the future, they wanted to know what the future held for them. Foretelling the future is among the oldest recorded occupations of humanity. All living nature is concerned in one way or another with the future but only humans can do something not only about the future but also about their knowledge of the future. Diviners, soothsayers, prophets of all sorts existed in all cultures, and in each enjoyed a special status and command respect. The reasons for the respect which they enjoyed are quite revealing. The respect was based on the belief that the future can be known and that some individuals have a privileged access to it. In our age of concern for the equality of the sexes, it is worth pointing out that the art of gazing into the future was shared by both sexes.

Of particular interest for our discussion are the reasons for the belief in the knowability of the future. Although they are nowhere



explicitly stated, two convictions underlie this belief, namely, about nature of the future and the nature of human knowledge. In order to be known, the future has to be knowable and in order to be knowable it must be describable in terms of present day knowledge, i.e. it must not transcend the ability of the available language to express it. This, in turn, means that the future must not surpass the explanatory capacity of the soothsayer and the capacity of his audience to understand him. The above condition can be satisfied, if their knowledge is sufficient for this task, i.e. if the conceptual system available to these persons is adequate for this purpose. Concepts and words derive their meaning from the objects which they represent. They are adequate to the extent and as long as they are fulfilling their role. This condition is best satisfied in a world which is determined in its basic nature, where history is a repetition of basically unchanging human situations and where radical novelty is non-existent, i.e. in a static, non-progressive situation.

It is not an accident that soothsaying is a profession in primitive societies. These societies persist in almost unchanged or very slowly changing conditions. They are tradition bound and past oriented. For them reality is stable in its broad outline. The past is the teacher for the present and the exemplar, the measure for the future. In these circumstances predicting the future does not pose serious conceptual problems. Futurists may view with understandable envy the conditions in which their professional predecessors operated. They have to live and work in very different, much more complex circumstances indeed. Interestingly enough there exists a close relationship between the complexity of the conditions in which futurologists have to work and the development of future studies. A discussion of this relationship will be helpful in the discussion of the interdependence existing between the level of knowledge, the degree of complexity of problems which humans have to deal with and forecasting. Let us, in the first place, reflect on the present existential situation in general and, in particular, on the situation of knowledge and of knowing.

### III

#### About the present situation

Life is becoming increasingly more complex. The more humans advance, the more (not fewer) problems they have to face and the more (not less) they have to think. The more people know, the more there is to be known. This is a rather strange, counter intuitive, therefore unexpected situation. In the last century, in the heady days of scientism, it seemed that scientists have found the adequate method for unravelling all the mysteries of the universe. It was firmly



thought to be a steady linear progression of observations providing precise, quantitative data, questions resulting from these observations and demonstrable answers. Consequently, the increase in the amount of knowledge and its growing sophistication was viewed as an unequivocally positive phenomenon. These rosy expectations are long gone and humanity is left with a curious mixture of immensely increased science which continues to expand at an evermore rapid pace and with the conviction that this kind of knowledge does not answer all vital questions and will not solve all the growing problems which humanity has to face.

Intellectual capacities of thoughtful individuals seem to be taxed to the limit and no relief is in sight. The same cannot be said about our muscles. We have relieved them from the majority of manual tasks which were still routine not so long ago, but in the process we have burdened our brains. As a result, muscles are in the danger of becoming atrophied and one has to do physical exercises to keep them in shape, but it is not known what happens to the brains. Are they becoming bigger and/or better organized as a result of greater use, or do they remain unaffected by this exercise? Brain research has not yet advanced sufficiently to answer this question. The invention and the dramatic advances in the design and use of electronic prostheses for the brain are major new factors which have to be included in the discussion of the state of our brains, but they do not simplify the problem. On the one hand they are a tangible proof of the inventive capacities of the brain, but on the other, they do illustrate through their very existence and performance the existence and the nature of some limits of brain capacity, as well as the fact that these limits have already been reached. The question which remains open is how extensive and how definitive are these limits.

The growing complexity of the human situation is a unique and curious fact. As far as one can tell, the human species is the only one whose life is becoming more complex. No other living species is in a similar situation. Moreover, nature in general does not seem to be growing bigger or more complex in a manner which would affect human life. There is no more nature today than there was a thousand years ago, nor is there any proof that there are now more or more complex laws governing nature than in the past. Nature, therefore, cannot be blamed for the growing complexity of the human situation. What or who is than responsible for the increasing complexity of human existence? The answer, unpleasant as it may be, is clear. Human themselves are the cause of the growing complexity of their situation. It



Not only the complexity is not intended, but, moreover, it is contrary to human intentions. The avowed aim of human rational effort is to satisfy needs and fulfill the desire for a good life, i.e. to make life easier and more pleasant. These efforts have not been entirely unsuccessful. Not does only the human race grow in size, but, on the whole, humans are better off than ever before. So why is life now more complex than it has ever been? The surprising fact is that this is so precisely because humans have succeeded so well in increasing their number, in developing powerful knowledge and in satisfying to a large extent their earthly desires. Paradoxical as this statement may appear, it leads to an inescapable conclusion which, because of its fundamental and general character, may be expressed in the form of a law:

Law I: The level of complexity of life is proportional to the size of the society (humanity), the level of knowledge and the degree of satisfaction of material desires."

In light of this law, the future does not seem to hold much promise of respite for human brains. True as it may be, this statement is not very enlightening or reassuring. Nobody in his right mind desires complexity for its own sake. If the growth of complexity of the human condition is unavoidable, one may be easily led to believe that there is something essentially wrong with the human species, with human nature as such, or, at least, with human desires and the way humans go about trying to satisfy them. One may conclude, as Arthur Koestler did, that the human species is an evolutionary misfit, a blind alley doomed to extinction. Apart from its dramatic effect, such conclusion seems to be rather simplistic and an implicit admission of an inability to things through. If Koestler's opinion is accepted, forecasting becomes useless and all the efforts to held humanity to shape its future are doomed in advance. If, on the other hand, Koestler's views are rejected, it becomes necessary to try to understand the nature and the causes of the present situation of mankind in a perspective different from that adopted by the doomsayers. The effort is certainly justified for theoretical and practical reasons.

#### IV

#### About problems

Let us try to find an alternative to Koestler's gloomy prediction by analyzing the causes of problems and the role of problems in human life. One thing must be conceded to the doomsayers, namely, that together with the growing complexity of life, the number of complexity



of problems facing humanity increases. Earlier, we have stated the systemic relationship between knowledge and problems. Let us express it in the form of a law :

Law II: "Problems are proportional to knowledge".

It is worth stressing that the above relationship is essential not accidental. The more we think the more problems we have. Thinking necessarily involves asking questions, i.e. perceiving problems. It is the formulation of questions not the finding of answers to these questions which is the most creative act of the thought process. The former is the very condition of the latter.

Importantly enough, intellectual curiosity transcends the need to know necessary for satisfying basic human requirements. The desire to know more than is necessary for more subsistence is, at the same time, the condition and the cause of the evolution of humanity and of the growth of the amount and the level of problems which humanity has to face. Knowledge satisfies curiosity but, in turn, curiosity feeds on knowledge. The more we know, the more we want to know. It means that, inevitably, we will be facing more problems requiring more knowledge to solve them leading to new questions, and so on. The interdependence between questions and progress of knowledge is an essential factor in the development of humanity. Let us express this fundamental fact in the form of a law:

Law III: "Human evolution and problems are interdependent",

The future will be, at the same time more rational and more problem ridden than the past. Somebody may remark that we do not need to force ourselves to invent problems; life, imposes enough of them on us to keep us busy all the time. The statement is true, up to a point, but it demands explanation. Life imposes more and more problems on us because it becomes more complex. As has already been said, we produce the growing complexity OURSELVES. Life becomes more complex because there are increasingly more people having more sophisticated desires requiring complex behavior to satisfy them. At the same time humans acquire greater power to do more things and to impact evermore strongly on the environment. All this is made possible through the development of knowledge. Four centuries ago Francis Bacon said "knowledge is power". We have yet to grasp all the implications of this fact.

The progress of knowledge is an eminently positive fact and problems, to the extent to which they stimulate thought, are also a positive evolutionary factor. It does not mean, however, that we should go on multiplying problems for their own sake. An ancient philosophical principle states that intelligibility follows unity.



Multiplicity as such is the principle of unintelligibility. The multiplicity of problems may transcend their evolutionary utility and the situation of humanity may become unintelligible and unmanageable. Previously we did not have to worry about such a situation, because we did not possess the means to manage or to destroy humanity as a whole. Now we have the capacity to do both. With capacity goes responsibility which entails the necessity of short and long range planning. This is a well known fact which would be hardly worth mentioning in a paper written for technological forecasters. What is, however, worth pointing out is the need of finding intelligibility in the growing multiplicity of problems.

In order to find intelligibility in multiplicity one has to find unity underlying or transcending and subsuming the multiplicity. This cannot be done using the same types of knowledge as that which led to the formation of the multiplicity. The majority of problems which humanity now faces such as overpopulation, pollution, atomic power, future shock, etc. are direct or indirect consequences of the development of science and technology. Consequently, the search for intelligibility in the sphere of these problems cannot be successfully carried out by means of scientific and technological knowledge. This type of knowledge is best in the analysis of quantitative problems, in the study of measurable (i.e. quantifiable) aspects of reality, and in generating more problems. Human life and activity imply both the quantitative aspects and the realm of values. It is an obvious fact that free choices are made on the basis of values. Humans not only can choose, but also have to choose. Consequently, values play a central role in human behavior.

In order to understand human behavior and to help to direct it, it is necessary to understand values and to suggest the right choices, i.e. to choose the most adequate values. The problem is that the choice cannot be scientific in the current sense of the word "scientific". Modern science has developed as an objective, value-free cognition. The choice which the founders of modern science have made was not accidental. They have opted for verifiable, consensus inducing knowledge and rejected personal opinions based on value judgments. This meant concentrating on the measurable (i.e. quantitative) aspects of nature and eliminating qualities from the field of research. Consequently, science is not a universal study of all aspects of nature, but a specific analysis of a chosen subject matter. It provides an increasing multitude of evermore precise data but offers little if any insight into the meaning and purpose of existence and into values by which to choose and to live.

It is now an accepted truth among legislators that you do not solve problems just by throwing more money at them. Analogically,



though much less obviously, it is impossible to solve or reduce the problems facing humanity by throwing more data at them. What is needed is the development of a knowledge of values which would catch up with the development of science. Only then may we hope to find some intelligibility inducing unity in the growing multiplicity of problems. Somebody may remark that the knowledge of values will not be very helpful because it is over values that we disagree most strongly. Values have an ambivalent impact on humans: they unite people but they also divide them. This is true and it has always been so until now. Since Adam and Eve people lived by what may be called the conflictual principle: the big eat the small. This principle determined many areas of human behavior. In this situation, even the most noble and non-conflictual values such as, for instance, the idea of charity, could not overcome the conflictual attitudes deeply ingrained in human nature.

The development of knowledge is radically changing this situation. Among its consequences there are two which are of particular relevance for our discussion. One is the power which humanity has acquired to self-destruct. The other is the process of globalization induced by the growing economic and intellectual interdependence of men, elevating humanity to a new level of species-wide development. These two factors make the conflictual principle of behavior biologically unjustifiable. In the presence of these two factors, two things become more and more certain. The first is old and obvious; namely, the supreme biological value is survival; The other is new and revolutionary: the survival of humans is a joint, species-wide problem. Humanity will survive together or will perish together. The survival of humanity demands global cooperation, i.e. global synergy. This has a direct consequence for value judgments necessary in directing human actions and the search for principles to guide us through the maze of problems confronting mankind. We now have before us a value and a goal against which other values and goals have to be compared and measured.

Evolution, whether biological or cultural, is a process of the development of synergy from the atomic to the human level. What is new in this situation is that humans have now to become conscious co-authors of this process. This is why forecasting will play an increasingly important role, and with it will grow the moral and social responsibility of forecasters. To shoulder this responsibility, they will have to become more and more value-wise. The growing need for concern with the knowledge of values is not limited to forecasters. It is an unavoidable consequence of the development of knowledge. Let us express this fact in the form of a law:

Law IV: "The need to think about values and the level of this reflection have to be proportional to the level of knowledge and the corresponding power to act."

We began this paper by stating that knowledge, problems and forecasting form a dynamic, therefore growing system. We have pro-



## Symbolism in the Poetry of W. B. Yeats

*Rupakshi Sharma*

Yeats has been rightly called the chief representative of the symbolist movement in English literature. According to Tyndall, he was a symbolist from the beginning of his career to the end.

Symbols are essentially words which are not merely connotative, but also evocative and emotive. In addition to their usual meanings they also evoke before the mind's eye a host of associations connected with them. For example, lily connotes a flower but it also evokes images of beauty, delicacy and innocence. It also carries with it the emotion of pity resulting from suffering and lack of attention. Through the use of symbols the writer expresses much more and much deeper than by the use of ordinary words. Symbolism is an oblique mode of expression which suggests much more than what is described. It deals with infinite and the Absolute and in the words of Yeats himself, symbolism gives "dumb things voices and bodiless things bodies."

In the essay titled "The Symbolism of Poetry", Yeats (1900) wrote: "When sound, and colour and form are in a musical relation to one another, they become as it were one sound, one colour, one form, and evoke emotion that is made out of their distinct evocations and yet is one emotion." Yeats was very much conscious of the power and potential of the symbols. He himself writes, "I cannot think symbols less than the greatest of all powers, whether they are used consciously by the masters of magic, or half consciously by their successors, the poets, the musicians and the artists". This shows how much he was wedded to symbols and symbolism. Arthur Symonds dedicated his book "The Symbolist Movement in Literature" to Yeats and called him the chief representative of that movement. And there was no ulterior motive behind Arthur's dedication or his declaration. It was a pure and simple recognition of the fact that Yeats was a symbolist.

It is Absolutely wrong to call Yeats as an heir to French symbolism. Yeats belongs to a general European symbolist movement of



which the French were, of course, leaders. Yeats knowledge of French language was so meagre that he could not have read those difficult French poems to which, in the opinion of some critics he was indebted. Yeats knowledge of the theories of French Symbolist Mallarme was acquired at second hand, perhaps through Arthur Symons who was his neighbour in the Temple.

Yeats symbolism was based upon the poetry of Blake, Shelley and Rossetti. But more than this his symbolism was based on his study of the occult. It is on record that under the influence of Madam Blavatsky, Yeats first joined the Dublin Lodge of the Theosophical Society and then the Order of the Golden Dawn. He explored theosophy Rosicrucianism, Platonism and neoplatonism. His wife—Georgia Hyde Lees attempted automatic writing i.e. writing dictated to her by some supernatural agency. She wrote in a state of trance. Yeats was already interested in the occult, he accepted this automatic writing as a supernatural phenomenon. His friendship with Prohit Swami an Indian ascetic brought him closer to Atharveda which is mainly a treatise on Black Magic. From Madam Blavatsky, he learnt that Anima Mundi, a reservoir of all that has touched mankind may be evoked by symbols. He became acquainted with the doctrine of correspondence (with spirits), the doctrine of signatures and the doctrine of magical incarnations and symbols which have power over spiritual and material reality. Yeats essay called 'Magic' expresses his conviction that the great memory of nature can be evoked by symbols. In his early poems, he used symbols drawn from Irish myths and legends. The hound one red ear, the white deer with no horn, and the island in the sea are just a few examples. He advocated the cause of Irish nationalism. revival of Celtic mythology and legend and in his poems, one finds mountains, rivers and trees, folklores and fairies. He used symbols but they were known and concrete and of traditional type.

But consequent upon the discussions with Symon he modified his concept of poetry and began advocating art for art sake, poetry for poetry sake. He rejected curiosities about politics, science, history and religion. He rejected exteriority in favour of inner experience, And all this called for the use of symbols of higher order.

Very often his symbols are both poetic and magical and cannot be understood without reference to his theories of magic or the occult. He himself tells us that his Michael Robertes is fire reflected in water, Hanharan is fire blown by the wind and Aedh is fire burning by itself.

But equally characteristic are his arbitrary symbols of rose, cross, lily, bird, water, tree, moon, sun, which he found in the Kabalistic, Theosophical and other works. The two trees in the poem are the



Sephirotic tree of life of the Kabala and the tree of knowledge. The powers of his poem—*The Poet Pleads with the Elemental Powers* are the elemental spirits, and the 'Immortal Rose' is the Rosicrucian flower and the Seven Lights are the seven planets of the astral light of theosophy.

One of the symbols, perhaps overused by Yeats is the 'Rose', which is the most complex. As a member of the order of the Golden Dawn, Yeats was familiar with the symbolic ritual which centred upon the rose and the cross. If we wish to understand this symbol, we must understand this ritual,

In the *Rose of Peace*, Yeats uses the symbol of rose to mean earthly love. In the *Rose of the World*, rose has double meaning. On one level, it means earthly love and beauty, and on the other, it means eternal love and beauty.

In the *Rose of Battle*, the rose means a refuge from earthly love. The rose in *To The Rose Upon the Road of Time* is the Rosicrucian rose. And in *The Shadowy Waters*, rose and the cross symbolise the union of body and soul, life and death, sleep and waking. Yeats fears the isolation of spirit from matter as he fears the isolation of matter from spirit; With these fears, the rose has come to mean 'unity of being' or the integration and harmony of self, world and spirit.

It is clear from Yeats' poems that a hundred men would advance a hundred meanings for the same symbol, for no symbol tells all its meanings to any man. *The Wind Among the Reeds* illustrates this point vividly. Arthur Symonds describes the volume as a triumph of symbolic indirection.

Yeats strongly believed that through the use of the ritual and hypnotic symbols he could experience deeper and more effective trances in which new images swam before his eyes. Magic permitted him to secure for his poems the wealth of his unconscious. Thus, Yeats discovered a poetic territory which had been neglected in England except by occasional mad men since the time of William Blake. One of the episodes in the Wanderings of Oisín was based on a vision that Yeats had seen. *The Cap and Bells* was a dream recorded exactly as he dreamed it. The images of queen, garment, hair, cap, bells, door, window and colour of red and green establish the theory of the unconscious expounded by his contemporary Sigmund Freud.

*The Song of Wandering Aengus* is another dream. The change of fish into a girl is a dream material. The images of wind, stream, berry and fire are from man's sleeping consciousness. But the sun,



moon and apple are conscious occult symbols meaning intellect, imagination and the tree of good and evil.

In 1925, Yeats announced an occult system in his essay called 'Vision'. He used many metaphors from this system in a number of poems written between 1917 and 1935. Poems in "The Double Vision of Michael Robartes" are unintelligible without reference to this system. Leda and the Swam is symbolic, in the sense that the manifest level is there to unstated themes: the union of matter and spirit, of god and man, of Dove and Virgin, and all the cycles of history which begin with these unnatural conjunctions. Similarly, The Saint and the Hunchback, implies three attitudes towards life symbolised by the Saint Hunchback and Alcibiades, the last of whom represents that aristocratic wholeness towards which Yeats aspired.

One of his ambiguous symbols is the "Tower". It sometimes represents the heaven-aspiration of the solitary intellect which evokes memories of Milton and Shelley.

From the far tower where Milton's Platonist  
Sat late or Shelley's visionary prince.  
(The Wild Swans at Coole)

In different poems tower symbolises different things. It stands for tradition, national heritage, for violence, for blood thirstiness and dark future of humanity.

Yeats said that the value of symbol is its richness or indefiniteness of reference which makes it far more mysterious and powerful than allegory with its single meaning.

Dance as a symbol sometimes indicates patterned movement, sometimes joyous energy, and at times the state of the soul, and in 'Among School children, it stands for ideal state of balance and unity.

O body swayed to music, O brightening glance  
How can we know the dancer from the dance.

In Byzantium dance is equated with trance which releases human beings from conflicts and complexities of earthly life,

Falcon and the falconer are symbols of intellectual mind and the self. Christianity is like a falcon that has lost touch with falconer and is thus lost and directionless.

*Leda and the Swam* is Yeats' most powerful poem in which every word is a symbol.

A sudden blow, the great wings beating still  
Above the staggering girl, her thighs caressed.



The Swam's sudden assault on a bathing girl Leda has been symbolically described in so few words but so powerfully. Again,

The broken wall, the burning roof and tower  
And Agamemnon dead.

The destruction of the Troy is vividly brought before our eyes,

In conclusion we may assert that Yeats' every poem is symbolic. He is the uncrowned king of the land of symbols. His symbols are of various kinds and colours, of depths and dimensions and they sit in his court as majestic courtiers all bowing to their excellency the Emperor. Like the evolution and development of his poetic excellence from stage to stage, his symbols have also registered change from period to period. His symbols which were traditional, mythological, legendry and inherent in beginning become personal, arbitrary and mystic with passage of time. Emotional symbols gave way to complex and intellectual symbols which evoked ideas and emotion mingled ideas. His symbols are marked by precision and a system which one does not find in French symbolism.

In his later poems, Yeats wants to reconcile the world and the spirit and to integrate himself with the world and the spirit. By this triple reference to self, world and spirit, symbols achieve on the synthetic plane a unity of being. Let us ask with Yeats:

O chestnut tree, great rooted blossomer,  
Are you the leaf, the blossom or the bore?

And reply with him:

O body swayed to music, O brightening glance  
How can we know the dancer from the dance.

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## Max Weber and the Frankfurt School on Authority and its Implications

Kai Nielsen

### I

Max Weber has famously defined the "state... (as) a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory".<sup>1</sup> Territoriality is essential to states as is the use of force. If there were no need for the use of force, if violence was not part of social life, there would be no need for a state. But violence is a part of society—Weber believes an inescapable part of society—and the state is considered the sole source of the 'right' to use violence". (33) (It is worth noting that in speaking of 'right' Weber uses scarce quotes here).

Like power-theorists, Weber further remarks that people who are active in politics strive for power "either as a means in serving other aims, ideal or egotistic, or as 'power for power's sake'..." (33) The state "is a relation of men dominating men" and this is a relation which is supported "by means of legitimate violence" (33). But Weber makes it perfectly clear that he is only taking the notion of legitimacy as a purely sociological category. He is in no way making a normative remark for he identifies perfectly explicitly, for his purposes 'legitimate' with 'considered to be legitimate' and does not

<sup>1</sup> Max Weber, "Legitimacy, Politics and the State" in William Connolly (ed), *Legitimacy and the State* (London, England: Basil Blackwell, 1984), p. 33. Subsequent reference to this work of Weber's will be given in the text. See also Hans Gerth and C. W. Mills (eds), *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958) and Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, Vols I and II (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1978), Vol I, Chapter III; Vol II, Chapters IX, X, XI, XIV and XV. See in this context, as well, Frank Parkin, *Max Weber* (London: Tavistock, 1982), Chapter 3.



entertain, for the purposes of his political analysis, any question about what is really legitimate or legitimate in itself or anything like that. He never asks what 'illegitimate domination' would come to. His task is to give a normatively neutral social analysis that squares with, perspicuously arranges and explains, the social facts.

He asks the question 'Why do people obey?' What kind of justification do people give to themselves for accepting that domination? It is important to keep in mind that for him legitimate authority comes to legitimate domination. He characterizes three forms of authority or domination that are used in such justifications. The first one is *traditional authority*. We have here people who accept the demands of tradition. They do what they do because it is what in their society is the thing done. It is sanctified by a long tradition and they unquestioningly accept that tradition. The second type of authority Weber calls *charismatic authority*. This is a domination of people by the extraordinary and personal gift of charisma. It is a powerful but unstable form of authority, where people have a personal commitment, and typically an unquestioning commitment, to a charismatic person and his programme—a religious and/or political leader such as Calvin, Gandhi, Hitler or Mao. There is here the phenomena of the leader and his devoted followers committed to his word and deeds. "Men obey him", Weber remarks, "not by virtue of tradition or statute, but because they believe in him" (34). We have the charismatic domination of the prophet "or—in the field of politics—the 'elected war lord, the plebiatarian ruler, the great demagogue, or the political party leader'" (34). Thirdly there is *legal-rational authority* that comes to a belief in the validity of legal statutes and functional 'competence' based on rationally created rules. The appeal to authority here comes in its most paradigmatic examples to domination through bureaucracy. The "domination here is exercised by the modern 'servant of the state' and by all of those bearers of power who in this respect resemble him" (34).

These different forms of authority all function to dominate people by in various ways getting them to accept the authority as legitimate. But people also sometimes obey for other reasons, as Weber is well aware, which have nothing to do with their taking their domination to be legitimate. We, of course, often obey out of fear and sometimes out of hope, e.g. hope for rewards and sometimes out of mere habit or out of despair. But where we obey because obedience is felt to be in one way or another the proper thing to do, because we regard the authority as legitimate, we do it because the authority has one of those three characteristics or some combination of them. They are all devices of legitimation to secure a belief in legitimacy. Weber



regards them as pure types and he further stresses that the pure types are rarely found in reality. In most societies there is a combination of these types, characteristically with a preponderance of one form over another.

A willing acceptance on the part of large segments of the population is necessary for any of these forms of legitimation to be successful—to actually secure and sustain a domination that does not simply rest on fear or unrationalized habit or some form of sheer expediency. For social life to be possible, there must be what Weber calls an organized domination. This is so because otherwise there would be no secure ongoing administration of the working of the society and without that there would be social breakdown. But this administration in turn “requires that human conduct be conditioned to obedience towards those masters who claim to be the bearers of legitimate power”. (35) This would be as true of state officials and elected leaders who have no charismatic authority but have instead legal-rational authority or authority rooted in tradition as those with charismatic authority. But for the authority to be at all stable—and here Weber reveals the need to have an iron fist inside a velvet glove—it must also be in control of those material goods which in a given case are necessary for the use of physical violence. It must have the guns, the jails, the courts, loyal police, soldiers and civil servants.

In the modern state, as disenchantment and modernization runs apace, the bureaucratic state order becomes especially important. The dominant form of authority becomes legal-rational authority with its characteristic forms of domination and control. And with the modern state, in contrast with the medieval state, we get an institution that “controls the total means of political organization” in a “complete parallel to the development of the independent producers”. (37) The modern state grows in power as “a compulsory association which organizes domination”. (37) As capitalism gains more and more control over the organization of the economy and of the workers, the contemporary state gains more and more control over the masses. It increasingly effectively monopolizes “the legitimate use of physical force as a means of domination within a territory”. (37) This, to get the extreme contrast, is not at all how it was in stateless societies of medieval Iceland. (It is instructive here to reflect on the picture of social life given in *Njals Saga*.)

The legal-rational domination of bureaucratic authority is not an authority where, on the one hand, the rationale for obedience is that this is something people have always done or, on the other do because will transform their lives. Rather the rationale for obedience, where



the authority is legal-rational, is that the authority is your lawfully appointed superior who is following rationalized generalizable rules that have been publicly proclaimed and generally rationalized. Here we have the rule of law.

This legal-rational authority of the modern bureaucratic state has three distinctive elements.

1. There are fixed rules and fixed duties for the bureaucratic structure. 2: The authority to give the commands required for the "discharge of these duties is distributed in a stable way and is strictly delimited by rules concerning the coercive means...which may be placed at the disposal of officials" (40). 3. "Methodical provision is made for the regular and continuous fulfillment of these duties and for the execution of the corresponding rights; only persons who have the generally regulated qualifications to serve are employed" (40). Legal-rational authority must work in that way to be such and it is the typical form of stable modern legitimation. We have, where such a system of authority obtains, a firmly "ordered system of supervision and subordination in which, in a firm hierarchy, there is a supervision of lower offices by higher ones" (40). We can observe this or something like this in the modern state, the modern corporation and the modern university. Moreover, both capitalist and state socialist states so function and in the most advanced capitalist firms we get a similar command structure with its distinct instrumental rationality.

## II

When in 1902, Weber returned to work after a nervous breakdown that had incapacitated him for four years, he published almost simultaneously his great methodological essays on the nature of social science (1903-6) and his *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. The latter is in part directed against Marxism—or at least Weber's picture of Marxism—and is concerned with the historical legitimation of capitalism.<sup>2</sup> But there are also two themes which emerge in it, and in his methodological essays as well, which were to preoccupy Weber for the rest of his life and which are important for his conceptualization of legal-rational authority (domination). The first theme is his profound conviction and distinctive conceptualization of what he takes to be the *meaninglessness of human existence*, a conception which links him both to Nietzsche, on the one hand, and on the other hand, to the post-modernists and to Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, classic, though very pessimistic, representatives of the Frankfurt School: The second theme, a distinctive conception of

<sup>2</sup> Sheldon Wolin, "Max Weber: Legitimation, Method, and the Politics of Theory" in *Legitimacy and the State*, p. 74.



a modernist, is Weber's conception of rationalization and with it the progressive disenchantment of the world. Rationalization refers to a world shaped by the distinctive rationalism of Western culture. It involves a recognition of the decisive importance of the development of modern science and its mastery over nature and, it accepts, as both inevitable and rationale, the increasing reliance on science and the diminished authority of religion or metaphysics for orienting ourselves in the world or, as Charles Peirce would put it, for the fixation of belief.

This notion of rationalization is also expressed in the increasingly bureaucratic organization of society with the underlying twin rationale of stable social and political control and a relentless building up of the productive forces that would bring into existence structures of power which would transform the world. In all of this rationalization both rational planning and discipline are essential.

The ideological underpinning to help provide motivation for that was not, Weber argues, a Benthamite calculation of rational self-interest and a concern with happiness but the Calvinist work ethic with the ideal of *capital accumulation* not for the sake of pleasure or comfort, so that finally the capitalist can lead the good life, but of the accumulator who defers consumption and who, as Weber puts it, "gets nothing out of his wealth for himself, except the irrational sense of having done his job well". We need for the development of capitalism and the development of the productive forces the disciplined capitalist ascetic, with a well-disciplined workforce firmly under his control, who with capitalist piety "accumulates material goods with a controlled frenzy."<sup>3</sup> Here we need methodical planning, renunciation, organized and determined work discipline and rational coordination.

Weber sees a parallel development in science. It comes out in his picture of what he takes to be the vocation of the scientist. That very vocation requires rational self-discipline to scientific protocols, a respect for the facts of the matter, impartiality, a control of his value preferences and biases and a control of that characteristic modern penchant for self-expression. For Weber both the entrepreneur and the scientist are Calvinist heroes. The scientist, moreover, accepts a fallibilistic view of the world in which he knows that we can attain no certainty and where he knows as well that his discoveries and perspicuous formulations will in time be superceded.

The scientist is also a person (*pace* Marx's socialist person) who renounces any Faustian conception of the universal human being and recognizes that a certain specialisation is a condition for doing val-

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<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 75.



uable work in the modern world. But she also recognizes that science cannot, anymore than religion or philosophy, tell us the true order of things or tell us what is of the highest value or what the good or just society would look like. The legal-rational authority of scientific or bureaucratic rationality cannot determine that or indeed anything like it. "Our highest values" are, as Weber puts it, "a matter of faith". There are no scientific or rational procedures which can assure us that our values are true or justified. There can be no scientific knowledge, or any other kind of knowledge, of what a truly human society is or what the good life for human beings is or (*pace* Engels) of what 'the true interests of society' are.<sup>4</sup> Science leaves us empty handed here and, since, what science cannot tell us, human and cannot know, we are left, since we cannot know how we ought to live or what we should aspire to, with a sense of the meaninglessness of life and a sense of nihilism.

Weber contrasts starkly with pre-modernists such as Plato and Aristotle, Augustine and Aquinas, who, with their philosophical theories or philosophical-cum-theological theories, claimed to provide us with a *founding* social theory which would help, along with tradition, shape the lives of a people in a *polis* by providing a guiding normative structure in accordance with which they and their posterity are to live. It would give them, if such a conception were warranted, not just *de facto* legitimate authority but would give them, as well, a *de jure* legitimate authority which would give the political order not only the power to rule but the *right* to rule as well. Charismatic authority in a rather 'mystical' way promised a similar authority and legitimacy but by the time we get to the legal-rational authority of modernism all such moralistic hopes have vanished. Weber clearly saw that and the implications of it; hence his deep pessimism and sense of the meaninglessness of life. But a recoiling from this did not lead him to an acceptance of what he thought to be an incoherent notion, namely a belief in *de jure* legitimate authority.

### III

Let me come at some of the general themes and issues involved here from a slightly different direction. "The Enlightenment's belief in progress", Thomas McCarthy remarks, "rested on an idea of reason modelled after Newtonian physics, which, with its reliable method and secure growth, was thought to provide a paradigm for knowledge in general".<sup>5</sup> For the classical figures of the Enlightenment

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup> Thomas McCarthy, "Introduction" to Jurgen Habermas's *The Theory of Communicative Action*, Vol. I (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984), p. xvi.



this progress was thought rather directly to bring cultural Enlightenment and with that human emancipation. For Marx and the classical Marxists, it came more indirectly with the twin and related development of science and the development of the productive forces. Weber was in a way a child of the Enlightenment, but, coming late in the game, he clearly saw at least some of its dark sides and its naivete. Most definitely—and here he stands in interesting contrast to Engels—he did not believe that progress in science was necessarily accompanied by progress in morality. But he did accept, with his stress on rationalization and the disenchantment of the world, that the development of science would have a powerful impact on the spheres of religion, morals and politics. The Enlightenment was right, Weber thought, in its belief that the development of science and the resulting ever more pervasive diffusion of scientific understanding and scientific attitudes would lead in many domains to the progressive eradication of inherited prejudices, superstitions and errors. There is a very great difference (to speak only of contemporaries between a typical Sardinian peasant and a typical graduate of the University of Toronto. The distance in cultural space is very deep indeed. But that this increase in scientific understanding and increased rationalization of life would lead to greater liberation, as the Enlightenment also believed, is something challenged by Weber. Where reason is seen, and Weber believes is correctly seen, to be purely instrumental, there can be no claim that any of our ends are rational (or for that matter, irrational). Reason will tell us how to master the world and even how to master the world in the service of human interests. But it will not tell us what ‘the true interests’ of society are, something Engels, as well as Condorcet, assumed we could come to know (Indeed, Weber would be skeptical about whether such talk had very much in the way of intelligibility. Talk of ‘human interests’ may be mythological. There may only be some rather strongly and pervasively held preferences).

Reason, contrary to what the Enlightenment believed, could not supply a new non-illusory, non-ideological centre of meaning for modern culture. It can, cognitively speaking, knock out religion, myth and magic, but it cannot “replace traditional religious worldviews with anything that could fulfill the functions of...giving meaning and unity to life”.<sup>6</sup> Traditional authority and the worldviews that go with it provided a centering to life: But this is gone with the disenchantment of the world. The disenchanted world is stripped, according to Weber, of all ethical meaning. The unity of the world will have collapsed where ultimate ends become a matter of decision

6 *Ibid.*, p. xvii.



or subscription or taste and where to boot they are variable and incommensurable.

Since, in the final analysis, values, Weber believes, cannot be rationally grounded but only chosen "there are at the core of life rationally unjustifiable commitments through which we give the disenchanting world meaning and unity".<sup>7</sup> But there is no meaning there to be discovered empirically or grasped in intuition. "Correspondingly, as McCarthy puts it, in expounding Weber, "the sphere of politics has to be understood as a sphere of decision and power and not of reason: Legitimacy is not a question of rational justification but of *de facto* acceptance of an order of authority by those subject to it."<sup>8</sup> There is no *de jure* legitimacy to be found in the world and there is nothing but the world. To even think in those pre-modern terms is a mystification.

For Weber the triumph of reason does not, as the Enlightenment believed, bring with it a reign of freedom but the dominion of impersonal economic forces and bureaucratically organized administrations—a 'vast and mighty cosmos' that 'determines with irresistible force the lifestyles of all individuals who are born into it'.<sup>9</sup>

#### IV

What is involved here is both complex and fundamental, so I want to, approach it from still another angle. John Schaar, writing in 1969 remarked that "Weber thought that the day of charismatic and traditional structures of legitimacy was over and that both were being displaced by rational-legal authority."<sup>10</sup> But, Schaar continues, Weber "did not see far enough into the matter, for rational-legal authority has also been undermined, leaving the great institutions it brought into being gravely weakened from within".<sup>11</sup>

However, I think Weber was a more complex and ambivalent figure here than Schaar recognizes. Weber, in sharp contrast with a conservative pluralist like Seymour Martin Lipset, was not complacent about legal-rational authority and its matching political and socioeconomic order and he was not so confident as Schaar gives us to understand of its ability to endure. Weber's remarks about the iron

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. xvi.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. xviii.

<sup>9</sup> Jürgen Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action*, Vol. I, p. 247.

<sup>10</sup> John Schaar, "Legitimacy and the Modern State", in *Legitimacy and the State*, p. 111.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.* This observation of Schaar's seems to me more expressive of a kind of 60's optimism than of sober sociological observation and generalization.



cage reveal his moral and human reactions to it. He was not like a Kissinger in thinking that all would be well if we would only hold onto our wits and keep our nerve, though Weber did think we should stoically face the unpleasant reality of our lives and get on with our jobs and he was scornful of the weakness of those who, even with the knowledge and understanding of a modern, sought religious consolation. He had, though there is no paradox here, attitudes which were at one and the same time both Calvinist and atheist. But, all that to the contrary notwithstanding, Schaar is surely right in seeing that in contemporary life there is a deep though *perhaps* irrational dissatisfaction with and sometimes even a challenge to rational-legal authority. The revolt of the 60's was a very good example of this and perhaps the cynicism of the Yuppies reflects this as well.

Looking at what modern societies are like, it is indeed more and more the case that more and more of our activities and energies get channelled through bureaucratic forms and it is also the case that a given bureaucracy (any bureaucracy at all) is not just a neutral instrument in our social life but that with it in place certain ends and certain ways of doing and conceiving things are inevitable.<sup>12</sup> Indeed with the very existence of a bureaucratic order, any bureaucratic order you like, a world order must be very different than one without it.

Weber was also perfectly correct in seeing legal-bureaucratic rationally as a superior mode of directing human energy toward the goals of mastering nature and other human beings than any of its alternatives. Traditional authority and charismatic authority do not, in this respect, stand a chance against it.<sup>13</sup> As Schaar well puts it: "It is superior in speed, precision, economy, and clarity over alternative modes of controlling men and coordinating their energies... modern bureaucracy is one of the supreme achievements of modern Western man. It is simultaneously an expression of the drive for rationality and predictability and one of the chief agencies making the world ever more rational and predictable, for the bureaucratic mode of knowing becomes constitutive of the things known. In a way Hegel might barely recognize, the rational does become the real, and the real the rational".<sup>14</sup>

— Still, Schaar argues, rightly I believe, Weber overdid both the part about the pervasiveness of legal-rational authority in the contemporary world and the extent of the disenchantment of the world. We have ways, as Michel Foucault has noted, of re-enchanting ourselves. "Our

12 *Ibid.*, p. 120.

13 *Ibid.*,

14 *Ibid.*:



age", as Schaar puts it, "abounds in charismatic figures and putative prophets..."<sup>15</sup> They "may be met on every street corner and in every rock band".<sup>16</sup> The basic opposition, Schaar maintains, "is not between charismatic and rational authority, but between what can only be called personal and human authority on the one side and bureaucratic-rational manipulation and coordination on the other".<sup>17</sup>

There is surely something to that, but, in a way Schaar does not clearly see, we need criteria for determining when (if ever) we have this "humanly meaningful authority".<sup>18</sup> However, it is just this—that is, that we have such criteria—that Weber, like Nietzsche before him and Adorno and Horkheimer after him, would be very skeptical about. With our scientific understanding of the world, with the elimination of metaphysics, with the increasing disenchantment of the world, where, as Weber put it himself, science has caused the meaning of the universe to 'die out at its very root', there seems to be no room for or even a coherent conception of a 'humanly meaningful authority'. Where we have a clear head we will come to see that there is no such thing as *de jure* authority but only different and often irreconcilable *de facto* authorities. Among those *de facto* authorities, authorities of the legal rational type fit best with a modern understanding of the world. Moreover, this is a type of authority which would be most comfortable with accepting its own purely *de facto* status, though there is perhaps a problem, as Richard Scotty would note, of the switch and perhaps at least the appearance of a conflict between the external and internal perspectives. We can hardly take them both at once.

"The idea and experience of genuine authority", Schaar remarks, "based on mutual respect and affection is almost totally foreign to our age".<sup>19</sup> Still, even those of us (if such there be) who have a nostalgia for such an authority—an authority rooted in a pre-modern world perspective—must, if we would be non-evasive, face up to the reality that we are very unclear about what the criteria for genuine authority would look like. We seem, to understate it, to have nothing like natural moral laws clear to the light of reason to which we may appeal. Still, even without such a conception of a humanly meaningful authority—a something we hope for, we know not clearly what—it is still possible, Schaar maintains, that the march a la

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 123.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 120.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 123.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 123-4.



Weber "toward the rationally integrated world is not progressive at all, but a wrong turning, a mistake, whose baneful consequences need not be supinely accepted as inevitable or slavishly rationalized as developmental".<sup>20</sup> We need to come to understand what "kind of knowledge...can properly be accepted as constituting a claim to authority in the human realm".<sup>21</sup> And, beyond mere increase in complexity, in know how and in control of nature, we need to be clearer about what progress would come to. It is precisely Weber's challenge that it may, after all, come to nothing.

## V

Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer and Herbert Marcuse, all of whom studied closely with Weber, Neo-Marxists that they were, still, in the areas we have been discussing, basically accepted Weber's diagnosis of the situation. They thought legal-rational authority had come to have the decisive cultural weight that Weber attributed to it in modern society and that this was, as Weber also thought, inescapable and irreversible.<sup>22</sup> They also believed that the social world we inhabit is increasingly becoming a disenchanted world threatening nihilism, meaninglessness and increasing bureaucratic domination. Such things, of course, made very problematic their earlier more uncritical Marxist hopes for human liberation and emancipation with the development of the productive forces, the progress of science and the spreading through the society of modernist attitudes. Still, they, like Weber, remained in the Enlightenment camp though they did so ambivalently and were keenly aware of its darker sides.

There were both theoretical and conceptual reasons and empirical historical reasons for their accepting the code of Weber's analysis. The empirical historical reasons are fairly obvious. They saw before their very eyes the rise of fascism, the degeneration of socialism into Stalinism dashing all hopes that Russia could provide the model for the steps to be taken, the depoliticizing of the proletariat, the emergence in the bourgeois countries, with the pacification of the proletariat, of an increasingly commodified and increasingly administered society. This left them with little hope; the barbarians,

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20 *Ibid.*, p. 124.

21 *Ibid.*, p. 125.

22 Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972); Herbert Marcuse, *One Dimensional Man* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964); Jurgen Habermas, "The Entwinement of Myth and Enlightenment: Re-Reading *Dialectic of Enlightenment*", *New German Critique* 26 (1982), pp. 13-30. See also Jurgen Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity* (Oxford, England: Polity Press, 1987), pp. 106-130.



they believed, were all around them in and indeed in their very midst. Santa Monica, where they settled during the war years after Hitler came into undisputed control in Germany, was clearly a better place to be than Frankfurt under the Nazis. But such a commodified, administered society still had its deep social injustices and virulent prejudices. It was hardly the harbinger of a new society bringing with it emancipation. They could not see, writing during that time, that there was any historical movement from an increasingly bureaucratized capitalism to socialism. For them the collapse—or at least seeming collapse—of a militant class conscious proletariat as the class that that would bring with it a deep and lasting social transformation was particularly painful. It eventually drove Horkheimer and Adorno, though not Marcuse, from Marx and Lenin to Schopenhauer and Nietzsche.

Many of their theoretical reasons, reasons they utilized to understand the situation, went straight back to Max Weber. Contemporary societies, capitalist and state socialist, democratic and fascist, they maintained, became societies increasingly operating according to the norms of legal rational authority. Even Germany and Italy, societies with charismatic leaders which in certain ways maintained charismatic authority, were still societies where the functionally pervasive authority was increasingly a legal-rational authority. And with a legal-rational society came a conception of rationality which was strictly instrumental. Gone was the Greek conception of a substantive reason of ends with its linked conception of the good life. Rationality was about discovering the most effective means to whatever ends you happened to have.<sup>23</sup> A rational order was an efficient order structured to efficiently satisfy whatever ends happened to be dominant. This called for the development of technology and a highly trained elite of bureaucratic and loyal mandarins operating efficiently within that order. There was no place for the critical intellectual or the militant worker challenging whatever ends that bureaucratic order might happen to have.<sup>24</sup> The idea that this could be done was worse than naive, it was incoherent.

Marx thought, as did earlier figures in the Enlightenment, that scientific and technological progress would be an important element

<sup>23</sup> Max Horkheimer, *Critique of Instrumental Reason* (New York: Seabury Press, 1974) and Max Horkheimer, *Eclipse of Reason* (New York: Seabury Press, 1974).

<sup>24</sup> Jurgen Habermas, *Towards a Rational Society* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), pp. 81-122 and Kai Nielsen, "Technology as Ideology" in Paul T. Durbin (ed), *Research in Philosophy and Technology* (Greenwich, Connecticut: JAI Press, 1978), pp. 131-148.



in our emancipation. Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse, by contrast, thought it was a powerful instrument in our domination. (This is an idea that Michel Foucault was to second later and with a different range of examples.) Science, or at least its utilization, they thought, became a new kind of ideology that gave us to understand that what science could know was to know and that the ends of life could never be a matter of reasoned deliberation and that all talk of human progress was an illusion. The productive forces indeed continue to develop but that does not provide humans with liberation but with an ever deeper and more thorough domination.

Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse were German Jews thoroughly emersed in German classical culture and German life-forms as well as Marxist orientations, itself very much a German cultural product. Exiled in America during the war, Adorno and Horkheimer wrote *The Dialectic of Enlightenment* during the most agonizing years of World War II: a book that Jurgen Habermas calls "their blackest, most nihilistic book".<sup>25</sup> They wrote it while still remaining loyal to their Enlightenment connections though ambivalently and with lots of self-questioning. Indeed they wrote it, as Habermas puts it, "in order to conceptualize the self-destructive process of Enlightenment".<sup>26</sup> They sought, taking many clues from Nietzsche, to radically enlighten the Enlightenment about itself.

In their earlier more optimistic work they had carried out cultural criticism and a critique of ideology with an emancipatory intent.<sup>27</sup> They continued to wish when they wrote *The Dialectic of Enlightenment* to carry out cultural criticism with an emancipatory intent, but they now realized that the task was not only even more difficult than they had imagined but that even more fundamentally it was conceptually problematic. The very activity of critique, they worried, may itself be incoherent. They needed—or so it seemed—an Archæmedian point on which to stand if they were to make a critique which was non-ideological and genuinely critical. Moreover, with the depth and pervasiveness of our socialization and the unrecognized domination that goes with it, we cannot know that our own conceptualizations, our own conceptual grids, are not themselves ideological. The prospect was before us—or so we thought—that all social thought

25 Habermas, "The Entwinement of Myth and Enlightenment: Re-reading *Dialectic of Enlightenment*", p. 13.

26 *Ibid.*

27 I try to say something about what this would come to in my "Emancipatory Social Science and Social Critique" in Daniel Callahan and Bruce Jennings (eds), *Ethics, The Social Sciences and Policy Analysis* (New York: Plenum Press, 1983), pp. 113-157.



with its associated practices is ideological. But again if *everything* is ideological then *nothing* can be, for we need some non-ideological genuinely critical ground to even be able to spot and identify ideology.<sup>28</sup> But, if we have no such Archimedean point, and it seemed to them that we did not, then we can hardly coherently engage in an activity that for a Marxist is vital, namely the critique of ideology. It was their scepticism about this—indeed a scepticism about its very possibility—that has pretentiously and obscurely been referred to as “a totalizing self-transcendence of the critique of ideology.”<sup>29</sup>

## VI

Let us come at this bit about ideology from another direction. Where we have a suspicion that ideology is at work or where we believe a theory to be ideological, we believe, as Habermas put it, that the claim to the autonomous validity of the theory is an illusion “because hidden interests have crept into its pores...”<sup>30</sup> Where the theory is thought to be ideological, we believe that it has an unacceptability that cannot be acknowledged without the theory losing its credibility. The critique of ideology wants to demonstrate that the validity of the theory under investigation has not freed itself sufficiently from the context of its genesis. It wants to demonstrate that hidden behind the back of an ideological theory of society is an “inadmissible *fusion of power and validity* and that it is moreover to this fusion that it owes its recognition.”<sup>31</sup> Hidden power claims answering to class interests (though typically in a disguised manner) are taken for genuine validity-claims: that is, claims which are reasonable candidates for being true or otherwise being justified. But by the time we come to the *Dialectics of the Enlightenment*, the very critique of ideology is itself under suspicion. The worry is that their own critical theory, or some rationally reconstructed version, is itself no longer producing truths or even capable of doing so. Moreover, given this suspicion, it is no longer evident what it would be like, at least in social domains, to stand on a non-ideological ground. Such a self-reflexivity about the norms of the Enlightenment throws ideology critique into crisis. Yet such a predicament, something like a self-refuting predicament, seems to follow from following out the very ‘logic of the Enlightenment’.

<sup>28</sup> Kai Nielsen, “Legitimation and Ideology”, *Ratio* XXIX: 2 (December, 1987), pp. 111-121.

<sup>29</sup> Habermas, “The Entwinement of Myth and Enlightenment: Re-Reading *Dialectic of Enlightenment*”, p. 18.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*



Linked with their conviction, or at least a conviction, that it was no longer possible to provide the rationale for a critique of ideology is their associated belief that the social sciences could not play the critical emancipatory role that critical theory initially expected.<sup>32</sup> The critique of ideology has, they believe, lost its foundations.

The undermining of the critique of ideology they attributed to the undermining of a humanly adequate conception of reason and that in turn they identified with the identification of reason with rationality where rationality was taken to be just instrumental rationality.<sup>33</sup> Where rationality is just *instrumental* rationality, we, Habermas claims, in effect eliminate the difference "between that which claims validity and that which only serves the interest of self-preservation".<sup>34</sup> And this in turn breaks down the barrier between truth and power. With this, Habermas tells us, we "annihilate that fundamental differentiation which the modern decentered understanding of the world thought it had gained by overcoming myth".<sup>35</sup> The Enlightenment, which had set out to rid us of myths requires a few myths itself to keep us from seeing this—following out Weber's insights—with all its nihilistic complications. Again, as Habermas explicates *The Dialectic of Enlightenment*, "Reason, once instrumentalized, has become assimilated to power and has thereby given up its critical power—this is the final unmasking of a critique of ideology apparent to itself"<sup>36</sup>.

The central idea that Horkheimer and Adorno develop in their critique of instrumental reason is the belief that

...behind the ideals of objectivity and the truth claims of Positivism, behind the ascetic ideals and the normative claims of Christianity and a universalist morality are hidden nothing but imperatives of self-preservation and domination. A pragmatic theory of knowledge and a naturalistic critique of mora-

32 Adorno and Horkheimer, *Dialectics of the Enlightenment*, p. xi.

33 *Ibid.* See as well Horkheimer, *The Eclipse of Reason*.

34 Habermas, "The Entwinement of Myth and Enlightenment: Re-Reading *Dialectic of Enlightenment*". This characteristic Frankfurt School belief needs a very careful critical examination. A belief in instrumental rationality as the only viable conception of rationality should not be thought an exclusive property of the Right; After all it was a firm belief of Bertrand Russell's. See Bertrand Russell, *Human Society in Ethics and Politics* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1955), pp. v-xi. To respond that Russell had Left politics but Right philosophical views is to say something that is both obscure and tendentious.

35 *Ibid.*

36 *Ibid.*



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 lity unmask both theoretical and practical reason as mere fic-  
 tions in which claims to power achieve an alibi.<sup>37</sup>

Are things really this bleak? Or is this both replete with conceptual confusion and suffering a kind of contemporary failure of nerve? Whether things are or are not so bleak may well be soberly assessed by trying (a) to determine what is plausibly on the historical agenda in the next few decades, (b) asking (going up a level) of that very attempted determination itself, whether it is likely that we have or can construct a social theory which will enable us to read the direction of epochal social change and (c) whether we can say anything reasonable about whether these changes could possibly be correctly (non-ideologically) said to be emancipatory. These are all daunting questions that will take us back to an appraisal of Weber's value scepticism, to an examination of the defenses of some analytical Marxists of historical materialism and to an appraisal of the force of Habermas's challenge to the hegemony of instrumental reason and to a normatively neutral conception of the human sciences. Weber, in wrestling with much of this, is an appropriate point of departure.

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<sup>37</sup> See Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, p. 107.



## 4

## The concept of Beauty, the philosophy of Art

Mamta Kundu

Human life is deeply concerned with some intrinsic values which are beyond the scope of scientific enquiry. A man knows that his mother loves him. He feels, realises but can not prove to his friend by experiment. But a scientist may easily prove a fact in a laboratory. Science deals with facts which may be easily proved than the values. Again if the values are extrinsic it is comparatively easy to solve the problem; for once we determine what is valuable in itself, we can reasonably be sure to what would be the proper instrument for its realisation. But philosophical problems are the problems of intrinsic value which is categorical, appreciated for its own sake and it is fully satisfactory in itself. Truth, Beauty and goodness are commonly regarded by philosophers as intrinsic values of human life. Our spiritual life consists in gradual approximation of these highest values. In Tagore's thought the religion of man is one and is the substratum of the supreme values like Truth, Beauty and Goodness and is the final harmony of all these values.<sup>1</sup> Beauty in a form of emotive value gives us the normative science of Aesthetics. A beautiful object gives us the purest delight possible, which is the most valuable emotion. Thus Beauty is the ideal of our aesthetic life and this is sought for its own sake.

It is very difficult to analyse the concept of beauty because we can neither explain what is beauty as it is a fact of subjective realisation, nor we can differ one kind of aesthetic pleasure from the other but we feel a supreme joy when we see a beautiful building, painting, statue, landscape, tasteful dress or we listen to music or the poetry of Shelly or Keats or we watch or participate in the graceful movements

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1 Santinath Chattopadhyay. *The Universal Man*. Naya Prakasa, 1987, p. 103, 206 Bidhan Sarani, Calcutta-700098 (India).



of the dance. The moment comes when we are overwhelmed with the natural beauty and exclaim that how beautiful it is, the philosophical impulse in us very strongly begins as enquiry what sort of experience it is. Nevertheless human mind with its restless longing to penetrate to all knowledge proves that philosophy of art should be highly recommended and the joy of life immeasurably enhanced by an initiation into a knowledge of the various sources of aesthetic pleasure—opens the gateway that we can listen to the voice of the supreme. We feel an inner urge which inspires us with certain glorious spirit for a certain attunement with our universal self. It is because of the fact that we have an aesthetic experience and we admire anything which is beautiful.

Now the question arises why beauty appears differently to different persons? As for example, the Europeans are habituated to see beauty in golden hair, the Indians see it in black hair and the Chinese observe it in limping ladies with crippled feet. Is beauty subjective in nature? The modern theories of beauty are psychological where as older theories were metaphysical.

The metaphysical theories considered beauty as something real and objective and perhaps a kind of essence or entity. Plato takes beauty as objective in character. Beauty according to him is a reality in itself, a kind of eternal and unchanging essence or 'form'.<sup>2</sup> Hegel in modern age also gives us a metaphysical view. All nature is a manifestation of the Absolute idea. Beauty is the Absolute Idea shining through some sensuous medium. It is a kind of disclosure of spirit. Art, religion and philosophy are for Hegel the highest stages in the development of spirit.<sup>3</sup> Schopenhauer's theory of beauty is also metaphysical. Anything is beautiful in proportion as it realises or approximate to the type. He says that in our contemplation when all of desires and will are extinguished, we are able to see this ideal beauty. The common man is two thirds will and desire and one third intellect but the artist is just the opposite. So it is the artist rather than the scientist who knows the reality. The artist ceases to ask about the 'why', 'when' and 'where' of things and regards only what'. The art which is most encumbered with matter is the lowest which is called architecture. Then comes sculpture and painting and poetry and finally music, the highest of the fine arts, in which there is an immediate objectification of the Absolute.<sup>4</sup> Ruskin

<sup>2</sup> Plato, *The Symposium*, Tr. by Jowett, Oxford University Press.

<sup>3</sup> William Knight. *The Philosophy of the Beautiful*. Part I, p. 71, discussing Hegel.

<sup>4</sup> Arthur Schopenhauer. *The world as will and idea*, vol. 1, p. 336.



believes that beauty in objects is found in certain qualities such as unity, repose, symmetry, purity and moderation which typify divine attributes. Kant says in his third Critique, the Critique of Judgment, that mind has a third faculty beyond that of the reason and the will, namely, that of feeling. The peculiar characteristic of aesthetic feeling or aesthetic pleasure is that it is disinterested. Sugar for instance, is not beautiful; it is agreeable. We have to possess it in order to enjoy it. Like wise a moral act is not beautiful; it is good. We approve of it and therefore have an interest in it. The beautiful on the other hand, is always the object of disinterested satisfaction, separate from all desire. Beauty, however, although it is mental, is objective, since it is always the object of a judgment. We say "This thing is beautiful". Thus beauty as a quality of objects is not merely subjective. Moore and Hartmann also support the objectivity of value and hence beauty is objective. Moore in his *Principia Ethica* explains the nature of value as indefinable concept. He says, "Good is simple, unanalysable, indefinable".<sup>5</sup> To define value property in relation to empirical property is to commit the 'naturalistic fallacy'. This type of non-empirical, non-natural objective property, according to Moore, can be realised by direct insight or intuition. Hartmann takes values as independent both of existence and of mind. He points out, "values have actually an existence in themselves, independent of all imagination and longing".<sup>6</sup> According to these views, values are independent of human mind and are purely objective. Some thinkers are of opinion that beauty is subjectively real. Lotze observes "what we mean by value in the world lies wholly in the feeling of satisfaction or pleasure which we experience from it". Pleasure is the state of feeling in mind, so value is purely subjective. Freud recognises both play and art as imaginative expressions and fulfilment of wish. Values according to him, are akin to day dreaming and are the expressions of repressed and unfulfilled sex-feeling and spite-wishes due to their being thwarted.<sup>7</sup> Beauty is the expression of desires or feelings. Spinoza points out, "men think they desire things because they are good; but in truth things are good because men desire them". Again Perry the neo-realist, pragmatists and logical positivists believe that values are subjective, relative and mind-dependent.

But the evaluation of these observations leads to the development of a third possible view which negates the partial approaches to these philosophers to beauty as subjective or objective. It points

5 G. E. Moore. *Principia Ethica*. p. 37.

6 N. Hartmann, *Ethics*, Vol. 1, p. 93.

7 Holt. *A modern book Aesthetics*. pp. 132-137.



out that beauty exists neither exclusively in object nor inclusively in the mind of man but it is both subjective and objective as it exists both in the environment and in the human mind as a special reaction to the environment. Alexander believes in the combined process. In the observation of Longfield it may be noted that, "Beauty is neither totally depended upon the person who experiences, nor upon the things experienced; it is neither subjective nor objective, neither the result of purely intellectual activity nor a value inherent in the object, but a relation between the variables— the human organism and the object".<sup>8</sup>

If beauty is objective then the question is raised regarding the relation between the beauty as the human value and the Absolute reality behind the world of appearance. There are different theories regarding this point as one of them says values are superior to reality. The ideals are more real than the actualities and they are greater than reality even. In a sense Plato follows this view when he says that the idea of Good is superior to other ideas (realities) in dignity and power. The Absolutists like Bradley, Bosanquet, Spinoza and Sankara hold that the Absolute reality is superior to human values. Truth, Beauty and Goodness are real only from the human point of view, but from the absolute point of view, which embraces both the human and non human nature, the values are illusory. Royce again holds that Reality is the conservation of human values. With the human beings ideals are always distant goals. No value is completely realised within the span of our life time. So there must be an eternally perfect personality in whose experience the values of human beings are eternally and fully realised. In Tagore's philosophy the integral Truth as Absolute which is one, complete and perfect is the final substratum of values and is manifested through the facts or limited truths. In this way absolute ideals or supreme values are also expressed in the life of human beings, as they possess an infinite power to realise the infinite ideals. In Personality Tagore explains, "In our life we have one side which is finite where we exhaust ourselves at every step, and we have another side, where our aspiration, enjoyment and sacrifice are infinite. This infinite side of man must have its revealment in some symbols which have the elements of immortality. There it naturally seeks perfection".<sup>9</sup> Values an eternal embodiment of truth, beauty and goodness inspire the infinite power of man to acquire the higher order for the fulfilment of his religious aspiration. Pringle Pattison truly observes, "Truth, Beauty, Goodness have no reality as self existent abstractions; they have no meaning

<sup>8</sup> Taylor, A. B. *Elements of Metaphysics*, London, 1961, p. 394.

<sup>9</sup> Tagore. *Personality*. p-30



apart from conscious experience. They carry us, therefore, to a primal mind in whose experience they are eternally realised. God himself is at once the supreme Reality and the supreme value. And the highest conception we can form of perfect personality is love—the self giving love which expands itself for others, and lives in their joys and sorrows. Such love is the ultimate value of which the universe is the manifestation. The inmost being of God is not solely the realisation of eternal Truth and the enjoyment of perfect Beauty, but preeminently the exercise and fruition of his nature as love.”<sup>10</sup> Tagore like Pattison finds the expression of truth and joy in all parts of life and world. He says, “Truth is everywhere, therefore everything is the object of our knowledge. Beauty is omnipresent, therefore, everything is capable of giving us joy”.<sup>11</sup>

Man realises joy not through an empirical way, they are placed in transcendent meditative process when he intuitively realises the intrinsic values of Reality. Beauty is revealed in intuition just like a flash of light and knowledge comes from intuition is always based on unity. We deserve symmetry, proportion and harmony everywhere because there is beauty in all these. An artist has some extra qualities that he finds out rhythm but in a feeling of disinterestedness. Thus his knowledge is less empirical than intuitional. When he proceeds to elaborate works of art, he would find that unity in variety is a never failing source of pleasure.

Man's intuitive realisation of supreme value means realisation of his infinite personality which is intimately related to the infinite quality. This is an 'Innermost beauty nearer to man'<sup>12</sup>. This according to Tagore is good nessor Mangala, As goodness is 'innermost beauty' of man, so it exists in the power of surplus of human beings. This eternal power of surplus in man is expressed through his creative activities. So the realisation of goodness through man's creative activity is the proper way for the realisation of his infinite self. In this connection we remember Hegel's dictum 'die to live': The more we can rise above our poor, individual and private self and can identify ourselves with wider and social life. the more we can realise higher, social and universal self. From his transcendent meditative perspective, Tagore also points out that there is a harmony in the individual self and through the creative activity by means of self sacrifice, we can realise unity or harmony in us.

10. Pringle Pattison. *The idea of Immortality*. p-109.

11. Tagore *Sadhana*. p-138.

12. Tagore. *Sahitya, Rabindra rachanavali*. (centenary edition). Cent. Vol. XIII p-756.



Beauty, thus, in a creative sense expresses unity in life which may be evaluated as the creative humanistic approach to truth as harmony of value of Truth, Beauty and Goodness. In this way we may examine the nature of beauty in a more creative humanistic sense as it becomes more real, true and fruitful in human life through its creative harmonious expressions of ideals as truth as satisfaction of intellect, good as the satisfaction of feeling. Cognition, affection and volition are intimately related to each other and thus form a creative organic unity of the expressions of ideal or value of unity of Truth, Beauty and Good in life and existence. For this Keats unites truth with beauty and beauty with truth, Herbert identifies good with beauty, symmetry, proportion and harmony constitutes beauty and asymmetry, disproportion and disharmony express ugliness. Thus beauty is a creative human value as it expresses harmony of form with matter as unity in plurality or variety in human existence.

Beauty in nature is infinite, absolute or transcendent ideal and is actively related to human process of thoughts, feelings and willing through which it can be expressed and realised in different degrees.

As beauty is contemplated for its own sake, it is an end in itself and is not a means to an end and so it is an intrinsic value by itself which is universal in nature.

Individual or narrow private interest is at the root of extrinsic value, creating contradictions or disharmonies due to contradiction of interests. So beauty as intrinsic universality is independent of these contradictions and is expressed through the disinterested ways of life and activities developing harmony. As an intrinsic value beauty manifests the human nature as creative personality through his different creative activities. Unfoldment of creative universality in man in different states establishes a harmonious individual and social co-existence on the principle of love and service to others. It is the inner beauty in man that he extends the interrelatedness with all.



## 5

## Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Space Perception: An Application of "Phenomenological Reduction"

Ekin Ergoden

In the preface to his *Phenomenology of Perception*, Merleau-Ponty defines phenomenology as "the study of essences."<sup>1</sup> It tries to give a "direct description of our experience as it is without taking account of its psychological origin and the causal explanations which the scientist...may be able to provide."<sup>2</sup> The primary task of phenomenology as a "matter of describing not of explaining or analyzing"<sup>3</sup> the phenomena of perception, constitutes what he means by "a return to things themselves".<sup>4</sup> This, according to Merleau-Ponty, reveals "the true meaning of the famous phenomenological reduction".<sup>5</sup> The phenomenological reduction does not mean for him (as it does for Husserl), a return to essences as they are perceived by a pure or transcendental consciousness which is removed from the world. Nor does it mean a return to the objective, conscious world and our experience of it. It means rather a return to things as they are in our "original" experience of them. Our original experience is described as primary perception which is "a non-positing, pre-objective and pre-conscious experience".<sup>6</sup> Merleau-Ponty describes this world as "the natural

1 M. Merleau-Ponty *Phenomenology of Perception* New York: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1962, p. vii.

2 Ibid., p. vii.

3 Ibid., p. viii.

4 Ibid., p. vii.

5 Ibid., p. xi.

6 *Phenomenology*... p. 242.



*setting of, and field for* all my thoughts and all my explicit perceptions"<sup>7</sup>, which "is there before any possible analysis of mine"<sup>8</sup>. Pre-reflective cogito or the "knowing organism" is conceived as our body as meaning giving force of specifying objects. To perceive, then, becomes a function which belongs to the body; it is "to render oneself present to something through the body".<sup>9</sup>

In the case of the specific problem of space perception, reduction must enable us to give a description of space within the outline given above: first, we must show that like any other human activity, space orientation, too, is rooted in our primary experience, without its being restricted exclusively to the contents of perception. Secondly, more specifically, space perception must be shown to be "constituted" on the level of "pre-objective", "pre-conscious" body-subject. Only if this can be shown to be the case, then a true description of space perception is possible, and this description constitutes an application of what Merleau-Ponty means by the method of phenomenological reduction. In the following pages, I will contend that Merleau-Ponty's description of space orientation, satisfies these two requirements given above, providing a concrete example of what he means by the method of phenomenological reduction.

According to Merleau-Ponty, the space problem has been traditionally, approached from at least the following two sides:

either I do not reflect, but live among things and vaguely regard space at one moment as the setting for things, at another as their common attribute—or else I do reflect: I catch space at its source, and think at the moment of the relationships which underlie this world, realizing then that they live only through the medium of a subject who shall describe and sustain them, and passing from spatialized to spatializing space...<sup>10</sup>.

In the first case, we are concerned with physical space, with the things, and also their mutual concrete spatial relations as an "irreducibly manifold reality".<sup>11</sup> In the second case, we discover geometrical space with its "homogeneous and isotropic" dimensions. The question is: is it true that we are faced with the alternative "either of perceiving things in space, or of conceiving space as the indivisible system..... of unification performed by a constituting mind"?<sup>12</sup> Merleau-Ponty answers this question negatively by analyzing

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., p. xi.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., p. x.

<sup>9</sup> M. Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, Northwestern University Press, 1964, p. 242.

<sup>10</sup> Phenomenology..., pp. 243-44.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., p. 244.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., p. 244.



and re-interpreting the experiments done by Stratton and Wertheimer. An interpretation of these data without any prejudices, will provide us a new conception of space which is rooted in our primary perception of the world.

First, he takes Stratton's experiment in which the subject, through "special glasses" covering his entire field of vision, sees the world "upside-down".<sup>13</sup> The subject has to wear these glasses uninterruptedly for a series of days. At first, he naturally sees an "upside-down" world. But after several days, surprisingly, the subject sees the world as it was before, that is, everything straightened out.

The way a "psychologist" (that is Stratton) interprets this phenomena is as follows: When the subject has put on the glasses, his field of vision, is so given to him "exactly as if it had been turned through 180 degrees and consequently is upside down".<sup>14</sup> At the same time, the tactile world remains "normal". Both worlds no longer coincide and the subject has now, two irreconcilable representations: the ones made by the tactile experience and the "visual images" which he has managed to retain from the period preceding the experiment, the other, his new visual 'upside-down' experience. Now the subject "harmonizes" these two representations of his body by his "experience of movement guided by sight."<sup>15</sup> At first he seems to "translate" the new visual experience into old, familiar space by reflecting upon it. But later it becomes a habit, and the old conception disappears. In the end, the confusion "up" and "down" comes to an end, when the visual and tactile worlds coincide. i.e., when the top of the visual field, where the legs at first appear, having been frequently identified with what is 'down' for touch "stops being described as 'the top'". This designation (of being 'the top') is transferred to the region in which the head appears, and that containing the feet once more becomes the bottom".<sup>16</sup>

For Merleau-Ponty this interpretation is "unintelligible". For it takes for granted that the "up" and "down" in the field of vision are connected to and can be changed by the direction of head and feet, in so far as this direction is "given in the image".<sup>17</sup> On the contrary, adds Merleau-Ponty, "the orientation of the field" is never

13 Ibid., p. 245.

14 Ibid., p. 245.

15 Ibid., p. 245.

16 Ibid., p. 246.

17 Ibid., p. 246.



"given by these contents of head and feet which appear in it".<sup>18</sup> Where this so, then these contents would themselves have to have a direction; "inverted" or "upright" in themselves have no meaning. Neither can one say that the new field of vision is 'inverted' in relation to the tactile and bodily field, since the mere presence of these fields is not enough to provide any direction themselves. Lastly, we cannot "take the world and oriented space as given along with the contents of sense experience or the body itself" because the experiment has already proven, that, "the same contents can be successively oriented in one direction or in another". The real question, therefore seems to be: "how an object can appear to us as 'the right way up' or 'inverted' and what these words mean"?<sup>19</sup>

In order to answer this question, Merleau-Ponty, first rejects the empiricist's and the rationalist's answers. The "empiricist psychology" treats the perception of space as the taking in of a real space to ourselves and "the phenomenal orientation of objects as reflecting their orientation in the world".<sup>20</sup> The "intellectualist psychology" takes the 'upright' and 'inverted' as the "relationships dependent upon the fixed points chosen"; for this approach, the orientation depends solely on the point of view which the subject will take. Then "it is easy to show that there can be a direction only for a subject who describes it". But this means that the mind is "eminently able to trace out all directions in space... without an actual starting point, an absolute 'here'".<sup>21</sup> From these considerations, it is obvious that intellectualism and empiricism "cannot even begin to ask the question": In the case of the latter, the question was now the image of the world, which, in itself, is inverted, can right itself for me. Intellectualism cannot even concede that the image of the world, after the glasses are put on, is inverted. For, according to his view, the putting on of "glasses" can change neither the direction nor the orientation.<sup>22</sup>

Stratton's experiment, when it is freed from the intellectualist and rationalist prejudices, teaches us the following: though in the contents of perception nothing necessarily has to change, the orientation can change. Space perception, therefore, cannot be understood "either in terms of the consideration of contents or of some pure unifying activity".<sup>23</sup> We are here confronted with what Merleau-

18 Ibid., p. 246.

19 Ibid., p. 247.

20 Ibid., p. 247.

21 Ibid., p. 247.

22 Ibid., p. 247.

23 Ibid., p. 248.



Ponty calls the "third spatiality", which is "neither that of things in space, nor that of spatializing space".<sup>24</sup> But to find out what is the nature of this space, we must look into Wertheimer's experiment in which the meanings of the concepts such as "spatial level", "anchoring point", and "my body as a subject of space", become clear.

In Wertheimer's experiment,

a subject sees the room in which he is, only through a mirror which reflects it at an angle at 45 degrees to the vertical, the subject at first sees the room 'slantwise'. A man walking about in it seems to lean to one side as he goes. A piece of cardboard falling down the door-frame looks to be falling obliquely... After a few minutes a sudden change occurs: the walls, the man walking about the room, and the line in which the cardboard falls become vertical.<sup>25</sup>

Merleau-Ponty interprets this phenomenon through the notions of "spatial level" and "anchoring points":

perception before the experiment recognizes a certain *spatial level*, in relation to which the spectacle provided in the experiment first of all appears oblique (or inverted), and during the experiment this spectacle induces another level in relation to which the whole of the visual field can once more seem straight.<sup>26</sup>

It is then, as if some of the objects (such as walls, door, etc.) out of the scene, which, in respect to the original spatial level appeared "aslant" will take action as "anchoring points",<sup>27</sup> causing the previously established horizontal to "tilt sideways". In this explanation, one does not make the mistake of "realism", which assumes that every scene is already oriented in itself. What this interpretation, is assumed, is that every scene is already oriented with the respect to a certain earlier spatial level. The question becomes now, in what does this already accepted spatial level consist. Further, how is it possible for certain objective points in a determinate and already accepted level to appear as fixed 'anchoring points' that cause us to form a new level? And what do "top" and "bottom", ultimately mean?<sup>28</sup> By answering these questions, we shall be able to answer the original question, in relation to Stratton's experiment above.

In the constitution of the spatial level our body has an essential task; but that which is important for the orientation of the spectacle

24 Ibid., p. 248.

25 Ibid., p. 248.

26 Ibid., pp. 248-49.

27 Ibid., p. 249.

28 Ibid., p. 249.



is not "my body as it in fact, as a thing in objective space, but as a system of possible actions (such as walking, sitting down, etc.), a "virtual body" with its phenomenal "place" defined by its task and situation; My body is wherever there is something to be done".<sup>29</sup> In the Wertheimer experiment we see that "at first, the mirror image presents him a room differently canted, which means that the subject is not at home with the utensils it contains", he does not, inhabit the scene, and share it with man he sees walking in the room.<sup>30</sup> But suddenly, "the reflected room miraculously calls up a subject capable of living in it". What happens is this: the virtual body "ousts" the real body to such an extent that the subject no longer feels itself bound to the world in which it first lived; and instead of its real arms and legs, the subject suddenly feels the arms and legs that would be necessary to be able to walk and work in the scene; it is then that "the spatial level tilts and takes up in a new position";<sup>31</sup> it revolves into another position in answer to the requirements made by the scene. The spatial level is, therefore, "a certain possession of the world by my body, a certain gearing of my body to the world".<sup>32</sup> Normally, the spatial level originates in a harmonic combination of my motor intentions with the demands of the field of perception; in other words, it is a 'pact' between my virtual body as a system of possibility of actions (certain gestures, positions) and the perceived scene as an invitation to those actions.<sup>33</sup> When this 'pact' is achieved my actual body becomes "at one with the virtual", which is required by the scene, while the objective scene, in its turn, becomes "at one with the surroundings that my body projects around itself".

In the light of this conclusion then, we can clarify the previous experiment (Stratton) as follows :

at the beginning of the experiment, the visual field appears both inverted and unreal because the subject does not live in it and is not geared to it. In the course of the experiment, we notice an intermediate phase in which the tactile body seems to be inverted and the landscape upright because, since I already live in the landscape, I see it accordingly as upright, the disturbance brought about by the experiment, being concentrated in my own body, which thus becomes, not a mass of affective sensations, but the body which is needed to perceive a given spectacle.<sup>34</sup>

29 Ibid., p. 250.

30 Ibid., p. 250.

31 Ibid., p. 250.

32 Ibid., p. 250.

33 Ibid., p. 250.

34 Ibid., p. 251.



The new level will be constituted, therefore when the demands made by the experimentally controlled scene invite my virtual body to take certain movements and action, creating a 'pact' between the two. This pact constitutes space for me, and my body has a hold on the world only when my perception presents me with a scene as clear and as verified as possible, while my motor intentions develop themselves there, and receive from the world the answer they expected. This maximum clarity of perception and this maximum of certainty in my actions together define a "Perceptual ground" for my life, a general "setting in which my body co-exists with the world".<sup>35</sup>

To make this analysis complete, we must make a last observation and answer the objection "Why... are clear perception and assured action possible only in a phenomenal space which is oriented"?<sup>36</sup> In other words, why could we not suppose that "the subject of perception and action faced with a world where there are already absolute directions, so that he has to adjust the dimensions of his behavior to those of the world"?<sup>37</sup> According to Merleau-Ponty, we can not make this supposition, precisely because "the constitution of a level always presupposes another given level, that space always precedes itself".<sup>38</sup> This does not mean a mere "admission of defeat", that is admitting that, if every level presupposes another, is it not true that, in the end, we must "base" levels of space to an ultimate objective "level of all levels"? His argument for this point is as follows: (1) Perceived world is grasped only in terms of direction. The general direction in space is not a contingent characteristic of the object, it is the means whereby I recognize it and am conscious of it as an object.<sup>39</sup> That is, our perception would not comprise "outlines, figures, background, etc., if the subject of perception were not "a being-for-the-gaze" which meets the object at a certain angle; (2) Every conceivable being is related either directly or indirectly to the perceived world; (3) Therefore, we cannot dissociate "being, from oriented being", and, there is, then, no basis for asking the question, "What is the level of all levels?"<sup>40</sup> The very first level is the horizon of all our observations and perceptions, but this horizon, can in principle, never be reached and never be thematized in an explicit perception. Each spatial level is constituted when we "cast anchor in

35 Ibid., p. 250.

36 Ibid., p. 251.

37 Ibid., p. 252.

38 Ibid., p. 252.

39 Ibid., pp. 253-54.

40 Ibid., p. 253.



some 'setting' which is offered to us."<sup>41</sup> And each level is particularized only for a previously given level. The condition of our first perception's being spatial is that it should have referred to some orientation which preceded it. This first perception must have found us "already at work" in the world, yet this world can, in no way be defined.<sup>42</sup> Originally therefore, one comes upon an orientated level which became constituted by a "pre-personal" hold of my body on the world, as a "system of anonymous functions".<sup>43</sup> Every subsequent perception of space is endowed with its meaning, through this hold of my body on the world, since it has to be re-assumed at every moment.<sup>44</sup>

The conclusions drawn from the above analysis are first, when we perceive a field, we always are geared in with the world in accordance with a determinate orientated spatial level. Examination of the two experiments makes it clear that this orientation does not "come from" the subject. That is, space perception is not a result of a synthesizing activity of the subject. Therefore, the rationalist conception of space is wrong. Secondly, the spatial level is not given with the contents of perception, that is, "upright" and "bottom" are not given to the subject together with the perceived content. Nor is space a quality or property of the thing perceived. Therefore, the empiricist conception of space is wrong. The truth is then, the only alternative left, which is, there exists an already oriented level of space in each spectacle: 'up' or 'down', 'right' or 'left' are constituted every moment within a spatial level. Lastly, we learn that, in the constitution of this level, our body plays a crucial role: a spatial level originates in a harmonic balance of my motor intentions with the demands of the field of perception. That is to say, in a 'pact' between my virtual body as a possibility of certain actions and the perceived field as an invitation to these actions. Lastly, spatial levels have the following relationship among themselves: every spatial level in which we live in turn, is only spatially defined by an earlier given spatial level, and that itself is defined by an earlier given one. The very first level is on the horizon of all our perceptions, and this horizon, in principle, is never reached.

In conclusion, Merleau-Ponty describes space as it reveals itself to us in its primordial level and as exclusive of all prejudices<sup>45</sup>. In this sense, reduction is performed, by tracing "the origin of the positing space" to the "pre-objective situation",<sup>46</sup> to the "pre-personal" (anonymous) level of subjectivity,<sup>47</sup> and to the "pre-conscious world",<sup>48</sup> leading us to the conception of space as a mode of our bodies being directed to the world and things.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid., p. 253.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid., p. 253.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid., pp. 253-54.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid., p. 254.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., pp. 250-67.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid., p. 267.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., pp. 253-54.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid., p. 254.



## 6

*Pattern of self-disclosure in different areas of self and to different target figures among female students of Aligarh Muslim University*

*Saeeduzzafar & Qamar Jahan*

Self disclosure is an important characteristic of personality. It implies how much a person expresses his or her ideas, feelings, desires, love, hate etc. to other person. Horney (1950) commented, "greater the individual ignores his real feelings, wishes and wants more alienated he is from the real self". Similarly Jourard (1961) pointed out that the expression of 'true self' in a proper degree and in an approved form is a symptom of healthy personality. In other words, healthy personality is determined by the extent to which an individual expresses his/her ideas, feelings, desires, aggression, love, hate etc. to another person in his/her social environment. This contention has empirically supported by numerous investigators who found a close relationship between self-disclosure and mental health (Jourard, 1963b; Ruesh and Baleson, 1951; Traux and Carkhuff, 1965; Taylor, Altman and Frankfurt, 1968; Halversion and Shore, 1969 and Sinha 1973).

In the light of the above mentioned studies it would be rather interesting to investigate into the pattern of self-disclosure of the students of Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh. The findings of such investigations will throw some light on the personality make up of these students.

We plan to undertake a series of studies,

In the first study we will explore the pattern of self-disclosure in different areas to self and to different target figures of female students.



The second study would be designed to study the pattern of self disclosure in different areas of self and to different target figures of male students and finally in the third study the pattern of self disclosure of female students would be compared with the pattern of self-disclosure of male students under different age level.

The present investigation is a part of our above mentioned plan. Thus the purpose of the present study is to investigate the pattern of self disclosure in different areas of self on to different target figures of female students of A.M.U., Aligarh.

## METHOD

### Subjects—

The subjects were 200 female undergraduate students of Women's College, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh. The range of age was from 15 to 20 years.

Stimulus Material—Sinha's self-disclosure Inventory (1973) was used.

The utility of this tool has been well demonstrated (Sinha, 1972a). This Inventory measures the extent of self-disclosure in eight areas of self and to six target figures. Simple addition of the self-disclosure scores in different areas or to different target figures gives the total magnitude of self disclosure of the subject.

**Procedure**—Sinha self Disclosure Inventory was administered on a randomly selected sample of 200 female subjects to measure their self disclosure in different areas of self and to different target figures. The data thus collected were analyzed to draw necessary inferences.

## RESULTS AND DISCUSSION :

As shown in table—1 the subjects tended to vary the amount of self disclosure with respect to the category of the information to which an area about the self belonged.

TABLE 1—Showing mean self-disclosure Score in different areas of self arranged in rank order.

Areas of self	...	Mean Scores
Study	...	74.36
Feeling-Ideas	...	71.2
Interest	...	68.3
Vocation	...	58.68
Money	...	52.54
Personality	...	52.16
Body	...	49.6
Sex	...	17.48



As shown in table-1 the greatest information about which the subjects revealed to others was that of study. In other words study, one of the area of self emerged as the highest disclosing area. Feelings-ideas another areas of the self, emerged as the next highest area of the self about which subjects revealed information freely. Interest and vocation as shown in table-1 occupied 3rd and 4th, positions respectively. As was expected Body and Sex occupied 7th and 8th places respectively. Body and sex are such areas of the self particularly for females that they do not want to disclose or discuss it with other individuals, These findings are quite consistent with the culture of the East and particularly with the prevailing taboos of Indian culture where open discussion about sex and Body are not permitted. The findings that study occupied the 1st place among the different areas of self disclosure is also consistent with growing interest of female in their study and education. This contention may easily be supported by recent results of various examinations where girls not only out numbered the boys in passing percentage but also in merit.

As mentioned earlier it is also interesting to explore the target figures to whom the subjects disclosed about their different areas of self. Table-2 present rank order of target figures in self-disclosure.

TABLE 2—Showing rank order of target figures in self-disclosure by female subjects.

Target Figures	...	Mean Scores
Mother	...	102.4
Friend	...	87.22
Father	...	79.7
Sister	...	74.88
Brother	...	67.00
Teacher	...	35.96

As shown in table-2, 'Mother' emerged as the target figure to whom subjects liked most to disclose information about their self. After Mother, as evident from table-2, subjects liked to disclose information about their different areas of self to their Friends. Father Sister and Brother occupied 3rd, 4th and 5th rank respectively.

To determine high, medium and low disclosure subjects, Q1, Q2 and Q3 were calculated. Out of 200 subjects, 48 were found as high self-disclosure subjects, 92 were medium self disclosure subjects and 60 were low self disclosure subjects. In the context of relationship between self-disclosure and mental health, as mentioned as where, the findings of the present study provide a healthy trend about the mental health of female students of A. M. U., Aligarh, since majority of them are either high disclosees or medium disclosees.



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## The Five Senses

*Bradley York Bartholomew*

Brain scientists have continued to search for the way in which external stimuli activate the senses notwithstanding the fundamental message of Quantum Mechanics that their efforts are in vain. Quantum Mechanics as well as Hindu Philosophy are at one in denying the possibility of "duality", i.e. that both "subject" and "object" can have a separate existence, which therefore raises a question as to the true operation of the senses. We shall here examine in some detail the sensory apparatus of the body to see whether it is possible that Quantum Mechanics and Hindu Philosophy are right, and that the senses are actually giving us false information. In particular we shall look at the operation of neurotransmitters found in sensory receptor cells—neurotransmitters that are capable of activating the senses from within the brain.

All along, the Upanishads have been saying that the senses are directed from within. For example in relation to the sense of sight. "This person that is seen in the eye, this is the Self". (Chandogya Upanishad IV. 15. 1) "For everybody sees... through the mind alone". (Brhadaranyaka Upanishad I. 5. 3)<sup>a</sup> This can only be done by neurotransmitters in the retina of the eye which determine the nature of the electrical impulse that is sent down the optic nerve. Neurotransmitters are potent chemical substances which, as their name implies transmit neural (electrical) signals. And it is precisely electrical stimulation that causes them to be released. Throughout the brain and body there are constant waves of electrical activity emanating from the embryo brain region, and these brain waves can signal to a neurotransmitter in the retina which excites (or inhibits) a particular neurone or nerve cell.

Blood can also signal the release of neurotransmitters in the retina. The whole brain is bathed in blood, and hormones, which



are neurotransmitters carried by the blood, are capable of stimulating any neurone in the body. By virtue of blood the whole body becomes a closed circuit. The blood reaches everywhere and the hormones it contains are like radio messages. The programme can be picked up by anybody who has a radio to receive it (p. 530)<sup>3</sup>. These programmed messages are all released into the blood stream from the embryo brain region (including the pineal gland and the hypothalamus) and can regulate and stimulate myriad electrical interactions.

The standard explanation from neurophysiologists for what we see is that the retina is sensitive to light, and changes in the chemical composition of the retina activates "bipolar cells" which in turn activate "ganglion cells" which fire electrical impulses down the optic nerve. They further tell us that prior to the activation of the ganglion cells there is stimulation from "lateral" connections known as the "horizontal" and "amacrine" cells which are internal to the brain. This internal innervation, they do concede, can also determine the nature of the electrical impulses that are sent down the optic nerve to the embryo brain region. From there a dense group of fibers, the optic radiations, relay the impulses to the visual cortex at the back of the brain where the external world is registered. Wave functions in these optic radiations from the embryo brain region to the visual cortex determine what we see.

But this is only one half of the story. There is also a very dense projection of nerve fibers back from the visual cortex to the embryo brain region which indicate that the visual system is a circuit—output from visual cortex to embryo brain region, which in turn determines input to visual cortex. Neurophysiologists indeed are at a loss to understand why this should be so. It seems to be excessively complex if all the visual system is doing is monitoring objects in an external world (p. 803).<sup>3</sup> But a circuit such as this is precisely what would be required if the brain itself is generating everything that we see. All that remains is to pinpoint the part of the embryo brain region that can signal what we will see next to the horizontal and amacrine cells in the retina.

The retina of the eye is attached to the pineal gland via the retinohypothalamic tract. The pineal gland is said to be sensitive to light and is the central releasing factor for the neurotransmitters melatonin and serotonin. When light is "turned off" melatonin increases in the retina. When light is "turned on" serotonin increases and melatonin decreases. It is therefore possible for the pineal gland to signal to the retina the degree of brightness of the external light supposedly entering the eye. In addition, the enzyme responsible for converting serotonin to melatonin serves as a highly specific



marker for the site of formation of melatonin (p. 355).<sup>4</sup> It can therefore signal shades of brightness and darkness on the retina.

In lower animals the pineal displays photosensitivity and electrical activity suggestive of a "third eye" (p. 351).<sup>4</sup> And in those few species that actually have a third eye in the top of the skull, the nerve fibres connecting the pineal with this eye are very short; the two structures are almost touching (p. 530).<sup>3</sup> From these scientific observations we readily see the significance of the mystical third eye of Shiva, situated between the eyebrows, which is on line with the pineal gland in the embryo brain region (or heart) of the brain. "He who dwells in light but is within it, whom light does not know, whose body is light, and who controls light from within, is the Inner Controller—your own Self and immortal". (Brhadaranyaka Upanishad 3. 7, 14).<sup>2</sup>

Another neurotransmitter found in the retina, principally in the amacrine cells, and in the optic nerve and at several levels of the visual system, is somatostatin. The amacrine cells, it will be remembered, represent innervation from within the brain prior to the firing of the ganglion cells that send the visual impulses down the optic nerve. Somatostatin in the amacrine cells excites spontaneous neural activity (p. 573).<sup>4</sup> In particular, somatostatin is reported to stimulate serotonin release (p. 537).<sup>4</sup> As already stated, increases in serotonin. In the retina signal light being "turned on". The embryo brain region is the central releasing area for somatostatin into the blood. as it is, indeed, for all neurotransmitters/neurohormones which stimulate and regulate the brain waves on circuit.

It is easy to appreciate how brain waves generated from within can be responsible for our hearing. The basilar membrane in the cochlea of the ear is simply a frequency analyser, different frequencies producing activity at different places along the basilar membrane. The information contained in the patterns of vibration on the basilar membrane is transmitted in the fibres of the auditory nerve in the form of brief electrical impulses, called spikes or action potentials. Special cells, called hair cells, which rest on the basilar membrane, are said to be responsible for transforming the vibrations into spikes. However, the same neurotransmitter, somatostatin, that is found in the amacrine cells of the retina has also been found in the cochlea, and somatostatin fibres project into the main portions of the auditory nerve. (p 569).<sup>4</sup> In other words the same brain wave (electrical) frequency is capable of releasing a neurotransmitter that synchronizes sight and hearing.

Another neurotransmitter that appears to play a key role in what we hear is the enkephalin group which has been found in the entrance



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to and at the back of the cochlea (p. 585).<sup>4</sup> The enkephalins are also found in the olfactory bulb, and can therefore coordinate the workings of the ear and the nose (p. 585).<sup>4</sup> Indeed, more than a dozen neuropeptides have been identified within subsets of sensory neurons. Included in this list are substance P, somatostatin, CCK, VIP, dynorphin, vasopressin, galanin, and oxytocin (p. 625).<sup>4</sup> These can all be innervated by the electrical milieu (wave functions emanating from the embryonic heart of the brain) and so cause sensory receptors to fire as if stimulated by external means. Within (the heart in) the body, where the vital force has entered in five forms, is the subtle Self to be realized through that intelligence by which is pervaded the .. sensory organs of all creatures." (Mundaka Upanishad III. i. 9)<sup>5</sup>

The receptors for smell lie in the mucous membrane at the top or back of the air passages in the nose, but it is not known how small molecules activate these cells which causes them to fire electrical impulses into the olfactory bulb. As with the other senses, there are many neurotransmitters and neuropeptides in the smell receptors which can be stimulated by brain waves or by electrical activity in the mucous membrane as well as by other neurotransmitters and hormones in the blood. Nasal stimulation increases the blood supply to that portion of the brain serving the sense of smell (p. 349).<sup>3</sup> The more blood, the more neurotransmitters and neurohormones, and the more complex become the brain waves. Specifically, neurotransmitters released into the blood from the thyroid and adrenal glands can affect the sense of smell (p. 454).<sup>4</sup> These glands are in turn controlled by the pituitary gland in the embryo brain region. And so we can appreciate the advice in the Kaushitaki-Brahmana Upanishad, "Odour is not what one should desire to understand, one should know him who smells..." (III. 8)<sup>6</sup>.

By the same token, "Taste of food is not what one should desire to understand, one should know the discerner of the taste of food" (III. 8).<sup>6</sup> We must therefore find out how receptors in the mouth and throat are activated to give us the sensation of taste. Taste receptors are bathed in saliva, which is secreted from the salivary glands, and contains taste stimuli such as sodium chloride or potassium chloride; these can come from the blood (p. 768).<sup>3</sup> Changes in salivary concentration of taste stimuli can be 100-fold and highly significant. It can render an otherwise piquant food tasteless. So, as the Kaushitaki-Brahmana Upanishad says, there is no point in looking to the apparent external substance, food, as an explanation for taste.

The peptide somatostatin has been identified in the salivary gland and it is also found in the gut and pancreas. It is also found in the



olfactory tubercle which explains the co-relation between taste and smell (p. 569).<sup>4</sup> There is an extensive list of other neurotransmitters and neuropeptides that will activate somatostatin release (p. 572).<sup>4</sup> It will be remembered that the taste stimuli in saliva is sodium chloride and potassium chloride, and it has been found that somatostatin reduces the reaction of taste receptors to calcium and increases their reaction to potassium (p. 261).<sup>4</sup> This brings about the sensation of taste. Somatostatin is released in response to depolarizing stimuli (p. 568).<sup>4</sup> In other words through electrical activity (brain waves emanating the embryo brain region) we come "to know the discerners of the taste of food".

The last of the five senses is that of touch. The skin contains several kinds of touch receptors, and recent experiments have demonstrated that all these receptors can be stimulated electrically. Electrodermal activity (electrical currents in the skin) can therefore be responsible for the sense of touch. Like brain waves, this electrodermal activity is simply wave functions that emanate from the embryo brain region. And the results of these experiments indicate that external stimuli is both immaterial and unnecessary. For example, the Pacinian corpuscle receptors give a sensation of tickling, or when the electrical stimulation is increased a sense of vibration. Meissner corpuscles evoke a sense of tapping, flutter, buzzing, or vibration (related to the frequency of the vibration). The Merkel receptors evoke a sense of sustained pressure or sustained contact (p. 780).<sup>5</sup>

All that is required is for neurones in the sensory receptors to be activated whereupon electrical channels will innervate myriads of cells in the cortex that are actually responsible for telling us what we are seeing and hearing and touching etc (p. 129).<sup>3</sup> The retina, for example, is mapped not once but over and over in the cortex of the brain where we perceive an external world. And this is confined not only to vision. Multiple brain maps of sensory and motor systems, as well as representations of body schema are now established (p. 438).<sup>3</sup> There are billions of cells in the cortex that have their own specific stimulus requirements, and as a consequence when they are stimulated they "say" something specific about the world supposedly external to the brain. Cells that will signal colours, different orientations of lines or edges, directions of movement, brightness and texture size. Or, pressure, and tickling, and particular smells, sounds and tastes. "...The one divine Narayna alone (is the mainstay of all creation), the eye and what is seen... the ear and what is heard... the nose and what is smell... the tongue and what is tasted... the skin and what is touched..." (Subala Upanishad VI. 1).<sup>6</sup>



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The proof, however, that the brain/body is a closed electrical circuit and that therefore sensory stimuli comes from within is to be found in the branch of modern Physics known as Quantum Mechanics. Brain scientists have failed to appreciate that the brain they are analysing is a "physical" object like any other and is therefore a creature of the laws of Physics. When a brain scientist reports, for instance, that he has examined the workings of a certain nerve cell in the retina of the eye, and has found a certain neurotransmitter substance which caused the appearance of a "hole" or "passage" in the membrane of the neuroreceptor through which only a particularly charged ion can pass, he is really talking the language of Quantum Mechanics. He may talk about a more complex neuroreceptor response which involves an enzyme in the membrane as a second messenger and results in the secondary opening of particular ion channels. Again he is talking the language of Quantum Mechanics. The "two-holes experiment" to be precise.

Feynman, who received the Nobel Prize for Physics in 1965, says that the basis of quantum theory is the experiment with two holes. Why? Because this is a phenomenon which is impossible, absolutely impossible, to explain in any classical way, and which has in it the heart of quantum mechanics. In reality, it contains the only mystery...the basic peculiarities of all quantum mechanics (p. 164)<sup>8</sup>. This central mystery is that "particles" and "waves" behave in the same way. If a scientist in an experiment observes a "particle" passing through one hole then the interference pattern on the other side will be consistent with that one particle having passed through that one hole. However if nobody observes which of two holes that one "particle" passes through then the interference pattern on the other side will suggest that waves passed through them both. The strangest thing about the two holes experiment is that it is the act of observing a system that forces it to select one of its options, which then becomes real. In terms of Schrodinger wave equation, each of the potential "particles" corresponds to a wave, or rather a packet of waves. The observation that crystallizes one "particle" out of the wave of probabilities is called the "collapse of the wave function" (p. 173)<sup>8</sup>.

The significance then of Quantum Mechanics for the workings of the brain is obvious. If a brain scientist examines the workings of a certain neuroreceptor he will collapse a wave function in which case he will see an actual particle passing through a hole or through one of a number of holes in the membrane. And it is precisely the brain scientist's action in observing the process that causes the particle to select which hole it will pass through. But if no brain scientist



is examining the workings of that neuroreceptor then the effect is identical to brain waves having caused the neurone to fire. And what's more, as soon as the brain scientist stops looking at the particle, it immediately reverts to the wave function containing a new array of potential particles. Nothing is real unless we look at it, and it ceases to be real as soon as we stop looking (p. 173)<sup>8</sup>.

Which raises the question of how we obtain knowledge of atomic processes through the senses. "Whatever quantity we say we are 'observing', the actual procedure nearly always ends in reading the position of some kind of indicator on a graduated scale or its equivalent" (p.99)<sup>9</sup>. It is fundamental to Quantum theory that all that is real is the results of experiments. The ions in brain science are true particles within the meaning of atomic physics and can not be seen in any normal sense of the word. The most sophisticated atomic recording devices are used to determine whether an ion did in fact pass through a hole. And the membranes of the neuroreceptors are themselves practically of atomic dimensions and can only be pictured in an electron micrograph. It is these pictures that are all that is real. As Sir Arthur Eddington says, "Observable is a very elusive conception, and if we pursue the criticism to the end, we shall have to doubt a lot of things that we do not in the least want to doubt" (p.54).<sup>9</sup>

Potentially tens of thousands of holes can open through which ions pass to cause the single firing of one never cell, or so the instruments tell us. Yet the whole thrust of Quantum Mechanics is that to count the number of holes that open up in the membrane and record the ions that pass through it is erroneous. The wave function on the other side of the membrane, if no instrument records the event, is more complex mathematically speaking than the sum total of interference of the actual particles that passed through it when an instrument records them. Brain scientists however, although they are working with atomic processes, are not taking the findings of Quantum theory into account. They attach no special significance to the mathematically more complex wave function after the "particles" have passed through the holes when they are not on hand to observe.

It is misleading then to explain brain science in terms of chemical neurotransmitters and particles because they only become "real" when the wave function collapses. Better to look upon electrical waves stimulating the senses. This is also suggested by the sheer number of neurohormones, neurotransmitters, neuromodulators and neuropeptides that have now been found. In Quantum Mechanics more than 200 particles have been identified, which caused Dirac to remark, "People are only too willing to postulate a new particle on the slightest evidence, either theoretical or hypothetical" (p. 127).<sup>8</sup>



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Sir Arthur Eddington was even more sceptical, "...an illustration may show that a serious practical question is raised. Just now nuclear physicists are writing a great deal about hypothetical particles called neutrinos... I am not much impressed by the neutrino theory. In an ordinary way I might say that I do not believe in neutrinos. But I have to reflect that a physicist may be an artist, and you never know where you are with artists. My old-fashioned kind of disbelief in neutrinos is scarcely enough. Dare I say that experimental physicists will not have sufficient ingenuity to make neutrinos?" (p. 112)<sup>9</sup> Since then—1939—neutrinos have been "discovered".

In the same vein there are more than fifty recognized neurotransmitters which does not take into account sub-groups within that fifty, to say nothing of the neuropeptide "explosion". Peptides are made of amino acids joined together to make a chain, and since eighteen different amino acids are found in animals there are 306 ways of putting these together to make dipeptide and, theoretically, there is an astronomical number of different decapeptides (with ten amino acids) (p. 543).<sup>3</sup> They all create potential "particles" to be observed by brain scientists upon the collapse of a wave function. A leading neurobiologist (artist according to Eddington) talks of neurotransmitters as "a chorus of informational voices, each adding tonal colour or timbre to the final output of the brain and nervous system". (p. 560)<sup>3</sup> But the fact that there are so many also suggests that they are being thrown up to create an illusion, and when not being observed they are simply electrical waves emanating from the embryo brain region—the heart of the brain where the Self is located.<sup>10</sup>

Heisenberg's "uncertainty principle" would also appear to indicate the futility for brain scientists of observing particles. According to this principle we can never know all that there is to be known about a particle. If we know exactly its position then we can't know its velocity. Alternatively, if we know precisely its velocity we can't know exactly where it is. It can not be disputed that the precise position of particles in the membrane of neuroreceptors and the actual velocity of the passage of particles through the holes in membranes will have effects on the excitation or inhibition of the neurones. Schrodinger specifically says, "All chemical transformations, the velocity of chemical reactions... everything in fact... is governed by laws of this kind..." (p. 66)<sup>3</sup> Yet brain scientists go on identifying more and more neurotransmitters and observe the particles pass through the holes, without concerning themselves that the bewildering array of neurotransmitters already identified"... remains subject to the uncertainty relation, of which the only tolerable image is the guiding wave group" (p. 220)<sup>13</sup>.



The exquisitely subtle element in Schrodinger's wave mechanics is the concept of "probability". If we make an observation of a quantum system and get an answer A to our measurement, then the quantum equations tell us what the probability is of getting answer B (or C or D, or whatever) if we make the same observation a certain time later (p. 123)<sup>8</sup>. Sir James Jeans insists that these probability waves do not exist, but a merely waves of knowledge. Indeed, the only positive thing we know about them is that they have an irreversible relation to observation (p. 94)<sup>9</sup>. We have already learned that Quantum theory on observation is all about converting atomic processes into a life-size object that the scientist can actually see, the measuring instrument. This measurement at the macroscopic level becomes the only reality, in other words the wave of probabilities collapses to produce this one item of observational knowledge. But its options remain open for the future. Hear again, an insoluble problem for brain scientists trying to find through their own senses how the sensory receptors work at quantum level. Or at least it would be a problem, were they even to become aware of it !

The probability waves then are actually waves of consciousness in the brain of the observing scientist that caused him to see, hear, touch etc. his measuring instrument. Through these waves the total illusion is effected; conscious scientist, illusory measuring instrument, fictitious quantity measured, even the probability of obtaining a like measurement in the future and the denial of any underlying "reality". Waves of consciousness also satisfy all the stipulated conditions for probability waves. For a start, they are waves packets with precise frequencies, vibrations, intensities etc. Secondly they have an irreversible relation to observation for, by their very nature, it remains undetermined what observational knowledge they will produce in the future. And, finally, they conform to Sir James Jeans description as waves of knowledge that do not exist in external space. They are emitted from the embryonic substratum of the scientist's own brain. In the words of Mandukya Karika",... it is the vibration of Consciousness that appears to be the knower and the known" (IV. 47) .

Waves of consciousness of course are responsible for all sensory input, and not just for scientists obtaining knowledge of atomic processes through the senses. Recordings have been made from the exposed brains of fully conscious human subjects of the reticular activating system, that dense network of cells that arises in the embryo brain region and spreads upwards and outwards to infiltrate the cortex. Originally the subject was touched and could feel nothing. When the touch to the skin was intensified the recorded waveform



became more complex and the subject reported. "I can feel something". According to a leading neurophysiologist, "It seems reasonable to assume that the additions to the waveform reflected those contributions from the reticular system upon which consciousness depends" (p. 753).<sup>3</sup> And so we have direct evidence of the co-relation of changing wave functions from the embryo brain region and what external stimuli becomes conscious to us. "Out of the totality of the rhythm he created the organs of the sense organs" (Paingala Upanishad I. 10)<sup>4</sup>

Even if all the foregoing is not enough to convince that electrical waves are "probably" responsible for activating the five senses, there are also the findings of Quantum Mechanics concerning "subject" and "object". We (as subject) have the impression that we can see an object external to us. We may also have the impression that we are touching that object, or tasting that object, or smelling or hearing that object. The Upanishads, of course, are quite clear that this is an illusion. "On account of false notions the Supreme Being is perceived as manifold, for to him are yoked ten organs, nay hundreds of them. He indeed is the organs; He indeed is tens and thousands, numerous and countless." (Brhadaranyaka Upanishad 2.5.19)<sup>2</sup> If however Quantum Mechanics were to establish that there can be a "subject" then evidently the Upanishads would be wrong. The "false notion" would be to deny "duality" as the Upanishads do.

But this is where Quantum Mechanics so convincingly supports the Upanishads. In the words of Schrodinger, "that mysterious boundary between the 'subject and the object' has broken down" (p. 50).<sup>11</sup> said "It is there is also an unavoidable and uncontrollable impression from the side of the subject onto the object" (p. 53).<sup>11</sup> Brain science, however, is out of step with both the Upanishads and Quantum Mechanics. Brain scientists don't realize that they can never determine how an external stimuli (object) activates a particular sensory receptor (subject). There is no physical boundary between the two. And what of this unavoidable and uncontrollable impression from the side of the sensory receptor onto the external stimuli? An unavoidable and uncontrollable impression from the side of the nose onto the odour! "Then what should one smell and through what?" (Brhadaranyaka Upanishad 2. 4. 14)<sup>2</sup>.

Or another example, spy, the action of a light on the retina of the eye of an experimental animal. The light would be the object and the animal would be the subject. A brain scientist cannot determine how the one acts upon the other for the light and the retina of the animal are one. And there is an even more complex problem.



Now the brain scientist becomes the subject and the light and the retina of the animal is the object. There is no physical boundary between him and the light/retina object. Not only is he one with what he is observing but there is an unavoidable and uncontrollable impression from him onto what he is observing. To again quote Schrodinger: "We are to understand that we never observe an object without it being modified or tinged by our own activity in observing it" (p. 50)<sup>11</sup>. For a brain scientist to tell us how the light acted upon the retina after he "modified" or "tinged" what he was observing, is to tell us nothing.

The core of the problem is that modern physics has been unable to establish, as a matter of pure mathematics, that an external world exists. If this could be done then there would be some objective standard by which the reaction of external stimuli on sensory receptors could be gauged. If it could be proved that the light in the above example really existed in time and space external to the experimental animal, and we knew the mathematical constituents of that light alone, then theoretically it would be possible to determine how that light acts upon the retina of the animal. In theory it would be possible for a physicist to determine this without observing the experiment and therefore modifying it. But not only can't it be proved mathematically that the light exists external to the animal, on the contrary modern physics tells us that the light is not external to the animal. That mysterious boundary between subject and object has broken down. Without a boundary, talk of external stimuli becomes irrational and meaningless. Hence the statement in the Taittiriya Upanishad, "He that is here in the human person, and he that is there in the sun, are one" (II. viii. 5).<sup>12</sup>

Also, in the Brhadaranyaka Upanishad, "When there is duality, as it were, then... one sees another, one hears another... one knows another" (2. 4. 14). This raises the well known problem of "other minds". It is one thing to say that the whole universe is programmed into my own brain, but how do I explain the apparent fact that other people, and animals as well, are exhibiting thought processes similar to my own and yet these thought processes are not taking place in my brain. The answer is the Self. "There is no other seer than He, there is no other hearer than He, there is no other thinker than He, there is no other knower than He. He is the Inner Controller—your own Self and immortal" (Brhadaranyaka Upanishad 3. 7. 23)<sup>13</sup>. The Self is in the embryo brain region of each and every sentient being. There is no other seer than He in that He causes all sentient beings to see—and smell, and taste etc. There is no other thinker than He in that He causes all sentient being to think. The embryo



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brain region of all sentient beings is a microcosm in a macrocosmic intelligence link-up (Brahman).

This is the only way to explain the astounding finding of Quantum Mechanics that there is no boundary between subject and object. Duality, the apparent existence of other minds must be an illusion. We have to look to one entity that embraces everything—a macrocosmic mind. Sir Arthur Eddington specifically says the “statement that the universe is of the nature of a thought or sensation in a universal Mind is true in the sense that it is the logical consequence of” Quantum theory (p. 151).<sup>9</sup> We must picture then a non-physical observing universal “subject”—Brahman. There is no other knower than He. Through waves of consciousness He operates the five senses in all of us, and creates illusory objects. The Kena Upanishad could not be more definite on the point—“That which man does not see with the eyes, that by which man perceives the activities of the eye, know that alone to be Brahman and not what people worship as an object. That which man does not hear with the ear, that by which man knows this ear, know that to be Brahman and not this that people worship as an object. That which man does not smell with the organ of smell, that by which the organ of smell is impelled, know that to be Brahman and not what people worship as an object” (I. 7-9)<sup>12</sup>

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## 8

## Krishnamurti and Marx : Their Concept of Freedom

A. P. Sharma

Like Karl Marx Krishnamurti's philosophy also evolved out as a reaction against the existing social order. If Marx's dialectical materialism grew as a result of compassion for the oppressed class, Krishnamurti's philosophy developed as a consequence to man's plight and growing conflict in his life. Both, Marx and Krishnamurti desired man to be free but their visions of freedom were poles apart, and so were their procedures.

In the early twentieth century the Hegelian Dialectic stirred great opposition from different quarters. That resulted in the rise of certain reactionary movements. Karl Marx opposed the method of dialectic to reason or thought. Although Marx considered Hegel's notions of dialectic—a most important tool for understanding history, but he condemned Hegel for he thought that Hegel could not arrive at a genuine scientific understanding or dialectic. In Marx's opinion Hegelian philosophy suffered from deep seated internal contradiction between system and method.

According to Marx dialectic had a different dimension. He named it dialectic materialism. Marx, with this new dimension stood out as the greatest materialist in the history of the struggle for socialism. In fact he was a great materialist as he understood the historical conditions and true character of primitive societies and fought to eradicate the human exploitation and injustice on the basis of his novel method known as Dialectical Materialism.

Materialists' contention is that nature and matter are primary and consciousness secondary. That means that idea is derivative and also a property of matter. Dialectical materialism studies the most general law of the development of nature, society and human thought.



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It was originally created by Marx and Engels as a scientific philosophical outlook about the world and it forms an effective method of cognising it.

Marx's outlook to life's problems was primarily fashioned by the dialectical materialistic convictions. It can be witnessed from the first chapter of his *Communist Manifesto*<sup>1</sup> which began with the words:

"The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggle".<sup>1</sup>

History shows us that the humanity has always been prompted and directed selfish, narrow and short term interests and the changes from one society to another have occurred as a result of conflicts between different groups. There have been oppressors and the oppressed who have always stood in constant opposition to one another—the struggle resulting either in the common ruins or revolutionary reconstruction of society at large. Thus according to Marx the contradictions of the bourgeois society can be resolved only by conflicts.<sup>2</sup>

Marx's theory of conflicts is grounded on two pillars, i.e. materialism as well as antagonism. Both these aspects, in fact, determine the nature of his social philosophy and social strategy. The essence of dialectic materialism of Marx is that the moving spirit behind human civilization is gross materialism. Material forces and material relationship are the only reality in the historical setting and social framework.

From the above concepts the concept of class antagonism of Marx has developed. He derives its examples from history and says that in every era of history the economically privileged classes have tried to exploit the economically under privileged classes for their own selfish interest, resulting in the growth of class antagonism.<sup>3</sup> He, therefore, concludes that every form of society has been based on the antagonism of the oppressing and the oppressed classes, therefore, the violent overthrow of the privileged class by the proletariat revolutionary class is immanent.

Marx conceives that historical events happen when some individual wills become active but very often it is seen that the results produced are different—often quite opposite than what the individuals had intended. Their motives in relation to the total results are merely of secondary importance, but the importance lies in what

<sup>1</sup> Marx, Karl. *Communist Manifesto* Mosko: Progress Publishers, 1976, p. 40.

<sup>2</sup> Marx, *Communist Manifesto*, pp. 40-41.

<sup>3</sup> Nirmala Devi, B. "Dialectic: Hegel and Marx", *Darshana International*, Vol. II, April 1986, pp. 46-47.



driving forces in turn stand behind those motives, and what are the historical causes which transform themselves into those motives conceived in the mind of the actors.<sup>4</sup>

Therefore, Marx's dialectical materialism endeavours to examine the driving forces, which consciously or unconsciously, and indeed very often unconsciously, lie behind the motives of men in their historical actions.

Neither the old materialism nor the history put this question (what are the driving forces working behind an action?) to itself. But Marx gave the modern materialism as well as history a pragmatic status and proved that all political struggles were class struggles, and all class struggles for emancipation, despite their necessarily political form, were political struggles turn ultimately on the question of economic emancipation.<sup>5</sup>

Thus Marx clearly viewed that each society had an oppressing class which antagonised itself with the oppressed class, and human freedom could only be achieved in terms of social and economic freedom which does not consist of any human exploitation.

So far we have discussed Marx's views on freedom. Let us now examine Krishnamurti's views and see whether there exists any similarity or contrast in his views with that of Marx's in respect of human freedom.

Both, Marx and Krishnamurti have identical views on human suffering, poverty, starvation, slavery and consistent exploitation consisted of hatred, jealousy, fear, dishonesty, conflict and cruelty. Krishnamurti says :

"We live in a world, that is going to pieces, that has become quite insane, quite disorderly and dangerous place to live in".<sup>6</sup>

Speaking almost in Marx's manner Krishnamurti reflects that the world is full of diverse problems which are instrumental in pioneering revolts, inter-group bickerings, discontentment and distrust, which have made the contemporary man confused and violent.

Both believe that the traditional path must be abandoned and to bring lasting world peace the contemporary society need to be totally transformed so that harmony and order could prevail. Therefore,

4 Marx, Karl. *Selected Works*, Vol. I, London; (Ed) Adoratsky, V., Lawrance and Wishart Ltd., 1945, pp. 458-59.

5 Marx, *Selected Works*, pp. 460-61.

6 Krishnamurti, J. *The Wholeness of Life*, London: Victor Gollancz, 1978, p. 159.



both condemn the traditional path as it ultimately divides the society into various blocks, systems, ideologies, religious orders and diverse ism. This (following the traditional prescript) would not lead to freedom.

So far there appears some identity in their views, but a close examination of their ideas would reveal that although both believe in freedom, they reach the milestone of freedom from quite different paths. Krishnamurti suggests an intellectual procedure where as Marx believe in economic and material emancipation devoid of human exploitation.

Krishnamurti believes that the root cause of all problems is 'I—Consciousness'; Marx believes that root cause of all problems is human exploitation, injustice and antagonism which are persistently existing as there are always the oppressors and the oppressed in our society. Therefore, Marx's philosophy emerges from the social conflicts. But Krishnamurti's philosophy develops out of a mix-vision endowed with idealistic and pragmatic principles. Krishnamurti says that truth and freedom can truly be realised only by individual's efforts by which he means that one has to discover one's own path. For Marx freedom means material and economic salvation which can come only by combined efforts of the individuals.

Krishnamurti believes that one has to choose one's path through self-discipline and self awakening and a complete understanding of one's own self is the only procedure to solve all problems. He unfolds :

"It is very important to uncover for oneself what one actually is; not according to the theories and the assumptions and experiences of psychologists, philosophers and gurus, but rather by investigating the whole nature and movement of oneself; by seeing what one actually is".<sup>7</sup>

Marx's outlook towards the problems of life is quite different. It is totally fashioned by dialectic and materialistic convictions, which hold that changes from one society to another occur as a result of conflicts between different groups as well as due to the oppressors and the oppressed who stand in constant opposition to one another. The struggles between the oppressed and the oppressors have resulted either in common ruins or revolution and ended up in reconstruction of society at large. This kind of reconstruction according to Marx, is the sort of emancipation which he aims at, for in it the economic and material freedom is imbeded. So, for Marx the collective emancipation which emerges out of the class struggle, is more important rather than the individual's salvation.

<sup>7</sup> Krishnamurti, *Wholeness of Life*, p. 141.



But Krishnamurti's search for salvation can be fruitfully carried on with individual's efforts which can enable him to seek the union of the Self with the Original Spirit. This can only be done by knowing the self individually. It cannot be done merely logically. He believes that the individual must first reject all dogmas, beliefs and condemn rituals, and transcend beyond the concepts or patterns. This would enable him to see the truth as it is. Therefore, Krishnamurti considers that the individual is always more important as the through attention and awakening, can see the whole truth and understand the nature and meaning of freedom. He reckons that it is the individual who is the maker of his destiny provided he abandons the traditional precepts which can show him only the path but cannot make him walk on it.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Mishra, G. N. "A Pathless Path to Freedom", *Darshana International*, Vol, XXVI, January, 1986, pp. 40-46.



## *Resomal -- Isomorphous Principle (RIP)*

*Kubrat Tomov*

### INTRODUCTION

The present work deals with the synthesis of knowledge. The analysis of the form of movement of matter and of the concepts vibration, resonance, extremality and isomorphism which was begun by many scientists in the past and which continues in the present moment reveals fully the relation between all phenomena and material things in nature. All these facts lead to the generalisation of the concepts. The necessity of two new sciences appears on the base of this generalisation—resology and isology. Their place is between philosophy and the other sciences.

### PART I

#### **Resology—a Science of Vibrations, Resonance and Extremality**

##### **Chapter 1. The Vibrational Principle**

According to the contemporary understanding, the vibrations are processes which are repeated accurately or with a fair approach to accuracy in equal periods of time. Their major parameters are period, frequency, amplitude and phase. The distribution and importance of the vibrations in the non-living nature are briefly discussed: particles, atoms, molecules, geology, geography, atmosphere, astronomy etc. The concept “rhythm of time” is discussed too. The same ideas are applied to living nature and especially to man.

The main feature of the vibrations is their repetition. However, it is the main feature of the periodical structures and of the processes of development. This fact considerably expands the content of the concept.

The analysis reveals the main feature of the expand vibration: repetition (of processes, structures, qualities, laws, feature etc. and



their changes), non-specificity (vibrations exist in all kinds of processes, structures, levels etc.), functionality (we can speak about vibrations if there is dependency between at least two things), symmetry (it is needed for the appearance of repetition) and transference (the vibrations create all natural forces, respectively all movements and transferences in time and space).

On the base of this analysis we define the generalized vibration: something, which repeats with greater or smaller accuracy in a constant or changeable interval of another thing is called a vibration. It is attributive, immanent condition or way of existence and development of all forms of movement.

The generalized vibration connects with the interaction of the contraries and logically shows that there is a necessary change of the predominating contrary of the interaction. The change or the alternation of the contraries in the generalized vibration and the latter is the main feature or form of every interaction and movement.

The analysis reveals the ontological role of the vibrations. They are the main means of self-organization and self-control of matter. In other words, with the vibrations can be created a definite space structure and form of every body and a definite way of existence in time. The structural and form-creating role of the vibrations is studied by the spontaneously originated new science—KYMATICS—without the argumentation validity which is given in this work.

At the end of chapter 1 is formulated the vibrational principle which says that the vibration is the main form of movement and the main means of self-organization and self-control of matter, of nature, of all objects, bodies and systems in the world.

## Chapter 2. The Resomal Principle

### (The Resonance-Extremal Principle)

The main dynamic characteristic of the vibrational phenomena is the resonance. The definitions of the concepts resonance and extremality are given. The distribution of the resonancies and extremalities in nature is discussed.

The concept "resonance" expands when it includes the vibrational character of all forces—they are called resonance vibrational interactions. The resonance character of Kymatics, invention N 122, gravitation is revealed. The concepts "informational resonance" and "biological resonance" are introduced. The relation between resonance and structure is shown.

The analysis of the resonance reveals its main features. They are connected with complexity and perfection of the systems and



their interactions. All the features are extremal. This permits us to give a new definition of the resonance and to formulate a new concept: resomality.

The deductive proof of the fundamentality of resomality reveals and uses the symmetry and compensationality of the interaction, its resonance and extremal properties. It is shown that resomality is the attributive side of every interaction, of every movement. The ontological role of resomality is revealed. It is formulated by the author as a resomal principle.

At the end of the chapter is stated the necessity of a new science, called by the author—resology. It is the science of vibrations and resomality. Its subject, spheres of application, main concepts and apparatus are discussed.

## PART II

### Isology—The Science of Isomorphisms

#### Chapter 3. The Isomorphous Principle

At the beginning of the chapter the concept "isomorphism" is defined. Wider definitions of the isomorphism used in cybernetics, analogy and modelling are discussed. It is shown that philosophy and dialectics are a model of the world and its development and that isomorphism, is a basic component of polymorphism, symmetry, spiral structures, the general system theory and of the correspondence between mathematics and nature.

The analysis reveals the main features of the widely accepted isomorphism. The generalized isomorphism is defined.

The deductive proof of the fundamentality of isomorphism is based on the material unity of the world from which follows the existence of many and different isomorphisms between all bodies and phenomena, between their structures and manifestations. The ontological role of isomorphism is revealed. The author formulates the isomorphous principle from here. The necessity of a new synthetic science is proved on this base—*isology*: a science of isomorphisms. Its major concepts, apparatus and spheres of application are discussed briefly.

#### Chapter 4. The Resomal-Isomorphous Principle (RIP)

##### (The Resomorphous Principle)

The narrow closeness of the three principles—vibrational, resomal and isomorphous—is revealed. It is based on the closeness of the concepts movement, interaction and self-organization. Due to this fact the three principles are united into one; Resomal-isomorphous Principle or RIP. According to RIP every movement is a



vibrational, resomal and isomorphous interaction leading to self-organization.

The forerunners and the contemporaries of the theory of RIP or of parts of RIP are followed. The vibrations are mentioned in different Indian doctrines—Upanishads, then Plato, Schelling, Engels, Lenin etc. Here is discussed the contribution of Petrovich, Bogdanov, Witzeman, Bertalanffi, Lamouche, Urmantzev and Christov. All this shows the long pre-history of the theory of RIP.

The analysis reveals the place of RIP in science: the vibration is a concretization of the movement, resomality-of the interaction, isomorphism—of the general, resology and isology are integrating sciences between philosophy and the other sciences.

A separate point is dedicated to the interaction and the contraries because the analysis up to here reveals their main features: dichotomy and polarity (the result is a geometrical progression  $2n-1$ , 2, 4, 8 ...— and the connected with it octaves), seventh (there are seven kinds of interactions between the contraries), transitional process, compensations, vibration, resomality etc. It is shown that the octave division is found in hearing, sight, EEG, interreception, psychology, genetics crystallography, nuclear physics and astronomy. The division is connected with the arithmetic square, Pascal's triangle, binomial coefficients, geometry of multidimensional spaces, Fibonacci's order, the golden section and its manifestation in nature. A new solution of the coloured music and the basis of a new type of analysis, called by the author octave-chromatic analysis are suggested.

### PART III

#### RIP and the contemporary scientific picture of the world

##### Chapter 5. The Man—known and unknown

Some new features of the life, man and society are shown here.

At the beginning it is revealed the complete analogy between psychics and holographical damages. They are used as a base of the conclusion that psychics has holographical functioning. Correspondences between brain elements and holography are found and a conclusion is made that the material bearer of psychics and consciousness is not on the atomic-molecular level, but that it has a field nature. It is the cross field of the electromagnetic and other fields and particles connected with the neurones. The holographical mechanism and the field bearer convincingly and simply explain most of the enigmatic properties of human psychics in particular those which are studied by the parapsychology.

Later is discussed the thesis that belief as a psychical state is the means of the organism to mobilize its unexpectedly great resources.



It is appealed towards the separate studying of the psychical state "faith".

After that is revealed the relation of RIP with the yoga and para-psychology. An opinion is stated that the science accepts a part of the yoga's knowledge but still it is incapable of accepting the other parts due to their depth.

The next pages show the isomorphism between the periods of the history and the levels of the culture or between the diachronical and the synchronical structures of the culture.

All this is connected with the old thesis that according to his structure and functioning man is isomorphous to the Universe. New scientific data supporting this statement are revealed. It is stated also the hypothesis that the concepts "movement" and "life" are equivalent in a definite point of view.

In the end are given the physical models of some philosophical concepts and categories like system, contraries, evolution etc. The models create interesting questions and hypotheses. After that is revealed the idea that the future philosophy will be the united science of the future while the other sciences will be its holographical protections.

#### Chapter 6. The World in Calmness and Movement

At the beginning is given the contemporary understanding of the concepts ether, vacuum and substance. It is shown that there is not yet a clear understanding of these concepts.

Later is analysed the concept "energy" and is shown that it is a system property. A new definition of energy is given. The close relation between energy and information is revealed in a new aspect. After that is given a new and completely generalized definition of the concept "information". After a short review of the contemporary definitions, approaches and theories of the information its main feature are revealed: origin, function, purpose and transformation. Their analysis widens our understanding about time existence of the objects, about their physical boundaries, about the reflective apparatus of the living and non-living objects and about the ahoexistence (another existence) of things. A new definition of the information is stated at the end. The ontological role of the information is revealed.

In connection with information is shown the presence of isomorphism between the different properties, radiations etc. of the things and of the processes. A new concept is introduced—the natural-isomorphous information (natisition). The distribution of this phenomenon is nature is studied.



On the next pages is suggested the prerequisites which should be used for building the common theory of forces and for the classification of the elementary particles. On this basis a physical model of the world is suggested and through its mathematical analysis the formulas of gravitation, electromagnetism and of the nuclear (approximately) forces are derived. A number of consequences which can be found out by observation and experiment or theoretically are revealed. The model simply and convincingly explains the waves properties of the elementary particles and denies the contemporary understanding of the corpuscular-wavely dualism in the statistical quantum mechanics. There are given arguments contrary to the contemporary understanding of the same dualism. According to the author the material bearers of the contraries are different. In this case the elementary particles are the bearer of the corpuscular properties while the surrounding vacuum of the wavely ones. The particles create waves in the vacuum by pulsation.

In the end is given the contemporary world's picture which is got up by the RIP and the science.

At first is discussed the question who has to create the picture of the world—it is philosophy in connection with the other sciences. Earlier this role was played by the nature-philosophy which today is sharply but groundlessly criticized. Some of the "crazy" hypotheses which have already been stated in science are revealed. Some of the main principles and laws of building of the world are discussed. A model of the world is suggested.

The base of the world is the ether-substance which is a continuous medium with particles pulsating in it. These pulsations create on the different levels of organization of matter, the different forces by which the particles interact and increase their complexity. It is assumed that the substance is cyclically active. One of its main properties is its endless memory. During the active period elementary particles appear which have (according to the author) four main movements which create all forces. The world create different levels in its evolution and each of them has its own scale of space, time, speed, frequency and its main processes: physical (including chemical, physiological...), emotional, mental... Each "elementary" particle is looked upon as a micro universe, which is an anoexistence of the macrouniverse.

In the appendix are given the parameters and characteristics of the vibrations and of the vibrational systems, nondiscussed in the main text; some facts seventhness in the nature; authors and terms index. Bibliography has more than six hundred titles.



## IO

## Universal Religion With Special Reference to Hinduism

Mita Basu

Religion as one of the oldest cultural institutions of mankind has been present at every level of human society. But in some periods in the development of religion, the essential part of religion have become overcrowded with dogmas and rituals that it has become difficult to distinguish the essential part from the inessential.

The existence of God is common to all the religions of the world. But the philosophers, the sages and the priests have defined God in many contradictory ways. They have pronounced Him impersonal, beyond attributes and again personal, with form and again without form. Hence divergent religions have arisen. These divergence have acted as barriers between different religions and are main causes of all sorts of conflicts including bloody battle.

The greatest need of our present day is the mobilization of the universal religion. Universal religion lays stress on the essential unity of all the great religions of the world.

Some thinkers can find a certain kind of remedy in communism, utilitarianism or humanism for existing inequality. They are right to certain extent in protesting against inequality and ill conceived practices. They may temporarily solve certain economic or social problems, but they cannot go deep into the problem and the conflicts and frustration will remain unless the inner life and moral attitude of the people are changed.

"Brotherhood of all men, irrespective of race or nationality is the ideal aim of universal religion, Vivekananda has said that end of all religions is the realisation of God in every soul. A civilisation based on justice cannot last long. The true believer in God loves lowmen as he loves himself and his dear ones. An ide



religion is that which will be equally acceptable to all minds which will not destroy the individuality of any man in religion, and at the same time shows him a path of union with all others.

But today each religion of the world brings out its own doctrines and insists upon them as being the only true ones through fanaticism. Each religion talks of universal brotherhood but it receives only its own followers as brothers with open arms, without making any distinction but anybody who is not its followers will not be admitted into the brotherhood. The followers of each religion are like those of blind beggars who try to describe the elephant in their own ways and think that their descriptions are right. The universal religion does not mean a dogma but it means the realisation of the fact that all religions of the world expressing the same truth in different ways.

The study of comparative religions offer great opportunity in strengthening the concept of universal religion. By studying comparative religions, it has been found that every religion has some truth and therefore some value. An ideal religion, according to Swami Vivekananda, "If there is ever to be a universal religion, it must be one which will have no location in place or time, which will be infinite, like the God it will preach, and whose Sun will shine upon the followers of Krishna and of Christ, or saints and sinners alike. It will be a religion which will have no place for persecution or intolerance in its polity, which will recognise divinity in every man and woman, and whose whole scope, whose whole force will be centred in aiding humanity to realise its own true divine nature.

Now the important question arises, whether such a universal religion is ever possible or not. The answer to such question is that there is a light of hope in Hinduism. But this Hinduism is not of Gods and goddesses or of brahmins worship which has largely kept the masses sleeping and ignorant. It is the metaphysical aspect of Hinduism, the religion of the Vedanta which accepts all the possible forms and modes of religion and sees truth behind every form.

Hinduism aims at knowledge of truth which can be a direct realisation (tattvadarsana) and so it is called the vision of truth (darshana). It is called Sanatana Dharma, a religion coming down to people through eternity. In Hinduism, God is not a bygone personality, but is everywhere and in everyone of us. It is not associated with a definite personality claimed to be its first originator or founder and has not any definite text which is regarded as its basic religion text. It is based upon the collective wisdom of a whole spectrum of great people who, by dint of their spiritual power and spiritual realisation laid down certain eternal and permanent truths which will never change.



Hindusim is not only a religion with some fixed doctrines and dogmas but a social system (Varna-dharma) and a culture too based on certain sound eternal universal laws and principles. The Hindu view of the individual and his relation to society can be best brought out by a reference to the threefold discipline: first is the fourfold object of life (purusartha), which are desire and enjoyment (kama), interest (artha), ethical living (dharma) and spiritual freedom (moksa), second discipline is the fourfold order of society (varna), which are—the man of knowledge and learning (Brahmin), of action and power (kshatriya), of skilled productivity (Vaisya) and of service and manual labour (sudra). Here we have to remember that the system of caste or varna should be based on the merits of the individuals and not of births. In the 13th verse of the 4th chapter of the Gita, Lord Krishna clearly says : (Chaturvarnyan maya shrishtam gunakarma vibhagsha) i.e. the fourfold varna was created by Me by the differentiation of guna and karma.

And the third discipline is the fourfold succession of the stages of life (asrama) which are student (brahmachari), householder (grihastha), forest recluse or hermit (vanaprastha) and the free super-social man (sanyasin). In the words of Dr. Radhakrishnan, "By means of the threefold discipline, the Hindu strives to reach his destiny, which is to change body into soul, to discover the world's potentiality for virtue and derive happiness from it. The approach to this goal must not be too sudden and immediate for all individuals. It has to be reached through progressive training, a gradual enlarging of the natural life accompanied by an uplifting of all its motives. The rule, the training and the result differ with the type of the individual, his bent of life and degree of development".

Hinduism firmly believes that the essential nature of man is spiritual. The bodily aspect of man is only external and superficial. Action done with a sense of attachment (kama) is the root cause of man's continued involvement in the chain of birth and rebirth. If one wants to be liberated from this chain, he will have to be free from kamas, i.e. attached egoistic action.

Man is a complex of will, intellect and emotion which have given rise to willing, knowing and feeling. Different people attain the goal of salvation by these three different paths—detached action (karma), knowledge of truth (jnana) and devotion or love (bhakti). These three (karma, jnana and bhakti) ultimately stand synthesised. This synthesis is called yoga, i.e. the union of the individual with the Absolute. It means tranquility of soul, balance of mind (samatva). For variety of mind and inclinations, different paths are given to attain the goal of salvation in Hinduism.



Hindu belief in God ranges from polytheism through pantheism to monotheism. In Hinduism man tries to approach God and that is why, Hinduism is full of worships. Hindu monotheism retains the belief that though God is one, he has various manifestations in many gods. The one reality is called in different ways (Ekan sad vipra bahudha vadanti). As the supreme God cannot be known easily, we resort to aspects of the supreme and offer our worship. Hindus worship idols of God, because all forms are forms of the One Supreme, their worship is the worship of the Supreme. Here again we have to remember that Veda does not expound any dogma or religion. It is record of spiritual experiences connected in symbolic language. "Sri Aurobindo has said that the Vedic hymns represent a religion with a double face—one for the ordinary man wedded to outer ceremonial and ritual and the other for the initiate. All the details of the ritual carry this double sense. For instance, 'Sacrifice' or 'yajna' which is the central object of the hymns is capable of a double meaning—outer ritual and an inner psychological sense in which one did sacrifice internally. Agni one of the chief gods would then be the 'flame of fire in the altar and the 'will' ablaze in the heart, the inner altar. Surya would mean the solar entity and the God of illumination and higher knowledge.

In Rig Veda, the organic unity of the whole universe has been visualised for the first time in human history. There is no fight and no antagonism between Vedanta and any other system in the world. Hinduism, the most ancient religion has influenced Buddhism and indirectly it has also influenced Christianity through the Alexandrians the European philosophers of the Middle Ages. In India, Hinduism has been tolerating all religions of the world since immemorable days. And since Independence, India has been sheltering different religions of the world under secularism i.e. Sarva-dharma Samabhava. Indian Government have abolished ploygamy for the Hindu only. On the other hand they have refused to ban cow slaughter. Dr. Radhakrishnan has rightly said, "As a result of this tolerant attitude, Hinduism itself has become a mosaic of almost all the types and stages of religious aspiration and endeavour. It has adopted itself with infinite grace to every human need and it has not shrunk from the acceptance of every aspect of God conceived my man and yet preserved its unity by interpreting the different historical forms as modes or aspects of the Supreme.

In Hinduism man has been given a very high status. The concept of nara-narayana is amply speaks of the godly status that man has been given. Hindu dharma is in fact a manav dharma. There is the noble idea of the oneness of mankind—vasudhaiva kutumbakam



Vedanta claims that the basis of all our ethics and morality and doing good to others without expecting any results and return is the manifestation of the infinite oneness in human nature. This is summed up in Vedanta as Tat Tvam Asi, "Thou Art That". In the words of Vivekananda "That art one with the Universal Being, and as such, every soul that exists is your soul, and every body that exists is your body".

Now the question arises that if our culture and philosophy of life is really so great then why have we not risen above others. Here we have to remember that for many centuries, we had been dominated by invaders and foreigners. The missionary mania continued unabated in the country. But Hindus and Hinduism always represent and stand for Satvic forces i.e. righteousness. Tamasic force or aggressiveness and ambition is just not its way of life. Hinduism has been often accused of its caste system, But in the case of other religions, there prevail different sects within a religion and there is a severe discrimination among the status and family tradition of the people. Each have their own groups, sects, family traditions and will think twice before marrying outside that group. It hunts more in other religions which reject casteism than in Hinduism which is more open about it. Instead of converting others to Hinduism, it has accommodated others within itself. As there is no Hindu church to regulate the Hindu society and as Hindus have never tried to convert others to Hinduism, Hinduism has not gone outside India except Nepal. In the words of Sri Aurobindo "India has always existed for humanity and not for herself and it is for humanity and not for herself that she must be great". Could there be a more emphatic declaration of universal brotherhood and mutual regard and tolerance than what is given in the following Vedamantra.

Janam bivrati bahuda bibrachasang nanadharmanam prithvi yathaukasam  
i.e. many people who speak different languages, support different ideologies, subscribe to different religious beliefs and perform different duties, live on this earth like a family. Thus Hinduism proclaims the divinity in each human being, the essential unity of all religions and the brotherhood of the family of men.

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## II

### *Value and Morality... The Content of Freedom*

C. M. P. Oniang'o

#### INTRODUCTION

From the Sartrean existentialist viewpoint, existence is a challenge to the individual who accepts it. From this conceptual framework, it is argued, if freedom is to be meaningful, it must be practical, that is it must be acted upon and utilized in the authentic creation of our Being and Essence. In this paper an attempt will be made to relate value and morality to freedom.

If it is true that all men have projects or at least act upon various goals but only those goals which originate from within the individual's freedom and that he claims authorship of and responsibility for then Sartre will call these authentic, all the rest he considers inauthentic. What distinguishes authentic acts from inauthentic acts is a matter of content, or if you will, the motives behind one's actions. In *Being and Nothingness* Sartre distinguishes between two types of motives for human action—those done in "bad faith" and those done in "good faith". Bad faith characterizes the content of inauthentic existence, while good faith characterizes that of authentic existence.

Bad faith might best be described as a defence mechanism created to protect ourselves from our freedom and to block ourselves from the burden and responsibility of our freedom by viewing ourselves not as a being-for-itself, but as a being-in-itself. It results from a lack of courage to accept ourselves as our freedom. To protect ourselves from our freedom, we objectify ourselves and others by viewing ourselves as simply another thing-in-the-world. We deny the burden of our freedom for the false security of holding ourselves to be a thing, rather than an essence-creating human being. In this respect, therefore, "bad faith" does not come from outside to human



reality...it is not a state. In *Being and Nothingness* (89), it is stressed that consciousness affects itself with bad faith. The individual in bad faith is both the deceiver and the deceived, the obvious implication being that to deceive myself, I must first be aware of the truth from which I am deceiving myself, or else there can be no deception.

Bad faith is then a way of living which one *chooses* to live in order to avoid the burden of creating one's Essence and the fear of being responsible for it. It is an escape or flight from human reality and human being, the denial of man's responsibility to his being free, the denial of his authenticity, and the rejection of his potentiality to become that which he is-not. In other words acting authentically and acting in good faith are then one and the same.

Acts of good faith are then those acts which coincide with human reality and man's freedom. Freedom is each individual's responsibility, and can only be authentically expressed in each individual's approach to *his* situation. Consequently there is no one set universal criterion for good faith. The criterion must ultimately and subjectively be that of the individual.

### FREEDOM IS ANGUISH

Freedom for Sartre is anguish in the sense that it (freedom) is manifested in the anguish that accompanies man's nothingness, and this anguish reveals to man that he is free. There is also a concomitant obligation to remake the Self which makes men aware of his being and the need for an authentic commitment to his being, that is, the commitment to other which he is-not. If each man is to be the author of his Being and Essence, it follows that he must act authentically upon his freedom, otherwise what he becomes is not his creation, but the creation of another.

If his freedom and values are to be meaningful, then he must have the courage to be the author of his actions and Being, to have it any other way would mean that he was plagiarizing, his existence and authorship would *ipso facto* reflect the values of others. The difference between his being the author of his Essence and his being the creation of another is the exact difference between the authentic being of good faith, and the inauthentic being of bad faith. The authentic man accepts the burden of his freedom and becomes the self-creating author of his Essence and values, he is committed to his nothingness, the anguish of his radical subjectivity and finitude, and he is the man who has the courage to accept the total responsibility for his Being and his becoming that which he is-not.

Most men find freedom to be a nuisance; they lack the courage that is needed to accent the anguish of being free, they fear it and



refuse it. They look instead to the others for security and being. They find it easier to let others guide their lives and make decisions for them, thus thinking that they have alleviated themselves from the burden of their freedom and the responsibility of creating their Essence. Instead of becoming committed to themselves as their values, they seek refuge in the values and commitment of others. This only serves to accent their freedom, for the choice of servitude and bondage over one's authorship of his essence and existence is possible because men are free to make such choices. In a sense one chooses "his values" in choosing the values of the other, but if they are not identical with his authentic values, appraisal of the situation then accepting them would be an act of bad faith.

Bad faith can then also be looked upon as a lack of courage that is necessary if one is to accept the responsibility for one's values, in that the individual that acts in bad faith does so with full awareness that he is acting contrary to his beliefs and values.

Each individual stands in relation to the world and others as a free-creating being in each situation the individual encounters he will place some value upon it—even if it be nothing more than a feeling of indifference to the situation. If the individual's values are to have meaning, they must be acted upon, and it is how the individual's values stand in relation to his actions that his acts are asserted to be whether acts of good faith or acts of bad faith.

But a question might be raised, might not the individual hold the same values as those held throughout by the majority of the society? This certainly seems to be an everyday occurrence. Therefore, when an assertion is made that the authentic man is the man who acts in good faith, that is the man who acts upon his values it should be realized that his values may coincide with the values of the society, and that conformity to a set of values may result from an authentic agreement of each member of the society upon the same value (s).

That my values coincide in many respects with those of the other members of the society or the majority of the members of the society does not necessarily imply that I have either chosen the values of the other in bad faith or that the values I have chosen, which happen to coincide with those of the society, are inauthentic. Expressions of my values only become inauthentic when those values which I act upon are in truth, not my values, not an expression of my values but the values of some other. Inauthentic acts, that is, acts of bad faith, are acts that I perform which are not based on my values, but are acts which are *knowingly* contradictory to the values I hold.



Therefore, it is incumbent upon each person to examine the values he holds in relation to his situation in the world, and to judge for himself whether or not those values authentically represent his values. If they do not, then to continue to act upon them would only lead to acts of bad faith, for once one learns that he is acting contrary to his existential innocence, and to continue to act upon the values of the other is to act in bad faith.

### GOOD FAITH AND FREEDOM

Acting in good faith then also seems to imply necessarily that one knows that the values he is acting upon are, indeed, his values. If consciousness is intentional and the means by which man is led to assert himself authentically upon the world and other human beings, it necessarily follows that the authentic man intentionally (*knowingly*) chooses those acts which reflect his values. Therefore if a man is said to be acting in good faith, he must *knowingly* be acting upon his values. These values may or may not be the values held by the others(s) but in either case the important distinction is that in good faith one *knowingly* acts upon his values and in bad faith he *knowingly* acts contradictorily to his values and chooses instead to act upon the values of the other.

The essential part then of acting in good faith comes from the reason for acting in conformity with one's own values. On the other hand, bad faith originates in the denial of one's freedom and values. This may result from the fear of accepting the responsibility for one's freedom and values, or from a lack of courage which results in either a flight from one's values and freedom to the values of another or a denial of one's relationship to the situation.

One may also deny some of his own values for other values he holds to be more significant. In such a case one is not acting in bad faith with regard to some of the values he is denying rather he has chosen in good faith (or bad faith if it is for the reasons we have already discussed) a value(s) which he holds to be greater than the ones he denies. For example, I may value excitement, but I value my life more. So while I think that driving down the wrong side of the road might be exciting and has a great deal of value, as far as excitement goes, I may choose not to do it because I feel that it would put other lives in danger as well. I may in good faith choose to follow the traffic rules rather than jeopardize my life on the lives of others. Sartre would agree that human dignity is man's greatest value. All other values will become secondary to it, and that the man who acts in good faith will in the final analysis be the man who acts from the value of human dignity upon others who have the right to the same value(s).



Man's flight to the security of the other is never totally successful because he can never wholly objectify himself from his being. Inevitably he will find himself in a situation which will differentiate his being from the being of others. He may again choose the values of the other over his own, but once he becomes aware of the dichotomy that exists between his values and the freedom and values of the other, his existential innocence is lost, and the anguish of his freedom comes upon him like a "thunderbolt. Each time that he chooses the values of the other, he denies his values and existence, each time that he prostitutes his freedom for the values of an other he finds "that he must be what he is not (an object) and not what he is (free), Sartre (p. 112).

Man is best advised to be committed to the anguish of human existence and accept his freedom. This is good faith which is a commitment to that which makes man what he is—his essence as a free-value-creating creature, and the acceptance that he can never Be, for his nature is free only because he is not able not to be found in existence are only what my freedom recognizes as valuable. Man does not simply decide that such and such will have value, rather he "recognizes" it to have value from his relationship in the situation that he encounters it.

Freedom is the power to consider things not only as they are, but also as they are not, that is, to differentiate between what is and what is-not. In making these differentiations man comes to place his values upon the world and other things in the world as either wanting, that is, lacking in his being, or not wanting and such disclosures become a judgement and value-making endeavour.

Freedom is its own freedom. Since man is never completely divorced (free) from his freedom, there can be not act of human being that is *completely* inauthentic. Human existence gets its value from the fact we are free to become that which we hold to be our authentic being; indeed, our freedom necessitates the need for maximizing our potential to become that which we are not. Hence each choice that we make has a double value; first, its value as a choice that we have made, and second, its value as part of our accumulating Becoming. The first value is that of our motive for choosing it. If the move is an authentic expression of our involvement with the situation, then it becomes an expression of our good faith and an authentic creation of our human-being. The second value is a derivative of our commitment and responsibility to the first value of our freedom and becomes significant and meaningful only when it is acted upon.



Man's freedom gives life to meaning and significance in that it creates human values: were man not free, life could not have values, for everything would simply exist. Freedom not only gives life meaning and value, but it also implies that men should in turn value his freedom and place his potential to become in the light of his freedom thereby creating other values in the world.

The contention in this paper is plain and simple, that values are objectively discovered (contrary to the wide-spread classical philosophical thought), but rather, values are subjective manifestations of the individual's essence creating process towards Becoming. Values thus disclose man's authentic relation to the world and others and cannot (and should not) be reduced to mere facts. Values are not static, but are rather, dynamic inventions and expressions of freedom that engulfs human being. Man is, in this sense, the author of his values because he is the author of his Essence. He intends his world through his values and becomes his intentions only when he acts upon them. He can only claim as an expression of his values those deeds which he is responsible for creating and doing. Though values are created by the individual towards his essence, their real value only comes when they are acted upon. One's actions upon his values are not private, but public, that is, they take place in a world that is composed of others. Freedom and value(s) of freedom are the focal points of the doctrine of morality.

### CONCLUSION

The projection of one's values through one's action with respect to others is in essence an expression of moral values. An individual's interaction with others, based on freely formed authentic values of the situation are expressions, of the individual's moral relation to the other. Human existence has value, namely, as a human being. Human dignity never denies the rights of the other to act upon his freedom or create his Essence, nor does it deny the individual's responsibility for his Being. As such human dignity is the value of being human, of being able to choose one's Essence and act upon the other as an authentic value-creating being. It is the sense of pride that one can take in the creation of his Being and in acting in good faith, it is the sense of pride that one gets from standing in an authentic relationship with the other and treating the other not merely as an object in the world but as another human being. This is the basis that makes man a moral being as Sartre puts it, "nothing can be good for us, without being good for all". (*Existentialism*, p. 17).

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## AN ANTHOLOGY OF PEACE

We are herewith inviting submissions of articles on Peace. The emphasis of this collection will be on innovative approaches to the problems of violence and its manifold manifestations in our world, while avoiding over-specialization.

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## Book-Reviews :

**Morton A. Kaplan**, ed., *Global Policy: Challenge of the 80s*; Washington: Washington Institute for Values in Public Policy, 1984. vi+281 pp. no price indicated.

The editor contributes essays on Europe and China in addition to his opening "Global Policy". Other contributors include Donald Hafner on Europe, Edward Azar on the Middle East, Tetsuya Kataoka on Asia, Rolando Bonachea on Central America and Richard Rubenstein on religion and public policy. Commentaries are contributed by Alexander Shtromas, Douglas Macarthur II, and Smith Hempstone.

The papers were presented in a conference in 1981 and revised for publication at the end of 1982. Hafner's paper was added, Bonachea's paper grew out of the Central American Task Force of the Institute. The papers are largely critical of Press. Reagan's foreign policy which is essentially no policy which continues the lack of consistency from previous Republican and Democratic administrations. Reagan's rhetoric has alarmed our allies though his actions have been more prudent than his rhetoric. In fact, however, the complete disjunction between words and actions are part of the problem. The emphasis has been anti-Soviet virtually without regard, and at times in complete ignorance of other factors such as local poverty, ethnic tensions, regional needs. This, however, suggests there is a policy but it does not have much to do with the realities of the different areas, the individual nations or the needs of the people. The result is a betrayal—a continuing betrayal—of American moral values.

In each of the areas discussed, some of the players have now changed, been assassinated, etc. But the problems remain essentially the same. In fact, part of the value of this book is its review of the background of each area and American policy or lack thereof. The problems have been there for decades.

Another value of the book is for comparison with American policy or nonpolicy today which also remains the same. The major critique is set forth in Kaplan's opening claim that the United States needs a *global policy*. Regional realities need to be considered in relation to the proposed global policy. This includes a strong defense to be sure but it also includes a clear concern to consider the needs of



others, including helping undeveloped nations with their problems of poverty, illiteracy etc. This is a major focus of American moral values—genuine help for others.

This indeed provides a strong defense against Soviet expansionism but the emphasis is on human need and not merely anti-Communism. The latter has included support for inhuman murderous regimes worse than the Communists, in utter violation of American values. In the process, American reactions and concessions have played into the hand of the Communists and supported the very system we are supposedly protesting.

This volume should be read by all who are directly involved in American foreign policy. But in a democracy, foreign policy should be the concern of all Americans. It is a matter of democratic values and humane concern with the welfare of others, first and foremost. But it is also a pragmatic issue. On the one hand, we have gone deeply into debt to build an enormous military machine, presumably to hold off the threat of international communism. On the other hand, we support Communism through diplomacy, grain sales, machine tools, favored nation trade status, loans at lower interests than available to tax payers and favorable business deals.

Henry O. Thompson  
Philadelphia

Paul P. W. Achola & Arthur K. Msimuko, eds., *Development Through Self-Reliance in the SADCC Region*: Proceedings of the 7th PWPA Conference Eastern, Central and Southern Region; NY: PWPA, 1987. v+170. \$7.95.

The South African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) consists of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe (the map on p. v is helpful). Their primary purpose is to get out from under the control of the Union of South Africa. The essays here consider several potentials for such a program. Sharing resources of money and information, e.g., libraries, is one way. Many centers have been set up to train managers but centers lack money and trained personnel. Sharing could eliminate overlapping and do what the centers were set up to do.

The same is true in colleges. One nation could focus on engineering and another on agriculture, etc. Occupational testing (general ability tests, dexterity, reasoning, aptitude, personality) suffers from the same problems of duplication of effort with too few resources. In addition, centers are using tests from European countries,



## Book-Reviews :

sometimes adapted, usually poorly. So there is need for tests designed there for the people there.

Life-long education ("Continuing Education") is essential for self-reliance. But people also need to learn to read. Illiteracy is high. Programs suffer from lack of trained personnel, transportation, funds. "Distance" education—media, correspondence, etc. — has helped some but population growth has out-distanced the distance education so there are more illiterates than ever. There are practical problems involved such as planting trees now to provide fuel and timber needs in the future. Imported oil and other fuels are too expensive for most households. There are numbers of problems, in addition to the population explosion. Efforts to help self-sufficient small scale farmers have made them dependent on government agencies.

While a goodly part of the present situation stems from the colonial inheritance, several authors note Africans are now responsible for what is happening or not happening. Some proposed actions are a bit unrealistic, e.g., talk of computer programs when over half the people can't read. If farmers have trouble getting products to market because the roads are bad, it would seem to make sense to fix the roads rather than trying to fix the farmers. At least one author is aware that educated women marry later and have fewer children. If excess population is a problem, the obvious solution is to educate the women, who could teach their fewer children to read. While shortage of funds is mentioned, there is no corresponding recognition that vast amounts of money have been spent, e.g. on fancy military hardware. One author acknowledges that people in the present system need moral training in honesty and commitment more than high technology solutions to regional problems.

Henry O. Thompson  
Philadelphia

**Keith D. McFarland**, *The Korean War: An Annotated Bibliography*; NY: Garland, 1986. xxxiv+463 pp. \$72.00.

This is vol. 8 of a series of bibliographies on "Wars of the United States" under the general editorship of Richard L. Blanco. The latter calls McFarland's annotation of over 2300 entries, "terse colorful summaries of the rich literature on the subject". The author provides a comprehensive and yet selective bibliography. It is comprehensive in terms of books, articles and dissertations. It is selective in not including for the most part, newspaper and weekly news magazine articles in the time of the conflict. A map, and a 7-page chronology of the Korean War is very helpful. McFarland also makes



a number of helpful comments in his introduction. For example, the importance of the war can be seen in the million deaths and two million injured victims and thousands missing and never accounted for. U.S. casualties included 33,629 dead in combat, 20,617 dead injuries and disease, and over 150,000 wounded in what was called a police action but which was obviously a war.

He cites confusion, frustration and problems caused by a limited war—the first since the Mexican-American War over 100 years earlier. This was compounded because the individuals directly involved were frequently unable to examine the whole matter in an objective way. As a result, he notes a most useful insight. “It ordinarily takes a minimum of twenty years for any nation to begin to place a war in its proper historical perspective”. Korea was only five years after World War II and a mere 12 years elapsed before out next war in Asia, Viet Nam. The result was more blunders than necessary. He goes on to recognize that it is more likely that the U.S. will fight another or more limited wars than an all-out nuclear war. Right or wrong, he has a point and it follows that “it is essential that we study both limited conflicts (Korea and Viet Nam) and learn from both”.

This reviewer would add that we need to study both not only so we learn how to fight a war, but so we can learn how to win the peace. To paraphrase, to learn peace, we must study war. Part of the significance of this bibliography is that it is not narrowly conceived. One gets references on Korea *before* the fighting: There are references to what happened *after* the fighting. There are references to North as well as South Korea. There are references from within, such as the Truman-MacArthur conflict. In this context, one might note that when Truman left office, he was asked to assess his own administration. He responded that it would take 20 years for historians to be able to make an adequate assesment. Now, 35 years after these events; more objective perspectives are possible.

The text is in 22 sections with a number of sub-divisions. There are reference works, general accounts, background. There's a section on the attack and the U.S. decision to intervene, Wartime policy, training the forces (with an interesting sub-unit on women and Blacks in the military), the army, air force, navy, marines, military support systems, are followed by United Nations policy, non-UN forces, the Truman-MacArthur controversy, medicine, POWs, peace negotiations and armistice, Korea during and after the war, the U.S. home front, media, literature and finally—critiques, analyses and consequences. Pro and con entries are presented on all these issues, including the vexed problem of “brainwashing” and whether it is a new or old



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technique and studies of why 200 succumbed to "brainwashing" out of the 7,190 servicemen taken prisoner (2,730 died in captivity).

The work is fascinating in its own right. It is an absolutely indispensable research resource for anyone interested in war and peace in general and the Korean conflict in particular. First rate.

Henry O. Thompson  
Philadelphia

**Sang Hun Lee**, *The New Cultural Revolution and Unification Thought*; Unification Thought Institute, 1987. ii+100 pp. \$4.00.

Several presentations are gathered in four parts: history background, questions and answers, the new cultural revolution (NCR). The first describes Lee's life and search for truth as a medical doctor concerned with larger issues in life. He found many answers in "The Truth of Life" published by the Japanese religion, Seicho-no-Iye. He found all the answers in Unification Thought (UT) including a counter-view to Communism. He has systematized UT as a philosophy. UT wants to unite all religions and ideologies, science and religion, the physical and spiritual worlds.

Part II introduces Rev. Sun Myung Moon, his special revelation and current efforts of the Unification Movement (UM) for this work. Special Unification doctrines are the internal and external form of existence, yinyang (positive and negative) and subject and object relationships. Part III provides answers to such questions as the omnipotence of God, the source of ethics in the Original Image of man and a new critique of capitalism.

The NCR was a theme of the International Conference on the Unity of the Sciences (ICUS). Rev. Moon emphasized the role of ICUS scientists in "creating the world of new culture which must be established at any cost". "Scientists should play a decisive role in building the good, hopeful, future society". The true culture is one of Heart or love through which religion can be unified.

This is a good review in a "nutshell". People who do not know the UM will welcome it as a way of getting into more detailed studies such as Lee's other books. Those who know the UM will find this a helpful review of its main points. This "outline" can serve as a guide to development as the UM fills out the details of the ideal society.

Henry O. Thomson  
Philadelphia



## EAST MEETS WEST

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All correspondence on the Conference should be addressed directly to  
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*Post-Graduate Department of Studies in Philosophy*  
*University of Mysore*

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## I

*Self and Salvation: The Brihadaranyaka*

Lawrence E. Johnson

I often think of the Upanisads as being facets of a gem. This is not to make a trite point about how valuable it all is. The analogy is more substantive. They are different ways of looking at, different ways of entering into, one underlying reality. Each facet is beautiful in its own right-but of course there is no such thing as a facet in its own right. Only the gem is real. All that is real (and valuable) about the facet is the gem, which is more than the facet. So, too, there are phenomena, yet all that is real about phenomena is that which is more than phenomena. So, too, the Upanisads offer us insight into a reality and truth which run much deeper than the words of the Upanisad. They are different, these Upanishads, as the facets of a gem are different, yet they complement one another and allow us entry into that which is fundamental of them all.

The *Chandogya* tells us of the Self, and teaches us that we may obtain it by perfecting our self-knowledge.<sup>1</sup> The *Brihadaranyaka* tells us of the Self, and teaches us that we may obtain it by getting our values in order. Not only are these ways to the same end, they are basically the *same* way to the same end, though explained differently. Other Upanisads teach us about the Self in their own ways, or about the One, which is the Self, but what is of critical importance is that which is fundamental to them all, not their superficial differences:

My dear, by one clod of clay all that is made of clay is known, the difference being only a name, arising from speech, but the truth being that all is clay. (*Chand.* vi, 1,4)<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> I discuss this in my "On the Self: The *Chandogya*", *Darshana International* 25 (1985), no. 3. The current article can be seen as a companion piece to that one.

<sup>2</sup> Upanisadic quotes are taken from the F. Max Muller translation, that being perhaps the most widely distributed.



While profiting from the individual Upanisads, we must look beyond their several forms to that which we may hope to find within.

I propose now to discuss certain aspects of the *Brihadaranyaka's* teachings concerning the Self and Self-realization and concerning what knowledge and valuing have to do with our salvation. In the course of my discussion I shall make reference to certain of the other Upanisads, particularly the *Chandogya*, and I shall also make fairly wide-ranging reference to Western philosophy. It is not my intention to present a complete and adequate account of any of the *Brihadaranyaka's* doctrines, nor could I ever possibly hope to do so. Even so, perhaps I can present certain facets in a different light, as a contribution to a deeper understanding of the underlying significance of Upanisadic thought.

\* \* \* \*

In reply to the question "Who is that Self?", we are informed by Yajnavalkya that the Self is

He who is within the heart, surrounded by the Pranas (senses), the person of light, consisting of knowledge. He, remaining the same, wanders along the two worlds, as if thinking, as if moving. During sleep (in dream) he transcends this world and all the forms of death... On being born that person, assuming his body, becomes united with all evils; when he departs and dies he leaves all evils behind. (*Bri.* 1 v, 3, 7)

One of the things we are told here is that the true Self consists of knowledge, and that by leaving all evils behind we return to knowledge? But how are we to leave evil behind and return to knowledge? How are we to find this Self? What the *Brihadaranyaka* tells us in this passage invites comparison with Prajapati's second teaching in the *Chandogya* (viii, 10, 1), that the Self is "He who moves about happily in dreams". The Self is not to be found as any sort of object of awareness or experience. It is not object but subject, that for whom experiences are. That teaching in the *Chandogya* was, while correct, incomplete, for we must not identify the Self merely in terms of the objects for which it is subject. The would be to identify the Self as the empirical self, and so to bind it to maya, the surface phenomena. The Self is not to be found elsewhere than in the dreaming self, to be sure, nor elsewhere than anywhere we look—for there is no elsewhere—but to understand it we must seek beyond the phenomenal surface. The Self is not the empirical self, nor is it the null-self of dreamless sleep. In his final teaching (*Chand.* viii, 12-15), Prajapati indicates that the Self is that which serves to constitute dreams, and not only dreams but all of this phenomenal world of maya. It is the universal and transcendent One, the ultimate reality



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which is the ultimate ground. For one to liberate oneself, to achieve salvation, one must *know*, without mediation, this ultimate Self. To do this we must, as the *Brihadaranyaka* reminds us, transcend the maya-world and maya-self of our own making, and leave its evil behind.

There are wider parallels between the explanations of the *Brihadaranyaka* and the *Chandogya*, though they differ in detail and in their account of how salvation is to be achieved. In the *Brihadaranyaka* we are told that there are two states.

one here in this world, the other in the other world, and as a third an intermediate state, the state of sleep. When in the intermediate state he sees both these states together... what ever his admission to the other world may be, having gained that admission, he sees both the evils and the blessings.  
(*Bri.* iv, 9)

The Self is present in what is here said to be "this world", the world of maya, though the *Brihadaranyaka* reminds us that there is more to the Self than maya. Not to realize that there is more to it than that is to not progress beyond Prajapati's initial teaching and so to fall into the materialism which satisfied foolish Virochana and his fellow Asuras (*Chand.* viii, 8). The Self is the empirical self as well, but not to recognize that there is more to it than that is mistakenly to identify the Self in terms of its objects. Certainly there is more to the true Self. It is both immanent in "this world" and transcendent, yet it is not exhausted by either aspect of its fullness. On these points the two Upanisads quite united.

The *Brihadaranyaka* tells us that

having the Self alone as his light, man sits, moves about, does his work, and returns... And when he falls asleep, then after having taken away with him the material from the whole world, destroying and building it up again, he sleeps (dreams) by his own light... self-illuminated. There are no (real) chariots in that state, no horses, no roads, but he himself sends forth (creates) chariots, horses and roads. There are no blessings there, no happiness, no joys,... no tanks there, no lakes, no rivers, but he himself sends forth... (*Bri.* iv, 3, 6 & 9-10).

The whole phenomenal world, then, and all the evils thereof have no reality save as the ignorant and mistaken projections of our own Self. To liberate ourselves from the entanglements of maya, to achieve salvation, what must we do? Whereas the *Chandogya* called us to salvation through knowledge of the Self, the *Brihadaranyaka* calls us to salvation through the reordering of our values. I propose now to explore how it is that the way recommended by the *Brihadaranyaka* properly is a way to salvation, and then how it is that it is fundamentally the same way as that recommended by the *Chandogya*. I



hope thereby to bring out some important but often neglected aspects of the Upanisadic doctrine of the Self.

### Values, Self, and Salvation

The *Brihadaranyaka* tells us, as we are told many other places, that we must leave evil behind in order to become liberated and achieve salvation. How is it that coming to have the right values can be effective in achieving one's liberation and salvation? We can appreciate what values have to do with liberation only through having an awareness of what liberation consists of, and we can have that only through an awareness what it is we must be liberated from. What we must be liberated from is the ignorance, illusion, *maya* which we generate, a darkness of our own making. We live in error—error which is both evaluative and epistemic. As I shall subsequently argue, these are not two radically different sorts of error. Ultimately, they converge. Ignorance and evil arise together. For now we shall be concerned with error in its evaluative aspect.

The fundamental point is that we shape the world we experience and we create our own role within it. This is as true of "this world" as it is of any dream world. We get out of the world what we put into it, as the law of karma describes. It follows that we should be very careful what we put into it, by action, by belief, or by valuing. As Yajñavalkya tells us,

A man of good acts becomes good, a man of bad acts, bad...a person consists of desires..., And here there is this verse; "To whatever object a man's own mind is attached, to that he goes strenuously together with his deed; and having obtained the end (the last results) of whatever deed he does here on earth, he returns again from that world which is the temporary reward of his deed) to this world of action'... as to the man who does not desire, who, not desiring, freed from desires, is satisfied in his desires, or desires the Self only...being Brahman, he goes to Brahman. (*Bri.* iv, 4, 5-6)

In order to realize the Self, then, to find *moksha*, we must rectify our desires so that we value only true value in the Brahman.

This brings to mind the doctrine of St. Augustine of Hippo which equates being with value, holding that things are more or less valuable, in degree, accordingly as they are more or less real. We have our being according to the order of our loves. We are as we love, and we perfect our being or fall toward corruption and, literally, non-being accordingly as we love the real and the good or as we love that which is lacking in reality/goodness<sup>3</sup>.

3 In *Epist. Ioann.*, II, 14.



## Self and Salvation:

Hold to the love of God, that you may stand fast for ever as God stands: *for the being of every man is according to his love.*

What is it which is good, that which we ought to value? Augustine's answer is that we must come to know and love the supreme reality, God. That is something one has to learn how to do effectively. The Upanisadic answer is that we must come to know and love the supreme reality, the Self which is the universal Atman/Brahman. That too is something one has to learn how to do effectively. All things which are to be valued are to be valued because of, and only because of, that reality/value/God/Atman-Brahman which is in them. As Yajnavalkya tells Maitreyi,

Verily, a husband is not dear, that you may love the husband; but that you may love the Self, therefore a husband is dear... (similarly for a wife, sons, wealth, cattle,...) Verily, everything is not dear, that you may love everything; but that you may love the Self, therefore everything is dear... Whosoever looks for the worlds elsewhere then in the Self was abandoned by the worlds... Whosoever looks for anything else where then in the Self was abandoned by everything. (*Bri.* ii, 4, 5-6 and again at iv, 5, 6-7)

We must come to know and value the Self, the Brahman, rightly in all things. It is that which is real and that which is valuable in all things. To do this is not just a matter of knowing and valuing the Self, for we may know the Self but not know it in the right way. We may value it, but not in the right way. Anything we know or value is the Self, so much as it is anything at all, yet our knowing and valuing may have as its object the Self only as it is distorted in maya rather than the Self as it is. How then are we to know and value the Self rightly?

We may know about the Self, the Brahman, having been taught about it and having reasoned about it, and we may believe all the right things to believe about it. Yet in itself that is not knowing the Self, the Brahman, but only knowing about it. We may have been taught what to value, positively or negatively and in what order of priority. We may have committed the rules to memory and committed ourselves to following them, yet in itself that is not to value the Self, the Brahman. It is only to value the rules and to value living in accordance with them. Such knowing and valuing is too superficial, touching reality only on the level of maya. In knowing and valuing rightly one goes more deeply. In tandem, each in its own form, the *Chandogya* and the *Brihadaranyaka* point the way for us.

In his highest teaching, Prajapati, in the *Chandogya*, tell us of the Self which, though never acting phenomenally, never thinking or experiencing, and never an object of thought or experience, yet makes



phenomenal action, thought, and experience possible. It is the reality underlying these superficialities. While it is everything about which we can think, we cannot think it in itself. Any conceptualization in terms of which we might think it is one we project on it. To know it we must go beyond conceptualization. Instead of a subject entertaining a thought of an object, a matter of one thing having a certain relationship to another thing, we know the Self, if at all, directly as a matter of identity. We recognize the Self as ourself. We do this not as a matter of identifying this with that, which would still be illicitly to separate that which cannot in truth be separated, but by realizing the non-difference fundamental to subject and object. Cognitive knowledge has its uses, but its ultimate end is the transcendence of cognition into the unity from which subject and object, and all distinctions spring. This is the knowledge which is self-realization. This is the path of knowledge commended by the *Chandogya*. But what does this have to do with the path of value commended by the *Brihadaranyaka*? Not much, if we accept the dogma that there is a radical discontinuity between fact and value, between *is* and *ought*. In Upanisadic thought, though there is no such discontinuity. Rather than rely on Upanisadic authority, however, I shall discuss secular reasons for believing that indeed there is no such discontinuity—that facts presuppose values and values presuppose facts. On this basis we can see that the *Chandogya*'s method, that of transcending cognitive truths into the fundamental truth underlying them, is ultimately the same as the *Brihadaranyaka*'s, that of transcending mundane values into the fundamental Value underlying them.

### Cognition and Value

To see the mutuality of facts and values we might well start by taking a closer look at the nature of supposedly objective fact. At one time much of Western philosophy was in the grip of the pernicious presumption that facts had a purely objective and independent status. If the world was not composed of facts (as Wittgenstein claimed in the *Tractatus*), it at least determined a particular set of them. Facts were there, and it was up to us to come to terms with them as best we could. At the same time, facts *that* so-and-so were treated as linguistic accusatives: we state or believe that so-and-so, and when it is true of the world, what we state or believe is a fact. Facts, then, were thought to stand at the junction of language and the world, with factually true beliefs and statements being true by virtue of objective fact. Fortunately, Western Philosophy is emerging from this naive and too-simplistic presumption. While truth certainly has its aspect of objectivity, we seriously misconstrue matters when



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we presume that objectivity and subjectivity are radically incompatible opposites, or that truth is a matter of us in here taking note of an objective world out there. Any fact has an irreducibly subjective element, no matter how objective it might appear to be.

We are aware of the world, we can be aware of the world, only from *our* Point of view. We shape the world as we are aware of it, and in so doing the world of our awareness is infused with our values. Even prior to the level of thought, our perceptions are shaped according to our makeup as beings and according to our internalized habits, expectations, and objectives). People from different cultures, for instance, may distinguish between colors differently and may see different numbers of bands in the rainbow. And certainly humans perceive the world very differently than do bats.) Our perceptions, like our values, have their roots in what we are and what our needs are. As well as our perceptions we shape our conceptions, and only in small part do we shape them consciously. Our conceptual schemes make distinctions which we (individually or collectively) have found it convenient to draw—relative to whatever interests and purposes we might have. Some things are more important to us than others and we draw our distinctions accordingly. That is why Eskimos have a more elaborate terminology than do Arabs for talking about snow. Our shaping our conceptual systems to fit conveniently with our values is more than just a matter of drawing our boundary lines one place rather than another, and more or less narrowly. Our conceptual schemes, and the facts they conceptualize, are theory-laden. We (again, individually and collectively) build assumptions about the world into our conceptual schemes, these being the assumptions we have found to be convenient relative to our interests and purposes. These built-in assumptions inevitably influence the way in which we experience, think of, relate to, and value the world.

Some of these assumptions or presuppositions, are easier to elude than others, should we wish to do so. That the word 'disastrous' has as its root-meaning "ill starred" need not push those who wish to resist into believing in astrology. We can easily neglect its root-meaning in favor of its now-straightforward application, and if we please we can coin a new term to do the same job without the astrological overtones. Sometimes, though, it is more difficult to avoid the implicit presuppositions, and sometimes it is well nigh impossible. Any conceptions having to do with causality or even with dispositional properties, for instance, turn on a web of theoretical presuppositions about how *things* of various *sorts* *act* under various *conditions*. There is a hoard of presuppositions lurking behind each of



the italicized terms. Consider a dispositional quality such as softness. To say of a thing that it is soft is to say that under conditions of certain sorts it would behave in a certain in a certain sort of way. We think this to be the case because of the way it or relevantly similar things have behaved in the past under relevantly similar conditions. This rests on a mass of assumptions about the uniformity of nature and the regularity of its processes, the nature and continuity of objects, and so on. Without that frame of reference, with its built-in assumptions, the statement can have no meaning.

If we tend to think primarily in terms of things rather than events—or if we do things the other way around—that in itself will alter the whole nature of our relation to the world. Consciously or unconsciously, collectively or individually, we find it convenient to adopt some cognitive frame of reference with all of its theoretical content. Attempts have been made, many of them, to find a means of pure description which does not have any theoretical content, but these attempts have been foredoomed to failure. It had been hoped that by starting with pure phenomena—thought to be sense-data, or something of the sort—we could find means of describing them, and of analyzing things in terms of them, without lapsing into theorizing or into arbitrary ontological commitment. A coin, for instance, was to be considered as a construct out of visual and tactile phenomena. There are many problems just with the phenomenological analysis of the coin. For example, allowance has to be made for the fact that coins look or feel very different under different conditions. We must make allowance for that, yet still distinguish the coin from other things. Not even in principle has anyone ever succeeded in giving a phenomenological analysis for even a coin, let alone the world around us. The moral seems to be that the world does not just tie itself together in some automatic fashion. We ourselves *have* to tie the world together—and in so doing we add elements of preference, theory, and ontological commitment. Whatever the raw material, the world of our experience is in large measure *our* world.

Some frames of reference are better than others, and we can, in some measure, alter our cognitive frame of reference, though we can only go from one theory-laden frame of reference to another. Moreover, we can preserve any portion of a frame of reference which we wish to preserve, whatever may befall us, so long as we are willing to make compensatory adjustments in the rest of our cognitive frame of reference. Some people go to extremes and see virtually everything in terms of their own pet ideas/values—be they about economics, astrology, nutrition, psychology, religion, righteousness, or whatever.



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If we are determined to preserve our pet ideas/values, we can defend any of them if we are willing to pay the price. We can even contrive a cognitive frame of reference which allows us, consistently and coherently, to maintain the belief that we live on a flat earth, though any such frame of reference seems to me to be excessively inconvenient for general purposes. Absurdly but conceivably, for someone the most important, the most morally imperative, thing might be to eat parsley on Thursdays, and they might build their beliefs, values, and life around the over-riding moral significance of parsley. People have maintained values which were much more at variance with reality than that. We may not go to extremes at all—though how can we tell what is an extreme? — but however we think about the world we must do so in terms of *some* cognitive frame of reference which incorporates some balance of ideas about things and how they interrelate and behave, and what their significance is. Our cognitive frame of reference is not just permeated by our values but is an expression of them. It is not merely that we develop certain concepts, such as those of softness or causality, because we pay attention to certain things which are relevant to our interests and purposes. It is more than a matter of where we find it convenient to draw the lines. In developing and interrelating our concepts into a cognitive frame of reference we express what we, for the most part implicitly rather than explicitly, take to be important about the world. Important, that is, with respect to our own interests and purposes. Our values are not merely, if at all, what we say or think we value. That is only the surface. Our values are expressed in the orientation and drive of our life-process as a whole. We express them in the way in which we act and in the way in which we think, consciously and preconsciously. The world is there, but our way of fitting to it is *our* way, manifesting the values which are central to our being in the phenomenal world.

## A Note From Physics

Before I go on to consider the way in which values presuppose facts—as well as vice versa—I think it would be appropriate to point out another way in which pure objectivity breaks down. Recent findings in physics, particularly in quantum mechanics, have reinforced the conclusion that the subject-object distinction is, ultimately, untenable, and that we in some measure contribute to the features of (hitherto) supposedly objective reality. As Fritjof Capra put it, in a widely celebrated passage,<sup>4</sup>

A careful analysis of the process of observation in atomic physics has shown that subatomic particles have no meaning as

<sup>4</sup> Fritjof Capra, *Tao of Physics*, Shambala, Boulder, Colorado, 1975, pp. 68-69.



isolated entities, but can only be understood as interconnections between the preparation of an experiment and the subsequent measurement. Quantum theory thus reveals a basic oneness in the universe. It shows that we cannot decompose the world into independently existing smallest units. As we penetrate into matter nature does not show us any isolated "basic building blocks", but rather appears as a complicated web of relations between the various parts of the whole. These relations always include the observer in an essential way. The human observer constitutes the final link in the chain of observational processes, and the properties of any atomic object can only be understood in terms of the object's interaction with the observer...In atomic physics we can never speak about nature without, at the same time, speaking about ourselves.

Again, the conclusion must be that the world of our awareness is *our* world. We permeate it in its entirety, giving it determinate being with our own being. Thereby we shape it in truth and in value. Reality integrates both self and non-self, both subjectivity and objectivity—as the Upanisads tell us, both Atman and Brahman. This is not to say that we make the world whatever way we want it to be, just by wanting it to be that way. For one thing, to say that would be to, once again, posit a too-sharp distinction between subjective us and objective world. Moreover, our impact on the web is, while essential, not unlimited. It is the world of *our awareness* which we shape—but it is still *the world* of our awareness. Our impact would become total only were we to realize our Self as the unlimited Brahman, and not as our finite selves. What there is is neither fully objective—nor fully subjective—nor is it fully the unity of subjectivity and objectivity until we realize the world as the Brahman, the self as the Self.

### Value and Cognition

Our beliefs and our concepts presuppose and incorporate values. Yet it is no mere matter of our beliefs and values resting on our values. We must bear clearly in mind that there is a reciprocal mutuality, for our values presuppose and incorporate beliefs and concepts. Values are intelligible only within a framework of putative fact. We cannot value anything without having some idea, however minimal, of the world. If we value one thing (event, course of action,...) over another, it can only be on the strength of some assumptions we have about what is in the world, or is possible, and how events might go. If one's value is mere self-gratification, one must have some level of awareness of one's self and some conception of some things being conducive to its gratification. Our values may not be entirely coherent. One may desire to have one's cake and eat it both, and we may do so in ways that are not so obviously self-defeating. We may misunderstand the world and pursue mutually conflicting instrumentalities as we pursue our goals.



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More grievously, and more crucially so far as values are concerned, we often misunderstand our own self and how it fits into the world and what is conducive to its fulfillment. We mistake what is good for us because we mistake ourselves. We mistake what is of value in general because we mistake the world as a whole. We focus on what appears to be good for our individual self because we do not recognize that our true Self is the Brahman. Mistaken values rest on false presuppositions.

The error in which we find ourselves, the misapprehension, the *maya*, has twin aspects—error of belief and error of value—but at root it is one error. At root it is distortion in our awareness of reality, though that distortion can take many forms. We achieve Self-realization, *moksa*, as we free ourselves from those distortions. I maintain that the true Upanisadic doctrine is that the eradication of one of those sorts is the eradication of those of both sorts, and so that the doctrines of the *Chandogya* and the *Brihadaranyaka* are ultimately to be identified. The *Chandogya* concentrated on one aspect, error of belief and its rectification, while the *Brihadaranyaka* concentrated on the other aspect, error of value and its rectification. Fundamentally, though, the problem and its solution remain the same. Undistorted Self-realization is the realization of true knowledge and it is the realization of true value. So Prajapati links right desire and right understanding:

The Self which is free from sin, free from old age, from death and grief, from hunger and thirst, which desires nothing but what it ought to desire, and imagines nothing but what it ought to imagine, that it is which we must search out, that it is which we must try to understand. He who has searched out that Self and understands it, obtains all worlds and all desires. (*Chand.* viii, 7, 1)

So Yajnavalkya links right desire and knowledge, when he tells us that the Self is

the person of light, consisting of knowledge... when he departs ...he leaves all evils behind. (*Bri* iv, 3, 7)

and that the one who is

freed from desires...desires the Self only, his vital spirits do not depart elsewhere, ...being Brahman he goes to Brahman, On this there is this verse; "When all desires which once entered his heart are undone, then does the mortal become immortal, then he obtains Brahman". (*Bri.* iv, 4, 6-7)

So the other Upanisads, in their own way, also associate Truth and freedom from evil—as when, for one example, the Teacher in the *Talayakara*, or, *Kena* Upanisad tells us.

The feet on which that Upanisad stands are penance, restraint, sacrifice; the Vedas are all its limbs, the True is its above.



He who knows this Upanisad, and has shaken off all evil, stands in the endless, unconquerable world of heaven, yea, in the world of heaven. (*Kena*, iv, 9)

We are beings with wholeness, and in maya we are distorted in wholeness. Our beliefs and values, conscious and preconscious, are inseparable aspects of us and our awareness. For us to achieve Self awareness they must be rectified in unity.

The true knowledge and true value go together may seem very difficult to believe. May not a very knowledgeable person be morally corrupt? May not a morally very good person be not very knowledgeable at all? Must we identify moral error with factual error? These difficulties are apparent rather than real. Moral and factual error are both distorted apprehensions of reality. They are different forms of distortion, but to entirely remove one sort of distortion would be to entirely remove both sorts. It is true that a relatively very knowledgeable person might be immoral, and might even prefer to be so. Yet such a person is still of limited knowledge. Absolute knowledge would rule out immorality, for it would rule out the limited point of view and limited self-identification which is the source of immorality. No one, Socrates told us in the *Apology*, knowingly does evil. One may know that one is doing wrong and prefer to do so, but the full knowledge of the nature of one's Self and one's acts would rule out wrong doing. Again, one may have a good will and do good so far as one is able to comprehend the good—yet fully to pursue the good and fully to value it would require that we know the Self, the One, and know what there is about things that makes the good good. In order truly to value the good we must understand it truly. The highest knowledge and the highest valuing, then, are to be found as one in the Self-realization of moksa, as we free ourselves of the distorted knowledge and distorted values of maya.

### One, Many, and Moksa

The world of which we are aware, this phenomenal world of ours, is *our* world. We shape it, infusing it with our distinctions and values. This raises some critical questions. Is the world of our awareness only a maya world, woven from differentia and values which are spun only from our own ignorance? Are there no differentia or values which are not the illusions of ignorance—or are there such in reality? Is it possible to go beyond the veil of ignorance to find reality as it is, undistorted by illusion? On this last question the Upanisads give us a definitive answer. No, we cannot go to reality, for reality is not elsewhere. We realize reality, realize our Self, in realizing that we are it—*Tat tvam asi* (*Chandogya* vi gives us this formulation no less than



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eight times)—without the intermediation of belief, attitude or cognitive frame of reference. The *Brihadaranyaka* and *Chandogya* recommend ways—ultimately, the same way—of achieving this realization and elsewhere we are given alternative explanations. As distinct from that, interpreters give us genuinely different accounts of that reality/Self and its realization. It is agreed of course that words cannot capture or adequately express these things, but there are different accounts of *why* words cannot do so. By better understanding why a certain line of interpretation is *not* correct, I believe, we can better understand the way to that realization and better understand why those of the *Brihadaranyaka* and the *Chandogya* are the same.

Reality is one, the Upanisads tell us. Division is only apparent, always there being unity underlying what appears to be division. Does reality's being undivided imply that it is *undifferentiated*? There is some apparent reason for thinking so. For one thing, that we in our ignorance differentiate according to our own conceptions and values, and that we are aware of no differentia save that which fits into our cognitive frame of reference, suggests that differentia are only the unreal illusions of ignorance. But if differentia have no standing in reality, then how is it that there can be even the mere illusion of differentia? If the differentia are not in reality, then there must be differentiation in our ignorance (not necessarily the same differentiation) to cause our differentiated illusions. Indeed, our ignorance includes our illusions and must be differentiated if they are. Ignorance is certainly not truth, but it and its differentia must have some standing in reality if it is to cast a veil of false differentia over reality and so obscure the Self from the Self. The standard reply to that, of course, stoutly advocated by Shankara and the other Advaita Vedantins, is that our ignorance, and with it our differentiated illusions, are not properly real. Neither the differentia nor the presumed cause are real. They back this claim with further argument that differentia must not be properly real. All differentia is a matter of duality between this and that, yet underlying every duality is a more fundamental unity. It follows, the Advaita Vedantins maintain, that on the most fundamental level, reality is an undifferentiated unity. Which of these lines is correct is still a matter of controversy.

If the Advaita Vedantins are correct, if reality/Self is an undifferentiated unity, it follows, as I shall outline, that the paths of the *Brihadaranyaka* and the *Chandogya* to moksa are ultimately the same. Still, I argue that the Advaita Vedantins are *not* correct, that reality/



Self is differentiated. If this is so, the paths to moksa of the *Brihadaranyaka* and the *Chandogya* are still ultimately the same (as I shall also argue). However, if we do recognize that reality/Self is differentiated we can develop a richer understanding of how they are paths to moksa and why they are ultimately the same. Let us, though, first of all take it that Advaita Vedantins are correct in maintaining that reality/Self is an undifferentiated unity. Moksa is gained by recognizing our unity with the One, undistorted by the beliefs and values of maya. We recognize this unity—*Aham Brahma asmi*—but certainly not at the cost of thinking of it as an object of thought. “I am Brahman”, for that would be to divide identity with concepts. Rather, we recognize the identity undistortedly and without division, by dissolving the mediation of ignorant beliefs and values. Our distorting beliefs and values are obliterated into absolute uniformity. *Aham Brahma asmi*, and all of the other Upanisadic teachings, are means by which we may find our way beyond those and all other teachings to where we are the Brahman just by being it—without language, thought, preference, or mediation of any sort. This requires, as the *Chandogya* teaches, finding the unity of being underlying the superficial differentiation of phenomenal thought. It requires as the *Brihadaranyaka* teaches, finding the unity of being underlying the superficial evaluations of phenomenal thought. Either way, we must find the Brahman by dissolving the distortions of maya.

Let us suppose now that unity admits of differentiation and that the One is not undifferentiated. That there can be differentia in the Brahman will of course appear absurd to those who believe that differentia imply division and disunity. To that point of view a differentiated Brahman would be a One that was not one. It is arguable however that differentiation need not entail division, disunity, or discontinuity. A differentiated unity may remain whole, and be the richer for its differentia. I maintain that this is indeed the case, but this is not the place to consider whether the one point of view or the other incorrect<sup>5</sup>. Our concern here is to assess the consequences of this view for our current discussion of the teachings of the *Brihadaranyaka* and the *Chandogya*. To accept the view that reality is differentiated is not to commit us to accept the clearly false belief that the particular differentia we impute to reality, and presuppose in our cognitive schemes, are accurate. So long as our outlook is limited, and so long as our values are based on a limited self-conception and a limited world-view.

5 I discuss the point at some length in my “Oneness and Truth”. *Darshana International*, vol. 16 (1976), no. 3. In various forms this was, of course, a major point of dispute between various schools of the Vedanta.



the differentia of our cognitive schemes will be those of maya and not those of reality. We will still need to dissolve the differentia of maya and know the Brahman by being it. Our mediated knowledge shaped by our cognitive schemes must still give way to the immediate knowledge of being the Brahman. The difference is that the false differentia of *our* contriving must give way not to an undifferentiated uniformity but to the unmediated differentia of the Brahman as it is. This we can see as the rectification of knowledge or as the rectification of value—these being finally the same rectification.

Even the best of cognitive knowledge has its limitations, as we certainly know, and such knowledge can approach truth in the Brahman only as an asymptote which it can never reach. Our mediated knowledge must give way to immediate Truth. Even so, some cognitive knowledge has more value than other such knowledge. It may be a closer approximation to the Brahman, though falling short, and it may lead us closer to moksa, though no words can convey us finally to that realization. If the Brahman were undifferentiated then the closest approach cognitive knowledge could have to truth in the Brahman would be its closest approach to being entirely lacking in content—which would seem like no approach at all to the immediate knowledge of being. If the Brahman were differentiated, however, then the closest approach cognitive knowledge could have to truth in the Brahman would be its closest approach to having its differentia match those of the Brahman—though there would always remain the gap between the mediated and the unmediated. So long as we remain limited by our own finite particularized perspective, our knowledge cannot possibly match the Brahman. The best we could hope for is that we might match it more closely—that is, with a perspective less distorted—so that we might better try to make the leap from mediated to immediate knowledge. Once we achieved moksa our knowledge would no longer be the mediate knowledge of a cognitive scheme, and could not possibly be captured within any limited cognitive schemes, no matter how purified. Still, that the Brahman is a differentiated unity fits very congenially—more so than the contrary view—with the doctrine of the *Chandogya* that knowledge of the Self, and thereby moksa, is to be found through insight into the *basis* of our differentiated awareness. It also fits more congenially with the doctrine of the *Brihadaranyaka*.

There is no place for our petty, limited, distorted values as we find unity in the Brahman through moksa. They must be discarded as maya. "He who worships the Self alone as dear, the object of his love will never perish" (*Bri. i, 4, 8*). Even so, short of moksa some values are better than others—being better by virtue of being an



expression of a better comprehension of the nature of the self and its place in reality, and (thereby) better by virtue of bringing us closer to moksa. It is possible to value the Brahman in husbands, wives, sons, wealth, and other things (*Bri. ii, 4-6 and vi, 5-7*), the critical point being that we must value them for the reality of the Brahman in them. We must not value their limited maya being as an object for our own maya-self. Valuing things rightly can bring us closer to the Brahman. This would be true whether or not the Brahman were differentiated. Either way the teaching of the *Brihadaranyaka* converges with that of the *Chandogya*. Still, if we do take it that the Brahman is differentiated we again get a more natural interpretation. Then, values would have relative merit so far as they approximated those implicit in the Brahman as it is. As we sought to value the Brahman in things, that would give us something on which to attempt to focus. It is difficult to bring the featureless into focus.

This is not to say that one could achieve moksa just by drawing up one's scheme of values appropriately:

Here they say: "If men think that by knowledge of Brahman they will become everything, what then did that Brahman know, from whence all this sprang"? (*Bri. i, 4, 9*)

This applies to valuing as much as it does to knowing. Cognitive schemes and valuative schemes alike presuppose a distinction between subject and object. Moksa demands that we transcend all distinctions. This requires insight and it requires that we dissolve our own values, mediated by the distortions of maya, in favor of the immediate being of Brahman wherein value is one and realized. There is still the shift from the mediate to the immediate. If the Brahman is a differentiated unity, though, true value has an implicit nature which we can aspire to attain. It then becomes a matter of dissolving the impediments and distortions which limit our own dharma, and allowing it to fulfill itself as the true dharma of the Brahman.

### Self and Dharma

*Dharma*, let us recall, according to the original meaning of the word is "that which holds together". Ultimately, of course, that which holds together is the Brahman, which is, identically, true being, immediate truth, and realized value. Accordingly, dharma is understood as the law of value as well as the law of reality. Value, truth, and being are inseparable in the Upanisads and in all of Vedic thought. Each of us has our own dharma, it should be noted. That is true in a double sense. Since—*Tat tvam asi*—each of us is the Brahman, The Dharma is our own dharma. Also, we have our own limited and distorted identity in maya; Our maya-self has its own maya-dharma, that which holds it together in its own type and level



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of being. In maya we have our own values, explicit and implicit, our own awareness of reality, our own identity. That, of course, is maya, illusion, and must be transcended in reality. In realizing our Self we realize our true dharma as the fulfillment of our maya-dharma.

We must bear in mind that there is more to our values than is immediately apparent, as indeed there is to every other aspect of our dharma. Our values are not just matters of attitudes we have, beliefs we hold, or opinions we entertain. They run deeper than that. It is in fact quite possible that we might be mistaken in our beliefs about what our values are, and we might never discover that we are mistaken, or we might do so only partially and only under extreme circumstances. Our values are a matter of the nature and orientation of our entire being. They are not something which we *have*, they serve to constitute us and make us what we are. The same can be said for our beliefs, for our grasp of self and reality is not given just by our thoughts on such matters. Like our values, our beliefs are integral to what we are and give rise to our awareness. Our beliefs, our values, our entire being is one self--of which our awareness of belief and value is only the surface. We are beings with depth as well as surface and must be considered in our entirety. In distortion this is true of our self in maya, and in reality it is true of our Self as the Brahman. In coming to realize our true Self we must come to realize true knowledge and true value. While the distortions of maya do not qualify the Brahman as such, they qualify every layer and aspect of our nature as limited beings in maya. As we attempt to achieve moksa, then, we must seek to rectify the distortion in all layers, and not just on the surface of our knowing and valuing.

There are many ways to the final end, and we may pursue it concentrating on asceticism, action, knowledge, or value. Any of these can bring us to the goal, as we are told in another writing:

Renunciation and discipline of action

Both lead to supreme weal...

Of reason-method and discipline as separate, fools

Speak, not the wise;

Resorting to even one of them, completely

Man wins the fruit of both. (*Bhagavad-Gita*, v, 2,4)<sup>6</sup>

To be effective, though, they must be pursued in the right way and address the depths of our being. What we allow or deny ourselves, what we do or refrain from doing, what we think or think we believe—these things are of very little moment in their own right. They are

<sup>6</sup> I use the translation by Franklin Edgerton, Harvard, 1944.



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of significance only to the extent that, as means, they help us to rectify the distortions in our maya being and help us realize...immediately and in full depth—our self as the Self. When we realize our being, truth, and values as those of the Self, our dharma will be the Dharma and we will have found our salvation. Whether we accept this teaching or reject it, it is, I believe, one of the central teachings of the *Brihadaranyaka*.

As all waters find their centre in the sea, ...As a lump of salt, when thrown into water, becomes dissolved into water, and could not be taken out again, but wherever we taste it is salt, —thus verily, ...does this great Being, endless, unlimited, consisting of nothing but knowledge, rise from out these elements, and vanish again in them. (*Bri. ii, 4, 11-12 and similarly at iv, 6, 12-13*).



## 2

*Proper Names and Identifying Descriptions**P. R. Bhat*

Not all descriptions help us to identify the object referred to. Some descriptions, in some contexts serve the purpose and in some other contexts they turn out to be mere descriptions. Some others never serve as identifying descriptions and some always serve as identifying descriptions. 'The man with curly hair' in a context where there is only one person who has curly hair would serve as an identifying description, in some other context where there are many with curly hairs, this description obviously does not serve as an identifying description. 'A perfect triangle', 'totally free human being', in no imaginable contexts can turn out to be identifying descriptions, while 'the tallest mountain', 'the first woman to climb the Everest' serve always as identifying descriptions. Those which always and those which never serve as identifying descriptions are generally not problematic in the context of the theory of reference, but those which sometimes serve and sometimes do not serve as identifying descriptions have been the source of many philosophical controversies.

Identifying descriptions are unique, and hence different from other types of descriptions. In contrast to what are generally known as definite descriptions, the identifying descriptions do not describe a unique aspect of a thing, but they describe the shared attributes of a thing which happens in a context to be true of only one individual object. In other words, a definite description will always have, if at all it has, only one object as its referent; while, an identifying description always will have one and not more than one referent at a time, but the referent can change depending on the context. 'The first prime-minister of India' can be used to refer to only one individual, where as, 'The prime-minister of India' can be used in a context to refer to any one of the persons who had been in that position. The former is an example of definite description and the latter is an



example of identifying description. The identifying description 'the prime-minister who emphasized most, the importance of modern Science and Technology for India's Development' happens to be true of Pandit Nehru till today, but could cease to be true of him in future. But it will remain as identifying description of some one or the other so long as India does not cease to be a democratic country with the present form. While a definite description like 'the first prime-minister of India' can only be used to refer to Pandit Nehru and no one else; no future course of events can alter this.<sup>1</sup> A definite description is context free in the sense that one can begin a discourse by using a definite description, or provide it as an identifying description without specifying the contexts in which it should be used; whereas, an identifying description is not context free, and only within a context of discourse can it get specified to an object referred by the identifying description.<sup>2</sup>

On this understanding of identifying descriptions, ostensive definitions also turn out to be identifying descriptions. Within the perceptual field of the hearer who has certain linguistic competence, pointing to an object is in effect the same as providing identifying descriptions. Some of the observations the hearer makes about the object or the person would serve as an identifying description. Since the ostensive definition can be provided only within the field of the perception of the hearer, such a definition cannot remain as identifying description of the object in a different context. Thus, the identifying description 'the person whom I met a moment ago' would not remain as an identifying description in no other context, but only in one particular context.

In a context, when one provides very many descriptions of an object, some of them or some combinations of them turn out to be identifying descriptions in a context, and in such cases there will be no compulsion that one should provide any criterion. What is implied in this is that mere descriptions are not enough for identifications unless they are accompanied by an identifying description, or a definite description, or an ostensive definition. A person having some linguistic competence would know which description is to be taken

- 1 Note that one could consistently hold the view that no future course of event could alter the truth value of a sentence and yet maintain that the truth value of the sentence may change when looked at the same thing from a different perspective.
- 2 H. Putnam does not consider these indexicals as identifying descriptions, but as rigid designators, see p. 127 ff. in *Naming, Necessity, and Natural Kinds*, S. P. Schwartz (ed.) Cornell University Press, 1977.



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as a criterion for the identification of an object and which one to be treated as a mere description.

No tautologies and analytic sentences can serve as identifying descriptions. A tautology gives no information about the state of affairs and an analytic sentence provides only relationship of meaning and rules among the words that form the sentence but not anything about reality. An analytical sentence, even if a proper name occurs in it, does not give any information about the state of affairs. For example, the sentence 'Pandit Nehru is either a male or a female' would at best show that there is a certain kind of logical relationship between the words 'male' and 'female' and how it applies to the human beings, but it says nothing about Pandit Nehru.<sup>3</sup>

From our discussion so far, it is clear that only definite descriptions, identifying descriptions and ostensive definitions can serve as criteria for the identification of the referent of a proper name. To say that criteria are needed for identification does not amount to claiming that descriptions do not serve the purpose of criteria or to say that a set of criteria need to be provided first as a condition and only then the words which are proper names can be used in a discourse.

We do not provide criteria for the identification of the referents of the names that we mention at the outset. I might speak of someone first and provide identifying description to my hearer only if it is necessary. When I am asked the question 'whom are you talking about?' I may reply by saying 'The person whom I have in mind.' Kripke would consider this answer as unsatisfactory for the reason that the hearer cannot identify the person.<sup>4</sup> Such replies carry the hearer no where. Apart from it being a form of self expression, there would be no other significance to this statement. It is a truism that one is talking about someone whom one is thinking about. Otherwise, the speech is not counted to be sensible. If there is no form of relationship between what one thinks and what one speaks about, or if one could speak without thinking altogether, it would be a strange world. For similar reasons Kripke thinks that the descrip-

<sup>3</sup> Contrast the Kripkean condition of a criterion not being circular. For similar reasons, Kripke rejects any description which is question begging as proper criteria for a proper name. See S. Kripke, 'Naming and necessity'. Putnam considers that the world 'this' in an ostensive definition would be rigid. H. Putnam, 'Meaning and Reference' in *Naming, Necessity and Natural Kinds*, p. 128.

<sup>4</sup> S. Kripke 'Naming and Necessity' Lecture I in *Semantics of Natural Language* edited by Donald Davidson and Gilbert Harman, D. Reidel 1972, pp. 253-284.



tion provided for identification should not be circular.<sup>5</sup> It should not be of the form, for example, 'who is Einstein?', 'the one who has propounded the theory of relativity'; 'who has propounded the theory of relativity?', 'It is Einstein'.

Surely, if a speaker can refer to someone whom he cannot identify, a speaker can refer to someone whom he can identify but the hearer cannot. It is quite absurd to maintain that the hearer knows for sure whom the speaker is referring to more than speaker himself. Normally, what the speaker says is accepted, unless we have reasons to suspect the motive of the speaker. But if we suspect the speaker's claim, we need a theory to account for his behaviour, and yet another theory to determine the referent of the expression mentioned. If the given descriptions are not identifying descriptions, we normally ask the speaker to be more specific. And it is the speaker who decides to be more specific and give one description instead of another while specifying and providing us with an identifying description. This indicates that in normal circumstances, the speaker is the best authority to provide proper identifying descriptions. In the absence of the speaker, one has to root one's answer in a perspective in determining the referent of a proper name. In the example of Ibn Khan' discussed by Evans, whom does this name refers to would depend on the perspective; on one perspective 'Ibn Khan' is the name of the person who conjectured the mathematical proofs, and on another perspective, it turns out to be the name of the scribe who inscribed the mathematical proofs much later.<sup>6</sup> It depends on very many factors as to which perspective would be accepted in a given situation.

Not in all cases will the speaker be clear as to whom he is referring to. For example, when someone says 'Someone must be the author of the Vedas', not necessarily one means that a single person in a decade wrote whole of the four Vedas, but certainly one means that the Vedas must be the outcome of enduring human efforts and no details about the authors are available. Here, both the speaker and the hearers may not have any specific person in mind when they spoke of 'the author of the Vedas'. Among the scholars, there is a controversy regarding the author of the Vedas; one group of scholars maintain that Hiranyagarbha is the author of the Vedas, another group maintains that it is Prajapati.<sup>7</sup> Nyaya philosophers maintain

5 K. Donnellan also talks of such condition which he calls 'question-begging'. See 'Proper Names and Identifying Descriptions' in *Semantics of Natural Language Naming*, pp. 365 f.

6 G. Evans, 'The Causal Theory' in *Naming Necessity, and Natural Kinds*, p. 210.

7 S. C. Chatterjee and D. M. Datta: *An Introduction to Indian Philosophy*, University of Calcutta, 1968, p. 323.



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that it is God who is the author of the Vedas<sup>8</sup>, where as, Kumarila, a Mimamsaka philosopher maintains that there cannot be authors for Vedas<sup>9</sup>, yet another group of Sankhya philosophers believe that the Vedas are the culmination of the intuitions of the enlightened seers<sup>10</sup>.

According to some thinkers, not necessarily the speaker need to know the referent of a name he uses. Harrison, for example, in explicating such a situation maintains that even if the speaker does not know anything about the referent, he manages to refer to that particular thing or being because of the socio-linguistic conventions adopted by his community for the use of the name. And this is possible according to Harrison because proper names are rigid designators<sup>11</sup>. Similar is the account of Putnam, and he also invokes the concept of socio-linguistic conventions for the use of proper names and explains how a speaker manages to refer to one individual rigidly even if the speaker has no identifying descriptions or criteria<sup>12</sup>. Though Evans and Kripke recognize the real possibility of the speaker referring to someone contrary to what the majority of people of the community would attach a name to a person<sup>13</sup>, they would accept the causal account of names and maintain that the speaker refers to the person which the community would generally attribute the names to. The causal theorists who maintain that proper names are rigid designators would not accept any possibility of using a name without rigidly referring to a particular thing or being.

We may add here by saying that a proper name which has become the common vocabulary of a community would be a rigid designator because of the socio-linguistic conventions. Socio-linguistic conventions of natural languages is that a proper name is used as a rigid designator, though not in a literal sense that it will rigidly designate the person in all possible worlds, but in the sense that there will be only one person by that name, and even if there are more than one, the community knows how to distinguish between them.

<sup>8</sup> M. Hiriyanna, *Essentials of Indian Philosophy*, George Allen and Unwin (India) Private Limited, 1973, p. 101.

<sup>9</sup> M. Hiriyanna, *Essentials of Indian Philosophy*, p. 139.

<sup>10</sup> Chatterjee and Datta, p. 279.

<sup>11</sup> B. Harrison, 'Description and Identification', *Mind*, 1982, pp. 326-27.

<sup>12</sup> H. Putnam, 'Meaning and Reference' in *Naming, Necessity, and Natural Kinds*, S. P. Schwartz (ed.) Cornell University Press, 1977 pp. 125-26.

<sup>13</sup> G. Evans, 'The Causal Theory of Names', pp. 212-14. See also S. Kripke, 'Naming and Necessity', pp. 298-99.



One way this is normally achieved is by adding a surname to a proper name, and naturally even if we use the same word again and again to name different persons, they would be rigid designators if the surnames are different. Though the house numbers in different streets are the same, they achieve the status of proper names, because, one attaches the number of the street and the postal code along with it.

To claim that a proper name stands for a person or a place or a thing in contrast to a common name which does not stand for any thing in particular is to admit the rigid designation theory. That is the reason why if two persons want to vote in a general election against a name in a voter's list, we suspect that there is something wrong. Kripke, Donnellan and Putnam or for that matter Harrison do not seem to make any questionable philosophical point when they claim that proper names are rigid designators. We do not think for that matter Frege, Strawson and Searle have denied this simple point either, and even Russell, Quine would agree with this thesis that a proper name stands for an object.

We do not believe in Kripke's contention that the theory of Strawson, Searle or Frege can be reduced to the theory that any one who fits the description of Aristotle best is Aristotle. We believe that Kripke has misrepresented the contention of these philosophers. The important conclusion that can be legitimately deduced from the philosophical position of Frege, Strawson, Searle is that Aristotle would fit best the correct description of him. In fact, the very attempt of a cluster theorist to find a unique object or a person for each name is an indication that he uses proper names differently than the common names. Given the socio-linguistic conventions pertaining to proper names, which all of us are aware, it is unreasonable to think that any one held seriously the cluster theory view. To know that a speaker has used a name as a proper name, often the contextual clues are enough. In the cases of nick names, occasionally it becomes difficult to isolate a proper name from other words; however, in all other cases it will be amply clear that the word is a proper name and *ipso facto*, it stands for only one thing.

The main difference between a cluster theorist and a causal theorist does not lie in accepting or not accepting whether each proper name stands for a unique object, but in their account as to how this rigidity is achieved in the actual use of a proper name. The question: What is the role of identifying descriptions in the context of reference by using the names? is pertinent to both the theories. Apart from other things, a cluster theorist would believe that a definite description is the best guide for identification. When a cluster of descriptions are provided, some description may turn out to be



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mere descriptions, and hence, may not be useful for identification of the referent. It may happen, that certain descriptions in the cluster are unique, and thus identification of the object is possible, but some cluster of descriptions may be such that no one description could be unique, and yet some conjunction of them would turn out to be a definite description. A causal theorist would require, on the other hand, tracing the causal chain of transfer of the name from one person to another ultimately leading to the original baptiser in order to fulfil the non-circularity condition<sup>14</sup>. And in any case, if the causal chain is lost, one needs an independent criterion to fix the reference again.<sup>15</sup>

Though Kripke is very critical about the theory of meaning proposed by cluster theorists, he is quite sympathetic to their theory of reference. He recognizes the merit of cluster theory only in certain cases of proper names,<sup>16</sup> but maintains that this theory does not account for majority of the cases of proper names. In the case of the theory of reference, Kripke also recognizes the necessity of a criterion at one stage or another to fix the reference. To sum up his claims :

(1) The cases of ostension and initial baptising do not need any criterion to fix the reference.

(2) Where there is no non-circular causal chain ultimately leading to the original source, there is no need of criterion for the use of a proper name.

(3) Where the causal chain is broken, an independent criterion need to be provided to fix the referent again.

In the first case, it is trivial to provide any criteria for the use of a proper name, since, the hearer is also in a position to provide a criterion for the use of the name. The cases that belong to the second category have the advantage of using the same criterion used in the initial baptism if the causal chain is not broken. In the case of the names that fall in the last category, it is stated, an independent criterion need to be provided. This is to say that every proper name must have a criterion to fix the reference according to Kripke, though the speaker may not be in a position to provide them at a given point in time<sup>17</sup>.

14 'Naming and Necessity', p. 301.

15 'Naming and Necessity', p. 297.

16 See Kripke, 'Naming and Necessity', pp. 290-91 and p. 301, especially his examples of 'Jack the Ripper' and 'Hesperus'.

17 This concession to provide a criterion subsequently after checking with the person from whom the speaker has learnt the name



We may advance the following arguments in favour of the position that a criterion for a proper name is a contingent attribute of the object designated and hence the criterion cannot be taken as necessary :

(a) The claim that a criterion for the use of a name is necessary could be made if and only if one could show that the mode in which the object is referred is essential for the reference of that object. And such situations obtain when proper names are defined in terms of the identifying descriptions of the objects. Such names are nothing but disguised descriptions, and hence they are not the genuine cases of proper names. Kripke cites an example of this kind. One may decide for oneself and say— By 'Godel' I shall mean the man, whoever he is, who proved the incompleteness of arithmetic'. Here the term 'Godel' stands for the man, whoever he is, who proved the incompleteness of arithmetic'. Kripke writes further, 'If this is what we do, then if Schmidt discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic you do refer to him when you say 'Godel did such and such'.'<sup>18</sup>

(b) When we deny any property to an object, the resultant statement is not a self-contradiction. No sentence of the form 'This is not such-and-such' would be self-contradictory. And all cases where one could use the word 'this' with appropriate gestures to refer to an object are the cases where one could name the object. All conditions to name an object are met if one is in a situation to ostensively define an object. Instead of ostensive definition one could name the object and make the sentence of the form 'X is not such-and-such'. This is because, 'This is not such-and-such' is a synthetic statement, and hence a statement of the form 'X is not such-and-such' also would be a synthetic statement. That is to say denial of such-and-such property to X does not result in contradiction of self contradiction. And therefore 'X has such-and-such' cannot be either a necessary, or an analytic statement.

(c) Logically speaking, there could always be more than one way of identifying an object. And hence, no one particular criterion is inevitable. One could claim that a criterion is necessary if and

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is based on certain faith in the users of language, what is assumed here is that as a collective responsibility of the users of language, each and every time when one utters a name, one need not provide a criterion to fix the reference of the name. It is assumed that if the need to identify the object in question arises then the speaker would be able to provide a criterion to identify the referent. Under the assumption that the speaker will be able to provide the link between the name and the object, the transaction goes on.

13 'Naming and Necessity', p. 298.



only if one could show that there are no other ways of identifying the referent.

Note here that if one is not aware of any other criteria makes the existing criterion for identification necessary in a pragmatic sense. To think that a criterion is necessary because one does not know any other criterion is a pragmatic sense in which it is necessary. For instance, it is one thing to claim that one cannot take the measurement of the area of a ground in terms of square meters for the lack of meter rod, and another thing to claim that no other way of measuring the area of the ground is possible. When someone says that he cannot identify an object if a certain criterion is not applicable to that object in a context and therefore the criterion is necessary for him to identify the object, it is in the pragmatic sense that the criterion is said to be necessary for the person.

It is one thing to say that a criterion for the use of a name is necessary, and quite another thing to claim that no one criterion is necessary for the use of a proper name. The one who maintains that a criterion is necessary for the use of a name is not necessarily committed to essentialism. If one claims that to use the name 'Aristotle' we need a criterion to fix the referent, then he is not necessarily committed to the position that a particular property of Aristotle is essential for the being of Aristotle. Kripke, of course, thinks that no criterion is necessary, not simply because that there are more than one criterion that are available or possible for any given name, but because a criterion is a contingent property of the object designated by the name.<sup>19</sup> He would insist on a non-circular criterion to fix the reference, but he would not insist on any one particular criterion for this purpose. One cannot reduce this position of Kripke to some form of essentialism. If being the teacher of Alexander the Great is denied of Aristotle, we need something else as a criterion, say, the most successful student of Plato, or the author of *Metaphysics* or anything else which helps us to pick up Aristotle among many other human beings. To mention Evans' analysis, a community which withdraws certain use of a name also simultaneously decides to use the name in some other way.<sup>20</sup>

At least one criterion is needed to identify an object named is a pragmatic requirement. In this pragmatic sense one could say, a non-circular criterion is necessary. Practical problem of identifying an object referred by a name cannot be overcome without having a criterion. However, the debate about the necessity of a criterion in

<sup>19</sup> 'Naming and Necessity', p. 288.

<sup>20</sup> See G. Evans' example of 'Ibn Khan', p. 210.



the context of a proper name does not centre around this notion of inevitability of a criterion, but necessity of a certain property of an object because of which the object is said to be what it is. This metaphysical issue of an object and its necessary attribute, can be presented as an issue of a criterion for identification of an object. However, the pragmatic issue of needing a criterion, and a metaphysical issue of an object having an attribute essentially to be what it is are two distinct issues which have to be kept separate. Nevertheless, these two issues are interconnected. If an essential attribute of an object can be used as a distinctive attribute in a context, that can be used as an identifying description in that context. However, an essential attribute may not be distinctive attribute of a thing always. For instance, the attribute of having valency 79 cannot be used as a distinctive characteristic of golden biscuits in order to distinguish from golden chains. We need different criteria to distinguish between golden biscuits from that of golden chain, and both of them may hardly refer to any essential attribute of gold. Hence a necessary attribute of an object in the metaphysical sense may not serve as a criterion to identify the object in a given situation. One needs a distinctive attribute to identify an object, and what is distinctive of an object solely depends on what it shares with other objects and what it does not at a particular time.

Apart from a very few attributes of things such as the first democratic country in the world, the first man to go around the earth etc., all other distinctive attributes of things are only temporary. This being what it is, an identifying attribute of an insignificant object would only be a temporary attribute of that object. Thus, the metaphysical issue of a necessary attribute of a thing is quite the opposite of necessity of there being a criterion for identifying an object in a context.

Identification of an object without the help of a true identifying description is not possible. A definite description, as we have mentioned earlier, if it is not known to be true, cannot serve as a criterion. Unless a criterion is known to be true, there is no guarantee that a definite description or a description would satisfy the Kripke's condition of non-circularity. To meet this condition of non-circularity, it is in principle possible to trace back the source from which one has gathered the name. Though such an option is open to everyone, it is not obligatory on the part of every one to investigate the real chain of transfer of name which ultimately takes one to the initial baptiser to find a criterion to fix the referent. Even if one finds the initial baptiser who provided a criterion to identify the object while naming the object, there is no guarantee that one could use



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again the same criterion to re-fix the referent of the name, because the object might have changed its attributes since then.

The point that should be noted here is that the cluster theory and the causal theory seem to agree with one another in one respect: if a speaker does not have a criterion to fix the referent, the person is not using the name as a proper name, but only as a disguised description; whereas, if the speaker has an identifying description to identify the object referred to by using the name, then the speaker is in a position to use the name to stand for one and only one object. In general, all uses of names without any criterion to identify the referents are using the names as disguised descriptions for both the theories. Causal theory, which has the elements of both rigid designation theory as well as that of cluster theory would not agree with our interpretation. Following rigid designation theory of Kripke, the causal theory would claim that proper names are rigid designators. Whereas, the causal theory should have recognised the fact that one aspect of meeting the non-circularity condition is not met by those speakers who do not have any criteria to identify the objects themselves. Those who use the term 'Godel' in the example of Kripke, do not meet the condition of non-circularity, but certainly they could meet this condition provided they could trace the causal chain be the baptiser. Therefore, on one line of thinking, Kripke is tempted to say that the person who uses a name without having any identifying description is also using the name rigidly, and on the other, one could persuade Kripke to claim that till one could ensure that the causal chain is not broken, the non-circularity condition is not met, and hence the name is not used as a rigid designator.

Kripke's insight regarding a proper name and its relationship with a definite description is very valuable. Kripke positively believes that the criterion that one adopts to fix the referent of a name is a contingent attribute of the thing referred to.<sup>21</sup> No definite description could be an essence of a proper name or an essential attribute of an object or a person named. This is the reason why one cannot obtain a necessary statement by using a proper name in the subject place in a sentence. This is not to be taken to mean that a sentence of the form 'X is a male or not a male' cannot be necessary, but in such a case one does not use the name to refer to something, but merely mention it in the sentence.<sup>22</sup> When we use a name in a

<sup>21</sup> 'Naming and Necessity', p. 274. See Kripke's example of a meter, also see p. 289.

<sup>22</sup> See L. Linsky's distinction between a use of a name and a mention of a name in a sentence. 'Reference and Referents', in *Philosophy and Ordinary Language* (ed. by Caton) Urbana, 1963.



sentence, the sentence turns out to be a description of the referent, otherwise the name in a sentence can be said to be simply being mentioned. When we use a name in a sentence, we use it referentially, and always something else is predicated of it except in the case of identity statements. Proper names cannot be used as predicative expressions.<sup>23</sup>

The term 'criterion' has to be used cautiously it is not an unambiguous term. Sometimes one means by this term simply a 'symptom'.<sup>24</sup> For example, having very high fever may be taken as criterion of suffering from Malaria. Sometimes, the term is used in the sense that it is a necessary condition for the legitimate use of certain terms, though not sufficient condition. For example, to be recognised as a citizen of a country, there may be certain criteria to be fulfilled. On this reading, a certain prescribed number of years of stay in that country is taken as essential in order to obtain the citizenship of that country though that may not automatically ensure the citizenship of that country. In the context of general terms, the term 'criterion' serves as a sufficient condition for the use of the term, though not necessary. Some of the general terms are such that they have more than one criterion for their use, and even if one criterion is satisfied, the general term is applicable in that context. For example 'game' is such a term that it can be applied to various activities of human beings. That is to say, on the same basis of our concluding that two persons are engaged in chess one could conclude that they are playing games. Chess being one of the games, any criterion that could allow us to claim that chess is being played, one could conclude that a game is being played.

The term 'criterion' when used as an identifying description in the context of proper names has a different connotation than the one when used in the context of nouns and verbs. In the context of a general term, one could claim that the criterion constitutes the rule and thereby the meaning of the general term, whereas, in the context of a proper name, the criterion does not constitute the rules for the use of the term. The designated could be identified with least important and short lived attributes of a name, and hence cannot constitute the rules and the meaning of the term.

A criterion being an exclusive attribute of the thing named in the context of names, if one and the same criterion is claimed to have

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Also note that W. V. Quine makes a distinction between use and mention. See *Philosophy of Logic*, Prentice-Hall of India, 1987, p. 66.

23 See P. T. Geach, *Reference and Generality* Cornell, 1962, p. 34.

24 Wittgenstein's use of the term 'criterion' and 'symptom'. *The Blue and Brown Books*, Harper Torchbooks, 1965, p. 25-26.



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been shared by two names, then one of the following two alternatives are true: (1) The supposed criterion is not in fact a criterion. That is to say, the supposed criterion is a general description which fits more than one object and therefore does not help one to pick up the right object. (2) Both the names are the names of the same thing and therefore the criterion helps one to identify the object in question in either case. When the alternative (2) is true, then the identity statement between the names is true. There is no need to verify whether all the criteria of one name are the criteria of the second in order to conclude that the identity statement between the names is true.

Kripke makes a fundamental assumption that if the designated object exists in a possible world, the designator would designate the same object. This is all right as long as one speaks in the mode of 'possible worlds', but if one tries to translate the same thing in the language of alternative account of the world, then there arise certain difficulties. When we are speaking of a possible state of affairs, we could be speaking of possible states of affairs in which the designated exists, and some in which the designated does not exist at all. Let us limit to only those possible states of affairs where the designated exists. A possible world where the designated does not exist is also our supposition. Given the fact that we are speaking of possible situations with reference to an existant object, we stipulate the attributes of that object that it should have in that possible situation. Thus, in imagining a possible situation we imagine the existence of certain objects with certain attributes and without certain other attributes. A description which is true of Aristotle in a possible situation is true of him by virtue of our supposition. And therefore, 'Aristotle has the attribute such-and-such in a possible world  $w$  is a matter of definition.

What is possible can only be said after one knows what is actual and what are the logically conceivable given the logical and natural laws. This is to say, each possible world, or alternative course of events has to be constructed on the basis of what is actual and what the laws of logic and nature allow us to conceive of. Therefore, necessarily what is possible is something that is conceived and cannot have the status of existants. Something that is possible is not given the status of actual, and once an alternative account of the world is given such a status, the former account is no more called actual.

'Possible world' should not be taken to mean literally that there is some world out there.<sup>25</sup> A possible world does not seem to exist

<sup>25</sup> S. Kripke feels that we could replace this expression by counterfactual situation or any other expression which is less misleading.



any where. Putnam speaks of 'twin earth' to facilitate our imagination regarding the earth in terms of alternative course of events on the earth. Neither the twin earth, nor does the possible world exist any where; they are alternative ways of conceiving of the same world where we live in. Basically it is an issue of identifying the earth with the help of these two conceptions of earth. Given these two conceptions, which one is the most true conception of the actual world is the issue. That is to say, we are in search of the actual world testing out our different conceptions of earth and its inhabitants. In no way one could check the authenticity of a conception of the world without encountering the reality. That is to say, all possible conceptions of earth must have something in common: a definite description which uniquely describes at least one thing around which the whole universe is being imagined. For example, 'This planet is earth' could serve as the agreed criterion that establishes the link between one conception of the universe with that of another taking this definite description as true in both the conceptions.

What could happen is that one is mistaken about the actual world. If that is so, sometimes our view of actual world can be replaced by one of our conceptions of a possible world. That is to say, a possible world is a *conceived view of earth*. A conceived view of earth may become actual and factual if our believed world view is replaced by it. At any given moment, only one view is taken to be *actual* and all other views about the same thing are taken to be *possible*. Given this, at any given point in time, one believes in only one world view and conceives of many other possible world views. No need to add that in all cases of controversies, one's own view is taken to be the actual world and the perspectives of opponents are treated at best as possibilities. Since, no two persons hold identical views of everything in the universe at any given moment in time, it is safe to conclude that multiple perspectives would be prevalent at all time.

Speaking from one's own perspective, the objects that are in the possible worlds would then only be *conceived*. When one says that a counterpart of Aristotle exists in a possible world, one understands it as a conceived existence of a counterpart of Aristotle. Since the possible world itself is something that is conceived, existence of an object in that world is also something that is being conceived while conceiving the possible world. Thus, the phrase 'counterpart of

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See 'Identity and Necessity' in *Naming, Necessity, and Natural Kinds*, p. 82. See also 'Preface' to *Naming and Necessity*, Basil Blackwell, 1972, 1980. We prefer the expression 'alternative account of the world' to 'possible world'.



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Aristotle exists in *w*' could only mean 'we conceive of the world *w* along with the person Aristotle with his attributes'.

It is possible to speak of multiple views of many viewers in which each of them treat one of the views as actual and the rest possible. The main question then would be: what is it that is common between an actual world and a possible world of a viewer and across the viewers? A step towards finding an answer to this question would be this: A view point of what is actual of one person could be identical with a view point of what is possible of another person. Therefore, there is no need of treating multiple view points of many viewers. And hence, it is enough if we answer the question: What is it that is common between multiple viewpoints or possible worlds? Any justified answer to the question would be an adequate answer to multiple points of views of many individuals needing hardly any modification. The points of contact between the actual world and a possible world would be the number of object and their relationships that are taken to be identical between different possible worlds and actual world. A minimum condition to call one an actual world and another a possible world would be that at least one object is common between them. If we conceive of twin earth without there being any common element between them, it would be a different conception of a possible world than the one which Kripke is preoccupied with. It is with respect to at least one object that we conceive of an alternative world or course of events in Kripke's framework, otherwise the possible world is of no use; neither it helps one to establish the necessity of identity statements nor is it helpful in constructing counterfactual situations of any kind to prove a point wrong. For convenience, while speaking of possible worlds, we often speak of only changed view in the alternative world and not every details that are common between the actual and the possible world.<sup>26</sup> If there is not anything that is common between the actual world and possible worlds, then they cannot be world views; they cannot be compared with each other either. In contrast one may choose to imagine the alternative world with all its complexities with just one difference between the actual world and the conceived world.

When we make a definite description a criterion for identifying the bearer of a name by definition, we cannot use the name as a rigid designator. Something similar happens when we suppose something is true of the bearer of a name. A counterpart of Aristotle in a possible world is not identical with Aristotle, be at least for one reason that the spatio-temporal co-ordinates are different. Since the

<sup>26</sup> See 'Preface' to *Naming and Necessity*, Basil Blackwell, 1972, 1980, pp. 15 ff.



name 'Aristotle' cannot have an essence, and no criterion is a necessary criterion, we need to think that all attributes of Aristotle are contingent. Given this, not necessarily a property which Aristotle possesses in the actual world would be a property in a possible world, we cannot suppose anything that is contingent. There is no possibility of supposing that Aristotle has certain attributes in a possible world contingently. Anything that is supposed cannot be contingent. What we can suppose is that Aristotle may or may not have a certain attribute in a possible world. This 'may' gives us certain uncertainty and thus it is less specific as well. However, in contrast to this, we can suppose that Aristotle has certain properties in a possible world necessarily. Thus, what is clear is that necessity can be attributed to the qualities of the objects while speaking of them in possible worlds, but not 'contingency'. The word 'contingent' is applicable only with respect to objects that exist or do not exist, but not to an attribute. Possessing or not possessing an attribute is a contingency about the object, but not of the attributes.

If one cannot speak of contingent attributes of a thing in a possible world, or possible state of affairs, or counterfactual situation, then what we speak of things in a possible world necessarily has what it has in the possible worlds because of the very supposition. We have to speak of Aristotle and his attributes in a possible world  $w$ , then he has these attributes, and he exists in  $w$ . It makes no sense to speak of Aristotle having these attributes in  $w$  and not exist in  $w$  at the same time.

We mean to say that if we suppose that Aristotle is the teacher of Alexander the Great in a possible world, we cannot suppose it contingently, meaning thereby that this particular counterpart of Aristotle in this particular possible world is so necessarily once we suppose this. Whatever is true in a counterfactual situation is true only by supposition, and hence definitional in nature. While admitting a counterfactual situation as factual and the original factual situation to be counterfactual, the roles are mutually exchanged. Formerly, what was taken to be true is taken to be false, and what was taken to be false is now taken to be true while constructing a counterfactual situation. When we state that something is true by definition, it will be necessarily true given the definition. Similarly, suppositions are like definitions in one respect: whatever is said within that particular frame of reference would be true necessarily. If one supposes that a definite description of Aristotle is true of Aristotle in a possible world, then it is true of him necessarily. If I suppose it to be true of the counterpart of Aristotle in that particular possible world, that particular definite description becomes the necessary criterion by supposition



of counterpart of Aristotle in that particular possible world, though may not be true of another counterpart of Aristotle in another possible world unless I suppose it to be true even there. Given this what would follow is that the word Aristotle in that particular possible world cannot be used as a rigid designator, because by our very supposition Aristotle would be the one who possesses certain property specified in our supposition with respect to that particular possible world, though we can use the word 'Aristotle' as a rigid designator in our actual world at the same time. Therefore, the counterparts of Aristotle in different possible worlds would possess different properties and would have different criteria for identification of Aristotle which turn out to be necessary criteria in those respective possible worlds, as a consequence, we cannot use the word 'Aristotle' in those respective possible worlds as rigid designator, except in the actual world.

Then where does the contingency of the attributes of the things in the possible worlds lie? It lies in the fact that the possible world itself is contingent. That is to say, it is a contingent fact that we take one possible world with all its inhabitants as true rather than another. And this view may be replaced by another any time. Let us describe Putnam's twin earth. In earth one, an object has a property *P*, and in earth two, the same object lacks the property *P*. Though, it will be philosophically quite fruitful to go into the issue of whether there could be any counterpart of a thing that can lack just one property in an alternative account, for convenience let us restrict our discussion only to one property. All that we do to settle the controversy about a thing possessing or not possessing the property *P* when looked at it from the point of view of an alternative account would be identical with the method that we adopt to settle the issue of contingency of a world view. Of course, we do not do this in an arbitrary manner either. We have our own way of confirming or disconfirming whether an account of the world is true or not. The process of confirming a hypothesis in science is comparable to this process of confirming a possible alternative of the world to be true or false.

The issue of a common criterion for identifying an object in alternative accounts of the world and its inhabitants has its own philosophical significance. If we treat the issue of identification and the issue of designating as separate issues, then constructing alternative conceptions of the universe will have no practical significance. Even if Aristotle in a possible world was a businessman rather than a philosopher, that would have no practical significance to any human being. However, if the issue of identification is taken as inseparable aspect of designation, then if Aristotle in an alternative account is a businessman, then certainly there is significant consequence to our



history of philosophy. Moreover, one is interested in an alternative account sometimes, not simply it is true, but it is nearer to truth. There could be alternative ways of measuring things, for example, and one could choose more accurate method of measuring thing not because it is true, but because it deviates less from what is true. Therefore, it is necessary to show how objects in the alternative accounts of the world are placed with respect to one another in comparison to the objects of our world view. And this cannot be achieved without there being any identifying description as common criterion for the objects of our actual and the objects of the alternative accounts of the world. However, this does not imply that in every possible world, there should be one and the same criterion that fixes each counterpart of an object in alternative conceptions of the worlds in the same manner. Given any two alternative accounts of the worlds, there should always be one criterion each to identify each object that exists in the alternative world.

The Leibnizian principle is applicable only within a conception of the world. If  $a$  and  $b$  are identical, then everything that is true of  $a$  is true of  $b$  within that account of the world. From this, however, one cannot claim that if a definite description is a criterion for  $a$ , and also a criterion for  $b$ , then  $a$  is identical with  $b$ . But with adequate qualifications, it is possible to formulate an identify principle across the alternative accounts of the world. Let us see how it could be done very shortly.

Assuming that the name of an object in our world is  $Nn$ , and its counterpart in the alternative account of the world is  $Nm$ , the identity statement ' $Nn$  is  $Nm$ ' would be true if and only if there exists a criterion such that the criterion can be used to fix the objects of the names in both the accounts of the world. However, this is not to claim that each and every criterion of one name would be a criterion of another in a possible world if the identity statement between these two names is true.

If one criterion is true of an object in one account of it, and if another criterion is conceived to be true of the same thing in another alternative account of the world, then we need a third criterion to test the truth value of the identity statement between the name across the possible worlds. There is no other way that one could ensure the truth value of the identity statement, other than the *apriori* or empirical methods. In the *apriori* method the identity statement is assumed to be true, and in the empirical method the identity statement is discovered to be true.

One uses the *apriori* method of identity of names in various ways. When the parents of Vikramaditya nickname him as 'Vickey', they



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need not have a criterion to confirm that it is their own child Vikramaditya has been called 'Vickey'. If someone unknown wants to meet Vickey in his hostel, his parents could give one criterion, and if that is being doubted to be of much use, they could give another, a third one if the need be, and so on. And it is not necessary that the parents keep a list of criteria to identify Vickey in his hostel with them; they work it out while speaking to the stranger. That is to say, every time when they advance a new criterion for identifying him, they imagine a possible situation in which the stranger could find their son. They do not need any criterion themselves to confirm that they are imagining different situations in which their own son could be found, not some one else's. This being so, one could say that a speaker need not test the criteria before advancing them a criteria for a name, and he could construct on his own many criteria to identify the person named depending on the contexts where the person named has to be identified.

In the case of empirical method of finding identity statement between two names one verifies whether a criterion is true of both the names in the alternative accounts. If any one criterion of a name is a criterion of another name as well, then he discovers that both the name refers to one and the same thing, though in different perspectives.

One may be of the opinion that the Leibnizian law must be applicable if the identity statement is true. Leibniz's law would be applicable only if every attribute of Vikramaditya is the attribute of Vickey when the identity statement is true. To claim that the identity statement between names, such as 'Vikramaditya is the same as Vickey' is true across the alternative accounts of the world if and only if every distinguishing feature of the one is the distinguishing feature of another, is to claim that imagined alternative world should be exact replica of the actual world to the extent that each item one considers in the alternative account should be identical with the object of the actual world. However, the two accounts, the actual and the alternative, may differ in matters of details unknown to us. In other words, if a philosopher insists that Leibniz's law must be applicable across possible accounts of the world, then one has made the expression 'alternative account of the world' meaningless. If one has to ensure that every unique attribute of Vikramaditya is a unique attribute of Vickey even in an alternative account of the world, then the point of providing alternative account of the world would be lost. Normally the alternative account of the world is useful in the following way. For example, Vickey is accused criminal while Vikramaditya is known to be a gentleman. It is possible to have two accounts



of what the same person. If every detail of Vikramaditya is part of the description of Vickey, then there are no two accounts, one cannot suppose Vickey as a criminal where as, Vikramaditya as a gentleman. An alternative account of the person in question is possible if and only if every detail in one account is not part of the detail in the other account. Thus, in order to establish the identity of Vikramaditya in a possible world, we need only one criterion which is true of him here as well as in the alternative account of him.

Speaking from the point of view of the stranger, unless he has been informed, a common criterion which fixes reference of both the names is necessary for him to come to the conclusion that Vikramaditya is also called 'Vickey' sometimes. If the stranger hears calling Vikramaditya 'Vickey', there is no need of any explicitly criterion for the stranger to come to the conclusion that Vikramaditya is the same as Vickey. In the absence of such direct evidences that the same person is called by both the names, the stranger needs some criterion which fixes the referents of both the names to come to the conclusion that Vikramaditya is the same as Vickey. From the point of view of the one who has provided an alternative account of the world, the identity of the objects that are common between the actual world and the possible world need not be given. However, from the point of view of others who are neutral to the view, identity of these objects in alternative accounts of the world could be established only through their common criteria.

Within the framework of cluster theory, Aristotle cannot be different from what he is considered to be within a community. One cannot reject the present perspective about Aristotle without replacing it with another in such a manner that between old and the new perspectives there is one definite description which serves as a criterion is accepted in both the perspectives. The possibility of drastic change in our view of Aristotle on the basis of new discoveries is there only when there is one criterion that is taken to be true of Aristotle in the old as well as in the new perspective of him.

It is evident that proper names are used most of the time as rigid designators. Occasionally, certain proper names are used as nonrigid designators, and the simple reason for their being not rigid designators is that they are used as disguised descriptions or their criteria for fixing the referents are circular. The issue of identifying the designated in an alternative account of the world is not a significant question for Kripke. He believes that the criterion of identity across alternative accounts of the world is not genuine. In contrast, no definite description can behave as a rigid designator according to Kripke. The simple argument he has in favour of his position is



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that a definite description might cease to be a unique description of the object in an alternative account of the world.

If one could speak of identity statement between two names, one could also speak of identity statement between two names of two alternative accounts. However, the issue of transworld identification can genuinely figure here. Speaking from one's own perspective, the one who proposes the alternative account of the world, the criterion of identity may be unnecessary and unimportant. Every one who is familiar with a name and the object named has the option of offering different criteria for the identification of the object. Similarly, the one who proposes an alternative account of the world has the option of providing different criteria for the names for identifying their referents; but does not have the option of providing no criterion. Of course, it is only in a rare occasion that one may require to state the criterion of identity explicitly.



## 3

## Beyond the Linguistic and Conceptual: A Comparison of Albert Camus and Nagarjuna

Robert Trundle Jr. & R. Puligandla

It seems to be taken for granted in the West that the contemporary French novelist and thinker, Albert Camus, was not a *bona fide* philosopher.<sup>1</sup> It is the authors' contention, however, that Camus has not only made a significant contribution to Western philosophy, but is also strikingly reminiscent of the second-century Madhyamika school of Nagarjuna. Their similarities are the more significant because they bridge considerable temporal and cultural gaps. Their fundamental points of agreement are: 1. that an essential characteristic of the human condition is man's search for an absolute (e.g., the real) in what is merely relative (e.g., views of reality). Thus, we will explicate Camus' position that, "that nostalgia for unity, that appetite for the absolute, illustrates the essential impulse of the human drama,"<sup>2</sup> by reference to the Buddhist philosopher Nagarjuna. For Nagarjuna has not only "shown that the thirst for the real is at heart the quest for being,"<sup>3</sup> but has further given the most cogent demonstration of the relativity of all views of reality. 2. that the attempt to construct an absolute and exclusive view of reality, i.e., seek the absolute in the relative, results in logical absurdity. 3. and, in tangency to point two,

- 1 See Thomas Hanna's excellent commentary in "Albert Camus: Man in Revolt", (*Existential Philosophers: Kierkegaard to Marleau-Ponty*, ed by G. A. Schrader, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1967), p. 332.
- 2 Albert Camus, *The Myth of Sisyphus*, (tr. Justin O'Brien, New York: Vintage Books, A Division of Random House, 1955), p. 13.
- 3 R. Puligandla, "How Does Nagarjuna Establish the Relativity of All Views", (*The Maha Bodhi*, Volume 81, Nos. 5-6, May-June, 1973), p. 159.



that dogmatic metaphysical systems which claim to be absolutely and exclusively true fail to establish their claim. The failure accrues to the obfuscation of *views* of reality with reality itself; to the confusion of the merely perceptual-conceptual with the non-perceptual and non-conceptual.

To begin with, then, both Nagarjuna and Camus assert the failure of dogmatic metaphysical systems to provide the knowledge which they claim. The inadequacy and inconsistency of both the atman and anatman schools of the Indian tradition led to the Madhyamika dialectic of Nagarjuna. The Madhyamika school, which embodies the heart of the teachings of the Buddha, does not construct another metaphysical system; nor does it add anything to the propositions of other systems. Rather, like Kant, Nagarjuna's dialectic shows that there was something wrong not just with this or that system, but with Reason itself. In a word, the Madhyamika dialectic reveals the total conflict in Reason. The conflict in Reason ultimately resulted, of course, from mistaking the relative, i.e., *views* of reality, for the absolute, i.e., reality itself. Nagarjuna's awareness of the difficulties and dilemmas of both the atman and anatman system of philosophy led to the dialectic.

By comparison, it was Camus' consideration in the *Myth of Sisyphus* of what he saw as the most serious philosophical problem, which led to his differentiation between reality and *views* of reality, i.e., between the absolute and the relative. It was in the *Myth of Sisyphus* in which he dealt with whether life is worth living in the absence of absolute values and judgments. "All the rest", Camus says, "... whether or not the world has three dimensions, whether the mind has nine or twelve categories ... come afterward".<sup>4</sup> What significance can other philosophical problems have at the moment one finds life unbearable? Camus notes that many persons tacitly assume that without the possibility of being able to derive judgments and values from *views* of reality which can be shown to be absolutely true, life must be unbearable. "That nostalgia for unity, that appetite for the absolute, illustrates the essential impulse of the human drama".<sup>5</sup> Hence, Camus holds that much of Western philosophy is obsessed with the goal of constructing absolute and exclusive *views* of reality. It is our contention that Camus, like Nagarjuna, holds it to be logically impossible to construct an absolute and exclusive *view* of reality. This does not, however, lead to a nihilistic denial of reality, to a "philosophy of despair", or to a denial of the efficacy of common sense and everyday experience.

<sup>4</sup> *The Myth of Sisyphus*, *op. cit.* p. 3.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 13.



The epistemological status of Camus' position may be summarized in three respects: 1. It consists of both views of reality, e.g., possible way of looking at the world, and a discussion of views of reality. 2. his views of reality are admittedly relative. Thus Camus recognizes alternative views of reality when he states that:

Having started from an anguished awareness of the inhuman, the meditation on the absurd returns at the end of its itinerary to the very heart of the passionate flames of human revolt,<sup>6</sup>

only to qualify that very view:

But Oriental thought teaches that one can indulge in the same effort of logic by choosing against the world, (i.e., not being disturbed by the very "human" nostalgia for the absolute). That is just as legitimate and gives this essay its perspective and its limits.<sup>7</sup>

Camus does not attempt to conceptually "make everything clear" by formulating an absolute and exclusive view of reality. In his novels, he tries to relate many views of reality. "It is a moving experience to watch the horizon of Albert Camus develop through his novels, *The Stranger*, *The Plague*, and *The Fall...*",<sup>8</sup> comments Michael Novak. In short, Camus was never adverse to adopting a view of reality to the extent that he wants to act and live in the world. Yet, he never confuses his views of reality with reality. He holds the latter to be conceptually inexplicable and ungraspable. Further, he does not hold that because there is no absolute view of reality that all views are false. Nor does he thereby nihilistically deny reality. Camus admits that "the absurd considered as a rule taken as an absolute of life is therefore contradictory."<sup>9</sup> To acknowledge the absurd, according to Camus, is merely to call attention to the fact that, "There is no longer a single idea explaining everything, but an infinite number of essences giving a meaning to an infinite number of objects".<sup>10</sup> The perception of the absurd is not itself a view, but is simply one's keenly becoming aware of the nature of views. That it has colored so many thoughts and actions on the continent between the two wars only adds to the force of its power and validity.

3. Camus' discussion of views of reality is strikingly reminiscent of the Madhyamika teaching of Sunyata. The Madhyamika school of

6 *Ibid.*, p. 47.

7 *Ibid.*, p. 47.

8 Michale Novak, *Philosophy and Fiction*, (*Philosophy Today*. No. 2, ed. by Jerry H. Gill, Toronto: The MacMillan Company, 1969) p. 216.

9 Albert Camus, *The Rebel*, (Tr. by Anthony Bower, New York: Vintage Books, 1956), p. 9.

10 *The Myth of Sisyphus*, *op. cit.* p. 33



Nagarjuna establishes that it is neither proper nor logically justifiable to regard any metaphysical system as absolutely valid.<sup>11</sup> One can so regard any system only on pain of contradiction. The *prima facie* similarity of this epistemological stance to Camus' is quite unmistakable. Thus, Thomas Hanna observes:

Camus mentions the logical impossibility of making *universal* judgments about anything without ending in contradiction; on the level of logic, any effort to grasp absoluteness always leads to paradox.<sup>1</sup>

It seems clear that Camus held it to be logically necessary that absolutist systems of thought result in self-contradiction. Hence it seems that he sought to rest his position on a deductive truth rather than on a mere inductive generalization (by considering a few views in *The Myth Sisyphus*, viz., a Platonic-Aristotelian view' Existentialism, Rationalism, etc.). Furthermore, there is a peculiar sort of tranquillity and subtle optimism in Camus' work. This suggests that he recognized a mode of existence *devoid* of the tension of the absurd. Both Camus and his work were uniquely free from the *anxiety* so characteristic of the so-called existential literature with which Camus is often identified. In short, Camus offers a refreshing alternative to the predominant Western supposition, implicit or explicit, that we have no 'reason' to live or are totally without justification for what we do if there is no rationally (conceptually) apprehendable *absolute* upon which to base what we do. For "... if I recognize the limits of the reason, I do not negate it, recognizing its *relative* powers",<sup>12</sup> says Camus. Furthermore, "... there is no depth of opportunities for action, in the relative",<sup>13</sup> he adds. Nagarjuna concurs that "... we do not speak without accepting, for practical purposes, the work-a-day world".<sup>14</sup>

Like Nagarjuna, Camus recognized an ultimate reality beyond the relativity of concepts. It could neither be rationally explicated, nor, as Camus would say, "made clear". Nevertheless, Camus notes that "our epoch is marked by the rebirth of those paradoxical systems that strive to trip up reason as if it had truly forged ahead".<sup>15</sup> Simi-

11 B. K. Matilal, *Epistemology, Logic, and Grammar in Indian philosophical Analysis*, (The Hague: Moulton and Co. N. V. Publishers, 1971), p. 148.

12 Hanna, "Albert Camus: Man in Revolt," *op. cit.*, p. 354.

13 *The Myth of Sisyphus*, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

14 *Ibid.*, p. 147.

15 Nagarjuna, "Vigrahavyavartani: Averting the Arguments," (*Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning*, by Frederick J. Streng, Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1967), p. 224.

16 *The Myth of Sisyphus*, *op. cit.*, p. 17.



larly, "Nagarjuna exposes the relativity (i.e. mutual dependence) of all concepts and thereby claims that they cannot be considered real from the absolute point of view".<sup>17</sup> Camus was aware of a difference between systems of thought regarding reality and reality itself. These systems—(views of reality) are relatively true and efficacious. Ultimate reality is non-conceptual and not within the grasp of everyday experience :

Nothing can be predicated of it, and one cannot even speak of it literally... Dogmatic, speculative theories try to reach the unconditioned by unduly extending empirical principles; they come into necessary clash with each other... the categories of thought, causality, substance, identity and difference, good and bad, etc., are certainly not applicable to the ultimately real, being relative; but the Madhyamika does not deny their utility as patterns of explanations in the empirical region. It is the dogmatic theorist with his insistence upon the sole truth of his particular conception of the real who makes empirical activity impossible.<sup>18</sup>

Ordinary experience is on that plane of existence in which one is concerned with making sense of what one does. It is on that plane concerned with the useful and with getting things done. While Camus holds that "to will is to stir up paradoxes",<sup>19</sup> Nagarjuna recognizes "...that action which is a result of having willed; that is considered (by tradition) as physical or verbal".<sup>20</sup> Absolute reality must *ipso facto* be that which is devoid of both the verbal and of willing.

Pursuing some of the *prima facie* affinities between the positions of Camus and Nagarjuna will illuminate the spirit and logic of Camus' position. For Camus' outlook has unique overtones explicable neither in a philosophical vacuum, nor merely in the context of traditional Western thought. Both Camus and Nagarjuna recognize a reality that is non-conceptual and inexplicable in terms of logic and language. It is a reality *beyond* names and forms. Views of reality entail conceptual activity. But the very nature of reality precludes our describing it. Hence,

Nagarjuna sharply distinguishes between reality and views of reality. A view of reality is constituted of concepts and state-

17 Matilal, *Epistemology, Logic, and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis op. cit.*, p. 148.

18 T. R. V. Murti, *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism: A Study of the Madhyamika System*, (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1960) pp. 333-334.

19 *The Myth of Sisyphus, op. cit.*, p. 16.

20 Nagarjuna, "Mulamadhyamakakarikas," *Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning, op. cit.*, p. 201.



ments and is consequently a conceptual-linguistic entity. On the other hand, reality is non-conceptual and extra-linguistic... But in one's thirst for the real one overlooks this distinction and identified constructions (views) of reality through names and forms with reality itself.<sup>21</sup>

Western scholars have not only tended to confound reality with *views* of reality, but in addition to falsely conclude: 1. that those who assert the relativity of views of reality; e.g., Camus and Nagarjuna, must *ipso facto* nihilistically deny reality, reason, or common-sense experience.<sup>22</sup> 2. that this entailed that all views of reality were false.

Actually, as Camus says, this criticism belies an "all or nothing" position with regard to *truth*. It supposes that without eternal and immutable truths apprehended by reason, there is no truth in any sense whatsoever. This Western "mind", notes Camus, says, "I want everything to be explained to me or nothing".<sup>23</sup> Yet, says Camus, "in psychology as in logic, there are truths but no truth".<sup>24</sup> Camus refuses the Western "leap" to eternal Reason:

That which is true is true absolutely, in itself; truth is one, identical with itself, however different the creatures who perceive it, men, monsters, angels, or gods... That geometrical spot where divine reason ratifies mine will always be incomprehensible to me. *There too, I discern a leap.*<sup>25</sup>

Yet, Western thinkers, judging Camus' or Eastern thought, by their own "all or nothing" criterion, have held that Camus' thought and *a fortiori* Eastern thought result in a nihilistic affirmation of "nothing", or by *symmetry* a nihilistic denial of "everything". Thus,

The Western critics having correctly observed that the Indians, while attaching ultimate ontological status and significance to the eternal, assigned only a secondary ontological status and significance to the empirical world, go on to mistakenly proclaim that the Indians therefore regard the empirical world as unreal and illusory.<sup>26</sup>

It is worth quoting here Professor Eliade's denial of a common Western belief: "It is not at all the case that the discovery of cosmic illusion

<sup>21</sup> Puligandla, "How Does Nagarjuna Establish the Relativity of All Views," *op. cit.*, p. 159.

<sup>22</sup> See Richard Robinson's "Did Nagarjuna Really Refute all Philosophical Views?", (*Philosophy East and West*, Volume XXII, No. 3, July, 1972), p. 331.

<sup>23</sup> *The Myth of Sisyphus*, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 15.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 34.

<sup>26</sup> Puligandla, "Time and History in the Indian Tradition", *Philosophy East and West*, Volume 24, No. 2, April, 1974), p. 175.



and the metaphysical quest of Being express themselves, in India, by a total devaluation of life or belief in a universal vacuity'.<sup>27</sup>

Contrary to widespread misunderstanding, neither scepticism nor nihilism follows from the relativity of all views. Scepticism would follow from it only if "relativity of all views" means "falsity of all views".<sup>28</sup>

Perhaps the widespread misunderstanding has its source in a sort of "philosophical ethnocentrism" in which Western philosophers see as false and inferior what is not a part of their own philosophical heritage. Professor Nikolai P. Anikeev of the Academy of Science's Institute of philosophy in the USSR correctly calls our attention to a "philosophical condescension" in the West: "The allegation that Indian philosophy is inferior is encountered in most of the general courses in philosophy in the West, where Eastern philosophy is totally excluded as a subject of study."<sup>29</sup> Anikeev aptly observes that ordinary "Western philosophy regards that the results of *all experience* can be communicated through verbal or logical means."<sup>30</sup> He juxtaposes this to Indian philosophy which "denies the possibility of communicating the experiences of mystical intuition."<sup>31</sup>

"Logical and discursive thought as a process of meaning is a selective process,"<sup>32</sup> simply because thinking is always thinking about something and not everything. Views of the world and the mundane thinking of everyday affairs is not absolutely denounced by either Camus or Nagarjuna. Thus, although "it limits the awareness according to habits of apprehension,"<sup>33</sup> on the one hand, it is recognized by Nagarjuna to permit meaningful communication on the other.<sup>34</sup> Similarly, Camus says that he wants to remain in this middle path where the intelligence can remain clear,<sup>35</sup> and that he sees "no sufficient reason for giving it up."<sup>36</sup> Camus does not deny the efficacy of conceptual activity or logic. While he merely observed that "the

27 *Ibid.*, p. 175.

28 Puligandla, "How Does Nagarjuna Establish the Relativity of All Views?", *op. cit.*, p. 164.

29 Nikolai Petrovich Anikeev, *Modern Ideological Struggle for the Ancient Philosophical Heritage of India*, (Calcutta: R. K. Maitra from R. D. Press, 1969), p. 14.

30 *Ibid.*, p. 11.

31 *Ibid.*, p. 11.

32 Streng, *Emptiness; A Study in Religious Meaning*, *op. cit.*, p. 97.

33 *Ibid.*, p. 97.

34 *Ibid.*, p. 97.

35 *The Myth of Sisyphus*, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

36 *Ibid.*, p. 30.



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absurd effect is linked to an *excess* of logic",<sup>37</sup> Nagarjuna's "critical dialectic served to reduce the logical procedure to absurdity when it attempted to express Ultimate Truth".<sup>38</sup> Thus, Nagarjuna says in "An Analysis of the Holy Truths" that

The teaching by the Buddhas of the *dharma* has recourse to two truths: the world-ensconced truth and the truth which is the highest sense.<sup>39</sup>

But while both Camus and Nagarjuna hold that the ultimate truth cannot be conceptually apprehended, Nagarjuna *does* assert that,

The highest sense (of the truth) is not taught apart from practical behaviour, and without having understood the highest sense one cannot understand *nirvana*.<sup>40</sup>

This clearly shows that Nagarjuna recognized a "truth" applicable to practical behaviour and consequently of the efficacy of reason and experience. Indeed, such recognition is the very basis of Nagarjuna's proclamation of the ultimate truth:

...the analogical use of words and the logic of convergence are used for expressing certain characteristics of Ultimate Reality. In summary, "these symbolizing mechanisms are especially suited to apprehend and express Ultimate Reality as an eternal essence. This essence is apprehended through any particular phenomenon (or concept), since Ultimate Reality by definition, pervades every particular expression. On the other hand, no expression is adequate to bear the fulness or reality which must be finally known by a non-symbolical means: intuition."<sup>41</sup>

The denial that reality can be conceptualized, and hence described, does not entail nihilism (denial of reality), or affirmation of the illusoriness of the empirical world. Camus' denial of the absolute truth of any view of reality neither implies a denial of common-sense experience, nor the "falsity" of views of reality. Rather, Camus denies the possibility of conceptually "reconstructing" this reality. It is confrontable only in silence and non-conceptual experience. Thus Camus says that,

So long as the mind keeps silent in the motionless world of its hopes, everything is reflected and arranged in the unity of its nostalgia. But with its first move this world cracks and tumbles: an infinite number of shimmering fragments is offered to the understanding. We must despair of ever *reconstructing*

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 96.

<sup>38</sup> Streng, *Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning op. cit.*, p. 97.

<sup>39</sup> "Mulamadhyamakakarikas", *Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning, op. cit.*, p. 213.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 213.

<sup>41</sup> Streng, *Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning, op. cit.*, pp. 137-138.



the familiar, calm surface which would give us peace of heart.<sup>42</sup>

Thus, there is a remarkable resemblance between Camus' position and Nagarjuna's. As Thomas Hanna observes, "Camus mentions the logical impossibility of making *universal* (absolute) judgment about anything without ending in contradiction."<sup>43</sup> Camus astutely recognized Western man's propensity for elevating relative truths, which are certainly necessary in everyday life, to absolute truths. He refers to this as an "absurd procedure". In his "nostalgia for an absolute", man sees a world in which only relative truths can be conceptually apprehended, as absurd. Nevertheless, both Camus and Nagarjuna recognize the efficaciousness and worth of views of reality. Those who *expand* the merely efficacious to what Camus sometimes calls the "universal", violate their own "sacredly" held principles. They turn away from their own cherished principles. Thus, says Camus,

Reason bears a quite human aspect, but it also is able to turn toward the divine. Since Plotinus, who was the first to reconcile it with the eternal climate, it has learned to turn away from the most cherished of its principles, which is contradiction....<sup>44</sup>

Ironically, those who violate their own principles accuse those who avoid such a violation of being nihilistic, destroying the notion of Truth, and fostering immorality and despair.

Camus says that "reason" turns away from the most cherished of its principles, which is contradiction. But he also says that his examples of paradoxical systems of thought "are not interesting in themselves but in the consequences that can be deduced from them".<sup>45</sup> The consequence that can be deduced are: 1. that elevating the relative to the absolute results in suffering on the practical, social, and political planes (as discussed in Camus' *The Rebel*), and logical absurdity on the intellectual plane (as discussed in Camus' *The Myth of Sisyphus*). 2. and that "facing up" to the relativity of views (which is seen as an absurdity *vis-a-vis* our "nostalgia for the absolute") allows for an openness to a more profound, non-conceptual absolute reality. Thus the "nostalgia for the absolute" may be satiated only if we do not seek it in any view of reality. It is the person who elevated a view of reality to an absolute who violates his *own* principles. But how, we may ask, could Camus' assertion that views "are legitimate

42 *The Myth of Sisyphus*, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

43 "Albert Camus: Man in Revolt", (*Existential Philosophers: Kierkegaard to Merleau-Ponty*, *op. cit.*) p. 394.

44 *The Myth of Sisyphus*, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

45 *Ibid.*, p. 14.



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only in precisely so far as they are approximate",<sup>46</sup> be logically defensible, given his own denial of any absolute truth? If all views are relative, is not Camus' view itself relative? We have discussed the distinction between reality and *views* of reality. We will now differentiate them from Camus' and Nagarjuna's more fundamental discussion of views of reality.

The truth which is relative is that predicated of *views* of reality. Camus and Nagarjuna are discussing views of reality and this discussion does not itself constitute a view of reality. Hence, the charge that they are themselves offering views of reality is unwarranted. It is often said that the teachings of Camus and Nagarjuna are 1. based on a necessary truth, and is therefore devoid of empirical significance and can say nothing about reality; 2. and if they are saying something about reality, then they are saying something contingent, and therefore is potentially falsifiable. These are not cogent objections. For they are not offering a *view* of reality—a view of reality exhibiting a shema of the nature and constitution of reality, viz., Hegel, Kant, Aristotle etc. What they are saying is not itself such a schema. Specifically, in order to refute the claim of Camus and Nagarjuna concerning the relativity of views of reality, one must formulate a view from concepts, e.g., C, without dependence on other concepts, e.g. non-C. But the very interdependence and relativity of concepts must already be assumed in such a formulation or construction. The position of Camus and Nagarjuna that all views of reality are relative follows from the mutual dependence and relativity of concepts. Thus,

given any concept whatever, say C, what does it mean to say that its meaning is such-and-such? There are only two possible answers: 1. The meaning of C is explicated through C itself, and 2. The meaning of C is explicated through some non-C concepts. The former is trivial, tautologous, and unilluminating, since all it says is that C means C. On the other hand, the latter is non-trivial, significant, and illuminating, but it is so precisely because C is now stated in terms of concepts other than C.<sup>47</sup>

In a word, one can only say what something *is* in terms of what it is *not*.

In summary, Camus both denies the falsity of varying views of reality, and the absolute and exclusive truth of any one. This is precisely what Camus means when he says that he wants "to remain in this middle path where the intelligence can remain clear."<sup>48</sup> But what is it, he questions, that leads one to claim the absolute and exclusive truth of one's view of reality? "That nostalgia for unity, that appetite

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 15.

<sup>47</sup> Puligandla, "How Does Nagarjuna Establish the Relativity of All Views?" (*The Maha Bodhi*, op. cit.) p. 161.

<sup>48</sup> *The Myth of Sisyphus*, op. cit., p. 30.



for the absolute illustrates the essential impulse of the human drama,"<sup>49</sup> observes Camus. It is "in one's thirst for the real [that] one overlooks this distinction and identifies constructions (views) of reality through names and forms with reality itself,"<sup>50</sup> notes Nagarjuna. But reality is that which is absolute, and thus not relative to or mutually dependent on anything. Reality is unlike views of reality in being extra-conceptual and non-linguistic. Since it is *beyond* any perceptual-conceptual activity, one may not say what it is. Like the Taoist notion of the Tao, one must stand mute before it:

The Tao (Way) that can be told of is not the eternal Tao:

The name that can be named is not the eternal name.

The Nameless is the origin of Heaven and Earth;<sup>51</sup>

In the intuitive confrontation of Reality one is not concerned with getting things done, and hence need not assume certain relative and efficacious truths. "Beginning to think is beginning to be undermined,"<sup>52</sup> notes Camus. But Camus realized that in the presence of the extra-linguistic and non-conceptual reality, one does not think. "To will is to stir up paradoxes," he notes. But in the silent confrontation of reality one does not will. "From the outset, then, Camus was aware of a realm of human experience that lay *beyond* the reach of words, outside all conscious elaboration."<sup>53</sup>

Camus had a rare outlook that appreciated both the contemporary existentialist concern for commitment, and the Eastern recognition of man's limits with regard to philosophical and everyday commitments. He appreciated both the value of reason and action, and the value of non-action and silence. He recognized the usefulness and worth of views of reality, and a more profound reality beyond their limits. "The truths that come within my scope can be touched with the hand,"<sup>54</sup> he metaphorically noted. Yet,

Immersed in the light, the sea, the wind, he could merge with the natural world, escaping the limitations of his life, exulting in a sense of power and wholeness, an experience that he knew was as real as it was temporary. *It neither negated his sense of the impermanency of life nor was cancelled out by it.* It was a dimension of experience that enriched his awareness of the value of being alive, physically alive in and to the world...

Silence was a dimension of existence; the silence of his mother, the silence of the earth, those things to which obscurely he acquiesced.<sup>55</sup>

49 *Ibid.*, p. 13.

50 Puligandla, "How Does Nagarjuna Establish the Relativity of All Views?" (*The Maha Bodhi*, op. cit.), p. 159.

51 Lao tzu, "Tao-Te Ching", (*A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*, tr. & compiled by Wing-Tsit Chan, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1972) p. 139.

52 *The Myth of Sisyphus*, op. cit., p. 4.

53 Germaine Bree, *Camus and Sartre*, (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1972) p. 63.

54 *The Myth of Sisyphus*, op. cit., p. 66.

55 *Camus and Sartre*, op. cit., p. 67.



## 4

*Jaspers' distinction between Science and Philosophy: An attempt at transparency*

C. P. Srivastava

The contemporary Indian thought has been immensely influenced by Existentialism. This current of thought is unanimously accepted originating from the revolutionary philosophy of the well known Danish thinker, Soren Kierkegaard (1813-1855). Following Sartre's division of existentialism into theistic and atheistic classes, we have already admitted Karl Jaspers (1883-1969) in theistic camp, though in a Sartrean sense. This paper intends to delineate Karl Jaspers' attempt to distinguish between the roles of Science and philosophy in perennial pursuit of 'Knowledge and Being'.

As soon as we are conscious of us, we encounter 'the Being'. The texture and nature of 'Being' if there is a being to be discovered at all, need further analysis and interpretation. Being or what Jaspers also calls 'The comprehensive' (das-umgreifende) or 'Encompassing' is subject-object both simultaneously. Since, 'we can not help studying 'Being' beyond this basic dichotomy of S—O thinking process,\* namely, when ever we think, our consciousness is always directed to an object which is to be conceptualized during the whole of our thinking activity. Our thinking of all kind is always encircled in objective surveying. It is, however, noteworthy that objective surveying sometimes provides with something non-objective and non-rational\*\* which is of utmost importance in philosophical thought or philosophizing.

Hence to deny the inexplicable 'Being' after having been unable to explain it through an objective discovery is itself a sign of unscientific knowledge, much less philosophical, besides, from the past to

\* (S—O)—Subject = Object.

\*\* 'Non-objective and Non-rational' terms have, here, been used in a specific sense of existentialism.



the present, we observe one more striking tendency in philosophers as to how present philosophy like a science. The said tendency is described by Jaspers as 'scientism', which produces a 'pseudo-science'.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, when science also denies 'Being' since it is not to be conceptualized within its specific methodology; it again becomes a 'pseudo-science'. But Jaspers is not antagonistic to science. He clearly admits that science is indispensable to our philosophical quests for truth because we very much depend on science in our day-to-day world-knowledge.<sup>2</sup>

Keeping in view the nature and approach of science, Jaspers distinguishes between two types of thought.<sup>3</sup> (a) Intellectual thought or what he also calls the level of consciousness as-such; and (b) Rational thought. The former is employed in science and technology in order to gather physical facilities and material prosperity in the world. These things being very much congenial to human well-being and power, are all the more applauded and supported almost unanimously by the people. But it is noteworthy that while experimenting a scientist depends wholly on its method and apparatus. Taking up a fact or phenomenon for observation, he watches certain reading and then explains it inductively. The hypotheses so drawn are in a sense always subject to rectification since they are relative to the specific method, apparatus and above all to the varying time.

The latter one, namely, the rational thought is a fundamental urge in man to original thinking. It comes from one's innermost recesses of being and changes oneself from within. He is, then, awakened and accordingly lives or decides with inspiration and instruction from his ownself. In other words it is an original will to know and choose simultaneously.

Furthermore, to Jaspers science is based on four foundation stones: First, we apply a specific methodology for discovering certain principles in nature. Second, scientifically discovered truths being intelligible are obligatory to all and sundry. Third, they have a universal validity and the fourth, the universality of science is never

- 1 'What was presented as philosophy impressed me as a pseudo-science! Jaspers, Karl; Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 6.
- 2 'There are not two worlds lying side by side, there is but one world... we cannot avoid using objective concepts and categories as means of expression'. Jaspers, Karl; Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 18.
- 3 'Intellectual thought' is the inventor and maker... The result is a world in which a few minds devise the mechanics... 'Rational thought' on the other hand does not provide for the carrying out of mass directives but requires each individual to do his own thinking, original thinking. Jaspers, Karl; The Future of Mankind, p. 7.



mere conceptual but tangible, that is, subject to intellection. Universality of scientific knowledge also suggests its transferability among the men of skill, namely persons having their developed cognitive faculties to a certain level. For instance, a neutron bomb can be made in any country whatsoever with the same skill and technical know-how. It never needs scientist's self-application during the process of an experiment. It shows that scientific knowledge is mainly analytic and discursive. As such we are all along conscious of a scientific activity regarding its beginning and endless advancement.<sup>4</sup> Also, when we arrive at a conclusion or form a hypothesis, it can be equally shared by all scientists through 'universally communicable language'.

Now, what is philosophy? we understand that there are infinite objects of our knowledge in the world. But to know every object is not philosophy. It is an inclination to know 'the whole' or 'Being-in-itself'; it is also an effort to make 'Being' worth attention to the seekers after truth. Being is firstly irrational meaning thereby that it can never be fully described in any language or terminology. However, for the convenience of discussion beforehand, Jaspers mentions three aspects of 'Being'<sup>5</sup> (i) objective Being, (ii) Being-in-itself, and (iii) subjective Being.

Scientific realm is confined only to immanent objective Being or the world and so its outlook is also objective or cognitive. But this can express only the face-value of comprehensive or Being, ignoring outright its place-value. The place-value of Being depends on the varying sensitivity, insight and will-power of a philosopher. A man who is not satisfied with the conceptual and universally valid knowledge of the world and as such has developed aspiration for 'Being' is called by Jaspers a 'potential Existenz' instead of an ordinary man whom he names the 'empirical existence'. Existenz is potential as it wishes to be touched with Being's transcendence. Transcendence in Jaspers coincides with God or substance of Spinoza; though it can never be made biased through our prayers or oblation. The potential-

<sup>4</sup> 'My knowledge can be regarded scientific only when I am able to perceive the method; its beginning and processes to present it in universally communicable language'. Wallraff, C.F., K. Jaspers, *An Introduction to his philosophy*, p. 42.

<sup>5</sup> Jaspers, K. *Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 48. (Jaspers has described the tripartite division of Being in his *Philosophy*, Vol. I, published in 1931, but in his later writings, such as, 'Reason And Existenz'—1935, *Way to Wisdom*—1951, *Philosophical Faith And Revelation*—1962 he has clearly stated only two aspects of Being; namely, subjective (Being-what-we are) and objective (Being-in-itself). Objective being consists of 'world' and 'Transcendence' which are immanent and transcendent aspects of the same 'Being'.



lity of Existenz is also called philosophical faith and only in and through it we experience the revealed truths which spontaneously emerge during the communication between Existenz and Transcendence. The said revealed truths are all the more appreciated by Jaspers when he came to know the logical and ecclesiastical inefficacy in its explanation as a whole.<sup>6</sup>

It is now pretty clear that science can not be substituted for philosophy nor can there be a strict scientific philosophy. And owing to misconceptions this blunder has been several times repeated by eminent philosophers of the past. In this context, Jaspers depreciates Husserl and Descartes<sup>7</sup>.

How does, then, science help philosophy? In answer we can show two ways of how science is helping philosophy. Firstly, to demonstrate 'Being' we cannot help using concepts, symbols and myths;<sup>8</sup> though they awaken us indirectly. Secondly, Reason gives rise to dilemma in us and thereby indicating some underlying reality incapable of being conceptualized. Here Jaspers refers to Kantian antinomies regarding the nature of the world. Reason has both the views: 'The world has a beginning in time'.... as well as 'The world is beginningless...' Both of them appear to be equally strong while propounding opposite theses. The former asserts a positive thesis whereas the latter establishes negative one.

Amidst the above mentioned dilemma of positive and negative theses a potential Existenz becomes aware of its futility and finally surrenders to the Transcendence.<sup>9</sup> That is why Reason's realm now comes to an end and so is dissociated from the Existenz. This is what Jaspers calls the 'shipwreck of Existenz'. Only then Existenz is illumined by Transcendence through authentic communication with it. But truths on this level, says Jaspers, can be awakened only in those

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- 6 'We have no prophets anymore to put this faith into appropriate words. Further, 'Ecclesiastically fashioned faith in revelation has failed to realize the ethos of truth in ways of life...' Jaspers, Karl, Preface of 'Philosophical faith and Revelation'.
  - 7 'Husserl seemed to me to have committed the most naive and pretentious betrayal of philosophy'. Jaspers, Karl, Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 7.
  - 8 'The non-objective, in so far as we have access to it at all, is accessible only by way of objectivities. Jaspers, Karl, Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 18.
  - 9 '... No metaphysics can ever be fulfilled except in the reality of an Existenz touched by Transcendence. Jaspers, Karl, Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 16. Also, Yunjannevasn Sadatmanasm Yogi, Vigatakalmsu Sukhen Brahmasamsparamatyantam Sukhamashute. The Bhagavadgita, VI, 28.



persons prepared for the same.<sup>10</sup> What he meant by the word 'preparation' for philosophical flight is not much clear in his voluminous writings; though he has appreciated 'revealed truths consonant to saintly visions. Here, it is important to mention that', Jaspers like N. Berdyaev never supposed man to be an 'original sinner'. As it is man who is ultimately touched by Transcendence, how can he ever be a barrier during his advancement to his own highest good?<sup>11</sup>

In Indian philosophy Jiva is essentially Existence-consciousness-bliss (Sat-chit-Anand), if and only if he has realized the Brahman within his ownself. In fact, though the perennial truths e.g. 'Aham Brahmasmi', 'Tat Tvam Asi' etc. have not been explicitly stated in Jaspers' philosophy, yet his thoughts are very suggestive and symbolic. Thus they touch the boundary of Indian sages' philosophical insights. Moreover, Jaspers being a person of both the fields, that is, science and philosophy his distinction between the same has been a brilliant effort to ascertain scientific and philosophical realms respectively.

While concluding I understand Jaspers' existential philosophy has not fully freed itself from the fetters of intellectual approach mentioned earlier in this paper. So, existential thinkers like him do not have a spontaneous light shedding and enlivening our soul from within. This is surely because of a great gap between merely rational or existential approach of a western philosopher and the experience of an Indian mystic.

<sup>10</sup> 'These are not communicable like cognition of things only one who knows can awaken them in one who is prepared'. Jaspers, Karl, Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 321.

<sup>11</sup> 'Theologians have often claimed that man is an obstacle to revelation, thus apparently overlooking the fact that revelation takes place solely for man's benefit'. Berdyaev, N., Solitude and Society, p. 28.



## 5

# Systems, Movements, Methods and Processes In Western and Indian Thought

A. K. Sarkar

It is high time that the specialists in both Western and Indian philosophies remain aware of the significance of the terms—systems, movements, methods and processes, and also of the terms in association with them—in the contexts of Western and Indian Philosophy in development from their respective pasts to the present times. The final stage of the advanced processes of both, is towards a complex process-philosophy, transcending early orders of simplicity and restrictive philosophic deliberations, leading to logic, metaphysics, theology and epistemology of some sort with reactionary breaks from such notions, in different periods of their respective cultural history. From the Indian Buddhists to Whitehead of the West, as indicated in the Introduction to *Philosophers of Process*<sup>1</sup>, by Hartshorne, there is a continuous challenge to philosophy of Being (Substance or Subject) for, the real is in the transcendence of one's inherited abstract past by memory and perception in confronting the concrete happenings in Nature—Causal and Apparent—which are situations of momentary decisions in one's creative march towards an unfathomable future, in terms of the confronted orders of perception and memory in togetherness, with a basic feeling.

In each of the formative periods of Western cultural evolution, there is a rise from a ground-consciousness to a consequent process of perceptuality and memory.<sup>2</sup> The ground-consciousness is usually

1. Edited by Douglas Browning with an Introduction by Charles Hartshorne, Random House, N.Y. 1965, pp. v-xxii
2. Cf. In general, the different periods of Western thought, (*A History of philosophy*, by Frank Thilly, third edition, revised by Ledger Wood. Holt, Rinehart and Winston, N. Y., 1951.) In a truly philosophic spirit, Wood quotes Thilly's and following statements: "The



in a constructive direction towards a final abstract reality, with a logic, metaphysics or epistemology, in respect of its attachments for cultural contexts. The consequent processes in Western cultural context are critical and detached attitudes of a later process, of scepticism, eclecticism or even mysticism<sup>3</sup>, and, in the Indian thought, the consequent processes from the Vedas, are a series of critical attitudes or even scepticism of the transcendental modes. But, in each of these traditions there is a false attachment for something as abstract identity that cannot be sacrificed, but held as a sacred heritage for one's egoistic satisfaction.<sup>4</sup>

With the rise of the religious process, in a ground-consequent manner, in the West, in terms of Judaism and Zoroastrianism as basic, there emerged consequent processes as of Mythraism from Zoroastrianism, and Christianity and Islam from Judaism, and, in each, again, there were consequent processes of mystic developments beyond the notion of the transcendent self to God incarnate (Son), or God as a Creator (Father). In the latter process, theism of some sort persisted with a consciousness of a history and a psyche having a concern and a care of the life and its norms of a living personality. Man's life

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man who tries to construct a system of philosophy in absolute independence of the work of his predecessors cannot hope to rise very far beyond the crude theories of the beginnings of civilization." (Preface and pp. v-vii).

- 3 The suggestion is here for the development of philosophy in its advanced aspects from the ancient to the contemporary Western thought. For some details in the context of ancient Greek philosophy, vide Zeller's *Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy*, Meridian Books, The World publishing Co., N.Y., Ninth printing 1962, specially Third Period, pp. 225-281, for progressive reactionary attitudes.
- 4 For the development of advanced ancient Greek philosophy in international contexts, vide Zeller's book mentioned above: Fourth Period, pp. 285-336, and also the conclusion, pp. 336-338. For understanding the progressive philosophic thinking beyond Plotinian mysticism in post-Aristotelian thought, one can get sufficient materials in intercultural contexts, only if one remains open to the interpretation of mysticism in comprehensive evolutionary contexts or the Whiteheadian thinking in contemporary Western thought, where reason is separated from its abstract restrictive processes of metaphysics, theology and epistemology, and is placed within Nature as an emergent process, having a background in a non-sensuous Causal Nature, with possibilities in apparent and superject Natures. From this perspective, one can see some progressive elements in philosophic thinking in the following statements of Zeller: "In the Hellenistic period and the Roman Empire, when not only the orient was Hellenised but the Greek world, too, was to a large extent orientalised..." p. 336.



was neither totally pessimistic nor totally nihilistic, but it was construed with a prospect and a possibility, in a social situation but not with a complete sense of freedom or decision, as by a complete departure from abstract absolutist process with an adherence to a fixed reality or principle".<sup>5</sup> In post-Hegelian thought there emerged a transcendental phenomenological attitude as in Husserl, who from his transcendent subjectivity, could confront a subjective ego and an objective universe in relativity and prospect, as a secondary order of experiential process, yet with a correlative importance and togetherness.<sup>6</sup> Husserl retained still a remnant of an abstraction in spite of his pursuit to a radical eliminative situation of an *epoche*, forming the basis of a two ordered universe transcendent and apparent—primary and secondary—indicating a prospective field beyond both. From Husserl's phenomenological perspectives and objective possibilities, there developed varied transcendental existentialist modes from Kierkegaard and Nietzsche to Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau Ponty, Thevenaz<sup>7</sup> and others, and, in further orders of different currents of

- 5 In these statements there is a hint for developing philosophic thinking of the West and India, in advanced lines.
- 6 *Ideas : General Introduction To Pure Phenomenology*: by Edmund Husserl, Collier Books: N. Y.. 1962. For the development of the phenomenological with some details, vide, Introduction, pp. 5-52. Husserl's stress on phenomenological attitude lies in stressing science of pure possibilities as preceding the science of real facts. In his words; "The science of pure possibilities must always precede the science of real facts, and give it a guidance of its concrete logic". p. 7. According to the writer of this paper, if there is too much stress on the inner possible phenomenological experience that needs to be compensated by the possible in objective phenomenological spheres as suggested by Peirce beyond Husserl.
- 7 *What is Phenomenology and Other Essays*, by Pierre Thevenaz, edited with Introduction by James M. Edie and Preface by John D. Wild, A Quadrangle Paperback Original, Quadrangle Books, Chicago. John Wild, in his preface, and James Edie, in his Introduction, to the above book of Thevenaz, clarify the position of Husserl's Phenomenology, by relating it, in an aspect, with James' radical empiricism, which is a new approach to the phenomena of our lived existence, as immediate experience. a vast world of wide-ranging scope with distinctive structures of its own, which, for their clarification, require methods quite different from those of the objective sciences. Husserl called this moving historical field of our lived existence, — the *Lebenswelt* (life-world)—and inaugurated the disciplined exploration of this life-world, its essential structures and its manifestations. This movement has stirred up new approaches and new speculations in the traditional fields of ethics, metaphysics, and the philosophy of religion, by a



thought as in the pragmatisms of Peirce and James, with extension in the trends of instrumentalism of different varieties from Dewey to Mead, and the new *apriori* of Lewis.<sup>8</sup> This process of detachment from abstract intellectuality and extension of the horizon of experience to possibilities, took various shapes in the evolutionist directions of Bergson, Alexander, Morgan, Boodin and Santayana, with a further comprehensive evolutionist attitude in Whitehead, who utilized the integral experience of a neo-Hegelian Bradley as already present in one's living organism, in interpreting the perceptual situation of a living human organism, by placing the living human organism within Nature as dual—casual, apparent and prospective.<sup>9</sup> As causal, Nature is operative as a non-sensuous past, driving the human organism to an emergent order of apparent perceptuality, which is sensuous, intellectual and also prospectively beyond those processes. In this, Whitehead indicates a continuity of Nature in its entirety whether as causal, apparent or as prospective. In its pastness, Nature is connectedness, without the element of bifurcating intellectuality, which emerges at a certain stage in the perceptual order of experience of a human organism, but is crossed over in its consequent possibility, so that Nature, in its evolutionary prospect remains an integral possibility in its many-dimensional activity in prospect.<sup>10</sup> This comprehensive attitude of experiential possibility eliminates the notion of the absolute

detachment from formalist logic, metaphysics or theology, and also abstract empiricism from the stage of Locke to Hume.

8 *The American Pragmatists*, Edited by Milton Konvitz and Gail Kennedy, Meridian Books, The World Publishing Company, New York, Sixth Printing, 1969, cf. Lewis' *A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori*, pp. 303-315. In the background of phenomenological, existentialist, realist and pragmatist modes, which revolt against all abstract formalist logic, the new and advanced method of deliberations Lewis,—a disciple of Royce,—develops Peirce's conceptual pragmatism and its logical requirement, by suggesting that in confronting facts, one has to admit that they are hard, independent and unalterable to our will, but there is also a meditating process, an element of *apriori*, which is indeed malleable to our purpose, and responsive to our need. In this context a key fits a lock, and there may be different keys for the same lock, but not any key. Lewis denies the traditional conceptions of the *apriori* as innate or a natural light confronting the flux of immediacy with some godlike foreknowledge of principles which are legislative for experience.

9 *Whitehead's Four Principles From West-East Perspectives*, by A. K. Sarkar, Bharati Bhawan, Patna (India), 1974, for a development of interpretation of experience from an advanced evolutionary perspective to the stage of Whitehead.

10 *Adventures of Ideas*, by A. N. Whitehead, A Free Press Paperback, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1961, Parts III-IV.



or abstractly reflective character of intellectuality. This bifurcating character of intellectuality is the core of egoistic consciousness or the innate psychic disposition or element of ignorance that governs the life of an individual, and is interpreted differently in Indian thought by such terms as *avidya*, *ajnana*, *Maya* or *Karma*, in Indian transcendental modes, Vedic and non-Vedic, through the centuries.<sup>11</sup> But the later cultural prospect, in all cultures, is a progressive departure from any kind of abstract mode, which does not rest on prospective yet integral experiential process.

Like other experiential processes, according to Whitehead, intellectuality is only an occasion, having a past and a possibility; it is just a phase, a terminating process in subject-object form, with emergence and perishing.<sup>12</sup> In the human experiential process, there is an emergence of a personality-process, but it is also a phase, emerging and perishing; in its experiential continuity and prospect it is a trans-forming process, and is subject to the changing scientific or other forms of experiential processes. In all these evolutionary prospects from Husserl to Whitehead, one can find a development of past Western thought from Thales to Hegel.<sup>13</sup> But this development is not in the same direction of any kind of abstraction; it is a continuous detachment from abstractions. But, as Hartshorne marks rightly, whitehead alone could be fully conscious of the confronted occasions, through the human organism in its dual adventures, in the aspects of concrete experiential processes of memory and perception in togetherness, that the self-creative decision of freedom from all confronted occasions, including that of the so-called mental occasions,—is a possibility, that one can rise to, separating oneself from all abstract principles of consciousness or existentiality.<sup>14</sup> This kind of analysis of experiential process in its confronted situation beyond objective determinations, was a presupposition of the phenomenological deliberations of Husserl, and was extended further in varied directions of the confronted experiential world by Heidegger, Sartre, Ponty and Thevenaz, according to Edie, as indicated in his Introduction to Thevenaz's *What is Phenomenology?* But this writer, accepting the credits given by Edie to the phenomenologists and existentialists mentioned above—gives a further credit to Whitehead's interpretation of the confronted situation of a living personality organically

- 11 *Indian Philosophy*, volumes I & II, by S. Radhakrishnan, London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., First published 1923, eighth impression 1966, for a general survey of the principles of Karma et al.
- 12 *Process And Reality*, by A.N. Whitehead, A Free Press Paperback, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1969, Preface & Ch. 1.
- 13 *Ibid.*, Chs. II & III.
- 14 *Adventures of Ideas*, part III.



placed within and without Nature in movement towards possibilities. In these thinkers, with a stretch to Whitehead, one can find a continuous effort to go beyond the restricted intellectual mode, which is nothing but the core of Indian supposition of ignorance (*avidya* or *ajnana*) leading an individual to fall into the clutches of one's inborn restrictive dispositions, differently interpreted by the expression: karma, or guna et al. This consciousness of freedom—from basic ignorance, which Whitehead discerned, in his evolutionary perspectives, from his scientific principle of relativity, in advanced mathematical modes of the concept of zero, and in the general modes of spatio-temporality as possible characters to emerge and perish, in the changing universe — was known meditatively by the Buddha and his followers long before the Christian era, challenging whatever element of abstractness or ignorance of one's restricted intellectuality might lie in the Upanisadic transcendental processes of experience in terms of transcendent consciousness (Atman) and existentiality (Brahman).<sup>15</sup>

To Whitehead, from his advanced experiential processes of the post-Hegelian modes to the stage of the other evolutionists of his time, there is an emergence of an awareness of freedom from any restricted form of intellectuality, and from this detached perspective (akin to Indian steady personality), Whitehead suggests, that the business of logic is not the analysis of generalities, but their mingling<sup>16</sup>, and, philosophy, so discerned, for him—is an ascent to further generalities with the view of understanding their possibilities of combination.<sup>17</sup> The discovery of new generalities, Whitehead contends, adds to the fruitfulness of those already known. It lifts into view new possibilities of combination, and makes man progressively aware of the vast possibilities of further self-creative decisions. Speaking generally of Western philosophy from Plato and Aristotle to Hegel, — Whitehead asserts with insight, that “European thought is littered with metaphysical systems.”<sup>18</sup> According to this writer, they are basic elements of ignorance or the germs of karma, variously interpreted in Indian Philosophy. The thinkers concerned, of this period in Western thought, remained restricted to some form of abstract reality or principle, which does not change. To explain his position further, Whitehead says, “When we survey the history of thought, and likewise the history of practice, we find that one idea after another is tried out,

15 *Philosophers of Process*, Cf. Introduction by Hartshorne, also *Changing Phases of Buddhist Thought*, by A. K. Sarkar, Bharati Bhawan, Patna, India, Second Edition, 1975.

16 *Adventures of Ideas*, p. 235.

17 Ibid.

18 *Process and Reality*, p. 17.



its limitations defined, and its core of truth elicited".<sup>19</sup> But to Whitehead, the proper test of philosophy, "is not of finality but of progress".<sup>20</sup> Criticizing Aristotle's logic and metaphysics, Whitehead denounces Aristotle's metaphysical notion of an ultimate Substance or Principle, and his logic resting on an abstract proposition of 'subject-predicate' form.<sup>21</sup> Whitehead's concrete philosophy of living human organism within Nature, inheriting its relational past as the basic urge (prehension), with possibilities in the apparent and symbolic directions of one's perceptual order of experience in terms of possible visions—is not restricted to any abstract concept of any abstract experience in the confronted occasion in any positivist sense, but, it is an approach, in a hypothetical manner, suggesting that the given occasion might or might not have emerged for observation or perception, but, if admitted for perception in any hypothetical restrictedness or contrasts, it has to be detached from all abstract proneness to think in terms of any specific subjective or objective ways, for the confronted occasion, in its emergence and perishing, as a decision-point, hypothetically construed, is virtually a 'subject-superject' process, with progress or possibility, not in any sense of finality. In cosmic-psyche situation of experiential process, any confronted occasion—is at once a subject and superject of its experiences. The concrete experiential situation is thus a compound, in a dynamic sense of 'subject-superject' possibility where neither half of this description can for a moment be lost sight of.<sup>22</sup> Whitehead's notion of the human organism and human psyche—is very close to the Buddha's human organism as a compound, and human psyche as a continuity of a past to a perishing future. Abandoning Aristotle's abstract finality and restricted propositions as expressions of early cultural attitude, Whitehead, initiates his advanced evolutionary mode by the following critical attitudes towards experiential processes. He says: "The ancients asked what have we experienced, and the moderns asked what can we experience, but in both cases they asked about things transcending the act of experience, which is the occasion of asking."<sup>23</sup> To this writer, the basis of freedom from restricted intellectuality—is the decision to think of a self-creative activity that runs through all thinking processes in a hypothetical form of *if then*, discarding the notion of all apparent existentiality as such.

19 Ibid., p. 17.

20 Ibid., p. 18.

21 Ibid., Ch. II specially pp. 22-34.

22 Ibid., pp. 34-35.

23 *Adventures of Ideas*, Part III, specially Ch. XV., Philosophic Method, and pp. 224-239.



According to Whitehead, the ancient and the modern thinkers of the West, in their attachment for their abstract pasts, or inherited ideas, became subject to Nature's causal past or urge and they missed the subtle elements of creative decisions in continuous flash behind the confronted universe. Once conscious of this enlightening attitude, one understands the apparently *existing* as not what it is, but only as a possibility, which, may not have taken place, as it has emerged. So, there is always a possible error in one's perceptual experience, for one's positivist tendency, where usually a preference is given to one's eyes in analyzing the perceptual situation, and one's introspection, in analyzing the inner mental experience, but really, both these processes as affecting the inner experience, are the activities of the human brain in continuation with the human body or organism. This is nothing but maya or complex experiential process, at once psychic and cosmic, capturing human attention by a veiling and a superimposition of something which needs to be eliminated by an opposing psychic-cosmic discipline, —Apavada (refutation) as Sankara suggested beyond the Buddhist disciplined attitudes of Nirvana (total dispassion from restricted intellectuality) and Sunya (voidness of intellectual forms) in post-Buddhist Indian thought. Elaborating this entire process, in the context of the confronted occasion in Western thought, Whitehead says, that the human organism, in the perceptual situation, is an act of self-origination, including the whole of Nature and limited to the Perspective of the focal region, located within the body, but not necessarily persisting in any fixed co-ordination with the definite part of the brain (a kind of Sankara's Apavada, a refutation). It pertains to the entire organism as within Nature with a possibility as in Sankara's suggestion of a post-Mayic process. Hence the occasion of experience as confronted indicating a natural disposition, has an individual pattern, with creative possibilities. Each occasion lifts some components into primacy, and cloaks the vague confusions, and derivations which form the main stuff of experience. The same process of veiling and superimposing is admitted as an experiential possibility for Sankara in post-Buddhist process of Indian thought, as mentioned before when the basic ignorant disposition becomes a concrete function awaiting for its elimination by a posterior flash of decision in the disciplined aspect of refutation (Apavada). So the presented situation, to Whitehead, in the advanced process of Western thought, and to Sankara, in the advanced process of Indian thought, is, not a simple situation, an inner or outer experience—idea or impression—sense-data et al.—but is a complex of decision-points or possibilities, with a before and after. In order to discover some of the major categories for measuring the experiential processes and possibilities,



Whitehead contends—we must appeal to evidence relating to every variety of experience—experience sleeping, experience awake, experience in the light to experience in the dark, experience normal to experience abnormal, experience conceivable to experience inconceivable, and experience seen to experience unseen. It is a vast range of changing experiential situations in emergence and perishing. The aim, in perceptual experiential situation, is to tackle Nature's past in its capacity to entertain the emergent and changing confronted perceptual situation in its possibilities, for prospective decisions. This is equally developed by Sankara in the context of developing Indian thought of his time' with a further stretch to one's previous birth:

Whitehead's analysis of experiential situation, as confronted, is from within, and also from without one's organism, for a confrontation of the new, after the immediate order of perishing. Whitehead is not dealing with a static existing universe, but he is dealing with a universe, which is being entertained with a full consciousness that it might or might not have emerged at all as it looks, but when emerged, it has to be entertained as a possible situation, as the Maya of Sankara. Hence Whitehead objects to mere cognitive analysis of the confronted experiential process, by a reference to Euripides, to include always the basic experiential process of feeling as providing a ground for a possibility behind all cognitive reflections, by stating: "Zeus<sup>25</sup> whether thou art compulsion of Nature or intelligence of Man-kind." Similarly, in the case of Maya of Sankara, in Indian thought, one has to account for a vast range of experiential process from the son of a barren woman to the experience of a projected snake on the rope, in the objective interpersonal experiential process, with a possibility beyond. This kind of comprehensive consciousness in Whitehead and Sankara, is an admission of a beginningless emotional past (Prarab dhakarma) of Nature as operative behind man's consciousness becoming manifest in restricted attitude towards the confronted perceptual experience, but it has within it the elements of an integral urge towards a further creative possibility. Whitehead, however will not stretch Nature's past to one's previous past life; unlike Sankara, he is concerned with the human organism in its background and foreground of Nature—without raising the question of an individual's past birth.

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- 24 *Adventures of Ideas*, pp. 226-238, for Whitehead, and *Aparokshanubhuti* (Self-Realization) by Sawmi Vimuktananda, Advaita Ashrama, Calcutta, second impression, 1955, first published 1938, for Sankara.
- 25 *Adventures of Ideas*, p. 227, for Whitehead, and *Aparokshanubhuti* for Sankara.



In all experiential processes confronting a human organism, to Whitehead, and to this writer, after interpreting Whitehead, and Indian thought to the stage of Sankara's Maya, indicating a further prospect—there is a continuity between a basic perceptual situation and the confronted situation with a prospect beyond. In both experiential centers, there is a continuous process of emergence and perishing, which is becoming. In pure physical prehension, in the confronted perceptual situation, there is, —how, an occasion in its immediacy of being—absorbs another occasion which has passed into the objective immortality of its non-being. It is how the past lives in the present. It is causation. It is memory. It is perception of derivation. It is emotional conformation of a given situation, an emotional continuity of past with present. It is a realization of truth, where the background of cosmic-psychic Nature conforms itself to the foreground of psychic-cosmic possibilities. It is a basic element rightly the basic restricted intellectual propensity (avidya) or karma, stretched to the advanced yet restricted notion of Maya of Sankara from which springs the self-creation of each temporal occasion, in its possibility towards objective immortality. In each confronted perishing, there is an initiation of becoming. "How the past perishes is how the future becomes." Hence Whitehead transcends all specific controversies raised by the rationalist; empiricists, phenomenologists, existentialists, analysts and realists et al., by a comprehensive attitude of the confronted situation, where, for, any generalized statement, Whitehead needs a series of corrective expressions, as together, creativity, conspescence, prehension, feeling, subjective form, data, actuality, becoming, process, and so on. This process is also found in Sankara in his development of advanced Indian thought to the stage of Maya. In the continuous experiential series with a background and foreground in the advanced lines of Western thought, Whitehead always needs the presence of a *whole* experience, which, to Bradley (a contemporary British Neo-Hegelian), is a supra-intellectual process beyond all restricted categories in relativity, and, to James (an American pragmatist of this century), not merely a continuous stream of consciousness, but also a stream of sensibility or feeling-process. It is a whole-process, within and without, so that there is more in every situation of perceptual experience, indicating infinite possibilities. What Whitehead discerned in the background of advanced Western thought, was discerned by D. M. Datta, and eminent contemporary Indian thinker, with a special mastery over Sankara's Vedanta, and over Western philosophy to the stage of Whitehead. In this revolutionary work, *Six Ways of Knowing*, Datta, presents and evaluates Sankara's advanced theory of knowledge, in terms of his Maya, as a



prospective mode beyond the early prospective contrasts of the Upanisadic and Buddhist thinkers, as not an unreasonable stand or attitude, even when compared with the advanced philosophic, psychological and scientific attitudes of the West. In this discourse, this writer excludes the Indian doctrine of karma, indicating one's psychic predispositions from one's past life, but without ignoring such a process, confines himself to one's present life in evolution, with an inherited past in Nature, as understood or experienced, excluding the supposition of an individual's pre-existence in a past life. The past, if any, is a general supposition or background without any notion of an individuality, for, individuality is a restricted intellectual consciousness.

Evidently, needless to mention, Whitehead, in interpreting the confronted perceptual situation, in its basis and possibility, subscribes to no system, however advanced its standpoint may be, he, like the Buddha and the Buddhist thinkers, in general, interprets confronted situation as having a core of intellectuality or abstract restrictedness, or, in the Buddhist terminology, an element of Ignorance (*ajnana*), which has to be abandoned. The core of intellectuality is one's intellectual propensity or desire (passion, or *tanha*) in the Buddhist terminology, it is the same as the complex cosmic and psychic past of non-sensuous relatedness, prehension or feeling of Whitehead; it is the basic emotional urge conceived in a general sense, through the emergent human organism towards psychic-cosmic possibilities, and is interpretable through general principles and pursuits, at once cosmic and psychic, without the restrictive intellectual modes. To Whitehead these cosmic-psychic principles or general ideas are spatio-temporal processes, eternal objects, propositional processes, intellectual processes, and processes beyond all, in many-dimensional contexts of possibilities, which are describable in terms of God and Creativity. In the advanced cultural contexts of human orders of perceptuality, there is an evolution in the line of possible psychic-cosmic pursuits, which are generally describable in terms of Whitehead's Truth, Beauty, Art, Adventure and Peace. Whitehead's principles and pursuits as possibles in adhering to no systems, are in the order of continuous possibilities in integral senses, as not touched by bifurcating intellectuality of any restricted system, for, intellectuality, is only an emergent consciousness or awareness in the perceptual situation, with a non-sensuous past in Causal Nature, and with a possibility, in the apparent perceptual order of a reflective human organism, where also it emerges and perishes, into orders beyond all restricted intellectuality or systems. All the experiential possibility (freedom from system) is towards the many-dimensional pursuits in a psychic-cosmic



sense from Truth to Peace<sup>37</sup>, only when the final pursuit of Peace is realized in all its depths and comprehensiveness; then alone, like the Buddhist consciousness of Nirvana or sunya (vacuity), or freedom from all intellectual propensity, — can one understand, the frailty or limitation of intellectual wisdom, which needs to be sacrificed by progressive cultivation of contrasting attitudes. Credit goes to Whitehead for lifting Western thought to an insightful process indicating this vast sphere of possibilities and totally eliminating them from the restrictive intellectual consciousness. The detachment from restrictive intellectuality does not amount to ignoring intellectuality altogether, but only its restrictiveness.

If one surveys the development of Indian thought from the stage of the Upanisadic contrasts of Atman/Brahman complex to the advanced contrasts realized by the Buddha and his followers in terms of Nirvana/Sunya complex and beyond both to that of the Maya, Apavada, Sadhana-mukti process and other principles of the Vedantists from Sankara and the followers, or in the consequent processes beyond them, in Ramanuja and others—one will find in Aurobindo's experiential contrast of the Supermind, a similar prospective consciousness of freedom or a sense of perennial possibilities beyond one's predecessors. According to Aurobindo, the Supermind is a new fourth or possible, with a continuous function and urge from a transcendent triadic basis of existentiality, consciousness and bliss. The transcendent triadic basis as indicated is not an abstract positive sphere of experiential processes in its totality or in separations—but each of the characters indicated there, stands for a possibility, in contrast to its respective opposite—existence, therefore, is not an existence, in any positive sense, it is so, by way of its contrast—non-existence; similarly consciousness is so by way of its opposite—non-consciousness, and finally, the character of bliss is so, by way of its opposite or contrast—non-bliss. Each of the triads is a possibility, if the Upanisadic thought is rightly interpreted. What Aurobindo wanted to suggest, in the background of advanced Indian thought of his time, with a consciousness of the advanced Western thought of this present century—according to this writer—is an evolutionary and

26 *Adventures of Ideas*, Part III., Ch. XV, for Whitehead, *Aparokshanubhuti*, for Sankara, and *The Six Ways of Knowing*, by D. M. Datta, University of Calcutta, 1960, Second revised edition, first published in 1932 (in Great Britain), relevant portions.

27 *Adventures of Ideas*, Part IV., Civilization, specially Cn. XX., for Peace, for detailed comparison between Whitehead's pursuit of peace and the Buddhist pursuit towards Nirvana and Sunya, vide Whitehead's *Four Principles From West-East Perspectives*, by A. K. Sarkar, specially Ch. v.



transforming process beyond all possibilities, realized so far and not perceived so clearly before, in traditional Indian thought. Through his new fourth—the Supermind—Aurobindo indicates a dual process—a descent into the concrete empirical order of Matter, and ascent from Matter, through other concrete processes, to Life, Mind and over-mental processes, and also to a process beyond all, not as so many existential characters, but as so many possibles, with grounds in the complex of possibles or discernibles.

In the descent-process of the Supermind—Aurobindo, in the background of Indian thought in development, from the Upanisads to the Buddhism and latter Indian philosophical systems, beyond Buddhist, in varied Vedantic lines beyond Sankara—stretches Indian thought to accept the material process as fully real as a possible in its objective cosmic-psycho interpersonal contexts, stretching itself to higher orders of cosmic-psycho possibilities of vitality, mentality and overmental process, with necessary transformations as to outreach itself, along with other possible processes, to even over-mental processes; this stretching itself to the higher cosmic-psycho orders not only of Matter but also of other possibles to the stages of the overmind processes to supramental processes in a concrete progressive cultural context—is the ascent-process of the Supermind;—the Supermind of Aurobindo is not an entity, but a process and a possibility, beyond all conceivable apparent orders of possibilities, to the stage of over-mental processes and possibilities, and, in this post over-mental possibilities—the Supermind of Aurobindo is non-different from Whitehead's subject-superject process and possibility, in cosmic-psycho cultural perceptual situation in emergence and possibility.<sup>28</sup>

In developing Whitehead's philosophic deliberations in the aspects of his confronted occasions in human perceptual level, as subject-superject process and possibility—Whitehead has come too close to Aurobindo's deliberations in terms of his new contrast or fourth of Supermind process, in India's advanced evolutionary cultural process. But both retain the credit for master minds, to be shared in togetherness with an equality. The writer of this paper also takes the opportunity of showing that India's universally accepted notion of Karma of the transcendentalists, both Vedic and non-Vedic, stands

28 For a critical comparison between Whitehead and Aurobindo, vide this writer's paper : *Aurobindo And Whitehead : A Quest For General Ideas in Knowledge, Culture and Value*, in two parts, Edited by R. C. Pandeya and S. R. Bhatt, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1976, papers presented in Plenary Session, Panel Discussions and Sectional Meetings of World Philosophy Conference, Golden Jubilee Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress, Part II, pp. 517-523.



for some kind of restricted understanding in different stage of cultural process, interpreting the present human organism as an inheritance of an unfathomable past—beyond the present order of Nature's past, but not holding the view that the 'past' is an element of one's past life. Such a fixed past with a fixed notion of an individuality in some form of existence, needs to be polished up, with the notion of the possible, as "a may or as a may not be". Hence this propensity can be got over by progressive pursuits towards experiential processes of advanced cultural orders by way of possible contrasts, not alone as Karma, but also as Atman, Brahman, Nirvana, Sunyata, Dharmakaya, Svayamprakas et al. —they do not exist in any absolute sense. Any so-called existence of any of the contrasts, in a cultural milieu, is a possibility, which might or might not emerge in human consciousness, placed as it is, in an organism within a dual Nature, with a past, present and a future in continuity. In Indian thought, this complex process in a ground-consequent way before one's birth, during one's birth and after one's birth or death, —has been demonstrated continuously from the stage of the Upanisads to the Vedantist Sankara beyond the Buddha, Buddhists thinkers, and subsequent Vedic thinkers in post-Buddhist process. The same sort of contrasting modes have also been exhibited in post-Sankarite period among the theistic Vedantins beginning with Ramanuja and subsequent Vedantins, beyond Sankara and Ramanuja. This complex process can also be extended to various movements in syncretic religious and philosophic ways, in Hindu-Buddhist forms, and in contrast to the advanced background of the Jainist thinking. After the impact of the Islamic Sufism, there emerged a Hindu-Sufi cultural process.<sup>29</sup> As Indian thought is not merely speculative, but also, in practice, prospectively Yogic and Tantric, the advanced Indian thinking is in a complex syncretic aspect, with the best elements of Yogic-Tantric processes in development from the Hindu-Buddhist and Sufi processes to those of Aurobindo and his followers. The various socio-religious-philosophic-political movements of the nineteenth century and of the early twentieth century before and after Indian Independence in complex historical contents—indicate further complex movements and processes in Indian thought in contrast to advanced contrasts of Western thinking. It is wrong to hold that Indian thought is not scientific in advanced ways. It is a fact that Whitehead's deliberation is in the advanced lines of philosophical thinking, resting on his primary interests in the sciences of mathematics and physics, and his advanced thinking on those lines of mathematics is in the appreciation of Zero

<sup>29</sup> *The Cultural Heritage of India*, Vol. IV., Editor Haridas Bhattacharyya, The Ramakrishna Mission, Institute of Culture, Calcutta, reprint 1969, relevant portions.



of Indian mathematical thought, in the background of mathematical consciousness beyond that of the Greeks and Romans<sup>30</sup>, and also in the background of consciousness of the special and general theory of relativity of Einstein and beyond Einstein in a philosophical direction which Whitehead has developed further philosophically in the 'subject-superject' contexts of the confronted occasions as indicated. It is also a fact that Aurobindo's thinking is not scientific in Whitehead's sense, but it is no less scientific and hence, scientific in a broad sense, as a challenge to scientific achievements through Yoga and Tantra, of the phenomenon of death—whether death is a possible confronted occasion or not, or it has to be viewed as an ultimate, or in its apparentness; death is just a possible occasion, as other occasions confronted or to be confronted with a steadiness—the grounds of which can be traced back to the Upanisadic thinkers—Yajñavalkya, Yama, Prajapati, —Buddha, Sankara et al—and—to the stage of Aurobindo and others after them. The suggestion here, in the context of death, is the same as in the case of other occasions—that there is a beyond—and—beyond death—as other occasions.

This paper, in its consideration of the systems, movements, methods and processes in Western and Indian thinking, has curtailed the details by pursuing them as only so many possible discernible general ideas of all experiential processes, as held by their representative leading thinkers through the centuries, and they have come almost to the same forms of conclusions, with expressions, indicating a general prospect in continuous pursuing and never stopping at a point as the last or final. The tendency to systematize one's reflective activity by taking recourse to a restricted definition, indicating a logic, and extending that process further to a metaphysics, theology or epistemology—is a continuation or extension of such a restricted formalist propensity; really it is a continuous urge, a disposition or propensity—that mankind has to abandon, in its pursuit towards an ever-fresh possibility—freedom or transcendence. It is an aspiration for an immortality—in the aspect of a pursuit which is confronted but is never a terminating process, —an extinct volcano; —only it has to be matched with the comprehensive decisions that one has to make in tackling any concrete situation, not in restricted details but in subtle symbolic suggestions, for possible developments, beyond any confronted situation, discarding the notion of existentiality in any abstract sense, for the emergent present, from an unfathomable past, is a *may be* or *may not be*, and hence, the future from this complex background, is equally so; — a *may* or *may not be*; but when existent, it is not an abstract existent, but a piece of possibility—as indicated in so many ways beyond all restrictive intellectual modes.

30 *Readings on Logic*, by Irving Copi and James Gould, Second edition, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1972, vide in this volume, cf. Whitehead's paper, *The Importance of God Notation* pp. 203-205, one has to mark here Whitehead's emphasis on the new symbolic function in mathematical thinking through Zero et al.



## 6

## Chomsky and the Structuralist Tradition Of Saussure : A Static Conception of Language

Akin Ergoden

The structuralism of Saussure and Chomsky proceeds from an epistemological principle of holding itself to the interior of the enclosure of the universe of signs; language (*la langue*), according to this view, is an autonomous entity of internal dependencies. Central to the present article is the argument that this epistemological position does violence to the true nature of the linguistic experience. This argument is supported by Piaget's and Wittgenstein's views

Saussure and Chomsky wrongly subordinate *parole* to *langue* excluding thereby the following fundamental aspects of language from any consideration: (a) communication (i.e., speech acts) as the goal of language, (b) history, as the production of culture and of man which is crystallized in language.

The present paper attempts to show first that there is a close similarity between the structuralism of Saussure and Chomsky, and secondly, that a fundamental opposition exists between Saussure and Chomsky on the one hand and the structural-functional method of Piaget, on the other. The former view postulates that "form" or "structure" can be considered and described independently of the "substance" in which it functions, thus confirming a formal, functional, ignoring outlook on language. In contrast to this view, Piaget's method considers both function and structure in their developmental or historical context, thus constituting a first step towards bridging the gap between a conception of language as an abstraction removed from its actual functioning, and the view that language is to be considered within its function, that is, within the context of human purpose and communication.



First, it will be demonstrated that there is a close parallel between the three main ideas of Saussure which are responsible for a formal, abstract notion of language, and the key concepts of Chomsky's theory. These three ideas are, as Saussure develops them in the *Course in General Linguistics*, that of the "sign", *la langue-la parole* dichotomy, and the synchrony-diachrony distinction. Chomsky, like Saussure, treats the sign primarily as an entity which is combined with other kind of entities according to complex rules. The Saussurean distinction between *langue* and *parole* is replaced by a similar distinction in Chomsky, between "linguistic competence" and "linguistic performance". Like Saussure, Chomsky also accepts the distinction between synchronic and diachronic perspectives, assuming the primacy of the former in linguistics. Thus despite Chomsky's claim to the contrary,<sup>1</sup> he does not provide an alternative to Saussure's structuralism, but a mere extension or expansion of it.

Secondly, it will be argued that both Saussure and Chomsky fail to include, in their account of language: a) the genetic or historical dimension, b) the extra-linguistic or communicative factors affecting linguistic meaning.

The point of departure for Saussure's theory of language is the "linguistic sign" which he identifies with the concept "word".<sup>2</sup> Saussure defines the linguistic sign as "the combination of a concept and an acoustic image".<sup>3</sup> The sound in which the word consists is the signified (*signifiant*), the concept is the signified (*signifié*). Saussure regards the link between the signifier and the signified, the sound form and the content as strong as if they were the front and back of a sheet of paper,<sup>4</sup> suggesting thus that for every signifier there is one particular concept. Language, according to Saussure, is the sum total of such static forms each of which is locked up with a certain meaning. He thus does not take into consideration the relationship between the "literal" or dictionary meaning of words and the extra-linguistic contexts which determines these "literal" or dictionary meanings. The sum of the linguistic signs, according to Saussure, exist in the heads of all individuals of the linguistic community "almost like a

1 Noam Chomsky, *Current Issues in Linguistic Theory*, Mouton: The Hague, 1964, p. 23.

2 Although Saussure makes a distinction between "words" and "linguistic sign", they correspond, in Saussure, to each other in the sense in which variants like "do" and "does" are different words. He is even prepared, for convenience, to speak of "words" in preference to linguistic sign (F. de Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics*, London: Mc Graw-Hill, 1966, pp. 110-111.

3 F. de Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics*, p. 67.

4 *Ibid.*, p. 113.



dictionary of which identical copies have been distributed to each individual".<sup>5</sup> In relation to recent insights gained from the philosophy of language (i.e., Wittgenstein) it could be argued that, contrary to Saussure's view, semantics should be regarded as a behavioral science in that no hard-and-fast line can be drawn between meaning of linguistic expressions and the meaning or significance we place on the non-linguistic actions and behavior patterns.

The second essential feature of Saussure's conception of language is the *la langue-la parole* distinction. Since there is no generally accepted English equivalent of these terms, the present dissertation adopts John Lyons use of "language system" for *langue* "language behavior" for *parole*. *Langue*<sup>6</sup> is, according to Saussure, the "system of regularities which underlies the utterances produced by speakers."<sup>7</sup> *Parole*, on the other hand, is the "executive side" of the language which consist of "(1) the combinations by which the speaker uses language code for expressing his own thoughts; (2) the psychological mechanisms that allow him to exteriorize those combinations."<sup>8</sup>

The purpose of the *langue-parole* distinction, according to Saussure, is to isolate the proper object of linguistics. This is the language behavior which the science of linguistics is concerned. Thus, analyzing a language is not to describe speech acts but to determine the units and rules of combination which make up the language system.<sup>9</sup>

The third important idea which underlies Saussure's static conception of language is his distinction between synchronic and diachronic perspectives and his insistence of the priority of the former. The former approach according to Saussure, is "concerned with the logical and psychological relations that bind together coexisting terms and form a system in the...mind."<sup>10</sup> The synchronic approach to language, then, studies it in a particular state (i.e., static) without reference to time, while the diachronic mode studies its evolution in time. Saussure's argument for the primacy of synchronic over diachronic perspective is based on the assumption that historical change originates in *parole*, in linguistic behavior, and not in *langue*: "The diachronic perspective deals with phenomena which are unrelated to

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 19.

<sup>6</sup> J. Lyons, "Structuralism and Linguistics" in D. Robey (ed.) *Structuralism: An Introduction*, Oxford University Press, 1973, p. 13.

<sup>7</sup> F. de Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics*, pp. 13-14.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 14.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 20.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 99-100.



the system, although they do condition them (the system, i. e., *langue*)”<sup>11</sup>.

These three main aspects of Saussure's conception of language reappear (albeit in modified form) in Noam Chomsky's theory of language. Chomsky, like Saussure, takes linguistics in its most proper sense to be concerned with “language system” rather than “language behavior” and language seen synchronically or statically rather than diachronically or as it has developed through time. Thus, Chomsky states: “The logical priority of the study of *langue*... seems quite inescapable”.<sup>12</sup> Chomsky, however, rejects Saussure's conception of language as a “system of signs” and redefines language as a set of sentence types. Saussure, he writes

regards *langue* as basically a store of signs with their grammatical properties, that is, a store of word-like elements, fixed phrases, and, perhaps, certain limited phrase types. He was thus quite unable to come to grips with the recursive processes underlying sentence formation, and he appears to regard sentence formation as a matter of parole rather than *langue* of free voluntary creation rather than systematic rule.<sup>13</sup>

Saussure's failure to distinguish between sentences themselves as grammatical forms and the utterances by which sentences are realized in speech led him to exclude sentence formation from the linguistic system and view language merely a system of signs. It is this aspect that Chomsky stresses in replacing Saussure's *langue-parole* distinction with his own concepts of competence and performance. The “linguistic competence” which is the main concern of linguistics, is the mastery of the abstract system of rules by which a person is able to understand any and all of the grammatically well-formed sentences of his language, whereas the “linguistic performance” is the actual use of language, affected by what he terms “grammatically irrelevant conditions”:

Linguistic theory is concerned primarily with an ideal speaker-listener in completely homogeneous speech community, who knows its language perfectly and is unaffected by such grammatically irrelevant conditions as memory limitations, shifts of attention and interests, error (random or characteristic) in applying his knowledge of the language in actual performance.<sup>14</sup>

11 *Ibid.*, p. 85.

12 N. Chomsky, “The Logical Basis of Linguistic Theory”, in *Proceedings of the Ninth International Congress of Linguistics*, The Hague, 1964, p. 916.

13 N. Chomsky, *Current Issues in Linguistics Theory*, p. 23.

14 N. Chomsky, *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax*, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1965, p. 4.



As different from Saussure, therefore, Chomsky explains the linguistic competence in terms of the theory of grammar: a generative grammar "attempts to characterize in the most neutral possible terms the knowledge of the language that provides the basis for actual use of language by a speaker hearer."<sup>15</sup> Because of his failure to include sentences within *langue*, Saussure's weak conception of syntax, according to Chomsky, must be revised so that it includes a system of rules which a speaker has mastered. Even with such a "revision" of Saussure, however, Chomsky is not too far away from the former's view that *langue* as the system of signs (or rules combining signs) existing in the brains of the members of society like a dictionary whose copies have been distributed to each individual. This fact is revealed in Chomsky's deliberate use of the term "grammar" ambiguously to refer to both the model of grammar that linguists develop and to those actual rules that are presumed to exist in the speaker-hearer's mind. The native speakers have in their minds, and presumably stored in their brains, sets of rules of the kind that linguists formulate in their generative models of the language system.<sup>16</sup>

Finally, Chomsky's redefinition of the goal of linguistics as that of exploring differences between the "grammatical" and the "ungrammatical" is not actually too far away from Saussure's view that the goal of linguistics is to discover the differences between the units within the system of *langue*. Thus Chomsky writes:

The fundamental aim in the linguistic analysis of language L is to separate the *grammatical* sequences which are the sentences of L from the *ungrammatical* sequence which are not sentences of L and to study the structure of the grammatical sequences.<sup>17</sup>

Chomsky, on this point, seems to be following Saussure's dictum that "in language there are only differences without positive terms".<sup>18</sup> Rather than discovering the differences in general, as Saussure does, Chomsky is placing the difference finding to sentence level, but the task of linguistics remains, for both that of difference finding at the level of *langue*.

We have thus far stated the parallels between Saussure's and Chomsky's view in order to emphasize the fact that their conception of language, conceived as abstract formal system existing in the brain of every member of community (Saussure) or innately prescribed in

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 3.

<sup>16</sup> N. Chomsky, *Syntactic Structures*, Mouton; The Hague, 1957, p. 13.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 25.

<sup>18</sup> F. de Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics*, p. 120.



humans (Chomsky) has been largely responsible for detaching the object of inquiry (*langue*) from the historical and functional of language. In the following pages I will dwell on the implications of such a notion of language and some of the problems it poses.

First, Saussure's distinction between synchronic and diachronic linguistic phenomena creates difficulties when considered within the context of Chomsky's "revision" of *langue* in terms of the competence of the ideal speaker hearer; *langue* has a long history whereas individual speaker-hearers (even with unlimited memory spans) have access only to its manifestations during short life spans. How, then, is the residual of linguistic change to be represented in the model of linguistic competence?

Let us take, for example, English morphemes of Latin descent such as *ex* and *dis*.<sup>19</sup> Novel constructions in which such morphemes are used productively—as for instance the expression “to disambiguate a sentence”—may actually require a different competence than that of linguistic competence and diachronic linguistic information far beyond the intuition of the competent but illiterate speaker of English. Some native speakers may even find no more resemblance between “distrust” and “discount” than between “discount” and “disk”. Furthermore, it is obvious that information concerning the prefix “dis” in English will exceed any linguistic competence that can be acquired from exposure to plain synchronic English. We are thus in a dilemma of either omitting necessary diachronic information in our description of *langue* or adding a somewhat mystical “racial memory” to the innate capacity of the ideal speaker-hearer!

Second, the structuralism of Saussure and Chomsky treat linguistic meaning as a result only of linguistic elements within the system of *langue* while excluding extra-linguistic factors and the language use in actual communication. This approach creates the impression that, as Hormann puts it: “First there are signs, secondly they carry meaning and thirdly they can even be used”.<sup>20</sup> Thus Chomsky, with his overemphasis on grammar, explains the meaning of an ordinary sentence according to the formulation that syntactic descriptions are mapped by the hearer upon the linguistic input and thus assume their meaning:

A system of propositions expressing the meaning of a sentence is produced in the mind as the sentence is realized as a physical signal, the two being related by certain formal operations

19 R. Rommetveit, *Words, Meanings, and messages*, New York: Academic Press, 1968, p. 31.

20 H. Hormann, *The Meaning-Form Understanding Problem of Psychological Semantics*, New York: Springer-Varlag, 1981, p. 8.



that, in current terminology, we may call grammatical transformations.<sup>21</sup>

Saussure expresses the idea that linguistic meaning is a result only of intralinguistic relations when he says that the linguistic unit is a *value*.<sup>22</sup> By saying that an object—for example, a coin—is a value, one is affirming that its exchange capacity is solely determined by fixed relationships existing between itself and objects of the same nature (the exchange rate between the coin and other monetary units of other countries). Similarly the signifying power of a linguistic unit, according to Saussure, is merely determined by the relationship uniting it with other signs of the language.

The most forceful argument against the above conception of linguistic meaning is put forth by Wittgenstein who affirms that the meaning of linguistic units cannot be explained solely by its relations to other linguistic units. This is so, he claims, because no clear-cut line can be drawn separating the meaning of linguistic behavior from the meaning or significance we place on the nonlinguistic actions and behavior patterns. Wittgenstein argued against his earlier associates such as Russell and Moore, who analyzed the meaning of linguistic expressions ('number', 'right', 'probable', etc.) by finding other equivalents or synonymous expressions which might be stated either in formal terms (i.e., *Principia Mathematica*) or else informally, using other everyday words. To do this alone was, in Wittgenstein's eyes, to remain trapped within the linguistic realm, and did nothing to make the relations of language to other things any less mysterious. When applied to Saussure's view, this criticism maintains that the value of a dramma or peso cannot be explained merely by showing that they can be exchanged for dollars or pounds: it is knowing how money functions in substantive transactions that counts. Similarly a linguistic unit according to Wittgenstein, owes its meaning to having been given the use or uses in the context of linguistic activities ('language-games'). Language games, in turn, however, must be understood in their own broader contexts; and for those contexts Wittgenstein introduced the phrase "forms of life"; the pattern of linguistic activities fixing the meaning of a word is simply an element or component in a larger group of activities. A language game derives its effective point from being geared into other non-linguistic activities. In sum, then, contrary to Saussure and Chomsky, we shall understand the meaning of a linguistic unit a right only if we see it in the context, first of the language games by which the word is put

21 N. Chomsky, *Language and Mind*, New York: Harcourt, 1968, p. 25.

22 F. de Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics*, p. 114, ff.



to use, and then, of the forms of life (which are only partly linguistic) from which these language games derive their significance.

Third, I will criticize the structuralist postulate of the existence of the linguistic forms (either as Saussurean system of signs or as Chomsky's grammatical structure) which all native language users "know". This knowledge of the "system" (Saussure) or of "structure" (Chomsky) exists independently of its functioning in actual communication situations thus narrowly defining the term "functional" merely as the way in which the elements of the "system" are put together. Hence Chomsky states :

There may be a 'functional explanation' for the organization of language with grammatical transformations, which would be a well-designed system corresponding to certain organization of short and long-term memory, for example.<sup>23</sup>

Contrary to this view, Piaget redefines the relationship that is traditionally assumed to exist between structure and function. He argues that the structure and function are necessarily interdependent and therefore must be considered simultaneously. The traditionally accepted distinction between function and structure to which Piaget opposes is represented by Titchener who, using an analogy from biology, initially proposed a three-fold distinction:

We may inquire into the structure of an organism, without regard to function-by analysis determining its component parts, and by synthesis exhibiting the mode of its formation from the parts. Or we may inquire into the function of the various structures which our analysis has revealed, and into the manner of their interrelation as functional organs. Or, again, we may inquire into the changes of form and function that accompany the persistence of the organism in time, the phenomena of growth and decay. Biology, the science of living things, comprises the three mutually interdependent sciences of morphology, physiology and ontogeny.<sup>24</sup>

Revolutionizing the above made distinction between functional and structural approaches, Piaget regards all three aspects of Titchener's outline as interdependent: his theory is at once structural, functional and genetic. That is, contrary to Saussure and Chomsky, diachrony or genesis is not characterized any longer as sequence of discrete, static synchronic systems, but that diachrony is dependent

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- 23 N. Chomsky, *Language and Responsibility*, p. 86; For Saussure, see J. Culler, *Structuralist Poetics*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975, p. 10.
- 24 E. G. Titchener, "The Postulates of Structural Psychology", in *Philosophical Review*, 1, 9, 7, p. 499, quoted by K. F. Riegel, *Psychology of Development and History*, New York: Plenum, 1976, p. 110.



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upon synchrony for its movements and that synchrony carries the possibility of diachronic movement within it: "Every structure (is) the resultant of a genesis and every genesis (is) the transition from a more to a less elementary (or more complex) structure".<sup>25</sup> Being thus mutually bound up with each other, genesis emanates from a structure which carries the genesis to start with. For example, for a child to move from one stage at which he can see and touch a concrete object (i.e., a cat) to a stage at which he can symbolically represent the object with the name "cat" involves both the movement from one structure to another, and the presence of the possibility of that movement within the first structure. Thus, Piaget writes: "must the symbolic function be thought of as permanent (as in Saussure or Chomsky)? Would it not be legitimate to think of what Saussure called the 'sign' as having evolved from what he called the 'symbol'?"<sup>26</sup>

Moreover, contrary to Saussure's and Chomsky's conception of "function" as merely the way in which the elements of an abstract universal structure are put together, Piaget's concept of function includes the action ("Praxis") of the language user. Language (as part of "symbolic functioning") is shaped by the subject's activities and that the language-using subject actively participates in the transformational processes. To quote Piaget himself:

Praxis or action is not some sort of movement but rather a system of coordinated movements functioning for a result or an intention. To take but one example, the displacement of an arm which interferes in the act of putting on or of removing a hat is not praxis; a praxis consists of an action in its totality and not of a partial movement within this action. Praxis is an acquired as opposed to a reflex coordination; this acquisition can derive not only from the child's experience or education... but also eventually from the internal operations of equilibrium which express a regulation or a stabilization acquired from coordination.<sup>27</sup>

In sum, Piaget's dialectic theory of genetic structuralism helps us situate the concept of language as part of a total system (i.e., symbolic functioning) and as part of the horizon of man's being constructed (rather than innate) from the most elementary level of activities through interaction with the environment. Such a shift in interpretation, first of all, represents (contrary to Saussure and Chomsky) an emphasis on the language users and their activities. If it is accept-

<sup>25</sup> J. Piaget, *The Principles of Genetic Epistemology*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972, p. 12.

<sup>26</sup> J. Piaget, *Structuralism*, New York: Harper and Row, 1970, pp. 114-115.

<sup>27</sup> J. Piaget, "Child Praxis" in Piaget, *The Child and Reality: Problems of Genetic Psychology*, New York: Grossmann, 1973, p. 63.



ed as Piaget claims, that function and structure are interdependent, then it follows that an adequate explanation of the language system must include a theory of symbolic functioning, not necessarily, however, the one implied in Piaget's theory.

Secondly, if Piaget's argument for a dialectical conception of the relationship between genesis and structure is accepted, then it follows that an adequate theory of language must include a developmental perspective, that is, it must give an account of the essence of language as explored in the early stages of human life. If so, in relation to the acquisition of language, Chomsky's claim that the nature of language and the process of language acquisition are such that they are inexplicable other than on the assumption that we possess a unitary human language capacity which is either there or not from the start, must be abandoned. Piaget demonstrates that the structures (linguistic or not) are not fixed innate forms but rather emerge through continuous transformational activities of the child. However, such a developmental perspective need not necessarily be the one Piaget's theory implies, but must go beyond it.

The present article underscored the resemblance in Saussure's and Chomsky's views of language as a formal, static system and their implications for theories of knowledge and meaning. Thus, it is indicated that the structuralism of Saussure and Chomsky ignores the importance of the functional and genetic aspects of language both in the sense of communication and in the sense of the developmental activities of the language user.

A two-fold claim is made. First, it is through language that we come to make sense of our world. That is, our knowledge is primarily an attempt to take the events from "real" world and capture them in symbols. Second, that an understanding of the origins and development of our knowledge (both phylo— and ontogenetically) is crucial for an understanding of knowledge itself. If these two claims are true, then it is maintained, language cannot be viewed as a self-enclosed entity relying solely on the internal dependencies of the system of signs. Language becomes rather, a dynamic part of man's being-in-the-world which makes knowledge possible: Meaning and understanding (in and through language) arise from action or more precisely the interaction between the intentionality of the self and a concrete world of social-historical setting which includes other human beings.



## Book-Reviews :

**Panos D. Bardis**, *Global Marriage and Family Customs*, Lexington, Massachusetts: Ginn, 1983, pp. viii+136, \$7.95.

This book consists of over 30 articles by the author, reprinted from a wide range of journals in this country and overseas. The selections provide a very cosmopolitan and intercultural view of their subject matter. As the author rightly maintains in his Introduction, "Marriage courses, even at the college level, tend to be incredibly and inexcusably ethnocentric and temporocentric.

These readings show the strength and value of the comparative approach, both in terms of different societies and other eras of history—ancient, medieval, and modern. Undergraduates tend, albeit understandably, to be very ethnocentric and lacking in a sense of history, as seen in their poor knowledge of the family (and other aspects of man's society) in other cultures and epochs. One task of sociology is to enable them to become less culture-bound and less mentally confined by their own point in time.

The articles are compiled in three sections: Family Systems, Love and Sex, and Scales. Family systems are dealt with in terms of ancient Egypt, the modern Greek family, Scandinavia, India, the Philippines, and Hawaii. In each case, the articles present a wealth of concrete and well-documented data. Students should be fascinated by early Egyptian attitudes and customs regarding fertility, toys, and schooling, for example.

The modern Greek family is portrayed as having been influenced by the church, rural life, and economic disorganization. This article, like all the others (with one exception dealing with etiological theories of homosexuality), is marked by a concise brevity that should appeal to students. In each case a vast amount of information is compressed into a few pages—for example, on Scandinavian sex mores and basic facts on the family and status of women in India. In the Philippines, Spanish sovereignty, the Catholic Church, and more recent American influences all played a part in affecting birth rates and marriage customs. In Hawaii, pre-Cook feudalism, later, international contacts, and Americanization have left their impact.

A review of ancient Egyptian sex life and contraception is followed by a succinct and graphic portrayal of sex life in early Greece and Rome. Typologies and theories (biological, psychoanalytic, and environmental) of homosexuality are presented at length, with many references to the research literature.



The last section starts with a scale for measuring degrees of liberality in attitudes toward dating. The Erotometer is an instrument for the quantitative measurement of heterosexual love. Bardis obtained about 500 items describing various aspects such love. Students could have an enjoyable and fascinating time using this scale and gain some insight into their own feelings for another person. Five other "meters" involve questions and true-or-false statements, all very explicitly, on sex information, physical aspects of human intercourse, pregnancy, menstruation, and attitudes to vasectomy.

A Pill Scale provides a technique for measuring attitudes to oral contraception, with a similar scale on attitudes regarding abortion. Other scales will enable individuals, both single and married, to understand their respective attitudes to their families, in terms of the forces that attract them to the family and those that pull them away. Attitudes toward familism are the theme of another scale, while two others explore violence (both in the family and in society generally). The last two scales involve attitudes toward morality (secular or traditionally theological) and to religion.

These highly readable articles and scales cover a very comprehensive range of themes, cultures, epochs, and issues. The entire work presents an interesting combination of historical and cross-cultural learning with modern scales applicable to topics very relevant to today's students' experience. The writing is marked throughout by clarity of expression. One never has to ask what the author meant by a particular phrase or question.

This book can be profitably used as supplementary reading in any marriage and family course, particularly courses whose contents are not confined to contemporary US society. No undergraduate could fail to find the work highly informative and enlightening.

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A. J. Ayer: *Metaphysics and Common Sense*, San Francisco: Freeman, Cooper & Co., p. 267, 1970, Price \$ 6.50.

This book is important for number of reasons. Chief among these is the fact that the author is one of the outstanding leaders of that very influential school of contemporary philosophy known as Logical Positivism or Logical Empiricism. Indeed Ayer's best known book, *Language, Truth and Logic* (New York: Dover Publications, n.d.), has even been called "the Bible of Logical Positivism". Again, this book



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is important because in it we also find those aspects of Logical Positivism which may be considered contributions to philosophy as a whole: its emphasis on analysis as a significant aspect of philosophical method; on clarity and linguistics; and on empiricism-including both ordinary common sense knowledge and scientific knowledge. Suffice it to say that, in terms of the above, it serves to bring philosophers out of their ivory towers and down to earth.

As over against his other books, *Metaphysics and Commonsense* consists of fifteen essays dealing with various subjects from his philosophical standpoint. While some of these essays are rather technical and hence of special interest to professional philosophers, this is by no means true of all of them. In the *Preface*, in fact, the author tells us that not less than "seven essays" were especially "written with a wider audience in view than that of professional philosophers." (p. ix) Among these the following are note worthy: "On Making philosophy Intelligible"; "Reflections on Existentialism"; "Man as a Subject for Science"; and "Philosophy and Politics."

As a philosopher, this reviewer offers the following criticisms-criticisms which pertain to Logical Positivism in general as well as to this book in particular. First of all, many readers will object of the highly technical, analytical method which sometimes leads to a preoccupation with trivial details. No wonder that the logical positivists have been charged with the *trivialization* of philosophy. Secondly, closely related to the above, is the over-emphasis on analysis at the expense of synthesis and synopsis. In our universe, after all, things do hang together and interact-and we are not likely to understand it, if we merely look at it in a simple, piecemeal fashion. This leads us to the third great weakness of Logical Positivism, as exemplified in this book as well as elsewhere: Ayer and his colleagues have no place for metaphysics. In fact, they have tried to kill it by attempting to dismiss it as "nonsense."

By metaphysics as understood here, of course, is meant an effort to develop a world view. This involves such very important questions as the following: What is the meaning of this mysterious universe in which we find ourselves? What is the meaning of this our human life? Why are we here? Is there a God-or is the idea of God merely a gigantic shadow cast by man's own projection of himself? Are there any basic, universal principles of right and wrong which serve as guidelines? Insofar as Logical Positivism has served as a warning against dogmatism, it has benefitted both philosophy and theology; but, insofar as it has tried to dodge the great perennial questions, it has been forced to retreat-a retreat that has by now become a riot.



In spite of the above strictures, this book of Ayer's is certainly worth reading. Besides the reasons for its importance given above, one other must be added: it sharpens our minds by challenging us to question and to think.

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**Don Martindale**, *The Scope of Social Theory: Essays and Sketches*, Houston, Texas: Cap and Gown Press, 1983, around pp. 500, cloth \$19.95, paper \$12.95.

In the opinion of the present reviewer, no volume has had greater impact on the thought of post-war sociology than Don Martindale's 1960 landmark study, *The Nature and Types of Sociological Theory*. It reduced multiple, conflicting classifications to five, mapped the entire field, clarified the criteria of classification and developed a picture that permitted the teaching of the trajectory of individual careers with new accuracy. Its combination of analytical and historical procedure took the study of theory out of the anecdotal stage and placed it on a scientific footing. Everyone was indebted to it, though there was no social movement to acknowledge this. Its effects could be seen everywhere as one after another of its analyses was quietly taken over-frequently without acknowledgement. Unquestionably, it played an important role in the rapid proliferation of theory in the 1960s and 1970s.

Then in 1981—in an astonishing feat of ratiocination—Martindale quietly dismantled the 1960 edition of *Nature and Types*, salvaging everything that had proven seaworthy from it, clarifying the implicit presuppositions of the first edition. He remapped the entire field synthesizing everything of importance in theory that had appeared in the past twenty years. The significance of what was done has not yet exploded on the contemporary mind. It takes time, it seems, for major conceptual events to be comprehended. Or, perhaps, we are still blinded by the lightning flash of the achievement. I predict that it will be at least a score of years before another synthesis of theory as monumental as the revised edition of *Nature and Types* is achieved.

It was my privilege to review the revised edition of *Nature and Types*. Therein I called attention to the fact that its single major defect from my point of view, was Martindale's failure to include himself among the theorists he reviewed. He preferred to keep his role as a student of theory separate from that as an original theorist in his own right. He seems to be uncomfortable in referring to his theories in third person in the manner of princes, emperors and imperial presidents.



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To my considerable satisfaction. *The Scope of Social Theory* comes genie-like as if in response to my wish. It is a selection of essays from the range of Martindale's original theorizing. Following an introductory essay on *The Scope of Social Theory*, the next seventeen essays are organized in three divisions as follows:

I. History and Metatheory which includes: *The Birth of Sociology from the Spirit of Philosophy*; *American Sociology in Historical Perspective*; *Limits to the Uses of Mathematics in the Study of Sociology*; and *Alternatives to Functionalism in Sociology*.

II. *Social Structure and Social Change* which includes: *The Formation and Destruction of Communities*; *Socialization: Socialization and Community: Historical Perspectives*; *Control of the Material Environment*; *Economy and Community: Historical Perspectives*; *Social Control*; *Social Control and Community: Historical Perspectives*; and *The City*.

III. *The Sociology of Knowledge and Art* which includes *Society, Civilization and the Intellectual*; *Fact, Truth and the Sociology of Knowledge*; *Sociology and Aesthetics*; *Aesthetic Theory and the Sociology of Art* and *The Sociology of the Personal Essayist*.

These are all held together by an interesting preface on the decline of the humanist scholar in post-war sociology, the introductory essay, and introductions to the special sections. The volume also includes a relatively complete bibliography of Martindale's writings.

How does one review such a volume when it includes some single essays which deserve as much space as the entire review. I have listed the titles of the sections and essays as a convenient way of revealing the range and richness of the volume. The introductory essay is new. So, too, is much of the essay on *American Sociology in Historical Perspective*—the best and most insightful review of American sociology I have seen and worthy of publication as an independent monograph in its own right. Some of the essays such as those on community formation and destruction, mathematics in the social sciences, functionalism, the sociology of the intellectual, the sociology of knowledge, and the sociology of aesthetics are already viewed in some quarters as minor classics. The whole has a unity which dramatizes Martindale's importance as a major theorist of the post-war period.

In the 1980 volume edited by Mohan and Wilke on *Critical Realism and Sociological Theory* some of us who discussed Martindale's theories described him as a critical realist because of his clear affinities with such American giants as the philosophers Charles Peirce,



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William James and John Dewey, such students of jurisprudence as Oliver Wendell Holmes, such historians as Carl Becker and Charles Beard, and such institutional economists as Thorstein Veblen, John R. Commons and John Kenneth Galbraith. While accepting as accurate our location of him in these philosophical and intellectual traditions, Martindale has always preferred to describe himself as a social behaviorist. Certainly he has clear affinities with all branches—the social action, pluralistic behavioral, and symbolic interactionist—of that school. Martindale is an elementarist—that is, he is convinced that the ultimate reality of socio-cultural life consists of interpersonal acts and the cultural meanings they embody. However, while emphatically rejecting holistic interpretations of the content of socio-cultural reality, Martindale has a holistic methodology. Moreover, he is a humanist with a deep appreciation of science leaving it unclear whether he is best described as a scientific-humanist or humanistic-scientist. While he appreciates the need for specialization, he is too interested in all human conditions to specialize for long. Of same Renaissance men it used to be said that wherever a learned man was to be found, he was at home. This could be said of Martindale, whose writings range the whole of sociology.

*The Scope of Social Theory* is a valuable text for a surprisingly wide spectrum of courses: Social Theory; The History of Social Thought; Social Structure; Social Change; The City; The Community; The Sociology of Knowledge, Science, and Art. There is also much that is relevant on Socialization; Economic Sociology; and The Sociology of Social Control and Political Sociology. In addition to this, it is a major statement of social behaviorism. The ease with which Martindale interprets points of view other than his own and the sympathy with which he enters their perspectives, accepting their evidence and points of view to be explained within his own perspective are strong arguments for social behaviorism. This is perhaps, a lesson in the value of broad-gauged humanistic scholars. Martindale belongs to an endangered species.

Undoubtedly, everyone will have his favorite essay from this collection. Mine was American Sociology in Historical Perspective because of its unforgettable descriptions of the clash of ideas and events in the 1960s and 1970s which have brought American sociology to its present unhappy state. However, I must admit that I was also strongly persuaded by the essays on the intellectual, the sociology of knowledge and science, the sociology of aesthetics, and the imaginative essay on the sociology of the personal essayist which compared Henry David Thoreau and E.B. White. There is an uncanny quality to the best of the essays. One reads them, finding them interesting



## Book-Reviews

enough to return to later. One reads them again only to discover that the author has mysteriously managed to rewrite them enriching them with exciting things that were not present on first reading. Like *Nature and Types, The Scope of Social Theory* is a book to be read many times.

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**Hem Raj Shastri (Editor) :** *Vidur Niti and Vidula Putra Samvada* pp. 222, Indra Prakashan, Patna, 1981.

Shri Hem Raj Shastri, is a great Sanskrit Scholar of Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia). The present work is a part of the great work Mahabharata of Vyasa which is one of the largest epic in the world and is also a treasury of knowledge and information. The present book *Vidur Niti*, the moral advice of Vidura to Dhritarashtra has acquired a status of independent philosophical classics and ethical codes throughout the world.

The *Vidur Niti* is in eight chapters. In the first chapter Vidura diagnoses the situation and attributes the cause of Dhritarashtra's anxiety and restlessness to his lack of judgment in entrusting the administration of the kingdom in the hands of worthless counsellors like Duryodhana (verses 1-16). He then expatiates on the characteristics of a learned and wise man 16 to 29 and those of a fool and continues in general what ought to be done and what ought not. In chapter II Vidur describes how the king should be well equipped with noble qualities, like control of the senses and control of speech. In the third chapter, he illustrates by an episode of Virochana Sudhanvan the superiority of good conduct, good behaviour and nobility of character. In the fourth chapter narrating the discourse between the sage Atreya and the Sadhyas, he underlines the importance of soft words, perseverance, the nature of noble families and of true friends, the importance of unity and strict adherence to virtue. In the fifth chapter after describing the seven types of people involved in futile activities, he answers Dhritarashtra's question why all people do not live upto the full span of hundred years. In the sixth chapter beginning with the necessity of respect for elders Vidura highlights the power and the greatness of intelligence, and advises how one should deal with woman, should take counsel of ministers and friends, how a king should administer the kingdom and whose counsel should be sought and whose avoid. In the seventh chapter though Dhritarashtra is found agreeable to the advice given by Vidura, yet he shows reluctance to leave his son. Vidura advises him again to give up the company of



his evil counsellors, to enrich love towards his kith and kin, to do some favour to the Pandavas by giving them atleast some villages for their living, and to have feelings of equality towards your sons, both your's and Pandu's,. In the last chapter Vidura continues his advice extolling the merits of the virtuous, condemning the evils of hatred and pride etc., which generally stands in the way of the acquisition of learning, pointing out what ought to be welcomed in every household, saying that one should never go astray from the path of righteousness, appealing to the evanescence of human glory and power and to very transitoriness of this human life and its attainments, and adverting to the necessity of a virtuous life freed from all passions with an eye to the merits of a life hereafter.

Vidur Niti covers a wide field of individual and social life. It is indeed a treasurehouse of civil and moral wisdom. He has nicely translated in a simple and faithful manner in English of the Vidur Niti and the talk of Vidula and her son Sanjaya.

It is a very well translated ethical book which will help every one to be an ideal citizen. Dr. Satya Deo Misra has written a good foreword to this book.



## I

## Did Plotinus Influence St. Augustine's *De Trinitate* ?

Warren Matthews

In his classic *Confessiones*, Aurelius Augustine openly described how he was influenced toward a new philosophy of life through reading certain books of Platonists. Scholarship is divided on which Platonist he read, but the weight of opinion seems to support Plotinus. And since Plotinus contains a basic triad, one has some incentive to investigate whether Augustine's understanding of the Trinity was in some way influenced by Plotinus.

Some writers on Augustine have tried to make a case that the works he completed prior to his ordination as a Presbyter in 391, that period beginning with his conversion in 386, were essentially Neoplatonic, while those after 391 were Christian.<sup>2</sup> However, a study of the texts of the period will show that while Augustine did use some Neoplatonist ideas, especially on the scale of being, he also used a great many distinctively Christian concepts.<sup>3</sup> Without citing a long list of examples, the writer simply points out that in another place he has shown that Augustine's doctrines of God, Christ, Spirit, and Trinity in the period were, in the final analysis, basically Christian.<sup>4</sup>

On the other hand, one who reads *De Civitate Dei* may be struck with the evidence that Augustine had not abandoned the Neoplatonists even though he had been a Bishop in Hippo since 396.<sup>5</sup> From the list

<sup>1</sup> *Confessiones* VII, ix.

<sup>2</sup> L. Grandgeorge, *Saint Augustin et le Neo-Platonisme*, Paris: Ernest Leroux, Editeur, 1896.

<sup>3</sup> Oliver de Roy, *L'Intelligence de la Foi en la Trinite Selon Saint Augustin*. Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1966.

<sup>4</sup> A. W. Matthews, *The Development of St. Augustine from Neoplatonism to Christianity, 386-391 A.D.* Washington, D. C.: The University Press of America 1980.

<sup>5</sup> *De Civitate Dei*, Book VIII.



of philosophers he cited one could conclude that Augustine continued to read the Neoplatonists during his years as a clergyman. Since *De Trinitate* was begun prior to *De Civitate Dei*, is it possible that some ideas of Plotinus influenced his interpretation of the Trinity?

How could that be possible if Augustine's comments on the Trinity, even during the *Cassiciacum* dialogues, showed a definitely Christian presentation of the Trinity? The answer is that while Augustine was dealing with other doctrines from the standpoints of both reason and authority in *Cassiciacum*, his references to the Triune nature of God were primarily presented on the basis of authority of Scriptures and the Catholic Church. In *De Trinitate*, on the other hand, he not only did a thorough search of the Scriptures according to the letter and according to the spirit, that is through use of allegory, but also he did an examination according to reason<sup>6</sup>. For Augustine believed in reaching the same truth through two different routes, authority and reason.

Within the scope of a short paper it is not possible to deal with the comparison of the triad of Plotinus and the three persons of Augustine's Trinity. However, following a route taken earlier by Perler, one can summarize a comparison between the *Nous* of Plotinus and the *Word* in Augustine.<sup>7</sup> Such a comparison should give indication as to whether Augustine's examination of the Trinity according to reason may have been influenced by Plotinus.

One might begin by a summary of the *Nous* of Plotinus with which Augustine may have been familiar. In any knowledge which a human being has of the One, *Nous* is essential.<sup>8</sup> An attempt of a person to understand a power beyond reach, yet dwelling within one, leads to the *Nous*. In the *Nous*, which is present in the Soul, a person finds Being and order but also an awareness of a One which is beyond human intellect and feeling. While both the One and *Nous* are present in the Soul, the emanations in the Soul are, of course, less self-sufficient than the One or the *Nous*. The Soul is sustained by the One; it is the source of All and conserves All.<sup>9</sup>

The *Nous* is by nature the Truth itself.<sup>10</sup> It is consistently knowledge, the resting place of the Ideas.<sup>11</sup> The Real knowledge is

6 *De Trinitate*, Books I-VII are exegetical. Books VII-XV are more philosophical and speculative.

7 Othmar Perler, *Der Nous bei Plotin und das Verbum bei Augustinus als Vorbildliche Ursache der Welt*. Freiburg: Studia Friburgensia, 1931.

8 *Enneads* V, 3, 14.

9 *Ibid.* V, 3, 15.

10 *Ibid.* V, 5, 3.

11 *Ibid.* V, 5, 2.



given in the Nous which is present within a person and not through the senses which deal with objects. Since Nous has all knowledge in itself, nothing can be added to it from outside. Knowledge in a person is, then, internal rather than external. Nothing can be more true and truth is measured by truth itself.

Intellection and being are coexistents.<sup>12</sup> These are not present in the One but are dependent upon the One. And that which depends upon the One shares in the One. There is an intellectual form of man and man, and the intellectual form of justice and justice. The diversity begins in the Nous, but the unity or sameness is sustained in the One.

Although the three hypostases are present within an individual, the person may not be aware of them<sup>13</sup>. One who looks only outward may be concerned about being in the world and yet separated from its objects. But when one turns inward, one realizes that the three hypostases are within oneself. At the same time, one may feel that one is separated from the triune hypostases within. It is only as one turns inward, toward one's true self, that one can begin a union with the God silently present.

Salvation of a person is accomplished through one's turning to the higher hypostases. First the Soul must turn to Nous and then rise above Nous to the Good, which is impossible to surpass, since it is the highest. The first hurdle is that of even awakening the Soul so that it can start on its journey of return. Powerful as it is; the Nous, alone, is incapable of awakening the Soul to start its journey; only when the divine light of the Good illumines the Nous does it become attractive enough to awaken the Soul. When the light shines through the Nous to the Soul, the Soul awakens to a longing that leads to dancing and love. The Soul develops a passion for the Good which Nous alone could not arouse.<sup>14</sup> Should the Soul stop at the Nous and not proceed toward the Good, it would not reach that which could give it fulfillment.

From that brief sketch of the Nous in relationship to the individual and to the Good, one has some idea of the kind of material which was probably available to Augustine as he read Plotinus. Could one find in *De Trinitate* any kind of exposition which might reflect such ideas? Perhaps so.

It is in books VIII through XV of *De Trinitate* that one is likely to find the influence of Plotinus. In the opening books Augustine

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.* V, 6, 6.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.* V, 8, 11.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.* VI, 7, 22.



did a very workmanlike job or exploring the letter and the spirit of the Scriptures. His presentation of the Trinity was thorough and in keeping with the best authorities of the Catholic tradition. But in books VIII through XV he tried an approach to the same truth through reason. As a teacher, he wanted his students to understand as well as to believe. One had to believe, he held, before one could understand and find enjoyment in the Trinity, thus living a blessed life.<sup>15</sup>

Augustine thought that knowledge of God, a thing not adequately attained, could be furthered by looking within oneself. After all, a person who is not himself just can know what a just man is by looking within himself. In a similar way one can approach the Trinity, whom one has not reached, by looking within oneself for trinities.<sup>16</sup>

From that introduction, Augustine was able to find, as many readers recall, several illustrations of trinity within human lives. There is lover, beloved, and love.<sup>17</sup> There is also mind, the love of mind, and the knowledge of mind; when they are perfect, all are equal.<sup>18</sup> There is no confusion through commingling; each is a substance in itself and all are found mutually in all.<sup>19</sup> In the mind eternal truth is perceived, from which all temporal things have been made, the from according to which one is, and by which one affects oneself or other things. The true knowledge of things one bears within one as a word, and begets it by speaking within; however, it does not depart from one in being born.<sup>20</sup> Although by some act one communicates a word to others, it remains with one undiminished. All that man does is preceded by the word within him. When the mind knows itself, that which knows is known, and knowledge has a likeness to what is known. Knowledge, in that case, is image and word, and what is begotten is equal to the begetter.<sup>21</sup> There is trinity in the mind, and knowledge of it and love from a third. Yet, all are one substance; The offspring is not less, since the mind knows itself by the measure of its own being, nor is love less, since it loves according to its knowledge and being. In the mind knowledge is begotten as the Son is begotten, and in the mind love is not begotten as the Holy Spirit is not begotten. Knowledge is born through the desire of the mind to know.<sup>22</sup>

15 *De Trinitate* VIII, 5, 8.

16 *Ibid.* VIII, 8, 12.

17 *Ibid.* VIII, 10, 14.

18 *Ibid.* IX, 4, 4.

19 *Ibid.* IX, 5, 8.

20 *Ibid.* IX, 7, 12.

21 *Ibid.* IX, 11, 16.

22 *Ibid.* IX, 12, 17f.



Another trinity in man is composed within the mind. Memory, understanding, and will are all functions of one mind, yet they are separate and distinct. They are equal to all or they would not be able to comprehend each other or all together.<sup>23</sup> The image of God in human beings is clearly in the mind rather than in the body, otherwise the image would be different in men and in women.<sup>24</sup> Reason in the mind is like the Word, which is not like the knowledge gained through senses.<sup>25</sup> In order to love things, one must have knowledge of them, or at least things which lead to them.<sup>26</sup>

Since the mind can know the trinity within itself, it can know the image of God, which the mind contains.<sup>27</sup> The mind remembers itself, understands itself, and loves itself. But far more important is its ability to remember, understand, and love Him by whom it was made. It is this latter trinity which leads to wisdom, and all else is foolishness.<sup>28</sup> The apostle spoke the truth when he said that God is not far from any one of us, for in Him we live and move and have our being.<sup>29</sup>

How did Augustine envision the mind moving from the human level of senses or reason to knowledge of the Christian Trinity, which is God? The mind can, through its own efforts move toward that remembrance and knowledge which draws it to God. But though it can remember something in its rightful place, it cannot attain it alone. Only the affection which God freely gives can raise the soul to God. It is only in the contemplation of God that one enjoys the blessed life, namely the eternal life promised to mankind.<sup>30</sup>

Did Plotinus influence St. Augustine's *De Trinitate*? There are, in the opinion of this writer, some places where St. Augustine seems to have some ideas similar to those found in the *Enneads* of Plotinus. Both agreed that the bodily senses do not lead to higher knowledge and that useful knowledge begins when humans turn away from senses and turn inward to study the mind. Useful knowledge can be gained by the mind exploring its own fundamental nature; it is the road to the highest life possible for mankind.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.* X, 11, 18.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.* XII, 8, 13.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.* XIII, 1, 2ff.

<sup>26</sup> H. A. Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Church Fathers*, Vol. 1. Cambridge, Massachusetts; Harvard University Press, 1956, pp. 127-137.

<sup>27</sup> *De Trinitate* XIV, 8, 11.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.* XIV, 11, 14.

<sup>29</sup> Acts 17: 27f.

<sup>30</sup> *De Trinitate* XV, 4, 6.



By turning inward, one finds in one's own human mind the evidence one needs to know that there is a trinity above man. For there is a trinity in the human mind itself, albeit a pale reflection of that greatest power which supports the being of mind. The rational element in mind is a reflection of the second member of a higher trinity.

When a human being turns inward, it is revealed that one is at once more than one thought one was and less than one could be. There one finds evidence of higher order of being to whom one belongs and in whom, in an imperfect way, one lives and moves and has one's being. Enough evidence is present even in the fallen state of the mind to awaken one to the knowledge that fulfillment of one's true nature lies in moving to the highest One.

In neither Plotinus nor St. Augustine is one able to rise alone to the One. In Plotinus, only when the One shines through the Nous to the Soul does the Soul respond. The Nous alone could not inspire the Soul to that frenzied dance of longing for union with the one. In Augustine, the soul can effectively move toward God only when God Himself moves it through Grace to seek eternal life through contemplation of the Triune God.

Nevertheless, even in those areas where St Augustine and Plotinus seem similar, there are some differences of significant importance. Where in St. Augustine God is Being and the source of all being, in Plotinus the One is above Being, which is introduced with Nous. In Augustine the Father knows, plans, hears and speaks; in Plotinus the One does not carry on intellectual activity.<sup>31</sup> In Augustine the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are equal, and wherever one is there are the three; in Plotinus the One, Nous, and Soul are in decreasing power, with each dependent upon its Predecessor.<sup>32</sup>

Aside from these passages where St. Augustine and Plotinus seem similar, there are other passages where St. Augustine is quite different. His reliance on Scriptures and doctrines of the Catholic Church separate his final views from those of Plotinus. The doctrine of the Incarnation of the Logos, based on the Gospel of John, is quite different from Plotinus.<sup>33</sup>

31 John H. S. Burleigh. *The City of God—A Study of St. Augustine's Philosophy*. London: Nisbet and Co. Ltd., 1949. See p. 71.

32 Jacques de Blich, "Platonisme et Christianisme dans la Conception Augustinienne du Dieu Createur". *Recherches de Science Religieuse*, Tome XXX, Numero 2, Avil, 1940, p. 184.

33 *Confessiones* VII, 9. This was published about the time St. Augustine began *De Trinitate*.



However, in his use of reason to explore the Trinity through evidence in the mind of human beings St. Augustine may reflect his knowledge of how Plotinus wrote of the *Nous*. The writer believes it would be almost impossible to prove that St. Augustine deliberately relied on Plotinus in writing the *De Trinitate*. On the other hand, there are some striking similarities.

One must also consider the possibility that St. Augustine's exposure to Platonism was not so much from a direct reading of non-Christian sources as from within the Christian tradition. For example, a case can be made that from his early hearing of St. Ambrose in Milan St. Augustine received a Christian Platonism. How much did he later learn from reading the fathers of the Church, from reading the Christian Platonists of Alexandria? Plotinus is not the only possible source for St. Augustine's ideas of the Trinity.

In the final analysis, although St. Augustine may have used Neoplatonism where it helped to explain Christian doctrine, as he did with the Problem of Evil, he only used it where it could be done without conflict with doctrines of the Catholic Church.<sup>34</sup> Where there was conflict, St Augustine relied on the dogma of his Church<sup>35</sup>.

<sup>34</sup> Sister M. P. Garvey, R.S.M. "Saint Augustine: Christian or Neo Platonist? Milwaukee: Dissertation for Marquette University, 1939.

<sup>35</sup> W. R. Matthews. *God in Christian Thought and Experience*. London: Nisbet and Co. Ltd., 1935.



## 2

## Plato's Concept of Education and Its Relation to Human Freedom

Bhupendra Singh Yadav

Plato considered education in the context of ethical, social and political considerations rather than in isolation. Stated simply his ethical and political philosophy is based upon the principle that all men are equally entitled to happiness and that consequently provision should be made for the happiness of all men in the ideal state. This moral principle has the immediate consequence for education that its prime object should be to produce adults who may successfully contribute to the happiness of the whole community, while themselves enjoying happiness within that community. This paper aims at showing that Plato's concept of education, as suggested above, has a relevance to the claims of human freedom, although certain critics of Plato argue against it.<sup>1</sup> However, it will be argued in this paper that Plato's concept of education is not destructive of human freedom despite of creating certain demands which are, of course, gross interference with the freedom of the individual. It makes a room for the claims of human freedom with the restrictive provision that these claims must be subordinated to the claims of happiness. Before coming to see all this, it would be worthwhile to consider Plato's views regarding education.

The state, according to Plato, is an educational institution, the instrument of civilization, and as such it must have its foundation in

- 1 See K. R. Popper, *The Open Society and its Enemies*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1966, 5th edn (revise), Vol. I, p. 88; R.H.S. Crossman, *Plato Today*, Allen & Unwin, London, 1963 edn, p. 84; and B. Russell, 'Philosophy and Politics' in R. Bambrough, ed., *Plato, Popper and Politics*, Heffer, Cambridge, 1967.
- 2 See Plato, *Republic*, 473 d (All the references to the works of Plato throughout this paper will be from *The Collected Dialogues of Plato*, eds. E. Hamilton and H. Cairns, Princeton University Press, 1978 edn).



the highest kind of knowledge attainable, that is, philosophy. The state shall undertake the education of the children of the higher classes, following a definite plan of instruction, which shall be the same for the citizens of both sexes during the first twenty years of life, and shall include: the narration of Myths, selected with a view to their ethical influence; gymnastics, which produces healthy bodies; poetry and music, which arouse the sense of beauty, harmony, and proportion and encourage philosophical thought; mathematics, which tends to draw the mind from the concrete and the sensuous to the abstract and real. A selection of the superior individuals shall be made from the ranks of the young men at twenty, and these shall study the different subjects of their childhood in their interrelations and learn to survey them as a whole. Those who, at the age of thirty, show the greatest ability in their studies, in military activities, and in their other activities will study dialectic, i.e., philosophy for five years. Then they will be put to the test of holding military commands and subordinate civic offices. At the age of fifty, those who have shown themselves worthy will devote themselves to the study of philosophy, until their turn comes to administer the higher offices for their country's sake.

Thus, Plato's educational programme, as outlined above, consists in two stages—first, the stage of elementary education, and second, the stage of higher education. The stage of elementary education is completed at the age of twenty. It is a stage concerned with dispositions and basic skills; it is fundamentally non-intellectual. There is no emphasis on encouraging the mind to expand, to question or to activate itself. In the early years of this first stage of education programme, the teacher is to avoid laying down a rigid programme, and should rather follow or build upon the interests of the child<sup>3</sup>. But it does not mean that Plato would subscribe to the view that education is decided entirely by reference to what the child at the time wants to do or happens to value. The content of the curriculum to be taught at the early years of the stage of elementary education is ultimately decided by the teacher by reference to the claims of a just and happy community. Hence, the degree of freedom advocated by Plato for the children in their early studies is meant for the motivational and practical reasons; above all, so that the division later to be made between children on the basis of their different 'natures' shall indeed be, as far as possible, a division based on their innate proclivities and not on enforced or deliberately cultivated proclivities. In the *Republic* Socrates asserts, "...All this study of reckoning and geometry and all the preliminary studies that are

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., p. 536.



indispensable preparation for dialectic must be presented to them while still young, not in the form of compulsory instruction... Because,...a free soul ought not to pursue any study slavishly, for while bodily labours performed under constraint do not harm the body, nothing that is learned under compulsion stays with the mind. Do not, then, my friend, keep children to their studies by compulsion but by play. That will also better enable you to discern the natural capacities of each".<sup>4</sup> This passage makes it clear why Plato gives attention to the Spontaneity of children in learning their studies in the form of play. It is obviously not for the reason that Plato cares for what a child wants to do or happens to value; it is just for the motivational and practical reasons. He wants children to enjoy what they learn. He wants to make use of the way children would be instructed as a guide to find out their natural capacities. Apart from these reasons, he places no emphasis on children's freedom to pursue whatever activities they might spontaneously choose. Their whole education is to be superintended and controlled by the philosopher-kings. Plato does not slip from the proposition that the child should be treated as an end in himself to the claim that the child should therefore, determine the path of his education. The path of the education for the children is therefore, determined by the philosopher-kings. Approaching this path Plato clearly takes the view that the freedom of children should be limited extensively by reference to moral demands and the more general demands implicit in the type of education that reason dictates. Consequently, for the sake of a just and happy society, Plato advocates censorship and 'indoctrination', in course of deciding curriculum and criteria of learning for those who are to be provided with the elementary education. Plato maintains that censorship is necessary to protect the people, young and old, from the evils of bad literature, of stage performance, and of the teachings of some men<sup>5</sup>. This censorship is of a specific nature. Plato is not censoring on aesthetic criteria. His admiration for Homer as a great poet is explicitly acknowledged<sup>6</sup>. The censorship is designed to prevent the promotion of undesirable behavioural characteristics and attitudes through example<sup>7</sup>. Its justification must depend to some extent on the validity of the factual premiss that people are affected by the stories they read or hear and the characters they watch on the stage. Moreover, it must, in the end, presuppose that the principle of freedom is not an ultimate principle and there-

4 Ibid., p. 536 d-e.

5 Ibid., pp. 377-397.

6 Ibid., 387 b.

7 Ibid., 396 a and 395 d.



fore freedom of expression may be restricted for some other end. Censorship, considered as a restriction of certain types of speech or writing, namely those that promote enthusiasm for anti-social behaviour, seems no different in principle to restriction on other forms of other-regarding activity. If it is legitimate to restrict actions that harm the society, there seems to be no reason why one should not also restrict speech or writing that harms the society. However, it is clear that, for Plato, claims of a just and happy society with the prime object of education to bring it about, are more important than the claims of human freedom following with them a system of liberal education. This point is again emphasized when he advocates for what is called 'indoctrination'.

As censorship restricts freedom of expression, indoctrination restricts freedom of thought. That Plato advocates for indoctrination is evidenced by the fact that the majority of the citizens in the *Republic* are imbued with the beliefs in certain values without having examined their justification. The object behind selecting the soldiers and educating them in music and exercises of the body, says Socrates, 'was that they should be convinced and receive our laws like a dye as it were, so that their belief and faith might be fast-colored about both the things that are to be feared and all other things because of the fitness of their nature and nurture.....'<sup>8</sup> Moreover, the arrangement of censorship too aims eventually at bringing up the children in a manner that only certain sanctioned values will be inculcated in them. The philosopher-kings alone could be said not to be indoctrinated. For they alone are intended to examine the matter rationally for themselves. Thus, the arrangements of the *Republic* are such that all citizens in their early years will be brought up to accept the values of society and to abide by those conventions of society that are deemed to be morally desirable. At a later date some, the philosopher-kings who by definition are trained for, adept in and interested in such inquiry, will examine the basis and justification of these beliefs; the rest will receive no encouragement to do so. This sort of notice at Plato's views regarding his educational plan seems sufficient to say that the majority of the citizens in the *Republic* are indoctrinated, if indoctrination is to mean that one intends to inculcate the belief that a proposition is true in such a way that nothing will shake his belief.<sup>9</sup>

We have not been concerned here with the question whether Plato is justified in advocating what is called 'indoctrination'. Our purpose

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., 430 a.

<sup>9</sup> For the definition of indoctrination in terms of intention see J. P. White, 'Indoctrination' in R.S. Peters, ed., *The Concept of Education*, Allen & Unwin, London, 1967, p. 179.



has been merely to show that Plato does advocate for indoctrination. It is easy to see that Plato's indoctrination creates a demand which is, of course, a gross interference with the freedom of the individual. The same is the case with the demand created by his censorship. Moreover, Plato's conception of more than one kind of education and his thinking that there are discernible differences between children that justify different kinds of education also create a demand which is again a gross interference with the freedom of the citizens in the sense that they are not free to opt for the type of education they happen to like. Now the important question to be considered in connection with our preannounced objective is whether all this Plato's approach towards his educational plan containing necessarily the elements of censorship, indoctrination and unequal treatment in the distribution of education, shows that he does not care for the claims of human freedom. In reference to this question, it should be noted that Plato is not concerned to stigmatise 'freedom' as evil; he never argues that the less freedom granted to the individual in any circumstances the better. Indeed he expressly denies that this is so: "...either servitude of freedom, when it goes to extremes, is an utter bane, while either in due measure is altogether a boon."<sup>10</sup> Plato himself claims to be an advocate of freedom. If to be master of oneself, in the sense of the rational part of one's soul having control of the other parts, is to be free, as Plato maintains,<sup>11</sup> then he is, of course, a champion of freedom. But, whatever the reasons, the ideal of a world of autonomous beings, a world in which the individual is free to do what he feels like doing, is now widely held. For Plato it would be a world in which people were all sufficiently perfect to be able to live together harmoniously. His educational plan (alongwith the rules and proposals laid down for the socio-political system he advocates for in the *Republic*) is based upon the assumption that unless certain things are done, and unless they are co-ordinated by a group whose sole concern is to do 'what is best for the state',<sup>12</sup> people will in fact behave selfishly and unjustly. So far as the ideal world of autonomous beings who behave justly also, goes, there is no dispute. The question is how this kind of ideal world will be realised. Plato's whole aim of education is to make possible this kind of ideal world. Thus, 'freedom' in sense of doing what one feels like doing seems relevant to Plato's concept of education as a part of the ideal to be realised by the educational enterprise. However, it is true that this kind of conception of freedom does not enter in the specific rules and proposals laid down in the *Republic* with respect to the practical side of Plato's educational plan.

10 Plato, *Letters*, 354 e.

11 See the *Republic*, 431 b.

12 Ibid., 412 c.



## *The Furoshiki Still Intact— Japanese Religion Today*

*Gene Sager*

The Japanese word "furoshiki" refers to a square cloth used to wrap various and sundry items for hand carrying. A furoshiki can be the size of a small handkerchief or as big as nine feet square. If you know how to wrap and tie well, as the Japanese do, a furoshiki is very handy.

In what follows, I try to show how Japanese life, and Japanese religion in particular, is a Japanese combination of a wide variety of indigenous and imported elements neatly bound together and quite practical. It's like a furoshiki. I base what I say on academic research (1) and on experience living and traveling in Japan. I have consistently avoided such Western enclaves as the Holiday Inns and the Hyatt Hotels. Living in Japanese homes, lodging houses, and temples is a must, according to my view, if you're going to gain some sensitivity to Japanese culture.

I am focused on the Japan of today, so historical comment comes in only where needed. But I do not believe in the hackneyed phrase, "Today Japan is Westernized and secularized." In other words, I do not see postwar Japan as radically different from traditional Japan. Different yes, but not radically different, and by no means thoroughly Westernized and secularized. The furoshiki is still in use and it still holds things together well.

One of the lessons I re-learn every visit to Japan is that the concept of religion current in America doesn't apply very well to the Japanese situation. One result of this difference is that in survey interviews, two thirds of the Japanese say they have no personal religious faith, yet those same surveys show that the total number of people adhering to the various religious groups (Pure Land Buddhism, Shinto,



etc.) yields a total number greater than the population of Japan. We will see why this is so--we'll see what the Japanese conception of religion is.

Before getting into the particulars, the following tree-analogy borrowed from Professor Anesaki will serve to give us an overview of Japanese religion. (2)

The soil in which Japanese religion has developed was, of course, the original or indigenous Japanese religious consciousness. When a variety of elements were added to it, as when leaves from Buddhism combined with it, it gradually merged with these elements so as to lose its pure or unique characteristics. Perhaps we can call the soil, as it exists today, "Japanese Folk Religion."

The root tradition of Japanese religion would have to be Shinto, the ancient animistic and polytheistic religion unique to Japan. Since many of the deities worshipped are linked to natural and man-made objects such as Mount Fuji or the local sake industry, Shinto is distinctively Japanese and cannot be counted as a world religion. It is similar in many ways to popular Hindu polytheism. Hinduism uses the figurative number of 300 million to indicate the vast number of its gods; Shinto's symbolic number for its gods is eight million. Shinto has traditionally abhorred death and focused itself on ritual purity to express gratitude and make petitions to the gods. Shinto adherents are impossible to count, but perhaps there are 80 million.

The above-tree-analogy drawing of Japanese religion reflects the thesis that Confucianism is the most important aspects of Japanese religion. The trunk and the branches (ie., the basic structure) of the tree represent Confucianist teachings, Confucianism was brought into Japan along with many other features of Chinese culture beginning in the fifth century A.D. Confucianism in Japan is not recognizable today as an organized religion or an important philosophical school. It is, however, very strongly in evidence in political, social and moral practice.

In terms of numbers of adherents, Buddhism is the dominant religion in Japan today—85,000,000. (3) It continues to have a great influence in many spheres, including philosophy and art. In terms of emphasis, Japanese Buddhism has tended of focus on funerals and prayers for deceased ancestors. The form of Buddhism that Japan imported from China and Korea in about 540 A.D. is Mahayana Buddhism, the more liberal form of Buddhism. In the tree-analogy, Buddhism in its many form is represented by the leaves, flowers, and fruits. These are the spiritual fruits, one might say. Such remarkable spiritual assets as mono no aware (the realization that all worldly beauty



decays) and the poetic form called haiku are inheritances from Buddhism.

Along with other cultural assets from China, Japan received Taoist influence in a variety of ways. Philosophical Taoism continues to influence Japan through Zen Buddhism, which is at least half Taoist. Religious Taoism, or Immortality Taoism, has so much merged with the other aspects of Japanese religion that it is impossible to identify as a distinct element. I tentatively associate Religious Taoism here with the sap of the tree. Religious Taoism has always accompanied Confucianism as an outlet for the popular need for divination, healing astrology, and suchlike. Aspects of Religious Taoism appear time and again in the Japanese history, often thoroughly mixed with Japanese folk religion, and even in some of the so-called "New Religions" (Shinshū Shūkyō).

Having touched briefly on each of the major aspects of Japanese religion in overview, I can now go into the particular experiences available to the religious seeker in Japan. I have made no attempt to cut out the more earthy or humorous happenings, since they too are real parts of the experiences.

### The Asakusa Experience

Many of the above-mentioned dimensions of Japanese religion can be experienced by visiting Asakusa Kannon (also called Sensoji Temple) in the Asakusa Ward of Tokyo. "Kannon" refers to the Buddhist Goddess of Mercy, but the throngs of people who visit Asakusa may appear to be on a mere secular sightseeing outing, not on a religious pilgrimage.

My first impression of the Asakusa Kannon Temple was of Japanese visitors taking photographs of friends and relatives at the huge front gate. After a photograph at the gate, the average visitor passes through a colorfully decorated, bustling arcade of shops that goes on for some 200 meters. The shops are crammed with everything imaginable. Is this mere business, based on greedy motives, unrelated to or even in conflict with a purely religious experience? The best answer, I feel, is "not necessarily." Or, to put it more positively: the "business" is part of what brings so many people here--toddlers, elders, souvenir-hunters, lovers, families, high school classes, etc. It's one way to keep religion from being a hush-hush, boring affair. As for the secular, greedy motives, it should be noted that the temple gets a small fee from each shop, so even the allegedly greedy motive thus gets inadvertently converted into religious works. (The Temple supports a hospital and several social welfare projects).



Passing through the arcade, the visitor follows on a thousand years of tradition by proceeding to the main temple to toss a coin in the coffer before the goddess and bow in reverence. Many who visit the temple also pay their respects at the Shinto shrine for the spirits of the three fishermen who in 628 A.D. found the tiny Kannon image which was the original impetus for the construction of the Buddhist temple. The Shinto shrine and the Buddhist temple are parts of the same complex of buildings and both fit together in the minds and hearts of the people. The Shinto torii or shrine-entry-gate is in no way out of place in a Japanese Buddhist temple grounds.

The furoshiki concept of Japanese religion can help us understand how this Asakusa experience is a single, harmonious event, not an odd, jolting experience jerking the visitor from shopping to worship and from Buddhism to Shintoism. Just as a furoshiki is used to hold together and tie together a variety of objects making them into a single, manageable bundle, so the Asakusa experience is a whole. Business and pleasure, worship and the frivolity of children chasing the hundreds of pigeons on the temple grounds—all are bound together in the Japanese consciousness.

The rebuilt pagoda at Asakusa is a replica of the pagoda which was designated a National Treasure before its destruction in an air raid in 1945. Among the aesthetic aspects of the temple complex is a most beautiful landscape garden built by the Zen master gardener Kobori Enshu (1579-1647). The elements united in the Asakusa experience thus include business, prayer, festivity, and charitable contributions; in addition, the visitor may relish the cultural, historical, and aesthetic aspects.

### Glimpses of Household Religion

A homestay at Mr. K's home in Saitama Prefecture set me to reflecting on household religion. Many thanks to Mr. K and his family.

An American like me does not easily forget certain little mundane surprises such as using the traditional Japanese squat toilet and spying a Shinto amulet perched on a carefully bevelled stick resting on the floor in the corner of the tiny toilet room. I am not used to finding religious objects near the commode. Perhaps I have come to put religion in a compartment outside the "gross" facilities; I cannot imagine a Christian cross placed there. At any rate, this Shinto amulet blesses and safeguards the facilities and reminds those who use them of our dependence on forces beyond us. The members of the household put it there, not because of an explicit or zealous devotion but because of a vague yet real mixture of cultural tradition and



a recognition of the importance of spirituality. This particular household includes middle-aged parents and two teenage children. A parent who does not place such objects anywhere in the household might convey the impression of not caring to safeguard the household and its members.

The same home contains a Kamidana (little shrine for Shinto gods) and a Butsudan (small Buddhist altar for devotions). Mr. K. says many Japanese homes have both a Kamidana and a Butsudan, or at least one of the two. Mr. K recently completed a pilgrimage of 34 Buddhist temples in that area of Saitama Prefecture. However, if you ask him if he is "religious", he replies, "Not really, but the family has always been Jodo (Pure Land Buddhist)." According to the typical Japanese notion, one does not make an explicit commitment to one single religious group or faith. A family may participate to some degree in the practice of several different religious traditions, but an explicit personal or familial commitment is unnecessary.

Near the Buddhist altar in Mr. K's house are large pictures of two generations of ancestors. Periodic devotions are offered there, showing reverence to the ancestral spirits through ritual presentation of food and drink. Ancestor worship continues today, at least as a formality, in most homes. The practice is appropriate from the perspective of Shinto, Buddhism, and Confucianism. The theological and metaphysical aspects of ancestor worship are not nearly as clear as the moral and sociological ones. The value given to family relationships is still very high today, not only as a bond holding the extended family together, but also as a model for other relationships in Japanese society. Even a corporation or company uses the family model, as we shall see momentarily.

The keys to understanding ancestor worship are (1) to see it in its social aspect, and (2) to see that this social function also has a religious dimension. Ancestor worship fosters family continuity and family unity. The idea of remembering and being concerned about the welfare of one's parents and grandparents is instilled in each youth. Ancestor worship is a concrete reminder of the general principle known in Confucianism as filial piety. The elders, in turn, have responsibilities to children and grandchildren. Today grandparents, parents, and children are continuing to fulfill these obligations. Western sociologists suspect that respect for elders may diminish as Japan becomes increasingly industrialized, but recent statistics indicate that more (not less) young people choose to care for aging parents and grandparents in their own homes. On the national level, Japan continues to observe Elder's Day, September 15th.



How can devotion to parents and grandparents be a religious attitude? According to Confucianism, such devotion is the Will of Heaven (Tien). I am well aware that many young Japanese people may not believe in the existence of "the Will of Heaven." But the rightness of acts of caring for elders is something most Japanese, young and old, perceive. To perceive this is a religious experience in Confucianism, even if one has no inkling of "Heaven" or "Divine Principle."

Reverence for ancestors is again in evidence at Obon, which is, very roughly speaking, the Japanese equivalent of All Souls' Day. The spirits of the dead come back to visit the homes of their descendants at Obon, so most people try to return to their furusato (original family home) for the occasion. The holiday lasts for three or four days and includes a great deal of festivity. The climax is a simple dance called bon odori, often performed as a whole village or community with participation by all, even the most reticent of teenagers.

### Seculaized Marriage ?

On arriving in Japan in August, 1987, I was surprised by the large numbers of hotel ads in the trains promoting facilities for marriage ceremonies and receptions. Many books on Japan still speak of "marriage in a Shinto shrine and a funeral in a Buddhist temple." But Japanese friends told me that during the last few decades the trend is toward having the marriage ceremony and reception in a special hall or in a hotel.

The hotel ads try to sell their programs by reference to highly romantic themes, focused entirely on the two sweet lovers and the romantic drama of the event. One hotel even offers "fancy laser beam effects" to outdo their competitors. No mention of God, Buddha, family or long years of fidelity. One Japanese man told me he thinks that such "non-religious" marriages show that the Japanese have gotten more non-religious than Americans; many Americans still have church weddings.

A closer look into the situation makes it doubtful that marriage and marriage ceremonies have now become non-religious. Even in the hotel ceremony, a Shinto priest performs a short rite. Before the present hotel marriage program came into vogue, the marriage ceremonies were held in a Shinto shrine or in the family home of the groom, most likely the latter. A Shinto priest performed the ceremony.

What about the moral/spiritual obligations of the two families and the two partners in the 1980's? The ceremony, the vows, the obligations felt, and the actual carrying out of the marriage in daily life still clearly reflect a strong Shinto/Confucianist concept. Although



arranged marriages are fairly rare, a marriage is still the establishing of a strong relation between two whole families, not just two individuals. The signs at the entrance to the hotel announcing a marriage say, for example, "Iwata-Ke" and "Yamamoto.Ke"! "ke" means family or household. During the Shinto ceremony, the bride and groom sit between the two families :

The go-between is usually an older person or couple who is in a position of authority where the groom works or where the groom has gone to school. A modern go-between doesn't counsel, unless asked to do so, but in effect, represents a link to the world in which the new couple must make its way. The new couple feels obligated to carry out a successful marriage—obligated to themselves, to their families, and to the go-between. If the go-between is an executive in the groom's company, as is often the case, the go-between represents a powerful concern because the Japanese company operates on the model of the family. This model is illustrated in the non-layoff policy; management just does not layoff or fire a worker because of a drop in sales. In the same way, a parent cannot refuse to feed a dependent child because "times are hard". The worker, for his part, feels obligated to stand by the company through good and bad times. Thus the go-between who is the groom's boss represents a very powerful, family-type cluster of mutual concerns and obligation.

Manager and executives I talked to said that they often function as go-betweens for company underlings. Of these marriages about one out of six fail, and that's about par for Japan these days. A 16% failure rate is lower than for most "advanced" nations.

As for the Shinto ceremony itself, it is true that very few young Japanese people really appreciate Shinto rituals. Those who so often claim that Japan has changed are right in that a full-length traditional religious ceremony bores the younger set to death. The magic has gone out of the traditional ceremonies for most modern young people, East and West. They'd rather be watching TV. But again, a word of caution: the thing to look for in regard to Japanese religion, especially in its Confucian aspect, is long range behavior patterns, not momentary indifference or vagueness in theology. If we look at peoples' long-range behavior patterns, we can see Confucianism, or its Japanese variation, alive and well in Japan. Among the Confucian virtues exhibited are loyalty to one's spouse, cooperation with the members of both families, and concrete care of the elders.

Confucian realism about marriage is reflected in Japanese couples' attitudes. Despite the hotel ads' flashes of romance, Japanese couples don't expect marriage to be as romantic as Americans do. The result is a better track record for the Japanese—i.e., fewer divorces.



A final comparative point is in order: Japanese Confucianism is in some ways like Judaism; the emphasis is on what you do (long range behavior), not your stated creed or congregational membership. To borrow a phrase from Judaism's *Talmud*: What counts is "deed, not creed."

### Cemetery Buddhism

I visited a small village temple called Anyoin near Kawagoe, Saitama Prefecture, on a dismal rainy day in September, 1987. Since the priest and his family were very hospitable, the visit lasted several days and helped me immeasurably in understanding what critics call "cemetery Buddhism." The term is used to point to the fact that temples like this one are concerned mainly with funerals and prayers for the dead. The temple complex includes a cemetery, the temple itself, and the priest's home.

The syncretistic ways of Japanese religion are evident in this case, not because this little temple does so much but because it doesn't need to do so much. Syncretism sometimes means that a particular priest, group, or temple focuses mainly on one religious need with the understanding that other groups or institutions can take care of the other dimensions of life. The individual person "syncretizes" or synthesizes the teachings and practices of the various groups; the individual puts the various functions and activities into his or her own *furoshiki*. Actually it is as much a family process as an individual matter, as we have seen.

Shinto deals with the gods; Confucianism deals with morality; Buddhism deals with death. The result is a kind of religious division of labor in which the Japanese family partakes of the various practices and ceremonies of all these religions as needed. I noticed that the particular Buddhist priest where I stayed, Rev. T., had a Shinto amulet on the dashboard of his car. No religious exclusivism or segregation here.

Reverend T. is an ordained priest of the Tendai sect of Japanese Buddhism, as was his father and his grandfather before him. Tendai dates from the 9th century A.D. as a distinct sect in Japan and is the Japanese equivalent of Chinese Tien Tai Buddhism. Most Japanese Buddhist sects derive in part from Tendai. Its vast metaphysics include all the major aspects of Mahayana (Northern or Big Raft) Buddhism; but in a village temple, only a part of the teachings are engaged.

Rev. T. is married and has one child. He is a full-time history teacher in a public (non-religious) school. His activities as a priest include :



1. A daily 15 minute recitation of prayers at the altar of the temple, using incense, gong, and wood clappers. The priest does this alone but on behalf of the community.

2. Assisting those who come to the temple cemetery to pray for the well-being of their ancestors. In the priest's absence his wife receives these visitors; some effort is exerted to insure that most of the time either the priest or his wife is at home to receive such visitors.

3. The priest performs funeral ceremonies and is present at the reception for mourners. In addition, he visits the home of close family members of the deceased at least once after the death, on the 7th or 21st day after the death; at that time he reads appropriate scriptures and prayers and counsels the survivors. Most likely the home will have a small Buddhist altar for daily devotions, to be led by the head of the family. The priest does not conduct congregational meetings. It pays to remember that Japanese religion, like Judaism, is more home-centered than Christianity.

4. Another activity of the village Buddhist priest is performing special ceremonies for special occasions like Obon (festival discussed above in *Glimpses of Household Religion*). Another example of a special occasion is Osegaki, a time of special prayers offered by families and the village priest for ancestors who may be in *gakido* (realm of the hungry ghosts.) This realm is one of the six realms into which people incarnate (get born into) depending on their karma.(4)

In this realm, a soul has a ghostly body with a huge stomach and a tiny pinhole mouth. Always hungry, these poor souls try in vain to fill their distended stomachs. Evidently they have bad karma and are in need of the prayers of their progeny. As a very rough parallel to traditional Catholic belief, we may say that Buddhists believe in six types of purgatory, the ultimate release from all six realms being Nirvana.

5. The village priest also participates in occasional Buddhist conferences held on a prefectural, national, or international level, and he sometimes assists other priests whenever the need arises.

Is this village temple just a mortuary-cemetery with a priest caretaker on duty? Does its function reduce to the dismal repetition of funerals and prayers for the dead? This is what the term "Cemetery Buddhism" implies, but the atmosphere I experienced there showed me that the term doesn't fit. In addition to the generally cheerful,



vital atmosphere of the priest's household, there are several positive themes that tie the functions together. All the devotions are, in one way or another, an expression of reverence for ancestors, and such reverence is part of the general principle of care for elders. The family, the living and dead family members, are tied together through all expressions of this general principle. Everyone knows that in old age and death they will not be forgotten; they will be loved and cared for.

Another positive teaching that village Buddhism instills is the importance of good behavior. The law of karma and the wheel of life teaching (pictured above) are constant reminders to living individuals that you create your own punishments and rewards in this life and in the next. The law of karma (moral/spiritual law of cause and effect) works moment to moment, lifetime to lifetime. So, for example, my praying for grandpa, who may be a hungry ghost, is a reminder that I had better not be greedy in this life lest I become a hungry ghost in the next. To put it more positively and more generally, it pays for me to behave with respect and kindness to others, moment to moment, lifetime to lifetime. Here we have a positive moral and spiritual principle.

### Jesus is the Only Way to Heaven

I stayed for a few days at a student dormitory called Fukuin Senta (Gospel Center) in Nishinomiya, Japan. Fukuin Senta is a five minute walk from Kansei Gakuin University. The sign over the entrance reads: It means, "Jesus is the only way to heaven". The Japanese word "koso" has several meanings, so I double checked it with the head of the Gospel Center to verify: it means "only" in this case. The word "only" here is part of the reason why, after four centuries in Japan, Christianity can claim only about .5% of the people—one half of one percent of the population. We have already seen that Japanese religion is syncretistic; the exclusivism of Christianity doesn't harmonize with the Japanese concept of religion. You can't put something in the furoshiki if it tends to reject or eject some of the other things you need to have in the furoshiki. I'm not sure what people mean by "the Westernization of Japan", but in terms of religion, Japan is not Westernized.

Another way in which Christianity differs from Japanese religion is in its basic concept of human nature. Whereas Christianity regards humanity as fallen and sinful, Confucianism, Buddhism, and Shinto regard humanity as at least neutral (basically neither good nor bad) and possessing the potential to attain high spiritual states like Nirvana.



Christianity carries with it the stigma of a "foreign religion" for several reasons. As a superficial reason, the association is made between Christianity and missionaries from America and Europe. But I suspect that the foreign-ness runs deeper, on the level of differences concerning syncretism and the basic concept of human nature. Originally, Buddhism was foreign too, having come from India through China and Korea. But Buddhism has fared much better than Christianity, perhaps because of its flexibility.

One should not be hastily in forecasting a dismal future for Christianity in Japan; Buddhism has been in Japan for a thousand years longer. Among the significant influences and accomplishments of Christianity are : widespread knowledge of the Bible (not necessarily with deep, systematic or standard interpretations), many Christian educational institutions (from kindergartens to graduate schools) social welfare programs, and an institutional unity among seven Protestant denominations which are separate in America. In addition, Christians have been rather active in the peace movement.

### Maikakyo

Any essay on Japanese religion today has to face up to the question of materialism, the problem that religions in all modernized countries must deal with. Most religions allow that money, Possessions and gadgetry are not wholly wrong, so the problem is how to arrive at the right place for or right degree of emphasis on such things.

"Maikakyo" is a lightly comical Japanese/English combination term. Maika is Japanized English for "my car". Kyo is Japanese for religion or teaching. Thus we get the odd sounding term "My Car Religion". "Maikakyo" comes across as a mild joke in Japanese; in fact, I stole the terms from a Japanese scholar who said the term is so corny he didn't want his name associated with it.

When the questions of comfort and convenience arise, most Japanese complain that space is too limited in Japan; living space, driving space, storage space, farming space, building space. Even though Japan has a zero population growth rate, the crowding and space problem persists, or at least most people *perceive* the space situation as a problem.

A number of modern trends, including the increase in the number of personal and family cars, tend to make the problem worse. Another modern trend that complicates things is urbanization; Tokyo, for example, has the dubious honor of being the most populous city in the world. One of the going jokes in Tokyo is that the freeways



become parking lots during rush hours: not free ways but parking ways.

Even in small towns, the preference for driving one's own car tends to make the stores and restaurants with parking lots more popular. But when space is at a premium, it is no small effort and expense to obtain equal space for store and parking: the space problem gets doubled. The snowball effect includes rising prices, more noise, and more smog. Perhaps the most serious problem is when a family or individual sacrifices more wholesome or spiritual values in order to buy a car or second car.

Japan's trains are world-renowned, and the buses are quite good too. Almost every household has a bicycle (or 2 or 3, and a bike is invaluable in Japan. Biking and walking are healthful as well, but Maikakyo teaches that walking and biking are to be avoided.

Since the problem is one of degree (not a question of no cars at all), increased use of "mini-cars" may be a partial answer. Imagine a car about one third smaller than a subcompact car; that's what I call a mini-car. Legally, they are limited to four passengers. Mini-cars, or as some say, toy cars, are a sensible solution for people who "must" have a car. Indeed, shouldn't we Americans start demanding more mini-cars (whether made in Japan or not)? Americans, I fear, are napping when it comes to moral and spiritual reflection on matters of energy use, space, and transportation.

Sensitive readers will have already asked what business is it of mine to talk about Maikakyo and criticize the Japanese people. Actually, I'm equally or even more critical of Americans when it comes to such concrete questions. I'm not sure if my readers will grant me this, but as I whiz along the Japanese countryside leaving Kanazawa and heading for Kyoto on a Japanese express train, I fancy myself a world citizen, not a foreigner observing Japanese life and religion from outside. The world has a space problem and a growing problem of materialism. Since we are all in this together, I can speak out. But we must not lose our sense of humor in this case or in any case. We can see ourselves as overcrowding and spoiling our own cage. Or, we can see that, in a sense, we have come to worship things like cars.

### **Zen, Peace, and a Bottle of Beer**

Suzuki Kakuzen Sensei is quite a well-known figure these days in Japan. He is a Zen Buddhist master and a professor of Zen studies at Komazawa University in Kanagawa Prefecture. I interviewed him in the evening on August 15th; that same morning he had appeared on Japanese TV, so I was a bit nervous by the time I was to



talk with him. He put me at ease right away with an apology about the flush on his face from just having drunk a bottle of beer. Thus put at ease, I launched into the topics I wanted to discuss with him: the present religious situation in Japan, the Soto Zen approach (his speciality), and the Zen answer to the problem of world peace. That day, August 15, 1987, was the 42nd anniversary of the official end of World War II.

Suzuki Sensei cautioned me not to equate congregational membership or attendance at congregational meetings with adherence to a religion. He does not think that Japanese people generally, or Japanese young people in particular, are highly secularized (nonreligious). A lot depends on one's definition of religion, an important general question already discussed above. As for the Zen sect itself, it is probably the second or third largest Buddhist sect in Japan today. However, it is impossible to get accurate statistics on such matters.

Soto Zen, still following the teachings of the great Japanese master Dogen (13th century A.D.), fosters awareness of the true nature of the self. One's true self cannot be "known" as one knows that there is a piece of paper here or that World War II ended August 15, 1945. The true self can be experienced but not known or grasped by the intellect. You can experience the self directly in meditation (zazen).

When awareness of the self comes, some surprising insights come with it. First of all, what Common sense calls happiness or fortune is a chimera. It is vain to strive for happiness by thinking of one's own well-being as a separate thing...separate from that of others. Also, the idea that happiness is necessarily connected to a degree of wealth or social position or marriage situation, etc. is a mistake. The bottom line is that the whole idea of striving to make Number One happy is to be abandoned. Happiness...and here's the shocker...even, one's self...are not things one can have or grasp. A very practical outcome of all this is that it makes no sense to make oneself the center of one's life. To use a Zenny idiom, one needs to reach the point when one says of one's own happiness: 'It's no big deal.'

The enlightened sense of time which comes with Zen awareness is that one lives and dies each moment. Each moment is new and immediately terminates into a fresh moment. Each moment's activity or practice itself is enlightenment. Soto Zen does not teach that you should strive to become enlightened in the future. Even zazen is to be viewed as enlightenment, not as a means to enlightenment. To put it another way, zazen is Buddha-activity. Ultimately every



activity, each moment, is Buddha-activity. Here and now. Suzuki Sensei said that the other two types of Japanese Zen, called Rinzai and Obaku do *strive* to achieve enlightenment (i.e., divide means and end), so Soto Zen is unique.

Although Zennists usually don't criticize other religions, they do have a critical word for Sokagakkai, the aggressive Buddhist group that branched off from Nichiren Buddhism: Sokagakkai is too aggressive and fosters selfish interest, or so the criticism runs. You hear this criticism from many quarters in Japan. Suzuki Sensei said Sokagakkai is a quasi-religion (nite hinaru shukyo).

I asked Suzuki Sensei what he thought should be the relation between individual peace, or peace on the personal level, and world peace. He said the two are not different. It is a mistake to view them as distinct or separate. There is just one reality, one peace. If an analogy or picture were to be offered to express the idea of a person in relation to the world look like this: In this process you become less significant (the candle burns down). Actually, the wax just changes energy-forms in the process; nothing is annihilated or lost. The ultimate insight here is that the only peace is world peace. The world is totally integrated, so no part is separate. Let each activity each moment, be peace-activity.

After the interview, Sensei invited me to a local restaurant for snacks and a bottle of beer. No teetotaling or squeamishness in Zen. Neither is it over-indulging. I have no doubt that Suzuki Sensei has his food and beverage diet under control, adapted to the situation. In Buddhist terminology, it is finding the Middle Way between asceticism and indulgence. It's ok to include a bottle of beer in the furoshiki.

Which Way to the Pure Land ?

Which Way to Nirvana ?

The old American joke about the state of Nirvana being south of Michigan is funny because it takes Nirvana to be a literal geographical place. In talking with the leading Pure Land Buddhist scholar, Professor Hisao Inagaki, I tried to avoid such literalization. Actually, he's a specialist in Shin Pure Land, a subtype of Pure Land Buddhism, but we don't need to get into the difference here. He confirmed my suspicion that I had an oversimplified concept of the goal of all types of Pure Land Buddhism.

On the popular level, pure Land Buddhists may think of the heavenly realm the sect pursues as a physical place one goes to after death. The proper understanding of the Pure Land, according to the Professor, is that it's a condition in which one's karma becomes puri-



fied to the point of reaching spiritual well-being (bliss). A bundle of impure or defiled energy is what a person is when entangled in selfishness, worldliness, and attachment. When a person puts his/her faith in the Buddhist savior Amida, however, this energy (karma) get transformed into good or pure energy. Amida, as his name indicates in Japanese, is a being of pure light; his compassion and power are limitless.

"Entry into the pure Land" is actually a condition or state of the devotee's energy transformed by the power given to the devotee by Amida. This condition can be experienced through intuition or feeling, but it cannot be "known" or intellectually grasped. Though words cannot fully describe it, it can be said to be dynamic and blissful. Professor Inagaki calls it the "Realm of Pure Activity". Pure Land Buddhism teaches that a person can enter the Pure Land condition even before death, since it is a condition, not a place.

The Professor said the Pure Land is the same thing as Nirvana. He said this is quite different from the Nirvana concept of Theravada Buddhism. Theravada teaches that Nirvana is a condition of no karma and no experience...total cessation. Mahayana Buddhism, of which Pure Land Buddhism is a part, sees Nirvana as dynamic and blissful—something one can fully experience while in this body, living in this world.

The popular misconception is that the Pure Land is a heaven to be attained only after death and that Nirvana is a condition or place you enter after leaving the Pure land. A well-educated Pure Land Buddhist understands the Pure land Paradise of Amida to be a condition of pure, dynamic karma, or Realm of Pure Activity. It is the same as Nirvana.

### Street Religion

My favorite hobby in Japan is walking the streets. Village streets are the most interesting, but any street will do. When you walk the streets of Japan, especially in a village, you'll see what I call, for want of a better name, "street religion". In a village within ten minutes, you'll see a small shrine right on the side of the street. The image in the little street shrine may be of Amida Buddha, Kannon, Jizo-sama, or some other popular deity. Sometimes they're placed so close to the whizzing traffic that you'll be hard put to sort out your feelings. On the one hand, a Jizo Bodhisattva image suggests protection of the family, especially protection of children, and tranquil security. On the other hand, the very noisy, smoky, speeding traffic is nerve-racking. But there stands Jizo with a touch of a



smile on his stone face. He has a bib tied around his neck and a few coins and flowers at his feet.

Most towns have Bible quotes posted on walls along the streets. Even Izumozaki has such signs, and that's a small town way back on the China side of Japan. They are apparently put up by an evangelical or fundamentalist organization; the quotes focus on sin and salvation.

Street walkers will undoubtedly confront a torii or two, since these entrance gates to Shinto shrines are usually placed very close to the street. Some of them are 40 or 50 feet high and painted bright red-orange.

If you lunch at one of the popular cafe's with parking lots (see above, "maikakyo") you might notice that many of the parked cars have a Shinto amulet suspended from a knob on the dashboard. This is a part of street religion, even for people who wouldn't obtain such amulets for themselves. A Japanese friend of mine has one on his car window because someone gave it to him; he put it there out of a sense of obligation to the giver.

If you walk on out of town, the toriis and the little street shrines are less molested by the charging traffic. People move at a slower peace. You might ask a farmer about who is in charge of the upkeep of the little street shrines, but no one seems to be sure. Often they're on city or county property but no level of government maintains them. Once I saw an old lady cleaning off the dust and dried flowers from a little Jizo street shrine. I asked her if it was her appointed duty; she said it was up to whoever came to pray.

### The Lessons of Miyajima

Though Nara and Nikko are considered to be "musts" for all travelers, I would recommend Miyajima as an alternative. It's less of a tourist trap, and it has hundreds of tame deer, just as Nara does.

If I may play travel guide for a moment, I would tell you to go to Hiroshima first. There you can witness the memorials to those victimized by the A.bomb and ponder the fact that the H-bomb is 1,000 times more ghastly.

Miyajima is an island about 1-1/2 hours from Hiroshima. The last 15 minutes is by ferry, giving you a good view of the huge torii which stands in the sea about 200 meters from the island. The word "Miyajima" means "Shrine Island" because Itsukushima Shrine, dating from the 6th centry A.D is the primary attraction for all who visit the island. The shrine is on water stilts and looks like a huge



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ornate raft at high tide. It is dedicated to the three daughters of the shinto god Susano-o-no-Mikoto: princesses Ichikishima, Tagori, and Tagitsu. Shinto makes no sharp distinction between gods and humans, so shrines may be dedicated to gods or humans or both.

Shinto shrines usually don't display an image of the god or person to whom they are dedicated. Sometimes a mirror represents the spirit, but often there is only a holy of holies which mysteriously enshrines the spirit. As already mentioned, Shinto abhors death and considers it impure. Miyajima is so Shinto, and so holy that a tradition grew up and still exists whereby no one can die or even give birth on the island. Once born, an initiation ceremony for the newborn is held at the shrine. Everywhere in Japan special Shinto observances mark a child's passage through the ages of 3, 5, and 7. In addition, a variety of festivals punctuate the passage of the community through each season. Miyajima attracts massive crowds for its eight major festivals.

To a Westerner, the wild competitions, group dancing, and float parades on the occasion of these festivals may seem out of place in the rather reserved and structured context of Japanese society. These activities are extravagant group performances for the gods, who are the guests of honor. The individual sees himself or herself primarily as a member of the community in Shinto, and as such, relates to the gods. But the boisterousness and uncontrolled aspect of the behavior has a definite function too :

—group life—always involves certain contradictions, frictions, and antagonisms. What the matsuri (festival) does is to relieve men from their strains and tensions...in the religious context. Perhaps for this reason, though seemingly contrary to expectation, the communal festival, in and through its orgiastic inversion of normal rules of behavior, makes a contribution to group solidarity. Thus the observance and violation of ordinary conventions are two sides of the same coin, both of which suggest that the kami (gods) of Shinto are primarily communal and group gods. (5)

Another passage that Shinto observes and sanctifies is marriage, as explained above ("Secular Marriage?").

Traditionally, Miyajima has a dimension involving national pride or nationalism. In times of war, soldiers were sent to Miyajima for a final inspiration before being sent to the battle front. One of the shrines on the island is dedicated to a great political leader. Elsewhere in Japan a number of shrines have, or have had, explicit nationalistic functions. Meiji Shrine in Tokyo, for example, was dedicated to the Miji Emperor, who was considered to be divine. It



was used as a seat of nationalistic and religious fervor in the pre-World War II imperialistic period.

The divinity of the Japanese emperors was officially renounced in 1945, so the average visitor to such shrines as Meiji now has an experience roughly analogous to an American's visit to the Lincoln Memorial in Washington, D.C. Unlike the Lincoln Memorial visitor, however, the visitor to Meiji offers a petitionary prayer at the shrine. When asked, most people are very vague about the power to which this prayer is offered: "the spirit of the Meiji Emperor", "the ancestors", "the gods", etc.

Whether vague or explicit, Shinto has at least a touch of national pride mixed with it, and this aspect was used by the militaristic government prior to and during World War II. History shows that it was an intentional act of the Meiji government to clearly separate Shinto and Buddhism and make Shinto an explicit national religion. It was the government which wished to harness the power of Shinto and not the other way around. Although some angry Western writers have claimed that Shinto caused the war, this is surely an oversimplification; most Japanese Buddhists, Confucianists and Christians were quick to support Japanese imperialism.

To refocus on Miyajima. I could not but wonder what the groups of Japanese elementary students were feeling and thinking as they toured Miyajima the day I was there. All the sixth graders from one of the Hiroshima elementary schools were bused and ferried to the "holy island" on that day as a school outing. Their teachers pointed out that parts of the striking ancient shrine and the nearby Buddhist temple have been declared "National Treasures." For these students, history, natural beauty, architectural beauty, Shinto, Buddhism, and national pride were blended together in a joyous day's outing. For them, the experience was surely a furoshiki experience, combining all these six elements into a single event. And *nanto naku* (somehow, vaguely) Visitors to Miyajima become pilgrims.

### The New Religions and Risshō Kōsei Kai

You can't fully understand the present religious situation in Japan without coming to grips with what the Japanese call Shinkō Shūkyō (New Religions). Understanding these religions requires some knowledge of Japanese culture and some basic knowledge of comparative religion. I think I can show here that coming to grips with the New Religions is well worth the effort.

Using the going definition of a "New Religion," I refer to a group of religions which emerged after 1850. (.6) Most of them are libe-



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ated from the traditional Buddhist and Shinto ecclesiasticism—i.e., most or all ceremonies and other functions are not performed by priests or monks. Many of these religions involve, or involved at their inception, miraculous healings. All are as this-worldly as Japanese religion has always been, if not more so; more other-worldly religions like Krishna Consciousness have had little or no success in Japan. (7) The new religions provide considerable opportunities for fellowship, thus filling a felt need left unfulfilled by traditional religions. The new religions were founded by charismatic leaders with "humble" origins (lower class) who appealed to the masses.

The best known New Religion is Sokagakkai, an aggressive and politically oriented religion. But such political involvement is not necessarily a trait of all the New Religions. Among the innumerable groups are Risso Kosei Kai, Tenrikyo, Seicho no Ie, Sekai Kyusei Kyo, Ittoen, and PL Kyodan. No one knows how many people are actively involved in these groups; lumped together, their members may come to fifteen million. They have flourished in the atmosphere of religious freedom created by the 1947 constitution.

The question why these religions have emerged, along with a host of other questions can be answered through the example of a leading new religion called Rissho Kosei Kai. I stayed, without charge, at the Rissho Kosei Kai guest house near their headquarters in Tokyo for two weeks. This service to me is part of the general policy of openness, cooperation and compassion towards the people of all cultures and faiths. Such policies have, no doubt, contributed to Rissho Kosei Kai's positive image. RKK is generally accepted and appreciated by Japanese and non-Japanese as a genuine religious movement. Active members number about 7 million.(8)

"Rissho" means establishing the teaching of the true Buddhist law (the *Lotus Sutra*) in the world. "Ko" implies the spiritual unity of all human beings. "Sei" means the perfection of the personality and the attainment of Buddhahood. "Kai" simply mean, organization or group. The name in Japanese does have a ring of newness to it, and it's true that the religion was only founded in 1938. In some ways RKK is new and constitutes a clear attempt to fill needs not met by traditional Japanese religions. It has no "clergy" in the traditional sense of the term. Other non-traditional aspects of RKK include an aggressive attempt to foster group sharing in circles called hoza (compassion circles). RKK's strong efforts to promote inter-religious cooperation on a national and international level and its efforts toward establishing world peace are relatively new or non-traditions for a Japanese religion.



But there is much about RKK that is very traditional. In fact, it's more old than new. RKK is based solidly on the *Lotus Sutra*, a scripture dating from third-century India and the basis of many old Buddhist sects. The teachings of RKK are traditional Buddhist teachings: reincarnation/karma, the Four Noble Truths, the twelve causes, the six perfections, and the three treasures. RKK encourages chanting verses from the *Lotus Sutra* and the use of the traditional beads. It champions the Bodhisattva ideal. (9) All of this is as old as the hills.

RKK is not just traditional Buddhism, it's traditional *Japanese style* Buddhism in that it stresses reverence for ancestors. Also, on the 28th of each month, RKK observes a memorial day for the "Great Bodhisattva Hachiman". When Japanese Buddhists first began to revere Hachiman, he was already worshipped as a Shinto deity. Here we see typical Japanese syncretism. October 12, the anniversary of Nichiren's death, is a special memorial day for RKK. But Nichiren was the 13th-century founder of a uniquely Japanese Buddhist sect based on *Lotus Sutra*. All this is so much like Nichiren Buddhism that the Japanese government's Agency for Cultural Affairs considers RKK a part of Nichiren Buddhism.

I think the really new and striking aspect of RKK is its effort towards cooperation among religions and its efforts toward world peace. It cooperates with many religious groups on an international level. RKK founded the World Conference on Religion and Peace. RKK's founder, Nikkyo Niwano, has addressed the United Nations National Assembly and has audiences with the Pope to further the cause of world peace. An example of RKK's outreach is its rescue and care for the boat people of Viet Nam who were adrift in the South China Sea.

Critical observers may question whether RKK's efforts will continue and whether they will be effective. My experience with RKK people tells me they are quite sincere and will continue undaunted in pursuit of peace on many different levels. RKK will continue on the grass roots level seeking out the sources of personal discontent, and it will continue to challenge world leaders to see the insanity of the arms race.

This is not the pie-in-the-sky idealism of inexperienced, wildest dreamers. The Japanese people have a special contribution to make in the area of peace because they underwent terrible bomb storms in World War II and the A-bomb in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

The Japanese religious *furoshiki* can include a peace-pursuing religion. It goes well with spiritual virtues, as Jesus reminds us in



saying, "Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God." (Matthew 5:9) Can any religious person, can *any* person, honestly claim to be indifferent about the beatitude of peace?

### FOOTNOTES

- 1 Some readable materials available in English are listed in the bibliography accompanying this essay.
- 2 The tree analogy is quite different from the furoshiki analogy, so mixing or confusion between the two is very unlikely. The tree analogy can be found in Masaharu Anesaki's *Buddhist Art in Relation to Buddhist Ideals*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1915
- 3 Although this essay is not designed to enumerate groups, it might be noted here that there are six main Buddhist sects in Japan today; Pure Land, Shin Pure Land, Nichiren, Zen, Shingon, and Tendai.
- 4 Here "karma" means the situation one is in as a result of past actions and attitudes.
- 5 *Japanese Religion*, A Survey by the Agency for Cultural Affairs (Kodansha International, Ltd., 1972), p. 44
- 6 Definition based on that used in the Japanese Agency for Cultural Affairs' book, *Japanese Religion, A Survey* (Kodansha International Ltd., 1972)
- 7 I visited the ISKCON temple in Tokyo and talked with Kavichandra Swami at some length. He is well aware of the danger that modern Japanese society may induce too much materialism. The temple is at 2-41-12 Izumi, Suginami-Ku, Tokyo. That's there only temple in Japan. ISKCON stands for International Society for Krishna Consciousness.
- 8 RKK brochure, *Rissho Kosei Kei, An Organization of Buddhist Laymen*, Kosei Publishing Co., Ltd., 2-7-1 Wada, Suginami-Ku, Tokyo, 166, Japan, p. 23
- 9 A Bodhisattva is a compassionate, enlightened being who delays his/her entrance into Nirvana so as to remain in the world in a form that allows him/her to relate easily to suffering humanity..... to soothe and to teach.

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## Conception of Salvation of Rabindranath Tagore

Sunita Sinha

The general conception of salvation is that it is a state of non-worldly existence. The self realises God and after that it leaves the cosmos, and is passively united in oneness with the indeterminate nameless, transcendental and eternal Absolute.

But Tagore differs from the general idea of salvation. He does not conceive of any transcendental universe in which the selves live in the eternal identity. For Tagore, Salvation is neither a state of non-worldly existence and cessation of life, nor it is a state of passive union with the formless and nameless Absolute.

Rabindranath Tagore holds an unique conception of salvation. For him, salvation is a state of divine life on earth. His conception of salvation is influenced by Bhagavadgita. In Gita, soul has been described as immortal and eternal. It is deathless, indestructible and has formless existence. It neither dies, nor is born. The Bhagavadgita says, "It is never born, nor does it ever die, having once been, does it cease to be unborn, eternal, permanent and primeval. It is not slain when the body is slain."<sup>1</sup> Tagore too, conceives that the divine soul existing in us is immortal. There is no death of the soul. In the series of the births and deaths, the soul has its eternal journey and leaves one body for the other.

God also is an eternal Being. Lord Krishna says, "Never was there a time when I did not exist, nor you, nor these kings of man. Never will there be a time hereafter when any of us shall cease to be."<sup>2</sup> In these lines of the Gita, the soul is conceived to be co-eternal with God. Thus there is an eternal companionship between the soul

<sup>1</sup> Bhagavadgita, 2.20.

<sup>2</sup> Bhagavadgita, 2.19.



and God, which has been obstructed in the embodied condition of an individual-dominated by ego. When one has non-egoistic life, one realises salvation in one's earthly life. Salvation is the state of individual in which he realises eternal community and identity with God. It is not a condition of escape or freedom from the world, nor it is one's transcendental existence. It is the realisation of divine life on the earth, where the soul realises the ever lasting presence and oneness with God.

Salvation is not a condition of life far removed from the universe. Salvation is a condition of union and communion with God in one's life. The realised souls do not merge in the Absolute and live in eternal rest. The realised souls ever remain spiritual centres of mankind. For Tagore, there is no other world than the universe we live. It is in our physical existence that the soul realises the communion with God.

The realised souls never cease to exist. In the journey of the soul, God is the permanent companion. The salvation consists in one's bondage with God and his creation. It is a condition of deepest intimacy of one's self with God. Tagore writes, "our Master himself has joyfully taken upon him the bonds of creation; he is bound with us all for ever".<sup>3</sup> Further, to be disconnected from God is to be away from Him. It is a condition of ignorance, egoism and suffering. The moment, these are removed, one receives the ecstasy and bliss. Tagore conceives that the duality between Atman and Brahman, self and God, give eternal joy to the individual. The finite beings temporarily lose their identity in the state of mystic consciousness with the Divine, but the state of such a high degree of mystic consciousness is rare and momentary. The finite beings again come back to their normal consciousness of duality. Just as a lover in high ecstasy of love loses his identity and unites in oneness with the beloved, again perceives in normal state that he and his beloved are two and not in one existence. Similarly the finite being unites with God and is again separated from Him, but the souls' separation from God and its uniqueness remains for ever.

Tagore says, "The finite is not dissolved in the Absolute. Man remains ever imperfect. Man ever approaches but never merges into God. We are ever to become Brahman".<sup>4</sup>

The union is salvation, wherein one realises the consciousness of one's intimate relationship with God. We realise the highest aim of our life, when the soul in us is completely, absolutely and eternally

3 Gitanjali, verse XI, p. 7.

4 Santiniketan, Eighth Series.



bound in love with the Divine. Tagore writes, "Religious consciousness is nothing but the experience of the relation of love between the Absolute (Paramatman) and the individual self (Jivatman). This love has separation on one side and union on the other, bondage on one side and freedom on the other. In the love we get a synthesis between the limited and limitless, between force and beauty (Sakti and Saundarya), between form and feeling (rupa and rasa)".<sup>5</sup>

We have presently the egoistic personality, which is narrow, limited, ignorant and selfish. When we get rid of our ego, we realise our real soul. The real soul is the divine particle of God. When we have the soul-personality in us, we realise bliss and the joy of infinite oneness with God. But, the ego always follows us like a shadow. The moment, we get rid of the lower self or ego, we discover our divine nature. Tagore says, "where ever I go, I find that, this lower self follows me like a blank shadow. I wish to trample it under foot. I can realise the Infinite only when I have got rid off the lower self."<sup>6</sup>

When the ego is removed and the divine soul in us becomes open, manifest and revealed, it realises salvation. Salvation is the realisation of one's divine personality. The individual has to uplift the veil that covers the one's divine soul. The individual then becomes the divine being, ever living in communion with God. His limited existence no longer remains bondage to him. He becomes universal and united with God. Salvation is not a state of identity and oneness in the sense that the duality between the God and self ceases for ever. The soul does not become lost or absorbed in the Absolute as the Advait Vedanta propounds.

Salvation is a condition of Jivanmukta in the embodied state of an individual. For Tagore, to be a Jivanmukta is to realise salvation. The duality between God and the self and the participation of the latter in the former is possible only in his gnostic condition. God and the plurality of selves alone offer a dynamic and active life of union. The Infinite without the finite selves is a bare emptiness, a void and a vacuum. The selves too without God have no perfection and meaning. Tagore says, "The one without the second is emptiness, the other makes it true."<sup>7</sup> Tagore finds that the finite selves without God remain incomplete and imperfect, God also without the plurality of selves is reduced to passivity and blankness. Tagore feels that salvation is a state of Jivanmukta in which there is union and love with God. Without the plurality of souls God would have become passive

5 *Atma-parichaya*, p. 78.

6 *Gitanjali*, verse 141.

7 *Where Flies*, p. 52.



and inert. The finite too, without infinite is like a "lamp without its light" "a violin without its music". The two when combined are real and meaningful. Tagore says, "The infinite and the finite are one as song and singing are one".<sup>8</sup> It is through the finite beings that the God plays his music. The music and musician are inseparable, Tagore says, "music and the musician are inseparable. This world song is never for a moment separated from its singer."<sup>9</sup>

Radhakrishnan observes "It is only in marriage with the finite that the infinite can bear fruit; divorced from it, it remains barren".<sup>10</sup> The unity of God is manifested through plurality of souls only. It is so sweet and beautiful to live, for the manifestation of the infinite takes place in us, in our very existence. The infinite manifests itself in the finites. God manifests his truths, blessedness and omnipotence in the finite beings.

Salvation is not a state of inactive existence. It is a state, in which the Jivanmukta becomes the centre of God's activity. The Jivanmukta does the work of God and is ever engaged in the spiritualisation of mankind. His works are non-egoistic, selfless and ever manifesting godly actions. Salvation in Tagore's philosophy is the realisation of the state of Jivanmukta, in which one realises union with God. In that supreme state, man lives for God and becomes the media of his manifestation. He is a divine being who ever lives in the Infinite.

Radhakrishnan in his observation says that God is immanent in the universe and our material body is also surcharged with the divine existence. The body should be made the sign and utterance of the soul. Radhakrishnan observes that the world of nature is neither a delusion of the creator, nor a share of the devil. It is a play ground where we have to build our souls. Nature and society are the media for the manifestation of the Infinite in the finite. They help the finite to work out their destiny. All soul's existence is suffused with God. Nature and society are the gates through which we can enter and unite with God. We can enter to the abode of God. God also comes to us through nature, society and the world. Tagore says,

"Have you not heard his silent steps? He comes, comes, ever comes.

Every moment and every age, every day and every night he comes, comes, ever comes. Many a song have I sung in many a mood of mind, but all their notes have always proclaimed, 'He comes, comes, ever comes.'

8 Personality, p. 57.

9 Sadhana, p. 122.

10 S. Radhakrishnan, *The Philosophy of Rabindranath Tagore*, p. 43



In the fragrant days of sunny April through the forest path he comes, comes, ever comes.

In the rainy gloom of July nights on the thundering chariot of clouds he comes, comes, ever comes.

In sorrow after sorrow it is his steps that press upon my heart, and it is the golden touch of his feet that makes my joy to shine."<sup>11</sup> It is never too late to meet

with God. What is necessary is to prepare ourselves to receive God. In Gitanjali Tagore writes, "At the end of the day I hasten in fear, lest thy gate be shut, but I find that yet there is time."<sup>12</sup> We have to surrender ourselves to God. Happiness consists in giving oneself to the infinite. In all such surrenders, we feel the feet of God and forget ourselves.

Salvation is a state of the soul in communion with God and with his creations. The liberated soul does not escape from the world. He becomes the centre of divine activity. God works through such liberated souls, wherein the individual remains in union with God and joys inner peace and bliss. All his works are manifestations of the divine will working through him. Thus salvation is not a stage of freedom from bonds. The liberated soul becomes intimately connected with other souls, society and mankind. Every where, there is immanence of God; God is all in all. He is man, nature and spirit. He is in all human beings. God is everbound with us. Therefore there is no place where God does not exist. That is why, happiness consists not in negation, nor in running away from the world, but in intimate union with masses, men, society and nature.

In all the activities of the liberated souls, there is no selfish goal or end. It is out of sheer joy and fullness that the liberated souls work. The God-possessed soul works for the humanity for the state of sheer love. For Tagore withdrawal from social work and service to humanity is an obstacle to the union with God. The ascetic who runs away from the world, lives in abstraction and negation in a state of emptiness. Tagore says that loyalty to God means loyalty to mankind. When one becomes united with many in the love, he becomes transfigured in God. Radhakrishnan observes." It follows that the God-Possessed soul will spend itself in the service of man. Just as to the lover there is nothing unclean or impure in the loved one's body, even so to the lover of God, there is nothing untouchable in the great body of God, the world of men" In these passages, Radhakrishnan explains Tagore's ideas that the world of men is the great body of God and there is nothing to be rejected or renounced. In Gitanjali,

<sup>11</sup> Gitanjali verse XLV, p. 27.

<sup>12</sup> Gitanjali verse LXXXII, p. 55.



Tagore writes that the infinite is not other than the finite, but the finite transfigured. God says that one who serves his brothers serves Him. It is said "In as much as ye have done it unto one of the least of these my bretheren, ye have done it unto me", Radhakrishnan explains "The true mission or destiny of the religious soul is not isolation or renunciation. It is to be a member of society recognising the infinite and boundless possibilities of man, and offering oneself up entirely and exhaustlessly to the service of one's fellows".<sup>13</sup>

The work of the realised souls are offerings to God. The Tagore's mysticism is a practical work in which the person who has attained peace, bliss and communion with the Infinite, dedicates all his work to God in this temporal world. Salvation is realisation of union with God and service to humanity. Thus the activities and participation of Jivanmukta in serving the masses of men is his endless pursuit. Tagore thinks that his love goes out to every creature, the hungry and the thirsty and the sick and the stranger and the wretched, for God lives in them all.

The end of man is the realisation of self or infinite in him. This is man's dharma. The essence of man is the infinite. His dharma is to become infinite, which he already is. Salvation is freedom from ego and avidya. Tagore writes, "In the typical thought of India it is held that the true deliverance of man is the deliverance from avidya, from ignorance. It is not in destroying anything that is positive and real, for that cannot be possible but that which is negative, which obstructs our vision of truth. When this obstruction, which is ignorance, is removed, then only is the eyelid drawn up which is no loss to the eye".<sup>14</sup> This means that Tagore emphasizes that salvation is to remove the barrier between man and God. Man becomes God. When the barrier is removed. The Upanishads say "He who knows Brahman obtains liberation" Further, he who knows the supreme Brahman really becomes Brahman whereas the west conceives that man's becoming God is blasphemy. For Tagore; if we do not become Brahman, our life becomes meaningless. Tagore writes, "Yes, we must become Brahma, Our existence is meaningless if we never can expect to realise the highest perfection, that there is".<sup>15</sup>

Nevertheless the difference between the soul and God, the Atman and Brahman remains forever. Though in union with God we become Brahman, the difference is obvious. The finite soul is a particle of God and it can never be the whole. Brahman remains

13 S. Radhakrishnan, *The Philosophy of Rabindranath Tagore*, p. 5.

14 *Sadhana*, p. 59-60.

15 *Sadhana*, p. 133.



ever perfect, but souls are ever to become perfect, ever to become Brahman. There is the eternal play of love between the finite and the Infinite. Whereas the soul can become Brahman, it cannot make Brahman its part and parcel. Tagore observes, "Brahma is Brahman, he is the infinite ideal of perfection. But we are not what we truly are; we are ever to become true, ever to become Brahman. There is the eternal play of love in the relation between this being and the becoming; and in the depth of this mystery is the source of all truth and beauty that sustains the endless march of creation".<sup>16</sup>

Tagore thinks that the soul can become God, but only partially, as the soul is a part of God, It cannot become the same as God. Thus the soul's journey to perfection and God remains incomplete. The Upanishads say, 'I think not that I know him not'. We can never become Brahman in our endless pursuit. "By the process of knowledge, we can never know the infinite being, But if he is altogether beyond our reach, then he is absolutely nothing to us. The truth is that we know him not, yet we know him".<sup>17</sup> In these passages Tagore says that we cannot know God fully as our souls are parts, it cannot see the whole, just as an ant cannot see the mountain, the soul can never know Brahman in full. But once our soul unites with God, there is its transfiguration into the God-head, it becomes a divine being or God himself, though partially. It is this perfection of being that finds its expressions in all his poetry, drama and art. The souls ever remain growing into Brahman, but its endless and continuous pursuit falls short of the supreme perfection.

Tagore explains his ideas in simple words. Everyone asks the boatman "Take me across to the other shore".<sup>18</sup> The grocer, the customer, the carter all cry, "Take me across". But the river is infinite and vast, we can never go across, we can never reach the other side of the shore. We toil and strive in the river, similarly in our pilgrimage we go on and on put never reach our goal. Tagore says, "We feel we have not reached our goal; we know with all our striving and toiling we do not come to the end, we do not attain our object. Like a child dissatisfied with its dolls, our heart cries, not this, not this. "But what is the other? Where is the further shore".<sup>19</sup>

Tagore is aware of the Advaita Vedanta's conception of soul in which soul is totally absorbed in the Absolute. The personal divine self unites in impersonal entity-the Brahman, which is without quality or definition. The Advaitins conceive that the purest state of

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., p. 134.

<sup>17</sup> Sadhana, p. 136.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., p. 139.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., p. 139.



consciousness is without any object or contents. But Tagore does not accept this view. He writes, "In India, there are those, whose endeavour is to merge completely their personal self in an impersonal entity which is without any quality or definition; to reach a condition, wherein mind becomes perfectly blank, losing all its activities. Those who claim the right to speak about it say that this is the purest state of consciousness, it is all joy and without any object or content. This is considered to be the ultimate end or Yoga, the cult of union, thus to completely identify one's being with the infinite Being who is beyond all thoughts and words... Without disrupting its truth, I maintain that it may be valuable as a great psychological experience, but all the the same it is not religion,.....and man is more perfect, as a man than where he vanishes in an original indefiniteness."

### The Methods for the Realisation of Salvation

Rabindranath Tagore conceives that the intellect cannot help us in the realisation of God. The intellect is a weak instrument which remains unable to solve many a problem-social as well spiritual. This shows the incompetence of the intellect in the realisation of God. The truths are revealed always in intuition. The logical reasoning does not achieve the union of the finite with the Infinite. By intellect we cannot even unravel the nature of God. The human understanding can never be a means for knowing the infinite. It is through intuition or mystic experience that the union with God is achieved. Tagore writes, "Brahman cannot be known by debates. He is to be known only through anandam."<sup>21</sup> Again. Tagore says "From Brahma words come back baffled, as well as the mind, but he who knows him by the joy of him is free from all fears."<sup>22</sup>

Tagore says that the mystic experience came to him as a revelation. He writes in *Jivan Smriti* that the revelation came to him as a flash. He relates how for the first time in his life, while he stood on the balcony of his Calcutta house, the layers of ignorance vanished one by one, and he experienced the universal light, which flooded his entire being. The poet refers to the incident as the first coming of intuition in his life. Tagore relates about the first advent of intuition thus, "One morning, I stood on the balcony of our Calcutta house and looked at the gardens of free school. The sun was just rising behind the green branches of trees, and I looked on. Suddenly, I felt as if a layer was removed from my eyes. I saw an effable beauty, I felt an

20 The Religion of Man, p. 74.

21 Santiniketan vol. II, p. 625, Fourth Series, Calcutta Viswabharati, 1963.

22 Sadhana, p. 136.



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inexplicable joy within the depths of my own being and I found the whole universe soaked in it. My discontent vanished instantaneously and a universal light flooded my entire being."<sup>23</sup>

Tagore says firstly that it is not through intellect that we realise communion with God. Secondly, it is through intuition that we achieve salvation, thirdly intuition comes as a flash when aroused by the beauty of nature. While he was looking at the trees in the morning, the nature manifested its beauty. The layers of ignorance were removed. The divine light flooded him. He writes clearly that salvation or communion with God is achieved by observing the beauty of nature. By communicating and by coming in close contact with nature, the divine vision is achieved. The intuitive experience, the communion with God and salvation and the removal of ego came through his enjoyment for the beauty of nature. The mystic experience came to him through his enjoyment of the natural scenes. The sight of trees, stars and rivers give rise to ecstasy in Tagore who immediately feels the presence of God.

According to Tagore, realisation of beauty is a way of Realisation of the Infinite, beauty is everywhere, all pervading. Tagore perceives flower not as a mere flower, but as a messenger of God. He writes in 'Sadhana', "Such a messenger is a flower from our great lover..... In the meantime the flower comes across with a message from the other shore and whispers in our ears, 'I have come. He has sent me. I am a messenger of the beautiful, the one whose soul is the bliss of love.'" Tagore advocates that the man should lead a natural life "tending trees, feeding birds and animals; learning to feel the immense mystery of the soil and water and air."

The trees, stars and river at once make the poet to have the feel of the presence of God. He sings in 'Fruit-Gathering.

"Your speech is simple, My Master,  
but not theirs who talk of you.

I understand the voice of your stars  
and the silence of your trees."<sup>24</sup>

In the above poem Tagore says that it is feeling, which has nothing to do with words, intellect and logic, which serves as method for knowing the Infinite. For Tagore the best expression of feeling is found in music. Tagore conceives that when intellect stops working, when words end, the feeling arouses and thereafter the music fills over entire being. Music tells us what words cannot tell. Tagore writes, "Music begins where words end. Music reigns supreme in the

<sup>23</sup> Prabhat Sangit, 1882.

<sup>24</sup> Fruit gathering, verse XV, p. 18.



region of the inexplicable. Music tells us what words cannot tell."<sup>25</sup>

Music is the best, method for the realisation of self. Music is the surest means for the expansion of the soul and communion with God. Music removes our ego and selfishness. Music removes the obstacle between man and God. Music lifts the covering of ignorance put on our souls. The music intuition refers to the realisation of salvation or communion of the finite with the Infinite by means of music. He writes in 'Sadhana' "Music is the purest form of art, and therefore the most direct expression of beauty, with a form and spirit which is one and simple, and least encumbered with anything extra-neous".<sup>26</sup>

Tagore writes that music is an art and an expression of beauty. He writes that music is a form and manifestation of the Infinite. He says, "We seem to feel that the manifestation of the infinite in the finite forms of creation is music itself silent and visible".<sup>27</sup> The creation of world itself is silent and visible expression of music. God is a musician, his creation is the manifestations of the notes of songs of the divine. The mystics conceive of God as a singer and his creation is like a form of music. God himself is a singer and the poet listens his songs,

"I know not how thou singest, my master  
I ever listen in silent amazement.

The light of thy music illumines the world. The life breath of thy music runs from sky to sky; The holy stream of thy music breaks through all stony obstacles and rushes on".<sup>28</sup>

God is a music-maker and he loves to hear songs coming from men. Tagore says that, it is through music alone, that he comes in communion with God. He says,

"Ever in my life have sought thee with my songs, It was they who led me from door to door, and with them have I felt about me, searching and touching my world".<sup>29</sup>

Tagore preaches us for spiritual yoga, but he does not talk about asanas on different yogic postures. Yoga is taken in the sense of discipline, which demands sacrifices and renunciation. Tagore says that yoga is "the daily process of surrendering ourselves, removing all obstacle to union and extending our consciousness of him is devotion and service, in goodness and in love".<sup>30</sup> Music is a yoga and

25 Jivan Smriti, p. 214.

26 Sadhana, pp. 120-21.

27 Ibid., p. 121.

28 Gitanjali, verse III, pp. 2-3.

29 Gitanjali, verse CI, p. 66.

30 Sadhana, p. 128.



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this is the direct means for communion with God. For, God is also a singer and his beauty pervades the world. It is in His songs that Tagore wants to join. The earth is full of divine music and Tagore wants to communicate himself with that music. Tagore says that he listens to the songs coming from God. He says that the bees are singing the music of God. It is time for him to sit quiet, listen to Him sitting face to face with God. Tagore says that like a flute of reed, he sits quiet, so that God may fill it with music. He says,

"It has fallen upon me, the service of thy singer.  
In my songs I have voiced thy spring flowers,  
and given rhythm to thy rustling leaves.  
I have sung into the husk of thy night and  
peace of thy morning."<sup>31</sup>

The poet in the evening of his life sees the other side of the shore. He says that it is his songs, which has served as a boat to cross the wide sea and brought him to the other shore, the feet of God. He says,

"But now when in the evening light  
I see the blue line of the shore,  
I know my songs are the boat that has brought me to the  
harbour across the wild sea."<sup>32</sup>

Painting, drawing, literature, poetry, dance, drama and the different forms of art bring about expansion of soul and annihilation of the ego leading to the communion of the finite with the Infinite. But for the absorption of the finite in the Infinite, Tagore conceives that music is the most perfect art and the musician easily comes in communion with God in comparison to the dramatist, a literature or a painter. Whereas the different arts achieve union of an individual with God, The musician goes ahead of them.

The second method for the realisation of salvation is through devotion. It is the love of God, which is a direct path for communion with God. We are united in love with God through worship, prayer, meditation, surrender and dedication. Love and devotion depends upon the removal of ego in the individual. So long, there is ego-consciousness in man, there is no possibility for union with God. So long 'I', 'me' and 'mine' continue to guide man, he cannot enjoy the state of perfect love. In the 'King of the Dark Chamber' the queen Sudarshana sees the King only when she gives up her egoistic attitude. Ego always follows our divine selves. Tagore says that he is ashamed that ego accompanies him always. When the soul is left free, the love and prayer brings communion with God.

<sup>31</sup> Lover's Gift and Crossing, p. 74.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid., p. 67.



Salvation lies in loving the Infinite. Tagore, like other mystic poets conceives the relationship between finite and Infinite, man and God as of lover and beloved. He says that the aim of his life is to be in His love. He earnestly requests God to prevail His love on his whole being, thoughts and consciousness. Tagore wants to be completely immersed in the divine love, so much so that there is no difference between his love and the divine love. He sings,

“Let thy love play upon my voice and rest on my silence  
Let it pass through my heart into all my movements  
Let thy love like stars shine in the darkness of my sleep and  
dawn in my awakening.  
Let it burn in the flame of my desires  
And flow in all currents of my own love”.<sup>33</sup>

There is a great difference between love and attachment. Attachment is always connected with ego—the lower self. Attachment has a motive or purpose behind it. The true love is far above the egoistic impulses and motives. In true love, the questions of ‘how’, ‘why’, ‘what’ and ‘for’ do not exist. The poet says that the true love does not require any reasoning. He says, “Love is its own reason, its own goal and is its own responsibility”.<sup>34</sup>

Love, according to Tagore is not only sentimentality or an emotional attitude, but it has its practical aspects also. The theoretical side of love stands for certain feelings and practical side refers to certain corresponding actions. Action of love occupies an important place in Tagore’s philosophy. He says, “We find in perfect love the freedom of our self. That only which is done for love is done freely, however much pain it may cause. Therefore working for love is freedom in action”.<sup>35</sup>

For Tagore, actions are the play of love. Without action love is not love. Surrender is also an important action of love. We are united in love with God through surrender. That is why, the poet prays to God to give him the strength to bear the joys and sorrows lightly, to give him strength to make his love fruitful for mankind and to give him strength to surrender his strength in God’s love. He says,

“This is my prayer to thee, my lord—strike, strike at the root of penury in my heart.

Give me the strength lightly to bear my joys and sorrows.  
Give me the strength to make my love fruitful in service.

33 Lover’s Gift and Crossing, p. 55.

34 Prem, Santiniketan, First series.

35 Sadhana, p. 64.

36 Gitanjali, verse XXXVI, p. 21.



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Give me the strength never to disown the poor or bend my knees before insolent might.

Give me the strength to raise my mind high above daily trifles.

And give me the strength to surrender my strength to thy will with love". "

Tagore says that true love cannot be achieved without sacrifice. The first and foremost step in the act of love is sacrifice. Love and sacrifice both are complimentary to each other. Without the one other is incomplete, inconsequential. A man, who begins his spiritual quest in the act of love, has to sacrifice his personal considerations.

The initial acts of self-sacrifice may be painful and reluctant. But later on self-sacrifice becomes natural and a source of joy. Tagore says, "It is like plucking fruit when it is unripe; you have to tear it from the tree and bruise the branch. But when a man loves, giving becomes a matter of joy to him, like the tree's surrender of the ripe fruit."<sup>37</sup>

According to Tagore our actions of love and sacrifice should be in service of humanity, but these actions must not be in exchange of personal gains. The actions should be done selflessly and without egoistic motives. Working for mankind means recognition of God's entity in all. When man works for such a high pursuit, he no longer lives a finite life, but lives in the Infinite. The expansion of soul takes place due to its freedom in action. When we act selflessly for others, we feel liberated in the outside world, which is the first step towards achieving our liberation. Tagore propounds that any process, which develops human consciousness beyond his ego and towards the Infinite is a way of realisation. This is possible, action and beauty, so there are Realisation in love, Realisation in Action and Realisation of Beauty, but they all lead us to the same goal-The Realisation of the Infinite.

The manifestation of the divine love takes place in service to humanity. Tagore conceives that love brings union of the finite soul with God, which is expressed in constant and eternal works relating to the upliftment of the mankind. It is not mere temple-worship of chanting of names or telling of beads' but love is expressed in all activities relating to the mankind. God loves human beings and is constantly working for the good of men. The love of man for God leads the former in participation of all his works. God remains ever engaged with mankind and the devotee likewise participates in all His activities.

37 Sadhana, p. 64.



## George Combe and Orson Squire Fowler On the Theory of Heredity

Cemil Akdogan

Many scholars believe that Orson Squire Fowler, if compared to George Combe, is fake and unoriginal, since he borrowed ideas from original phrenologists such as Gall, Spurzheim and Combe and degraded phrenology making it a low art. In a review of Spurzheim's Phrenology, *The Ladies's Repository* remarked: "With Dr. Combe phrenology reached its zenith. In the hands of the Fowlers, and many itinerant selfseekers, it has degenerated to the reputation of a humbug."<sup>1</sup>

Unfortunately, this common belief about fakeness and unoriginality of Fowler does not comply with the facts. The purpose of this paper is to establish Fowler's creativity and originality against Combe in the theory of heredity. As we will see, Fowler indeed borrowed ideas from Combe, but he is never an exact imitator or copy of Combe. Neither does he corrupt phrenology. On the contrary, he enriches and develops the ideas that he borrowed and most importantly, he stamps his personality and the spirit of America on those ideas.

Both Combe and Fowler believe in transmission of physical and mental traits from parents to offspring. Not Combe, but Fowler almost exhausts hereditary qualities. Although Combe is satisfied with few examples of hereditary characteristics, Fowler presents too numerous examples., mainly derived from his experience in his professional life for a quarter of a century.

No doubt Fowler comes under the influence of Combe's laws of acquired characteristics and self-improvement, but with new elements

<sup>1</sup> Madeleine B. Stern, *Heads and Headlines, The Phrenological Fowlers*, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, 1971, p. 84.



such as love and magnetic secretions he makes them much more sophisticated and theoretical. Furthermore, he applies them to hereditary diseases.

In presenting the applicable laws of the theory of heredity in human progress, Fowler is unique and the only authority, because Combe treats the issue of heredity from the standpoint of philosophy. Therefore, Fowler popularizes the theory of heredity more effectively than Combe.

### I. Physical Characteristics

Combe wrote his famous book *The Constitution of Man* in 1821 and philosophically dealt with the theory of heredity which he placed within the general framework of progress. Although he laments the ill-assorted unions between men and women he ignores the application of the theory. In fact, heredity was not even a main interest, but a side issue in his book. So, he is satisfied with a very brief description of physical characteristics inherited from parents to progeny.

He mentions that deafness are hereditary. For instance, in the family of Kelley seven children out of eight were deaf and dumb.<sup>2</sup> Forms of brain are also transmitted. The European mind is distinct from that of New Hollander. Every Hindoo, Chinese, Negro and Carib inherits a particular form of brain from his parents.<sup>3</sup>

Blind and lame parents do not have blind and lame children, since blindness and lameness generally occur as a result of accident and are not constitutional. Otherwise, they would be transmitted hereditarily.<sup>4</sup>

Fowler spent many years to collect data on heredity and also examined the shape of heads of foreigners and native persons for twenty five years. Thus in covering the physical characteristics passed on to offspring from parents he was through.

Physical qualities of races and nations are transmitted. For example, the color of an African race is hereditary. Not only color, but also behavior, voice the manner of laughing, from of mouth, color of eyes, etc. are hereditary. Fowler then specifies the physical characteristics of Indians, Jews and Caucasians. He notices that one nation or race is distinct from another one. For instance, Caucasians have got a division or furrow in the gristle of nose differently than the native Africans.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>2</sup> George Combe, *The Constitution of Man*, Boston, 1841, p. 149.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 152.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 172.

<sup>5</sup> Orson Squire Fowler, *Hereditary Descent*, New York 1847, pp. 22-27



Family likenesses and stature are also transmitted. For example, the Rogers family has got red or light hair for generations. Another family, the Webster family, has got large, coarse, and heavy eyebrow which is passed on from one generation to another. Also, the form of body and the face of the Hopkins family persisted to be the same for five hundred years in spite of the intermixed marriages.<sup>6</sup>

If a family has got thin, and plump persons, in the coming generations there will be both thin, and plump persons. In the family of Hatch, all persons were thin for three generations. One day Fowler met a new customer in his office and took him as Daniel Webster, since he resembled Daniel so much; but he was the sixteenth cousin of Daniel. Daniel and his cousin resembled each other in carriage, slowness, power of motion, height, weight, color and coarseness of hair, form and color of eyes, extraordinary vital and muscular organs, and the same form and expression of face.<sup>7</sup> All these examples show that the general structures of body are hereditary.

Size of body is also transmitted. The sons of giants are giants, and the sons of dwarf parents are dwarf. Concerning Dixon H. Lewis, Fowler writes: "Dixon H. Lewis, the 'weighty' ex-speaker of the lower house in Congress, so large that a chair was made expressly to hold his magnitude, and that he always fills three seats in the stage, weighs 430 pounds, and has a brother who weighs 400 pounds, and also a sister of the extra delicate weight of over THREE HUNDRED".<sup>8</sup> In Africa there is a nation of dwarfs. Among other physical characteristics Fowler mentions physical strength, physical debility, physical deformities, longevity, short life, premature death and beauty.

Physical strength is hereditary. To support this law, Fowler gives two examples from his ancestors. Jonathan Fowler, the son of a large woman, kills a bear one day by his own hands and hearing this bravery, the England king orders a picture of this event to be drawn and posted on a wall of his palace. The great son of Jonathan Fowler, Seymour Fowler, also killed a big eagle in a sea.<sup>9</sup>

Physical debility, and physical deformities such as marks, excrescences, twenty-four fingers and toes, thick lips, squints, wens, flaxen locks' early baldness and grey hairs, etc., are hereditary. Longevity, short life, premature death, and beauty are also hereditarily transmitted. For beauty, Fowler writes: "Other nations, especially the Circas-

6 *Ibid.*, pp. 27-29.

7 *Ibid.*, pp. 30-33.

8 *Ibid.*, p. 35.

9 *Ibid.*, pp. 39-40.



sians, are famed over the earth for their beautiful women; and the Persian practice of importing these well-formed wives has greatly improved the looks of the descendants of these nobles."<sup>10</sup>

Lastly, Fowler sums up his argument about the hereditary transmission of physical qualities:

Having established the fact that some of those elements which compose mankind bodily—such as his anatomy, the number, shape, and position of his bones, muscles, and other organs; his physiognomy, or likeness, form of body, stature, longevity, and the like, even his idiosyncrasies—are hereditary, the inference that ALL his physical elements and peculiarities are transmitted from generation to generation, is perfectly obvious".<sup>11</sup>

## II. Mental Characteristics and Propensities

Combe gives the caste of Brahmins in India as an example to support that the mental characteristics are hereditary. The children of this caste are superior to the children of the other castes in intelligence, in being acute and docile.<sup>12</sup>

Combe further says that the same character is transmitted. Haughtiness, inflexibleness, severeness, boldness, rashness, and factiousness are transmitted from one generation to another. Mental talents depend on the size of brain which is different in each nation, and the mental dispositions of nations are different depending on their size of brains.

Fowler once again offers numerous examples to enlighten the transmission of the mental faculties. He accepts what Combe presents concerning mental qualities and further develops new mental characteristics in the theory of heredity.

Like Combe, he first states the interrelation between physical and mental qualities. Forms of head are transmitted, and those forms determine the mental qualities:

In short, the fact already conclusively established, that family likenesses and forms are transmitted, taken in connection with the truth of Phrenology, necessarily presupposes and proves that the relative size of those various intellectual organs which give the forehead its form, descend from parents to children, and of course those intellectual powers and predilections which Phrenology shows to accompany these forms. And since the relative size of a PART of the phrenological organs, and, of course, relative energy of some of the mental faculties, is thus transmitted, of course All the phrenological organs and facul-

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 69.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 70.

<sup>12</sup> Combe, pp. 149-150.



ties, in all their various degrees of development, are equally transmitted. Since one is hereditary, of course all are. That same law which entails any part, equally, and for the same reason, hands down all. Indeed, those very laws, in all their respective applications, already shown to transmit the various physical conditions of parents to offspring, equally transmit their mental likeness, their intellectual capabilities, and their moral character.<sup>13</sup>

Mental faculties are different from one nation or race to another. Indians, African race, Jews, Caucasians, and Malayians have got different mental and physical qualities. Fowler especially gives the mental traits of Jews as an example. All over the world the acquisitiveness of Jews is famous. From the time immemorial, they have run after richness and have got it. The destructiveness, mechanical ingenuity the inhabitiveness, the hospitality, especially moral, and intellectual faculties of Jews are important.<sup>14</sup>

Social faculties such as loving cat, homesickness, and love of family; and cautiousness, approbateness, self esteem and firmness, the moral faculties such as religious feeling, conscientiousness, benevolence, constructiveness, ideality, imitation, and mirthfulness are transmitted from parents to offspring.

For Fowler not only mental qualities, but also propensities are hereditary. Among propensities, combativeness, destructiveness, insanity, excessive and deficient appetite, intemperance, forging, the twin-bearing tendency, cannibalism and acquisitiveness are hereditary.

Concerning destructiveness and combativeness, Fowler mentions the known figure Nero and his deeds. For intemperance, he urges and warns parents not to drink and appeals to unmarried women not to choose a mate among drinking men, if they—parents and unmarried women—do not want idiot children.<sup>15</sup>

Amativeness is also a propensity, and Aaron Burr and his uncle have got large organs of amativeness in the lower and back portions of their heads. "For ages to come will these two" persons "be coupled with seductions the most artful and successful, with sexual indulgence the most gross and unparalleled on record as well as with the ruin of females the most lovely and unblemished before they encountered these arch seducers. Long may it before another as foul destroyer of chastity again scourges the earth."<sup>16</sup>

13 Fowler, pp. 128-129.

14 *Ibid.*, pp. 135-144.

15 *Ibid.*, pp. 166-167.

16 *Ibid.*, pp. 148-149.



### III. Acquired Characteristics and Self-improvement

Phrenologists believe in the progress of hereditary characteristics. The normal characteristics being increased by education are transmitted to offspring from parents. These acquired qualities may be further developed by offspring and passed on to the successive generation, and there is no limitation to this progress. This optimistic stand of phrenologists gives people a hope for future.

Parents can make an offspring witty, intelligent, moral, weak, strong and etc., since they, not God, control the future of their progeny. Although they breed their animals, and plants, they do not care about their progeny. Both Fowler and Combe accept that the same laws governing animals and plants are also valid for human beings. In fact they simplify the complexity of the matter of heredity by establishing the similarity between animals and human beings, and this is not a disadvantage in popularizing their case, the importance of progeny; for public can understand simple rules better than the intricate ones. Let us quote from Combe and Fowler, First, Combe writes :

By a proper attention we can preserve and improve the breed of horses, dogs, cattles, and indeed all other animals. Yet it is amazing this observation was never transferred to human species where it would be equally applicable. It is certain that, notwithstanding our promiscuous marriages many families are distinguished by peculiar circumstances in their character. This family character, like a family face, will often be lost in one generation and appear again in the succeeding. Without doubt, education, habit, and emulation, may contribute greatly in many cases to keep it up; but it will be generally found that, independent of these, Nature has stamped an original impression on certain minds which education may greatly alter or efface, but seldom so entirely as to prevent its traces being seen by an accurate observer. How a certain character or constitution of mind can be transmitted from a parent to a child, is a question of more difficulty than importance. It is equally difficult to account for the external resemblance of features, or for bodily diseases being transmitted from a parent to a child. But we never dream of a difficulty in explaining any appearance of nature which is exhibited to us every day. A proper attention to this subject would enable us to improve, not only the constitutions but the characters of our posterity. Yet we every day see very sensible people, who are anxiously attentive to preserve or improve the breed of their horses, tainting the blood of their children, and entailing on them not only the most loathsome diseases of the body, but madness, folly, and the most unworthy dispositions, and this too when they cannot plead being stimulated by necessity or impelled by passion.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>17</sup> Combe, pp. 150-151.



Fowler also says that the same laws govern both breeding animal and human beings, and parents can control the future of their offspring:<sup>18</sup>

Nor are these hereditary causes and effects hid under a bushel, or beyond human control. They are exposed to full view. Parents can compare—cannot well help comparing—their children with themselves, and drawing these hereditary inferences. Men study and apply these principles in planting seeds, selecting soils, and improving their breeds of domestic animals. They know how, by such application, to secure fleetness, strength, beauty, and other qualities in horses; fattening properties in swine, fine woolled sheep, game and fattening predispositions in fowls, and the like. So fully do they understand, and so effectually apply these laws, that they can predict with certainty beforehand, whether the prospective fowl is to be a mule or a race horse, the lamb black or white, the Calf Durham or any other breed: Now since those same laws which govern transmission throughout all its phases, he can of course ascertain and apply them to the production of whatever physical or mental qualities, in offspring, he may desire—can render his prospective children strong, healthy, sprightly, beautiful, intelligent, moral, and the like, as he may choose—can render them amiable or revengeful, proud or humble, coarse or refined, mathematical, mechanical, benevolent, reflective, or whatever else he pleases, or all combined—and thus BY CONSTITUTION “DYED IN THE WOOL”—and even predict their respective characteristics before they see the light. Parents can so unite in marriage as to render their offspring short or tall, diseased or healthy, deformed or well formed, long lived or short lived, peaceful or pugnacious, timid or courageous, honest or unjust, ingenious, musical, witty, acquisitive, communicative, poetical, logical, oratorical, profound, or whatever else may be desired. Those who doubt this in the main, virtually deny either that laws govern this matter of transmission, or else that man can see and apply them; to dispute either of which is to deny our senses.<sup>19</sup>

Acquired characteristics and unlimited possibility of progress for human beings are accepted by both Combe and Fowler. Combe asserts that the laws of transmission of hereditary characteristics are determined by phrenology. There are three possibilities. First these traits may be transmitted absolutely, and then the children will be the exact copies of their parents, and no improvement will take place from one generation to another. The second possibility is that children may inherit a combination of traits of their father and mother. Or thirdly the children may inherit the qualities of stock. In addition to this, the acquired characteristics.<sup>20</sup>

18 Fowler, pp. 18-19.

19 *Ibid.*, p. 20.

20 Combe, p. 153.



Combe rejects the first alternative by depending on some observations. He sees that each child is not an exact copy of one of his parents. He also rejects the second alternative, for a child does not inherit a combination of the characteristics of his father and mother. Then, Combe accepts the third alternative. Children not only inherit the general characteristics of their family, but also inherit the acquired characteristics of their parents at the moment of conception.<sup>21</sup> From this law Combe easily can derive the principle of development. The acquired characteristics can be added from one generation to another and no limit can exist for progress.

To support and enlighten the third law, Combe gives some examples. Let us explore two examples that he presents. Sir Walter Scott, the father of Napoleon Bonapart, is a very fine person with a talent of eloquence and strong intellect. He marries one of the most beautiful women, Laetitia Ramolini, who has a firmness in the character. She helps her husband on a horse in fighting with enemy before giving birth to Napoleon, and transmits her acquired characteristics in the field of war to Napoleon at the moment of conception; thus, Napoleon becomes one of the greatest commanders in the world.

In the second example Combe talks about the transmission of the increased form of a mother's talent of music to her children. A lady who has got a large brain exercised music as being a music teacher in a school and married a husband with moderate musical abilities. They had several children with great musical talents, since children had been conceived during the period in which their mother was practicing music.<sup>22</sup>

For Combe the existing conditions of parents are also hereditary. Children of older parents are much more intellectual than the children of younger parents, since a young parent has strong animal propensities whereas an older parent has strong intellectual qualities.<sup>23</sup> If combativeness and destructiveness are dominant in parents during conception, the child will inherit these animal propensities. But if intellectual activity is dominant at the moment of conception, children will be intelligent.<sup>24</sup> However, the genius of parents may not be passed on to offspring, if the parents exert their mental and bodily functions excessively.<sup>25</sup>

21 *Ibid.*, pp. 153-154.

22 *Idid.*, p. 175.

23 *Ibid.*, pp. 159-161.

24 *Idid.*, p. 162.

25 *Ibid.*, pp. 172-173.



Sometimes parents with low intellectual faculties may have children with powerful mental faculties, if some external conditions during conception make parents vigorous intellectually. Also, a child may inherit no moral faculties from a highly moral parent, if the animal propensities of his parent are effective at conception.<sup>26</sup>

As for Fowler, he takes up the ideas of Combe on the transmission of acquired characteristics of parents to offspring, the unlimited possibilities for progress of human beings, and the transmission of the existing conditions of parents to children and enriches and develops them further by bringing new elements such as magnetism, and love into the picture.

Fowler believes in the unlimited development of human beings through acquired characteristics:

As, in raising water by means of the pump, one stroke after another raises it higher and still higher, while the valve catches and holds it, so one parent, endowed with only ordinary musical genius, can increase that gift by exercise, and transmit it thus increased to his offspring. They too, can still further increase it by cultivation, and thus endow their offspring with natural musical genius far superior to what they inherited, and so on for ever. Or, to carry out our figure, we can raise any or all our powers by cultivation just as we raise water by one stroke of the pump, and then the valve of parentage transmits them thus raised to posterity. The next generation can likewise re-increase them by culture, and then parentage transfer both the first and second increase to posterity, to be still farther reaugmented and again transmitted by every generation who choose to avail themselves of the advantages proffered by this infinitely wise provision.<sup>27</sup>

Fowler also accepts Combe's idea on transmission of the particular states of the minds and bodies of parents to progeny at the moment of conception. Just to enlighten this point together with the law of acquired characteristics, he writes a book called *Love and Parentage. Applied to the Improvement of Offspring*. In the page 32 of this book, he gives a quotation from Combe to show that the existing conditions of parents during conception are transmitted:

George Combe, high authority truly, in his "Constitution of Man", gives the following case in point. "In the summer of 1827, the practitioner alluded to was called upon to visit professionally a young woman in the immediate neighborhood, who was safely delivered of a male child. As the parties appeared to be respectable, he made some inquiries regarding the absence of the child's father; when the old woman told him that her daughter was still unmarried, that the child's

26 *Ibid.*, p. 162.

27 Fowler, p. 267.



father belonged to a regiment in Ireland; that last autumn he obtained leave of absence to visit his relations in this part of the country, and that on the eve of his departure to join his regiment, an entertainment was given, at which her daughter attended. During the whole evening, she and the soldier danced and sang together; when heated by the toddy and the dance, they left the cottage, and after the lapse of an hour were found together in a glen, in a state of utter insensibility, from the effects of their former festivity; and the consequence of this interview was the birth of an idiot. He is now nearly six years age, and his mother does not believe that he is able to recognise either herself or any other individual. He is quite incapable of making signs whereby his wants can be made known—with this exception, that when hungry he gives a wild shriek. This is the case upon which it would be painful to dwell; and I shall only remark, that the parents are both intelligent, and that the fatal result cannot be otherwise accounted for than by the total prostration or eclipse of the intellect of both parties from intoxication.

Like Combe, Fowler also claims that the age of parents determines whether children will inherit mostly mental faculties or animal propensities. The children of older parents will be more intellectual than the children of younger parents.<sup>28</sup>

#### IV. The Creativity and Originality of Fowler

Combe's ideas of heredity are observational. For example, Combe's law of the transmission of the existing conditions of parents is observational, since we can observe parents and their children and check whether the existing conditions of parents passed on to children or not. Although Combe depends on observations in a positivistic sense, Fowler goes beyond observations and establishes a real theory of heredity.

Fowler creates a hidden mechanism—magnetic secretions or sub-fluids—in order to explain Combe's observationally formulated ideas. He establishes a one-to-one correspondence between Combe's ideas and his theoretical scheme in terms of magnetic sub-fluids. Now let us see how Fowler explains Combe's hereditary characteristics and laws of acquired characteristics and existing conditions with respect to magnetic sub-fluids:

Now, those children that receive existence and constitution when all these sub-fluids maintain their usual relative power and activity in parents, will resemble these parents in every particular; but those that receive being and impress when the angry, or the kindly, or the intellectual, or any other sub-fluid prevails in parentage, and is therefore imparted in existing relative predominance to the materials of life, will inherit there

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 235-236.



sub-fluids in their then existing predominance or deficiency; some of which may be greater in the child than in either parents, because augmented by increased activity in both parents, and others less than in either, because little excited in either; while those begotten when circumstances have conspired to diminish the combative sub-fluid, and increase the mora, for example, or any other, will receive from parentage a proportional endowment of the temporarily prevailing sub-fluids and consequent characteristics: and thus when any other faculty or element prevails, or becomes deficient, in parents at this period; its existing degree of parental action being fully and faithfully represented in these materials, and thereby transmitted to progeny. Furthermore: when one sub-magnetic fluid prevails in one parent, and another in another, at this period, the progeny takes on the then existing combinations of these magnetic fluids, forces, or qualities: and thus of all their other combinations; nor does it matter whether they prevail temporarily, or permanently, so that they but prevail at this period.<sup>29</sup>

Here Fowler establishes a connection between magnetic sub-fluids (theoretical, non-observational and material entities) and observational characteristics. Thus he replaces Combe's practical empirical approach by the theory of the forces or magnetic sub-fluids that underlie observational characteristics.

Even expounding a real theory of heredity is not the only creativity of Fowler. He also applies love to the improvement of offspring. He successfully explains Combe's laws of the transmission of the existing conditions and acquired characteristics in terms of love.

The existing conditions of parents are transmitted to offspring by means of love. When parents love each other spiritually, they will call existing mental faculties into action, and as a result their progeny will be intellectual. If there is a discord between parents, they will make love with an animal passion and their children will mainly inherit animal propensities.

Love can also be utilized in order to explain the law of acquired characteristics. If a couple do not love each other at the beginning of their marriage, the children conceived at this period will inherit mostly animal propensities. But if the couple begins to love each other spiritually at a later period, then children will be more intellectual due to spiritual love which is an acquired characteristic.<sup>30</sup>

#### V. Diseases and Fowler

Fowler also applies Combe's laws and principle of improvement to hereditary diseases. Among diseases, consumption, scrofula, sy-

<sup>29</sup> Orson Squire Fowler, *Love and Parentage*, New York 1846, p. 29.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 109.



philis, gout, apoplexy, cancers, ring-worms, dyspepsia, heart affections, sudden death, cutaneous affections, blindness, deafness, stammering, hemorrhage, dizziness, fits, tic-doloureux, rheumatism, etc. are transmitted.

Fowler believes that not diseases, but the liability to disease is hereditary. Children of hereditarily diseased parents are liable to that kind of disease that their parents have; but they can escape the hereditary disease and lead a happy life, if they live out a full and healthy life and exercise enough to prevent the disease.<sup>31</sup>

Concerning the principle of improvement Fowler writes:

This principle of improvement is INDUBITABLE - a universal LAW OF THINGS— and therefore allows children, weakly by nature, and even diseased, to become stronger and stronger till energy supplants debility and health disease. It is not therefore impossible for diseased parents to have healthy children, and all hereditary diseases to be ultimately eradicated.<sup>32</sup>

At the time of conception, if parents have a hereditary disease, that existing condition will be transmitted to progeny. Furthermore, if a parent begins to be getting better through exercises, then his progeny will receive the new acquired situation and will be less liable to that illness than his parent.

## VI. Practical Rules of the Theory of Heredity

Not Combe, but Fowler develops rules in order to prevent ill-assorted unions between women and men. Fowler first formulates the law of confluence. If both parents have the same qualities in a high degree, children will inherit those qualities in a degree equal to both parents collectively. Thus, according to the law of confluence, the children will be better or worse than their parents. For example, "the two rivers of the Robertsons and Henrys united in the person of Patrick Henry's father, and this lingual river united with that of Winston eloquence, and the confluence of ALL THREE produced the most eloquent man of his age, and probably the world!"<sup>33</sup> But if propensities are inherited, then children will be worse than their parents. For instance, Aaron Burr is a product of parents who have the organ of amativeness in a large size.

From the law of confluence Fowler derives some practical rules to regulate choosing proper mates in marriages. "What temperaments should, and what should not, unite".<sup>34</sup> First practical rule

<sup>31</sup> Fowler, *Hereditary Descent*, p. 98.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*,

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 246.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 261.



for choosing a life companion states that "EXTREMES of temperament should not unite; because, the law of confluence, already demonstrated, will produce offspring having still greater extremes"<sup>35</sup>

If both parents have weak lungs, they must not marry, otherwise progeny will have weak lungs. "But those whose lungs are deficient in size and strength should marry those whose lungs are large and strong, because their issue being more liable to take on the strong than the weak organs of parents, will be more likely to inherit the strong lungs of the one than the weak ones of the other".<sup>36</sup> Those persons who have propensities in a high degree should not marry.

But Fowler warns that "offsetting should not be carried to the other extreme, Very great defects should never unite with great opposite extremes".<sup>37</sup> If a coarse man marries a finely organized woman, their progeny will be divided into two characters. In him coarseness and fine organization will conflict. "While the sluggish should not marry the sluggish, lest their offspring should be doubly tame and indolent, nor the extra nervous those equally excitable, lest their offspring should be feeble, yet precocious, still the wide-awake should not marry the dull, nor those of low organizations those highly wrought; but those given to extremes should marry those LESS extreme".<sup>38</sup> A fleshy person must marry a lean person, and a person who has light complexion, hair, and eyes, should marry a person who is darker than himself, not too dark. As a last rule Fowler says that well-balanced persons must marry one another, since they do not need an offsetting. A medium person should marry a medium person.

### VII. The children of kinsmen are inferior

The children of cousins or other nearer relatives are inferior, even though the married relatives are intellectual and moral. This situation is against the law of transmission of physical and mental qualities. Both Combe and Fowler agree on the inferiority of children of near relatives, especially cousins.

For instance, the old royal families, especially in Spain and Portugal, marry their near relatives and run out.<sup>39</sup> In another example, "N. P., of W., Mass., a fine looking and intelligent man, of good sense, married his own cousin, and what a set of children! One of them is clump-footed, another has but one eye, and all three of them

35 *Ibid.*, p. 262.

36 *Ibid.*,

37 *Ibid.*, p. 263.

38 *Ibid.*, p. 264.

39 Combe, p. 159.



are very weak in intellect, small in person, and have heads shaped like a flat-iron, point turned downward, flat on top, and their chin making the point."<sup>40</sup>

### VIII. Education and Heredity

In both Combe and Fowler the main emphasis is on heredity. Education comes after heredity and simply cannot create or eliminate the mental and physical organs, but can increase their abilities. Both education and hereditary organs are important, but heredity is the root of development.

### IX. Popularization of the Theory of Heredity

As seen, Combe does not care about practical matters of heredity and deals only with the philosophy of heredity. Furthermore, he furnishes little space to propound his views on heredity in his book, *The Constitution of Man*, which was already a target of criticism with respect to the relation between religion and phrenology. Some people accused Combe of not believing in God, since his book implies that not God but the laws of nature govern everything. For these reasons Combe's book did not become popular and influential.

As for Fowler, he writes for public and emphasizes the practical aspects of the theory of heredity. Whenever possible he does not miss the opportunity and appeals to parents and unmarried women the momentous importance of the issue. In one of those appeals he says:

And now, prospective parents, be entreated to pause and consider this whole subject. Does it commend itself to your investigation and application? And is it not the imperious duty of every prospective parent to study and apply it? As our possession of eyes, muscles, reason, speech, etc., imposes on us a solemn obligation to use them, so nature's proffer of such exalted blessings, renders us guilty if we neglect them. Are the temporal and eternal destinies of your dearly beloved children indeed so trifling? Though you may "neither fear God nor regard man", yet be entreated to regard "the born of your bone and flesh of your flesh". The destinies of your own dear prospective children lie completely at your control. Nay, you must control them.<sup>41</sup>

Fowler's books sold in thousands, and even a bookstore in New Haven was opened to sell only Fowler's books. He was the most fertile writer among phrenologists and was so popular that his books reached almost every town and village in the United States, since his

<sup>40</sup> Fowler, *Hereditary Descent*, p. 277.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 281-282.



books were "fresh and racy, 'intensely American' in style, full of graphic colloquialisms and slipshod grammar".<sup>42</sup>

### CONCLUSION

Fowler has originality in both theory and practice. Never is he an exact copy of Combe and neither does he degrade phrenology. Although he took the ideas of existing conditions of parents, acquired characteristics and progress of human beings from Combe, he enriched those ideas with a new element such as love and applied them to diseases. More importantly, with magnetical sub-fluids he established a real theory of heredity and explained Combe's ideas in a theoretical and scientific sense. Thus, he proved his originality in the theory of heredity. As for the practical aspects of heredity, he was surely the only authority in his time. He was a creative man, a very fertile writer and the most famous practical phrenologist in the world. Therefore, we must change the remark of *The Ladies's Repository* and say, not with Combe, but "with Fowler phrenology reached its zenith".

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<sup>42</sup> Stern, p. 64.



## A Defence of Mystic Experience

*Madhuri Devi*

The word "Mysticism" is used in a number of ways. Ordinarily it means regions unexplored by reason or shrouded by mystery. For example, the contents of unconscious mind are called mystical, because they are beyond the limits of reason. A more popular use of the term is to associate it with occultism and magic. But I am using this term as related to religion. Very often the term is used to denote that rare and unique state of consciousness which is found in the saints. It is the state of communion with the highest reality. In the present article it has been used in this very sense. Evelyn Underhill points out: "Mysticism is the art of the union with reality. The mystic is a person who has attained that union in a greater or lesser degree; or who aims at and believes in such attainment".<sup>1</sup>

Having stated what is meant by mysticism here, I must also make clear what do I intend to do in defending such experience. I will not suggest any deductive reasoning by way of proof, because such experience transcends the grasp of reason. My defence will consist in refuting a few charges that are levelled against such experience. Though this experience transcends reason, but the objection against it are based on reason. I will attempt to show that the objections are not satisfactory at all and they fail to serve their purpose.

I want to start with a presupposition which I do not think, will be illogical. Rational argument proceeds through language and language has its limitations. Every thing cannot be fully described by means of language. Our feelings of intense joy or love cannot be described exactly, though such feelings are real. This very problem has given rise to figurative language. Where ordinary language fails, figurative language comes as a substitute. But mystic experience, is still beyond the reach of such language. Though the mystics have

<sup>1</sup> Happon, C., *Mysticism*, p. 38, Reprinted 1984.



taken help of figurative language to state their experience, but that hardly makes their experience intelligible. But inability of expression by means of language, does not necessarily lead to the realm of unreal. That is the presupposition with which I want to start.

Mystic experience is the experience of the real by becoming one with it. It is the stage where the distinction of 'I' and 'you', of subject and object, of knower and known, is transcended. It is a rare state of consciousness, unique of its own kind. It has an autonomous realm. The laws of spatio-temporal world and the laws of logic related with the experiences of this world are not at all applicable to it. It is beyond them. Just as our sense organs have their own rules and realms of perception, (e.g. ear does not perceive light, eyes do not see sound, similarly rules of logic and of space time pertain to this world and not to the Real.

It appears that mystic experience presupposes a belief in God's existence. The experience of 'godhead' of Eckhart, the catholic mystic, the experience of the 'one' of Plotinus, the pagan and the experience of the self or Brahman of Hinduism, all presuppose a belief in God. All these can be called God-mysticism. But the Buddhistic ideal of 'Nirvana' which also is mystic experience, cannot be called God-mysticism. Buddha always maintained a noble silence or answered in paradoxes whenever asked about God. Nirvana is attainment of intuitive consciousness. Ashvaghosh in his Buddhist manual "The Awakening of Faith", writes: "If any sentient being is able to keep free from all discriminative thinking, he has attained to the wisdom of Buddha".<sup>2</sup> In God-mysticism one starts from the belief in God, but Buddhistic mysticism does not presuppose belief, rather it starts with full faith in the teachings of Buddha himself.

The common point between the two sorts of mysticism is the attainment of the state of peace, bliss and a non-discriminative consciousness. A true mystic is neither a Jew nor a Greek nor a Hindu, nor a Muslim. He transcends all sorts of distinction. In fact all the mystics such as Buddha, Christ, Gandhi etc., have undergone similar experience; they had same realisation. But when they took help of language or of symbols to utter what they had felt, differences start coming up. Mystics have always felt difficulty in describing their experiences. Just as a dumb man tastes sugar but can not describe it, similar is the case of the mystic. The inability of the dumb man to describe the taste of sugar, does not mean that he has not tasted sugar. In the same way what the mystics feel, they cannot describe or they describe it insufficiently. That is why mystic experience has been the target of severe attacks.

2 Stace, W. T., *Religion and Modern Mind*, p. 262, 1960.



Some main charges against the mystic experience are as follows :

- (1) It is said that consciousness always proceeds through contrasts. Then such experience in which all contrasts and differentiations vanish, is not theoretically possible.
- (2) It is stated that mystics are deluded or that they are telling lies. They do not actually have such non-discriminating experience.
- (3) Mystic experience is stated to be purely subjective like a dream. The dream is not true of the objective world. Similarly what the mystic experiences, that has nothing to do with the external world.

The first charge can be refuted by the help of an analogy. A person born blind knows things by touching them. He has not experienced what seeing is. Then he denies the possibility of knowing things by seeing them and suggests that knowledge of things can be had only through touch. But we who are blessed with eyes know that he is wrong and that things can be known through the eyes. Similarly those who deny the possibility of mystic experience are like the person born blind. One can experience what the mystics experience, only when he follows the path stated by them. No doubt that path is rigorous. But mystic experience is as much possible as any other experience.

To the second objection, it can be replied that though the mystics are born in different ages and places, but their message and their behaviour share a strange similarity. In fact such experience has been the source of their moral behaviour. The mystics have felt the unity, so they love all and preach the same to every body. The mystics, to whatever age and place they belonged, voluntarily showed their affection and kindness to every body. That speaks of the truth of the mystic experience. Love towards all can voluntarily be practised when one has the awareness that all are one. Such realization makes a man out and out a moral being. Christ asked for forgiveness even for those, who crucified him, because he had realized that oneness. A true mystic is a true moralist. He only can return love for both, love and hatred. The life of great saints and mystic exhibit in their behaviour the more virtues of love, kindness, forgiveness, truthfulness, non-violence etc. Hence the experience cannot be called a delusion nor the mystics can be blamed of telling lies. The unity of their behaviour cannot be the result of a lie or delusion. So many persons cannot have same delusion at different times and places.

To meet the third charge against mysticism, one should be able to distinguish between two frames of reference. One is the spatio-



temporal frame of reference and the other is the eternal frame of reference. From the first frame of reference mystic experience will appear as subjective. But when one becomes competent enough to acquire the other frame of reference then mystic experience stands as the sole truth. We should not apply the first frame of reference to the mystic experience in the same way as we should not apply the rules of grammar to judge the work of a poem. The mystic experience can never be equated to a dream. Because peace and bliss are its natural outcome. It revolutionizes one's outlook. A dream does not have such healthy effects on our total personality. A mystic carries on his normal occupation as before. To his friends and acquaintances, he is the same person. But in himself, he has changed. Rufus M. Jones, in his "The Testimony of Mystical Experience" says; "It is a notable fact that their experiences and their stabilized faith through what they believe to be their contacts with God in many cases, in fact usually, result in a unification of personality, in a great increase of dynamic quality—a power to stand the universe and in a recovery of health and normality".<sup>3</sup> A dream does not have such effect on our life. Mystic experience is a self rewarding experience. Dreams often produce harmful effects also. Sometimes dreams make a person more fearful, more superstitious and more pessimistic. So dreams may affect our personality adversely. But mystic experience results into betterment of personality. So much so that the dynamism and moral behaviour of mystic becomes examples for others.

Mystic experience has the elements of knowledge, feeling and activity combined into it. The mystic knows the 'one', he feels his oneness with it, and this he expresses in his outward actions of love and compassion for all. The mystic is not a blind lover, rather he is a lover with the fullest knowledge. Mysticism presents a unique combination of knowledge and emotion, together with activity.

Whether the mystic experience can be called cognitive, is a very controversial issue. I will like to mention two points here :

(1) The mystics themselves say that they know the Real, though they cannot express properly this knowledge by words.

(2) Some great scholars opine that in knowledge a distinction of knower and known always exists. But mystics claim to transcend this distinction in their unique experience. That is why the problem arises how to call it noetic.

I shall discuss the second point, at first. So far as knowledge of the empirical world is concerned, such distinction always exists. We

3 Bronstein, J. Daniel and Harold M. Schulweis, Ed., *Approaches to the Philosophy of Religion*, p. 192, 1960.



## A Defence of Mystic Experience

are habituated to think that the knower and the known are always distinct. But our knowledge need not be confined to this empirical world only. Man always feels in him an urge to transcend himself, an urge towards the infinite. This world and worldly things fail to satisfy him. He wants to know the secret of the universe, the ultimate reality. In knowing the 'real' it is not essential that the distinction of knower and known will persist. What is essential condition in case of the knowledge of this world; need not be essential in knowing the Real. Even in the case of the knowledge of our own self, the distinction of knower and known does not exist. I know my own self; here self is the knower and the known both. The distinction is transcended here. In mystic experience not only the distinction of knower and known, but any other spatio-temporal distinctions also are transcended, because it has the character of eternality. From outside it can be dated, but in itself it is above spatio-temporal divisions. Due to its unique character Otto calls it sui-genesis. It cannot be compared to any worldly experience and that is why distinctions found in worldly experience cannot be present in this experience.

Now I turn to the first point. Knowing and expressing the knowledge in terms of words are two different activities. The relation between the two may not be essential, rather we have established such relation to popularise knowledge. "Expression in terms of words" is meant to convince others. But "Expression by way of action" is of no less importance. The mystics may insufficiently express in words, their experience, but they sufficiently express it in their action of love, forgiveness and kindness towards every body. Their actions correspond to their knowledge. Inexpressibility in terms of words, here cannot disprove their knowledge. I agree with Dr. D. M. Datta when he says: "But is there any reason to make us think that the expressible exhausts the whole domain of possibles? On the contrary, do we not find that even certain definite facts of experience (e.g. the exact character of a bodily feeling, or of a joy, or a sorrow) though clearly felt cannot be expressed in language?"<sup>4</sup> So I feel that inexpressibility in terms of words does not affect knowledge. Of course knowledge must express itself, but either in terms of words or in terms of actions and actions are of no less importance.

To sum up, the blanced behaviour of the mystics is itself the greatest defence of mystic experience. Its indescribable nature does not render it impossible or unreal, in the same way as lack of exact description of beauty, justice, goodness does not lead to denial of these qualities. It is true that all of us cannot reach this height of experience. But then, same is true about science also. Not all of us are able to understand the clumsy laws of Physics and Chemistry. But these laws are not doubted. Then why should one doubt the reality of mystic experience at all, without attempting to achieve it?

<sup>4</sup> Datta, D. M., *Philosophical Perspectives*. p. 13, 1972.



## Inner Self Located

*Bradley York Bartholomew*

Sufficient is now known from neurophysiology and electroencephalography to pinpoint the part of the brain that operates in our sleep. It is the purpose of this article to review Hindu philosophy (as expounded in the Upanishads) on the subject of sleep and to enquire whether the part of the brain that operates during sleep is the part of the brain where the Self resides. It will be shown that the scriptures abound with Clues as to the precise location of the Self and just a basic knowledge of neurophysiology and electroencephalography is sufficient to interpret these clues, at which stage they become veritable signposts pointing in the right direction.

It can be no exaggeration to say that the state of sleep is the very cornerstone of Hinduism. According to the Katla Upanishad, Purusha, who keeps awake and goes on creating desirable things even when the senses fall asleep, is pure; and He is Brahman, and he is called the Immortal. All the worlds are fixed on Him; none can transcend Him. (II. ii: 8)<sup>1</sup> This Purusha is called thus, because he sleeps in all bodies (Purishaya). (Brhadaranyaka Upanishad 2. 5. 18)<sup>2</sup> On an individual plane this Purusha or Brahman is known as Atman or the Self.

Two states of sleep are distinguished. There is firstly the dream consciousness which is evoked and sustained by the Self. The blissful Self, revived by the impression of joy etc is perceived in dream..... (Shankaracarya's Commentary on Taittiriya Upanishad p 323)<sup>1</sup> That radiant infinite Being... puts the body aside in the dream state. (Brhadaranyaka Upanishad IV. 3. 11) This one who, being adored, moves about in dream, is the Self..... (Chandogya Upanishad VIII. 10. 1)<sup>2</sup> Purusha, is the supreme person, who Himself becomes manifest as the persons in the eye and in dream..... (Shankaracarya's Commentary on Chandogya Upanishad p 658)<sup>3</sup>



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When the Self thus stays in the dream state, these are the results of its past work. (Brhadaranyaka Upanishad 2. 1. 18)<sup>1</sup>. Dreams generally correspond to experiences of the waking state. But sometimes one dreams things neither experienced nor to be experienced in this life. And since dreams are not original experiences, the above must be attributed to experiences of another life... (Commentary on Brhadaranyaka Upanishad p. 319)<sup>1</sup> When it dreams, it takes away a little of this all-sustaining body, itself makes (the body) insensible and itself creates (a dream body) and dreams through its own radiance (illuminated) by its own light. In this state this entity (the Self) itself becomes the light. (Brhadaranyaka Upanishad 4. 3. 9)<sup>1</sup> The Prashna Upanishad states, there, in dreamling state, that God experiences His own greatness, He sees all, Himself being all (IV. 5).

There is secondly the state of deep sleep. "...then (the sleeper) becomes merged in Existence. He attains his own Self. Therefore they speak of him as, "he sleeps"; for he attains his own Self". (Chandogya Upanishad VI. 8. 1)<sup>2</sup> "...they teach daily (during sleep) this Brahman which is the goal". (Chandogya Upanishad VIII. 3. 2)<sup>2</sup> In deep sleep Purusha remains unmanifest and His organs fully withdrawn. (Shankaracarya p. 660)<sup>2</sup> Krishnananda says, "It is only in the state of deep sleep that the self goes back to its own pristine purity. The energy is withdrawn; consciousness is withdrawn; the ability to perceive is withdrawn. It appears as if life itself has gone. There is a practical non-existence of the individual for all conceivable purposes. What happens is that the central consciousness, which is the Self, draws forth into itself all the energies of the external vestures, viz. the body, the Prana, the senses, the mind, etc., and rests in itself without having the need to communicate with anything else outside. (p. 855)<sup>2</sup>

The self is consistently stated to be the agent that brings about the transition from the sleeping state to the waking state. ...it hastens back in a reverse way just to its previous state, that of waking... (Brhadaranyaka Upanishad 4. 3. 16)<sup>4</sup> as a large fish swims alternately to both the banks (of a river) eastern and western even so does this infinite entity move alternately to both these states—those of dream and waking... (Brhadaranyaka Upanishad 4. 3. 18)<sup>4</sup> While the Self withdraws itself from all manifestations when it is in sleep, it projects itself in waking through the very channels through which it withdrew itself in sleep (p. 865)<sup>5</sup>.

The Kaivalyopanishad states that "The being who sports in the three cities (viz the states of wakefulness, dream and profound sleep)—from Him has sprung up all diversity. He is the substratum, the bliss, the indivisible Consciousness, in whom the three cities dissolve



themselves (14)<sup>6</sup>. Verily the Atman (Self) should be known as being the same in its states of wakefulness, dreaming and dreamless sleep. (Amritabindupanishad 11)<sup>6</sup>. It should be noted however that when the Self has totally withdrawn, it is no longer considered to be contained within the state of deep sleep and the Upanishads speak of a fourth state. Then it is devoid of states, positive or negative, and remains in a state of non separation and oneness, then it is spoken of as Turiya, the fourth. (Sarvopanishad 2)<sup>6</sup> The Self or Atman is the Linga-sharira (subtle body), and the "heart's knot". In the fourth state the Self transcends the individual altogether and merges with the macrocosmic Brahman. "That very mind becomes the fearless Brahman, possessed of the light of Consciousness all around. (Mandukya Karika III. 34).<sup>7</sup>

Right from the time of the Rg Veda the divine texts have consistently maintained that the Self is located in the heart (hrdaya). Because this Resplendent God who is the nourisher of all by His might knows fully the hidden soul or Atman dwelling in the cave or the heart or intellect doing many noble deeds, He is Omnipotent..... (1. 23. 14) Shankaracarya explains the meaning of the word angushthamatrahr of the size of a thumb, the lotus of the heart is of the size of a thumb; (and) as conditioned by the internal organ existing in the space within the lotus of the heart, (the Self) has the size of a thumb. (p 181)<sup>1</sup> The Chandogya Upanishad states: This Self of mine within the heart, is smaller than paddy or barley or mustard or a Shyamaka seed, or the kernel of a Shyamaka seed. This Self of mine within the heart, is greater than the earth, greater than the intermediate space, greater than the heaven, greater than the worlds. (III. 14. 3)<sup>3</sup> In particular the location of the Self in deep sleep is given as the heart. The Brhadaranyaka Upanishad, for example, states: When this Self that is associated with the intellect is thus asleep, it withdraws by its specialised knowledge the functions of the organs, and lies in the Supreme Self that is within the heart. (2. 1. 17)<sup>4</sup> In the ether of the heart situated in the interior of the sheath, the divine soul attains the state of sleep..... Then by resorting to the same course he leaps into the waking state. (Subala Upanishad IV. 1)<sup>3</sup>

The sanskrit word hrdaya (heart) is composed of three roots-Hr Da Ya. Krishnananda explains, "Hr means draw. That is the grammatical root meaning of the word Hr. Drawing, to attract, to pull towards oneself, to compel everything to gravitate towards oneself, to bring everything under one's control, to subjugate everything, to superintend over all things and to be overlord of everything-all these meanings are comprehended in the root meaning of the letter Hr... that which draws everything towards itself. (p. 682)<sup>5</sup> The other letter



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is Da. In the word Hr-da-ya, Da is the second letter... Da connotes the meaning, 'to give' in Sanskrit. (p. 683)<sup>5</sup> The third letter is Ya of Hr-da-ya. In Sanskrit Ya means, "to go". (p. 684)<sup>6</sup> The obvious etymological significance, then, of the word "Hrdaya" is that it goes by drawing and giving. Monier-Williams in his Sanskrit—English Dictionary confirms Krishnananda's explanation of the three roots "Hr", "Da" and "Ya". Monier-Williams lists "to withdraw" as a specific meaning of the root "Hr". (p. 1302)<sup>9</sup> He lists giving, granting, offering, effecting, producing as meanings of the letter "Da". (p. 464)<sup>9</sup> "Ya" in the masculine, Monier-Williams says is a "goer or mover" and in the feminine, "Ya" means the act of going. (p. 838)<sup>9</sup>.

Given the fundamental precept of Hindu Philosophy that the Self is responsible for the three states of waking, dreaming and deep sleep, and the equally fundamental precept that the Self is located in the heart (hrdaya) the conclusion is inescapable that the heart (hrdaya) is the part of the brain that is responsible for drawing the individual into sleep and for waking him or her up again. The heart (hrdaya) goes by drawing and giving, that is to say it withdraws waking consciousness from the individual (draws him or her into sleep) and then it gives consciousness back to the individual at the time that it wakes the individual up (it produces a new waking consciousness). In order to locate the Self it is simply a matter of pinpointing the part of the brain that operates during our sleep.

There are many indications that the embryo in the womb is in a state of sleep. The state of "wakefulness" comes about after the state of sleep and depends upon the fetus being developed to the point where, at the end of the sixth month, its eyelids actually open. The part of the brain that operates during sleep is the embryo brain region. The adult sleeper must therefore be regarded as having reverted to the primary fetal state (the embryonic state). Mentally, the adult sleeper has returned to his mother's womb. This is reinforced by the many physical similarities between an embryo and an adult in the state of sleep that are too obvious to list here.

The specific neurophysiological and electroencephalographical indications that the embryo brain is in a state of sleep are as follows:

(a) We know that growth hormone is released from the pituitary gland specifically during the state of 'slow-wave' sleep. The pituitary gland in the embryo brain develops some thirty days after conception and commences to release growth hormone. In other words, 'slow-wave' sleep must be occurring for the growth hormone to be released.<sup>10</sup>



(b) The electroencephalogram picks up dysrhythmic low voltage brain wave activity as early as the second month of gestation.<sup>10</sup> This is consistent with 'slow-wave' sleep having commenced.

(c) Five weeks after conception the embryo will make an 'avoidance' type movement if the trigeminal nerve in its face is touched or stroked. It will even 'sneer' eight weeks after conception or 'scowl' eleven weeks after conception.<sup>11</sup> Such responses are consistent with the embryo being disturbed in its sleep.

(d) The part of the brain that is responsible for the transition from 'slow-wave' (NREM) sleep to dreaming (REM) sleep is located in the embryo brain region.<sup>12</sup>

(e) The neurotransmitter 'noradrenaline' which draws the individual into sleep comes from the embryo brain region.<sup>13</sup>

(f) The neurotransmitter 'dopamine' which wakes the brain from sleep comes from the embryo brain region.<sup>13</sup>

(g) There may also be a peptide neurotransmitter which is responsible for sleep, and although research data is not clear, larger concentrations of this substance have been located in the embryo brain region.<sup>14</sup>

(h) Another neuropeptide 'somatostatin', which releases or inhibits growth hormone, and is therefore very relevant to the sleeping process, has been traced to the embryo brain region.<sup>15</sup>

(i) Electroencephalography indicates that the "synchronizing" and 'desynchronizing' brain waves of the sleep-wakefulness cycle emanate from the embryo brain region.<sup>12</sup>

(j) In 1962 Jouvet suggested that the path responsible for sleep desynchronization (dreams) commences in the embryo brain region. Conversely the pathway responsible for the desynchronization observed during waking hours commences in the embryo brain region.<sup>12</sup>

The embryo brain consists of the thalamus, hypothalamus, midbrain and brain-stem. These are the specific areas of the brain that are discernible about five weeks after conception. As the brain grows and expands these areas remain the central core and guiding influence. It is mentioned in passing that the thalamus and hypothalamus comprise a part of the brain known as the diencephalon which also contains the pineal body. A special significance for this pineal body is not ruled out although there is little neurophysiological evidence as to its functions.

The hypothalamus is responsible for the states of being awake or asleep which are pivotal in our lives. It is said to organize, when electrically stimulated, total acts of aggression, timidity, mating and



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sexual behavior in animals. As to these last mentioned aspects, compare the content both of our dreams and our thoughts, where themes such as these regularly occur. In terms of human emotion we would talk of hatred, fear, love and desire. The hypothalamus apparently directs our mental processes from the very beginning, and is responsible for all our emotions. The hypothalamus is also considered responsible for the autonomic nervous system which directs all the myriad functions that take place in our body over which we have no conscious control—functions relating to circulation, respiration, digestion, excretion, regulation of body temperature and metabolism, regulation of water content, reproduction. The fact that the hypothalamus remains a relatively small area in the developed adult brain merely attests to its potency and to the fact that it was performing functions just as complex in the embryo period when it was very small indeed. Hence references in the Upanishads to the Self being of the size of a thumb or less. The entire embryo brain region in the adult brain is indeed about the size of a thumb. The hypothalamus itself has a rostrocaudal extent of about 10 mm.<sup>16</sup>

Compare the fact that the hypothalamus controls respiration with the passage in the Brhadaranyaka Upanishad, 'That which breathes by the breath is thy soul which is within every being. (3, 4, 1)' It is also known that the fetus in the womb practises breathing movements specifically during REM sleep.<sup>17</sup> Another factor indicating the workings of the Self in the embryo brain region, the source of respiration and dreams. Now he who, without stopping the respiration, goes upwards, moving about yet unmoving, dispels darkness, he is the Self.' (Maitri Upanishad II. 2)<sup>8</sup>

The thalamus has extensive connections with the higher regions of the brain and determines what will become conscious to us. Fibres from the thalamus are connected as well to neurones of the corticospinal tract, and so it controls all inputs to the central nervous system. gustatory, auditory, visual, and from the skin, the organs of balance, the bladder, the alimentary canal, the muscles and joints. The Upanishads speak about precisely these nerves emanating from the heart. Again when (this person) is fast asleep, when (he) knows nothing whatsoever (then) returning in the body with the seventy-two thousand nerves by name hita which proceed from the heart to all parts of the body, he sleeps.' (Brhadaranyaka Upanishad II i 19)<sup>5</sup>

By 5 months of gestation, increased brain wave activity is noted with onset of activity in the area around the thalamus.<sup>10</sup> This is consistent with the thalamus acting as a mediator or 'go-between' between the embryo brain and the higher regions of the fetus's brain that is by now substantially developed. And it is likewise consistent



with brain wave activity in the adult where there are 10/sec rhythmical brain waves that are considered to comprise a loop between the cortical regions and the thalamus.<sup>12</sup> There are a number of theories about the precise pathway that the loop takes but the concept of the thalamus as a 'go-between' is reinforced by Baron Adrian's observation that rhythmic thalamic activity persists even if substantial areas of the cortex are removed—indeed even if the whole cortex is removed! Further reinforcement comes from the theory that the thalamus acts as a central 'pacemaker' for cortical rhythmical activity, which implies that command signals from a small thalamic region are distributed to wide areas of the cortical mantle.<sup>12</sup>

The importance of the brain-stem is certainly on a par with the other areas of the embryo brain because a system of projections are in place here by the end of the embryo period (8 weeks) which influence the growth and development of the cortical (higher) regions. It is generally concerned with the states of arousal-sleeping, waking, relaxation, alertness, vigilance etc... Sensory input from the receptors does not reach the anatomical substrate of consciousness while we are asleep because of the operation of the brain-stem; if the input is urgent it awakens us.<sup>13</sup> The nerve that rises upward from the heart is their passage for moving (from the dream state to the waking state); it is like a hair split into a thousand parts. (Numerous) nerves of this body; called Hita are rooted in the heart.' (Brhadaranyaka Upanishad 4. 2. 3)<sup>4</sup> This Self (ie the subtle body) is surely in the heart. There are a hundred and one of the (chief) nerves. Each of them has a hundred (division). Each branch is divided into seventy-two thousand and sub-branches. Among them moves Vyana. (Prasna Upanishad III. 6).<sup>7</sup>

Neurones or nerve cells in the brain are a spherical medium enclosed within a surface membrane and containing a salt solution quite different from the surrounding medium. The composition of the external salt medium is similar to that of an ultrafiltrate of blood. Nerve fibres likewise contain an internal aqueous medium and lie in an external aqueous medium which corresponds again to an ultrafiltrate of the blood. (p. 20)<sup>18</sup> As the Chandogya Upanishad says, "Those that are these nerves of the heart are filled with subtle juices ..." (VIII. 6. 1).<sup>8</sup>

There are many clues in the Upanishads that the Self is located in the embryo brain region in the centre of the brain. For instance very often the Self is simply described as being located in the middle. After meditating on the Self seated in the middle (of the heart) like a lamp placed inside a vessel, of the size of a thumb and of the form of smokeless flame (the Self manifests himself) (Paingala Upanishad III.



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3) "All deities worship that adorable one, the seated in the middle, who pushes the prana upward and impels the apana inward. (Katha Upanishad II ii. 3) ...in the middle (between the two parts) there comes into being the divine person, the person with a thousand eyes, a thousand feet and a thousands arms....." (Subala Upanishad I. 1)<sup>8</sup> (between the two parts'-the two hemispheres of the brain) These would all appear to be clear references to the embryo brain region. 'Therein the individual soul who has established himself in the middle of the eyebrows.....' (Paingala Upanishad II. 8)<sup>8</sup> It so happens that the spot in the middle of the eyebrows the mystical third eye of Shiva, is directly in line with the embryo brain region in the middle of the brain.

We learn from neurophysiologists that when pieces of midbrain are isolated from the brain the cells continue to fire spontaneously and in a sustained manner.<sup>12</sup> By 'firing' is meant 'synapses' -the nerve cells acquire electrical properties. When one considers that by the fifth week after fertilization the embryo cranium is bulging with midbrain, and given the spontaneous nature of midbrain activity independently of the higher regions, it is apparent that we have a mental life from a very, very early age. This spontaneous firing of the midbrain is what the Brhadaranyaka Upanishad is referring to when it says, 'it thinks as it were, and quivers, as it were.' 'As in man the mind vibrates.....' (Mandukya Karika III; 30)<sup>7</sup> Krishnananda says, 'Even if there is a blazing sun in dream, it is the mind shining.' (p 519)<sup>5</sup> The midbrain 'shines' in the sense of spontaneous firing of nerve cells. 'As from a blazing fire sparks of like form issue forth by the thousands even so, many kinds of beings issue forth from the Immutable.....' (Mundaka Upanishad (II i 1)<sup>8</sup>

The fact that the midbrain is directly connected with the eyes is the clue that it is the source of dreams. The Maitri Upanishad tells us that 'The person who is in the eye, who abides in the right eye, he is Indra and his wife abides in the left eye..... There is a channel extending from the heart up to the eye and fairly fixed there. That is the channel which serves both of them, by being divided in two though but one.' (VII. 11) 'That is the eye in a man through which one sees in a dream.' (Vedic text p 52)<sup>7</sup> The visual pathway runs forward from the midbrain to the eyes and backwards from the midbrain to the visual cortex at the back of the brain. The visual pathway is indeed 'divided in two though but one' as the Maitri Upanishad says in order to serve both eyes. Dreams involve visual image and are therefore inextricably tied in with the visual pathway. Shankaracarya says, 'and then a man whose eyes are plucked out should not perceive blue, yellow, etc. in dream.' (Commentary on Aitareya Upanishad p 52)<sup>7</sup> This



is an allusion to the fact that only the color cone receptors in the retinae of the eyes can produce a color image in our dreams. It is apparent then that a dream image originates in the midbrain as an electrical impulse which then travels forwards to the eyes where the impulse is converted into a color image—this is why dreams always involve eye movement either rapid or non-rapid—and from the eye back along the visual pathway to the visual cortex where the image is actually registered. It is therefore understandable that brain wave patterns during REM sleep (desynchronized) are practically identical with those recorded during arousal.<sup>12</sup> The visual pathway comes into operation in both cases. Krishnananda says, 'As in dream, so in waking as in waking so in dream.' (p 521)<sup>5</sup> The midbrain 'thinks as it were, and quivers, as it were. For being one with dreams, it goes beyond this (waking) world.' (Brhadaranyaka Upanishad 4. 3. 7)<sup>4</sup>

'This is but the middle-part of the Self.' (Chandogya Upanishad V. 15. 2)<sup>3</sup> 'madhye asinam—sitting in the middle—sitting in the space inside the lotus of the heart, shining in the intellect as revealed knowledge'. (Shankaracarya's Commentary on the Katha Upanishad (p. 187)<sup>1</sup>. Abiding in the middle place, (man) sees both places, this and the place of the other world'. (Brhadaranyaka Upanishad 4.3.9)<sup>4</sup> It is submitted that in the midbrain is located the cosmic intelligence, Brahman, and Atman or the individual Self operates through the hypothalamus and thalamus as well as the brain stem. "The Supreme dwells in close fellowship with the individual Self in the cave of the human intelligence". (Rangaramanuja—quoted by Radhakrishnan p. 621)<sup>8</sup> There are dozens of similar references in the Upanishads to this 'guha', this secret place, this cavity, this cave in the intellect which is the akasha: space. "It is used as a name of the Supreme, because like space, Brahman has no body and is subtle". (Radhakrishnan p. 511)<sup>8</sup> There is literally a cavity or space associated with the midbrain. The fourth ventricle. A broad shallow rhomboid-shaped cavity that extends from the upper cervical spinal cord to the cerebral aqueduct of the midbrain. (p. 35)<sup>16</sup> "The fourth state, Turiya?..." the ether of the heart?... And it does arguably resemble the broad leaf of a lotus plant. In addition there is the central grey matter (grey perforating substance) of the midbrain which is also known as 'perforated space'. (. 198) <sup>8</sup>

That the embryo brain region is the location of the Self is consistent with the many references in the Upanishads to the Self being the 'seed', 'the source', 'the creator'. 'In a person, indeed, this one first becomes an embryo'. (Aitareya Upanishad II. i. 1)<sup>8</sup> 'It is the seed of all activity, that is to say, it is the state of deep sleep. That (mental state) is called jnanam, knowledge...' (Shankaracarya p. 392)<sup>7</sup>



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It is repeated that by the fifth week after fertilization the embryo cranium is bulging with midbrain that is firing spontaneously. This is the vital force. 'It is like that which is (known as) the flash of lightning, and It is also as though the eye winked'. (Kena Upanishad IV.)<sup>1</sup> 'The vital force enters into the womb along with the seed and it develops itself into the embryo and all the other limbs such as the eye, the ears and the rest manifest themselves subsequently'. (Sivananda p. 534)<sup>15</sup>.

'The desire is for knowing some special director of the mind.' (Ananda Giri) 'Who is that effulgent being who is the director of the mind and other organs towards their own objects, and how does he direct? (Shankaracarya's Commentary on Isha Upanishad p. 39)<sup>1</sup> He is all-pervasive, pure, bodiless, without would, without sinews, taintless, untouched by sin, omniscient, ruler of the mind, transcendent and self-existent. (Isha Upanishad 8)<sup>1</sup> This 'special director' this 'ruler' of the mind has to be the part of the brain that determines the growth and development of the whole brain, i.e. the embryo brain region.

"As the spider weaves out the web and again withdraws it, so the Jiva comes out to and goes back again to the wakeful and dreaming states respectively.' (Brahmopanishad p 62)<sup>6</sup> This reference to the Self being like a spider that casts out and withdraws its web occurs a number of times in the Upanishads. It is consistent with the Self being located in the hrdaya (heart) that goes by drawing and giving. It would appear to be an illustration of the way the Self lodged in the embryo brain region by means of the neurotransmitter, noradrenaline, draws the individual into sleep, and by means of the neurotransmitter, dopamine, wakes the individual up again. These neurotransmitters emanate from the embryo brain region in spider web pattern through the network of nerve channels in the brain. 'And when a man is about to wake up, they emanate-they proceed to their respective functions-from the mind itself just like the rays radiating from the sun. (Shankaracarya's Commentary on Prashna Upanishad p 452)<sup>7</sup>

We perceive an external world and function within it by virtue of the outer regions of the brain, and in particular the cerebral cortex. For instance the visual cortex acting on messages received from the retina of the eye forms an internal map of what is seen. The parietal lobes are responsible for providing us with 'body schema' information about the spatial properties of our own body. It therefore becomes easy to understand the references in the Upanishads to the upside down tree. 'With the root above and branches below (stands) this ancient fig tree. That (indeed) is the pure; that is Brahman. That indeed is called immortal. In it all the worlds rest and no one ever



goes beyond it.' (Katha Upanishad II. iii. 1)<sup>3</sup> The brain truly resembles a tree with the embryo brain region as its root and trunk and the cerebral hemispheres and cortex where the manifested world is registered as the branches. The root is 'above' in the sense that Brahman is located in the root. 'It is the self that is below'. (Chandogya Upanishad VII. 25. 2)<sup>4</sup> '...that One, the omniscient and transcendent—who is both para, high, as the cause, and avara, low, as the effect...' (Shankaracarya's Commentary on Mundaka Upanishad p. 139)<sup>5</sup> The tree branches 'downwards' in the sense that the cerebral cortex where the manifested world is located is the effect and is low. '...for this world is indeed lower...' (Brhadaranyaka Upanishad 3.1.8)

"Just as all spokes are fixed in the nave and the fellow of a chariot wheel even so are all beings, all gods, all worlds, all organs and all these (individual) selves fixed in the Self". (Brhadaranyaka Upanishad 2. 5. 15)<sup>6</sup> It doesn't take much imagination to envisage the brain as a section of a wheel. The embryo brain region in the middle is the hub or nave and the cerebral cortex is the circumference or fellow. "Within that (heart) in which are fixed the nerves like the spokes on the hub of a chariot wheel moves this aforesaid Self by becoming multiformed". (Mundaka Upanishad II. ii. 5)<sup>7</sup> Note the allusion is simply to the way the spokes are fixed in the hub; not to the Self being the hub of a complete wheel.

There are many references in the Upanishads to the Self being 'unborn'. This great, unborn soul is the same which abides as the intelligent (soul) in all living creatures, the same which abides as ether in the heart; in him it sleeps; it is the subduer of all, the Ruler of all, the sovereign lord of all beings'. (Brhadaranyaka Upanishad 4. 4. 22)<sup>8</sup> It is only when one grasps the significance of the sleeping state that the reference to the Self being unborn can be understood. From conception onwards the embryo is asleep and the adult sleeper reverts precisely to that embryonic state of mind. The Self is located in the embryo brain region and preserves its embryonic identity. It is in this sense that the Self is 'unborn.' When an adult goes to sleep he mentally reverts to his mother's womb. 'The talkers vouch indeed for the birth of that very unborn, positive entity. But how can a positive entity that is unborn and immortal undergo mortality?' (Mandukya Karika III. 20): '(The self) without being born (appears to be born in various ways), it follows that He is born on account of Maya alone.' (Mandukya Karika III. 24)<sup>9</sup> As Rg Veda says, 'It is the controller of the body, the unborn part, which survives death.' (X. 16. 4)

Finally, once one understands the significance of hrdaya as the embryonic region of the brain that draws the individual into sleep and wakes the individual up again, it becomes possible to understand the full meaning of the word 'satya'-truth. 'The gods adore even truth. The name of satya (truth) consists of three syllables. The first syllable is "Sa", the second syllable "Ti" and the third syllable "Ya". The first and the last syllables (Sa and Ya) are truth, the middle is falsehood (anrta) falsehood is on either side encompassed by truth. (Brhadaranyaka Upanishad 5. 5. 1)<sup>10</sup> This is an allusion to the sleeping-waking cycle. Truth, the Self, which withdraws into the hrdaya when we are asleep is the reality. When the Self gives us a waking cons-



## Inner Self Located

ciousness, that is the falsehood, the untruth. In other words, maya, the illusion of the manifested world. On again being drawn into the state of sleep we return to the reality. The truth is that Brahman is in the heart (hrdaya) and Brahman is the reality.

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## Myth and Miracle of Criminal Justice

J. Rajendran

OLD TESTAMENT—Book of Job “O that one might plead for a man with God, as a man pleadeth for his neighbour”.

So, one is pleading before God against the accuser of man-kind, saturn, that one is Jesus. He is appearing on the right side of God on the day of judgement and brings redemption to mankind, so he is a star of redemption for the entire mankind while saturn on the left.

Shakespeare—CYMBELINE —Act IV, S. II, line 247, 248:

“And though he came our enemy, remember  
He was paid for that, though mean and mighty, rotting  
Together, have one dust, yet reverence our foe was princely  
And though you took his life, as being a foe,  
Yet bury him as a prince”.

Bible, I. Timothy 2, 2-6:

- 2 “For kings, and for all that are in authority; that we may lead a quiet and peaceable life in all godliness and honesty.
- 3 For this is good and acceptable in the sight of God our Saviour;
- 4 Who will have all men to be saved, and to come unto the knowledge of the truth.
- 5 For there is one God, and one mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus;
- 6 Who gave himself a ransom for all, to be testified in due time”.

‘Supplications and prayers’, ‘inter cessions’ and ‘inter-cessory prayers’ or prayers sans intermission’ is contemplated here. All the laws are only prayers or only inter cessory prayers which is done by Jesus before God. This is being carried away by advocates in the Court of Law on earth. This is my whole basis of this thesis. The forms of address is unknown to Old Testament. This is unique in New Testament alone and this universal prayers is towards a definite purpose of man’s salvation from their sins. There can not be a break



in this prayer. The continuous prayer can be understood in the sessions practice: when a case is taken up for trial there should not be a break.

(a) Bible—Philippians, 4 (6):

“Be careful for nothing but in every thing by prayer and supplication with thanks giving let your requests be made known unto God”.

(b) I Timothy (2) 1

“First of all supplications prayers, inter sessions and giving of thanks, be made for all men”.

“Sessions” is the divine word. Parliamentary proceedings are also called “sessions”. The presiding officer in the session is God Himself. Before him the sins of the individuals are represented. They are redeemed and are given their final salvation. The sinner has to be delivered from his sins. The process of that delivery would be,

1 Propitiation,

2 Redemption,

3 Justification,

4 Sanctification,

5 Glorification

and the final end leads to,

6 Salvation of the Soul.

It is a very complicated process. It is the divine function carried on by Jesus in Heaven and the same work is purported to be or deemed to be carried on by courts, with all sanctity, paraphernalia and with divine order. This is illustrated in the following quotations:

II Timothy I (10):

“But is now made manifest by the appearing of our Saviour Jesus Christ, who hath abolished death, and hath brought life and immortality to light through the gospel”

II Timothy 4: (18):

“And the lord shall deliver me from every evil work”

Romans 8 (30):

“Whom he did predestinate them he also called: and whom he called, them he also justified and whom he justified, them he also glorified”

(This is Justice. I will deal with it in a separate chapter).

Shakespeare—LOVES LABOUR'S LOST

—Act V, S.II 745-750:

“Loves arguement is on foot for what it purposed”.

For what it purposed? The purpose of the argument in the court or the purpose of law is to bring salvation to mankind. Law is the



blue plan of God for the salvation of mankind. The mere appearance of Jesus before God is the definite sign of the human redemption once and for all. This is carried on in the courts on earth under the principle (that is) establishment of heaven on earth or earth is turned into heaven.

Mathew 6 (10):

"Thy kingdom come. They will be done in earth as it is in heaven"

So, propitiation leads to glorification finally this is nothing but self sacrifice of Jesus. Candle is the symbol for self-sacrifice. It dies itself, die to live and live to die are all the principles to be understood in their proper perspectives.

In this context, I want to make a distinction between Roman Law and the Law of Jesus. The Law of Jesus is the Law of love and it is an universal law. I will make complete distinctions in a separate discourse on this topic later on.

The kingdom of heaven has to be established on earth. This is the greatest message given to the world. This is also a great secret to be understood and bear in mind by each and every one who have to live in spirit but not in flesh.

"Son in law".

This is also an another secret. There is son, Jesus, in Law. This is the hidden secret. The manifestation of God or the Trinities is meant by this. This could be understood only by living in spirit.

"The Secrecy of the office"

and "The oath of allegiance"

are non but the secret of the manifestation of Jesus in Trinity in Law and allegiance to such Trinities under perfect oath.

So Jesus is the fountain of law. By Jesus, For Jesus, and Of Jesus the law has to survive. It is law of Jesus, law by Jesus and law for Jesus. Now I will give the relevant quotation from the Bible.

II Timothy I (10):

"But is now made manifest by the appearing of our Saviour Jesus Christ".

II Timothy I (6) to (10):

"Manifest—Law of Life—Law of manifestation".

Galations 3 (24):

"The law was our school master to bring us unto Christ, that we might be justified by faith".

Shakespeare...TH

—Act IV, S. I.

ERCHANT OF VENICE

6;



"For it appears. By manifest proceeding...  
Down, therefore and beg mercy of the duke".

So the law of Jesus is the legal system wherein there is the manifestation of God in Trinities. This is the greatest secret without understanding of which there will be only chaos and confusion or in other words the devil's rule will be the order.

TOYNBEE

Toynbee in his study of history has explained what is law. He says law is a revelation vouchsafed by God. The Sanction of Law is not human enforcement but only divine retribution. Law is the passport to salvation. It brings punishments upon transgressors. Toynbee also gives a quotation from some other preface to the II edition of the 'Roman Law' Book...

"The experience by which our Majesty has been aroused and stimulated to be stirred itself to retrieve and proclaim the good world saving law with the utmost zeal and utmost care is what we can only describe as our initiation in the secret chambers of the heart by the divine intervention of the 'Trinity in Unity'".

—page 61 'Study of History'.

I have strengthened my argument with this quotation, even though I find no other explanation even in Toynbee or in any other book.



## Book-Reviews :

**Anthony Giddens ;** *Social Theory and Modern Sociology*, Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1987, pp. ix+310, \$35.00 cloth, \$ 12.95 paper.

This is an interesting and significant collection of papers by one of the leading theorists in the field of sociology. Of the twelve chapters, eight originated as lectures given in various parts of the world during the mid 1980's. Although ranging across several topics, the work contains a unifying theme that extends from Giddens' definition of sociology as the systematic study of the social world "brought about by the advent of modernization" (viii). Early in the work, Giddens reflects a peculiarly British pessimism and concern with the state of sociology in that country and with the demise of sociology departments. As Philip Abrams reported in a 1981 paper entitled, "The Collapse of British Sociology?", sociologists have been under attack because of a perceived radicalism. Giddens notes that the field is imaged as a "shaggy horde pouring over the barricades..." (p. 2). Thus, Giddens begins his book with the rhetorical question, "What do sociologists do?" The response to the question occupies much of his first chapter and reveals a position in sociology that was suggested by Abrams, and one that appears to be gaining acceptance on both sides of the Atlantic, namely, the application of sociological knowledge. Giddens proposes that the mission of sociology is to "recapture the early optimism of its forebearers and to influence a better human condition" (p. 17) through "instrumental involvement" (p. 44). In the final analysis, to Giddens, "Social problems are in a fundamental sense sociological" (p. 17). and by implication are problems of modernity. In his most interesting and potentially influential second chapter, Giddens presents nine theses on the future of sociology (p. 23). What he offers is, "an endeavor modestly to influence the future of sociology" (p. 26). Of these theses, five stand out. His second thesis anticipates that a theoretical synthesis will emerge, although sociology may not overcome the reality of the "double hermeneutic" (p. 30). Giddens sees a new synthesis that will involve agency and will reject the determinism suggested by the "orthodox consensus." Yet curiously, the synthesis "will accept institutional constraints on individual action" (p. 32); Thesis four deals with the significance of world—system which, to Giddens, will substantially alter the way social scientists will view social relations and institutions (p. 34). Thesis five suggests that disciplinary divisions within the social sciences will become less sharply defined" (p. 37). In thesis six. Giddens argues against an empirically oriented and mid-



## Book-Reviews :

range approach to sociology which fails to capture the large-scale processes of social transformation (p. 43). Giddens writes, "I want unashamedly to reclaim for sociology the grand questions" (p. 42). In Giddens' most dramatic thesis (number seven), he proposes "The deepening involvement of sociology with practical social policies ....." (p. 44), and proposes a "dialogical model" for sociologists that will influence public policy as a "partner" (p. 46). Thus, research questions are to be based on open communication with those affected by the issues. Giddens devotes his fifth chapter to the work of Goffman whom he regards as a "major social theorist." (p. 109). He defends Goffman against critics who point to his idiosyncratic observations and lack of empirical backing (p. 109). In defense of Goffman, Giddens points out that one has to "unearth the systematic approach to the study of social life developed by Goffman" (p. 110). In recent years, Giddens has written about several concepts that follow from Goffman's ideas on region behavior. Giddens writes, for example, of "time-space" time-geography", and "situated contexts of action. "In his informative sixth chapter on time and social organization, Giddens, once again, pursues the implications of what he calls "spaciality", or the spatial organization of social life (p. 146). In this chapter, Giddens introduces a "theory of social organization" that is meant to be an alternative way of looking at social organization that focuses on the above concepts. Particularly interesting is his discussion of time and space within the context of modernity. He points out how the regulation of workers and the development of worker discipline is related to what Foucault calls "an architecture of power" (p. 153). That is, buildings become "power containers" (p. 157) that provide efficient surveillance and supervision through sequestering of workers. Chapter eight is a discussion of the relation of social theory and the field of economics, and Giddens notes an apparent convergence between the two disciplines (p. 184). Two themes are described in the development of economics since the 1970's. Mainstream economics had its own version of "orthodox consensus" which was heavily deterministic and assumed high predictability and control through "demand management" (p. 188). Recently, however, there developed the theory of "rational expectations" (p. 186) which involves the rationality of actors who used information to guide their economic decisions. Giddens writes that while this resembles the old "economic man" concept, the focus now theoretically is on the "reflexivity" of actors in economic thinking (p. 195). One consequence of this theoretical approach was the introduction of a high degree of unpredictability and unanticipated events (194). Giddens sees this current dilemma in economics as providing an opportunity to connect "rational



expectations theory" to microsociological theories. Giddens' interest in history appears in his ninth chapter based on the work of E. P. Thompson, an historian known for "writing history from the bottom up" (p. 204). Thompson makes use of a "dialectical reasoning" (p. 209) to show that historians have largely ignored the importance of agency, particularly in early industrialism. In the development of early industrialism, Thompson notes, "the working class made itself as much as it was made" (p. 206). Giddens places his discussion of Thompson within the context of sociological theory which argues for the recognition of agency while recognizing a degree of structural constraint (p. 219). Chapter eleven is an interesting discussion of Gouldner's primary works sprinkled with biographical notes. Considerable attention is given Gouldner's treatment of Marx, particularly in *THE TWO MARXISMS* which Giddens both praises and criticizes. Giddens describes Gouldner's explanation of "scientific Marxism" and "critical Marxism" as providing a legacy for sociologists who would turn to Marx for ideas (p. 258). In keeping with the theme on modernity, Giddens points to Gouldner's discussion of the "New Class" of intellectuals as an extension of economic development (i.e. money capital produces "culture capital" (p. 263).

Giddens' final chapter is based on Andre Gorz's work on the working class in contemporary industrial societies. Gorz's thesis is that, through a "revolutionary transformation of capitalism", the working class is effectively being done away with (p. 275). and is being replaced by a "non-class of non-workers" or what he calls a "neo-proletariat". Alongside this type is a proletariat consisting of workers who are characterized by their low pay, lack of union protection, and no class identity (p. 279). While Giddens feels that Gorz is premature in claiming that a "dual society" exists of workers and unemployed, he does acknowledge that the impact of technology on the working class has become a major problem.

Other chapters that will interest readers cover Habermas' theory of communicative action, nation-states and violence, the relation of philosophy and social theory, and structuralism. One might have wished for a concluding chapter that summarizes the many valuable ideas contained in this work. The book is strongly recommended for anyone interested in an overview of some of the important issues in social theory being discussed today. While all students of the social sciences should read the work, it is a "must" for advanced undergraduates and graduate students in sociology.

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## Book-Reviews :

**Dr. R. N. Vyas :** *Religion, Devotion and the Acharyas*, p. 160, Price Rs. 150/-, Amar Prakashan, New Delhi.

The present work has eight chapters. The first chapter throws light on the nature of religion. It offers a very rational view of religion. The superficial view about religion has been discarded and a plea has been made to accept the term in its right connotation.

From second to seven chapters the views of the Bhagavata, Shankara, Ramanuja and Vallabha in this context has been lucidly presented and an inter relation between devotion and the knowledge has been pointed out. It has been concluded "Some people may think that the ultimate aim of spiritual emancipation cannot be gained through devotion; only path of knowledge can bring emancipation. But this is not a tenable view". In the last chapter an integral nature of spiritual attainment has been presented. The author has rightly stated. "It is wrong to think that religion should be kept in the confines of temples and churches, and in practical life one is free to set in an irreligious way. Religion must rule the whole life and not a mere part of life. One's love for the Lord must manifest itself in all the acts".

The book reveals that the author has quite competently tried to present the right image of religion so that the superstitions and wrong notions about religion may be destroyed. The world specially India needs the works like the present one so that real face of religion may be un-veiled.

Dr. Vyas has a number of published works to his credit. The present work is a good contribution to the literature of religion and philosophy and a timely academic help to evolving pattern of human society.

**Ambalal Govind Ram Dave :** *Bhautiki Aur Darshan*, p. 173, Goel Stationers, Moradabad.

In 1909 A.D., Max Plank, the famous Physicist of Germany brought into light, a new system of nature's working, and he propounded the famous quantum theory. Apart this, the inner construction of atom also came to be known. Electrons together with many types of light particles were studied and it was found that their working was independent and did not confirm to any natural law. Man knew that every particle of matter confines itself to certain natural law and because of this, the universe was thought to be a machine. These strict natural laws of nature were considered by the scientist, so rigid and without exception that it was beyond imagination to think even of any exception. Therefore these natural laws were considered as dead-rigid upto 19th century.



In 20th century the conception of higher dimensions also came to be known. There are higher dimensions to the dimensions in which man lives. This is perhaps the reason that man can not have any idea about that mind. These dimensions have put forward a new knowledge of man but this knowledge itself is the limit of knowledge which man has advanced too. In this century the science of physics progressed so much, that it came to know the limits of its own knowledge. As three dimensions are photographed in two dimensions, in that very way perhaps, some higher dimensions are projected in three dimensions in our world. The helplessness and inability of man to day is some what similar to a limited earthen pot, which can not fill in itself the whole of portion. On this, Shri Ambalal Govind Ram Dave, a great knower of *Bhartiya Jyotish*, has put in his book *Bhautiki Aur Darshan* a new philosophy of *Viteen Darshan* in cognition style and strengthened his arguments by mathematical thinking.

Shri Dave has a very deep study of natural laws in the background of modern physics and as a result of this study it has been possible to understand human being in terms of natural laws, and also to define as to what is *Karma*. This study has abolished the difference between living and dead. In this book matter and events have been explained in this very context; intelligence, mind, *Karma-Pind* etc. have been thoroughly analysed and fresh light has been thrown on them.

It has been possible to draw the diagram of man's *Sookshma Shareer* (inside of being) like the diagram of the atom's interior. Death and *Samadhi* have come in new light. The difference between *Vigyan* and science has been brought out. Electron, about which the scientist will never be able to know, whether it is particle or wave, or both, or nothing have been shown speaking by Shri Dave in cognition style.

The knowledge of natural laws possessed by man, or can possess—Electron perhaps is beyond them. In the end of this book Shri Dave has written that in 20th century it is the small material particle—Electron which has for the first time pointed out towards the eternal intelligence. The philosopher has been shown as hearing the electron so that the future philosophical activities may be possible as based on this new position of Electron.

Shri Dave has given for the first time a scientific and mathematical definition of *Karma* and the diagram of *Sookshma Shareer* of man.

In this sense Shri Dave's, contribution in this book *Bhautiki Aur Darshan* is a unique contribution in the realm of modern science, *Vigyan* and Indian philosophical thinking.

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## I

## Science History and Philosophy

D. P. Chattopadhyaya

History breathes life into science.<sup>1</sup> History is the life-breath not only of science but, rightly understood, also of philosophy.<sup>2</sup> The days are gone by when the spirit of Enlightenment induced many to believe in the finality of science of the time and the infallibility of philosophy. The true science, born of self-critical abilities of man, is continuously engaged in tracing the historical course and the human roots of both science and philosophy<sup>3</sup>. When man stops interrogating his own abilities underlying his cognitive achievements, he tends to become socially stagnant or intellectually dogmatic or both. Self-reflection and self-interrogation are, at times, induced by the problems, both theoretic and practical, of man's own life-situation. The life-situation need not be necessarily construed from without.<sup>4</sup> Man's lived life often proves to be his Other, making it necessary for him to think of what he is doing and having. The Self/Other duality accounts for our self-critical, creative history.

I am aware that the above assertions of mine are based on a number of assumptions and certain definitions of science, philosophy and history. This is a situation which one cannot help. Presuppositionless assertions and totally "indefinite" dialogue are not humanly available. Non-disclosure of the presuppositions of most of our assertions leads many of us to believe that some of our statements are indeed *pictures* of the "concerned" states of affairs.<sup>5</sup> Scrutiny, however, reveals that neither we nor our statements stand completely disclosed—requiring no further exploration or interpretation. This ever incomplete nature of our self-disclosure accounts for the endless process of our history, of what we think, and of what we do.

To what is due this incompleteness or lack of finality of science? Wherein does, then, lie the proclaimed superiority of the scientific mode of knowledge? Is it merely an empty, fashionable slogan? With-

President's Address, Indian Philosophical Congress, Srinagar, 1987.



out belittling or overrating the dignity of science, the questions have to be closely looked into.

Instead of opting for this or that definition of science, it would be perhaps, more advisable to describe the characteristics and the career of science. There was a time when science was hardly distinguishable from philosophy. Almost all ancient philosophers were scientists of a sort. Most scientists were philosophical in their orientation. They were conscious of what they were doing. Like the economic division of labour, the intellectual one too has largely been the outcome of the needs for specialisation.

Placed in nature and interrogated by its forces, man is objectively obliged to look more and more closely into the secrets of nature. Contrary to the popular belief, the Book of Nature is not open to the uninitiated. Even to the initiated, it is only partially open. Nor do the secrets contained in it are disclosed to him.<sup>7</sup> The secrets of nature are twofold-micro and macro. The authors of the ancient treatises of medicine, for example, are found to be knowledgeable not only in medicine but also in ecology and philosophy.

Until very recently, there were no borderline disciplines like bio-chemistry and bio-physics. Within the broad scope of physics one finds today so many branches indicating the imperative of specialisation. This does not mean that the issues studied within the scope of specialised or borderline disciplines were not at all known in the past. What I wish to suggest is that the social and cognitive needs of specialisation were not felt as acutely then as now.<sup>8</sup>

Knowledge begets knowledge.<sup>9</sup> The quest for knowledge brings new problems to the fore and, in the process of solving them, the scientist gets into the deeper secrets of nature, acquires new knowledge for himself and shares the same with us, the public. Need begets need.<sup>10</sup> In the quest for fulfilment of our needs, we search for new science and new technology. That is, we create demands for additional investment of our intellectual and other resources for the production of scientific knowledge and technology. It is in response to our increasing social needs that more investment comes forth for science and its practical application.

In response to changing socio-historical needs, the different systems of Indian philosophy interpreted the Vedas not only in terms that differ from each other but even in those that clearly contradict each other. From the same New Testament how many diverse sects of Christianity have emerged! Has not Marxism in our own time lent itself to different and rival interpretations? All these are sought to be plausibly explained in terms of different socio-historical needs leading to creative and dialectical hermeneutics.<sup>11</sup>



## Science History and Philosophy

Needs, broadly speaking, have two aspects—(a) creative and positive, and (b) alienative and negative. When partial fulfilment of our cognitive needs motivates us to enlarge our knowledge or cognition, it is welcome. When knowledge in practice reduces human suffering, the additional needs this Knowledge creates for us are equally welcome. But in a stratified, if not a fragmented, society, where we get exclusively concerned with our own sectarian or highly private needs, we tend to deny, wittingly or unwittingly, others the means to satisfy their own needs which are not congruent with ours. Fastened to our own needs, we get alienated from and become objectively opposed to others' needs. In the process we harm the social cohesion.

A comparable situation develops also in the field of science. The need of science has been differently interpreted. Some are of the view that science is knowledge, pure and simple. It enables us to know ourselves better; it gives us a clearer picture of our environment, natural and cultural; and it defines better our position in relation to the world at large. But this very general and attractive view of science has met with opposition from many quarters. For example, it has been said that science is a camouflaged ideology; that its claim to objectivity is sham; and that in a class-ridden society it, like all other forms of knowledge, is used to serve the needs of the ruling groups.<sup>12</sup> Another view of science likens it to a highly specialised human construction of nature.<sup>13</sup> It is basically 'constructive', i.e., selective and eliminative, and not descriptive, as it is often claimed to be. If man is said to be in his science, what it means is this. The models in terms of which the information of the world is organised systematised and tested are human contrivances, reflective or expressive of man's own needs and purposes. If this view of science is accepted, it is difficult to deny its secret presence in other views as well. Complete de-humanisation or objectification of science seems to be an impossibility.<sup>14</sup> In that case the element of alienation which is said to be there in science as ideology or even in science as an ideal picture of the world-with-man-in-it turns out to be partial or qualified, i.e. not total.

There is an inner tension in the very scope of science itself. On the one hand, it is required to go into the micro details of reality, human as well as natural. At the same time, it is led to the world at large through the human route and to man through the worldly route. Man's situation in the world is such that the scientist cannot grasp the former's true identity, ignoring his place in the world. Nor can the scientist adequately understand the world leaving man totally out of the picture.<sup>15</sup> The higher reaches of physics—macro-physics or cosmology, come engagingly close to philosophy. This is a well-



known and very old story borne out by the history of science. Though all the theorems of macro-physics cannot be logically derived from those of micro-physics and the converse, their close relation, if not unity, can hardly be denied. The behaviour of sub-atomic particles might not be satisfactorily accounted for by the two-valued logic and the causal laws of the general theory of relativity, but that does not methodologically oblige us to abandon the research programme for trying to see scientifically the world as a whole, as a unity.

To start with, I have said that history breathes life both into science and into philosophy. Now when we see that science and philosophy are interlocked in a "love-and-hate" relationship, in a conflict-cooperative situation, how do we define the connection between history, on the one hand, and science and philosophy, on the other? Before I attempt to answer the question, let me briefly spell out the implications of the question itself. If science and philosophy are coordinate species of knowledge and equally ideological in their character, how does history get into them and to what extent? Must we take philosophy as an interpretation of the world or of the world-views found in science (s)? The problem of answering the question becomes acute if it is assumed that history itself is ideology-loaded.<sup>16</sup>

According to some thinkers, sciences, in general, and the physical sciences, in particular, are close to the material conditions of life and, therefore, their ideological load is minimal. Human sciences, because of their relative distance from their material base, are said to be thick in their ideological content. In between the physical sciences, on the one hand, and the human ones, on the other, one finds life sciences. Ethics, religion and fine arts are put at the apex of the pyramid of cultural products of man. This view has often been ascribed to Marx and his followers. Judged by the logic of the formation of this pyramid, even utopias are claimed to be sociologically rooted, despite their remote distance from their sociological origins, i.e., the material conditions of living.<sup>17</sup>

Philosophy, because of its abstract and seemingly rootless character, is often placed at the apex of the pyramid together with religion and ethics. This placement of philosophy is certainly not complimentary. When philosophy is not accountable to the ground-level scientific findings, it tends to be not only fanciful and alienated from the life-conditions but also suppressive of its own fancifulness and alienation.<sup>18</sup> As an intellectual commodity, it suffers from its inherent fetishism.

It is clear that many philosophers are not prepared to accept this critical view about philosophy. They find in it a noble emanci-



pation from the noisy details of different and specialised sciences. Besides, they find in philosophy a critique of scientific conclusions. Implicit here are the assumptions (a) that science *qua* science is neither self-reflective nor self-critical and, (b) that it is only in and through philosophy that science knows what it is all about, including its aims and limitations.<sup>19</sup>

Some adherents of the second view are in favour of regarding philosophy itself as a rigorous science, a sort of super-science. They claim to have found in it the contentual richness of all special sciences and, additionally, their connective and supportive principles. In philosophy, as science, details are only promised and not shown. Special emphasis is attached to the over-arching or transcendental principles purported to justify the fleeting details of different sciences.<sup>20</sup>

I like to make one thing very plain at this stage. Like every philosopher, I am also provisionally committed to a particular point of view. I say "provisionally" because the *anthropological rationalist* point of view, to which I feel committed, is not an uncritical or dogmatic commitment.<sup>21</sup> In the face of every possible criticism against me and my view, I do not feel obliged to take defensive refuge in or retreat into the said commitment. The transcendental view of philosophy, to which I made a brief reference, is obviously not my own view. But its conceptual and historical lineage is well known, both in the East and the West. The efforts to portray philosophy as science, preferably a super-science, is neither new nor peculiar to a particular culture. In its most general form, it turns out to be a transcendental philosophy of Being. Its main anti-thesis or enemy, declared or undeclared, is the experiential philosophy of Becoming, to use again a very general expression.

The reason for this age-old epic battle between these two camps of philosophy cannot be understood unless the issues involved are indicated. To be fair to the transcendentalist, it has to be admitted that he is not totally unmindful of the fleeting details of science recorded in the history of science. His main anxiety is that if philosophy is required to be answerable to the details of the history of science, it fails to be rigorous and is sure to be bogged down, if not lost, in the swamp of relativism and scepticism.<sup>22</sup> The point to be noted here, in minimum fairness to the empiricist-historist, is that he is not sold out either to scepticism or to relativism. He is also anxious to be fair to the demands of realism. He wants to remain accountable to the so-called fleeting facts of the history of science without any commitment to unquestionable transcendental principles.

All relativists should not be branded as sceptics. There are many respectable relativists who disclaim their relation with scepticism. To



them, non-availability of *absolute* knowledge, if any, is not a matter of shame or remorse.<sup>23</sup> Man is, by his very nature, said to be related to a social milieu and limited in his physical and mental capacities. Therefore, the relativist argues, whatever is created by man—institutions, theory or argument—, is only relatively valid. But there is nothing wrong in this sort of relativity. It is essentially symbolic of the humanness of what is thus created by human beings.

Notwithstanding this disclaimer and clarification, the so-called rationalist aims at attaining absolute knowledge whose truth-value is eternally attached to it. The defender of this ambitious programme is determined to bracket relativism with scepticism. Whichever piece of knowledge is relatively true is said to be dubious in principle. Truth-values are ascribed only to propositions, which, as abstract logical entities, are not themselves subject to historical mutation. But when we are forced to determine or answer the question of truth or otherwise of scientific statements, we cannot avoid the semantic aspect of truth. We are obliged to explore and, if possible, ascertain the relation between logical propositions and linguistic statements or sentences. The attending difficulties are not easy to solve. And it is no surprise that many philosophers prefer the vocabulary of sentence and statement to that of proposition. Indirectly this may be construed as a concession to the advisability of the historical approach to the whole question of truth.

To fend off the twin ghosts of relativism and scepticism at least three different strategies are available. First, a strong *correspondence* theory of knowledge coupled with a totally *objective* view of knowledge. The defender of this strategy argues (a) that knowledge has nothing to do with its human origin, and (b) that its validity or truth-value is a matter of correspondence between the statement of object and the meta-linguistic name of that statement.<sup>24</sup> Secondly, the *transcendental* strategy tries to show that empirical or scientific statements, unless backed up by some abiding principle (s), cannot stand on their own and are rendered invalid by infirming new historical findings. Here also an implicit theory of type is invoked.<sup>25</sup> The lower-level statements of science are made dependent upon the higher-level or the transcendental-level statements of principles. In order to make both (a) and (b), the said two strategies, some plausible "coordinating" or "bridging principles" are logically called for. Since it is not easy to spell out the characters of the said connecting principles, some philosophers come forward with a third strategy. The proponents of this strategy draw a sharp line of distinction, at times even of division, between "the empirical" and "the transcendental". They ascribe "lower-level" reality and "transient" truth-



values to "the empirical" and "higher-level" reality and "permanent" truth-values to "the transcendental". The names of Sankara, Kant and K. C. Bhattacharyya are often associated with this strategy.<sup>27</sup>

The main difficulty of the first strategy is that in its bid to de-historise knowledge it denies the relevance of man and his critical appraisal in the context of truth-value ascertainment. De-historisation entails de-humanisation of knowledge. Secondly, when truth is said to be language-bound, the question of recursive definition of the terms figuring in truth-claiming sentences becomes logically necessary. Under certain conditions, in formal mathematical languages recursive definitions are available. But the availability of recursive definitions in natural languages is yet a chimera. The problem attending the relation between natural language and its meta-language remains unresolved.<sup>28</sup> This seems to me the outcome of the problem of how to relate historical change in the terms of languages in which we frame and formulate our knowledge and the "corresponding" meta-language which is logically constructed and artificially insulated from the ravages of time.

The second strategy owes its origin to the fear of epistemological relativism and the anxiety to get out of it. The "materials" of knowledge admittedly require some "rules of synthesis" or organising principles. Compared to the former, the latter are bound to be transcendental. Transcendentalism, like empiricism, is a matter of degree.<sup>29</sup> Imagination transcends perception; understanding transcends imagination; and one can well conceive of transcendental thought which is beyond understanding and before which understanding itself may stand as object of investigation and reflection. But none of these steps or stages of cognitive journey can be shown as transcendental in a terminal or final sense. If, on the one hand, the transcendental principle is quite unlike the empirical materials which it is called upon to synthesise or organise as knowledge, it cannot perform its duty. If, on the other, it is like the empirical materials, its historical fortune cannot be very unlike that of the latter. It is in this connection that one is reminded of the wisdom underlying the Leibnizian law of continuity, *Lex continuum*, connecting perception with apperception.<sup>30</sup> Leibniz's professional familiarity with history helped him to skirt the pitfalls of abstract rationalism which afflicted Kant, who was basically anti-historical.

The empirical has its compulsive or undeniable effect on the scientist<sup>31</sup>. But when he as philosopher tries to explain it, he feels unhappy with the historical or the growing character of science. Somehow uncritically committed to the notion of knowledge with fixed truth-values, he does not know how to get out of the dilemma. His



scientific sense recognises the history of scientific knowledge. But his transcendental-philosophical sense goads him to stick to the notion of permanent or enduring knowledge. He wants to get out of the dilemma by drawing a mysterious unspeakable cut-off line between the realm of science and super-science, between *opara vidya* and *para vidya*.

The main point to be noted here is that the term "knowledge" may be taken in two different senses, epistemic and ontic.<sup>32</sup> Epistemic knowledge obviously is of this or that person, at least to start with. But ontic knowledge is an entity which may be discussed or even understood without reference to the life of this or that person. The distinction between the epistemic and the ontic is like that between the process and the product. True, *episteme*—valid knowledge, may be taken as something quite different from the process making it possible and, therefore, self-contained. But the very possibility of this method is being questioned. What in effect is being questioned is also the advisability or rationality of this method sharply dividing the process from the product. The bogey of *psychologism* underlying this ill-advised method of sharply drawing a cut-off line between the ontic and the epistemic is due either to a sort of Platonism or a sort of logicism or both. There is nothing particularly wrong with the psychological process of knowing—the process of acquisition of knowledge. In the name of Platonism or logicism what had been excluded from epistemology in the past has now come back either through cognitive psychology or philosophy of language. Much of the task of the traditional epistemology is now being gradually taken over by the cognitive psychologists or the philosophers of language. Like the forms of fashion, fashion of philosophising also change—but the substantive issues of knowledge remain.<sup>33</sup>

Fuller implication of knowledge, be that scientific or philosophical, can hardly be grasped without perusing its underlying *historical-character*. A product of history, man is at the same time its producer. Man as a product and producer of history is to be understood in his social relations with other fellow men. Whatever man produces bears the imprint of his being—historical being. What prompts man to know is not a matter purely of his private concern. His cognitive modification is rooted in some needs, some of which are more personalised in nature and some others more socialised in nature. In fact, man's cognitive enterprises are problem-oriented. Every act of cognition, rightly scrutinised, is found to be an attempt to solve some problem or the other. The aids, material and conceptual, needed to solve problems are in most cases borrowed, i.e., social, and not privately invented.



Language, for example, is a basic institutional aid for grasping the nature of a problem. Man is required to have also non-linguistic competences for correctly understanding the problems. Even social co-operation is necessary for arriving at a decision regarding the correctness or otherwise of suggested solutions of problems. Through language and other communicative means we not only share and form concepts concerning epistemological problems and their possible solution but also socially act together preventing the emergence of other sorts of problems.<sup>34</sup> The sociological aspect of epistemology is often forgotten or deliberately kept outside the concerned discourse because of its alleged awkward character or, what is more likely, its methodological inadequacy to do justice to the problem of knowledge.

I raise the question of Sociology of Knowledge not so much in "the context of validation" as in "the context of discovery".<sup>35</sup> Sociology is synchronic history. And history is diachronic sociology. Without de-sociologising knowledge, we cannot de-historise it. And without de-historising knowledge we cannot de-sociologise it. It is from this standpoint that one has to look closely into the history of both science and philosophy. In fact, as I said earlier, history is the life-breath of both.

The term "life-breath" is more than a metaphor. The main signs of life are birth, growth, decay and eventual death. History of culture or any sub-culture, like science, knows no literal birth or death. Certain conditions making birth of science possible precede its identifiable emergence. Similarly, the so-called death of science leaves some traces to be identified in the subsequent history of science. We do not know of any science which neither grows nor decays. Even in the curve of scientific growth there are marks of occasional regressive shifts.<sup>36</sup> In other words, history of science is not history of uninterrupted growth. Interruption or stagnation need not necessarily be taken as signs of decay. When a paradigm or a cluster of paradigms of science encounter very disturbing or disconfirming evidences, its defenders are bound to pause and ponder. A scientific theory, which can survive the test of all possible evidences, is not taken seriously. If a theory is not disconfirmable in any way, its confirmation is of little consequence. Confirmation which is merely additive in character with no test-content is of little scientific significance. It is for this reason that history of science exhibits clearly a visible sign of life, i.e. growth.

Another reason why this sign is visible is this. Scientific theories, somewhat unlike the philosophical ones, are addressed to *specific*



problems. This specificity of problems calls for specific theories for a possible solution of those problems. Theories may be specific because of the *limitation* of their scope or, as is the case with higher-level theoretical physics or cosmology, because of the specifiability of their boundary conditions. The specific theories which are not specific either in terms of their initial conditions or in terms of their boundary conditions are hardly testable and growing in character. They may be accepted or abandoned as a matter of taste or choice. The question of their establishment or dis-establishment in terms of experiential tests is not possible. Primarily for this reason, scientific theories are identified mainly in terms of their specificity and growth.<sup>37</sup>

When these criteria are applied to the history of philosophy, the outcome proves to be rather disturbing. The problems of philosophy—realism/idealism, rationalism/empiricism, transcendentalism/positivism, etc., have been debated down the centuries without any visible sign of either growth or death. The “eternity” or “immortality” of philosophical problems has often been interpreted in a pre-judicial manner. Some scientific-minded philosophers go to the extent of affirming that the philosophical problems are all bogus or scandalous, i.e. have no specific foundation, conceptual or experiential<sup>38</sup>. And, therefore, it is concluded, neither conceptual analysis nor empirical findings can decisively influence the career of the history of philosophy. The endless recurrence of philosophical problems is an unmistakable proof of their a-historical character, their remoteness from our living conditions, their social rootlessness.

This negative criticism is at times construed as providing some positive clues for *scientific* reconstruction of philosophy. What is suggested is this. Philosophy *qua* philosophy, i.e. in its pure form, is at best merely interpretative and at worst vacuous. They way out consists in philosophising on the basis of specific scientific findings. Related to the specifics of science, philosophy will hopefully assume, though indirectly and derivatively, a traceable historical character. Infusion of history in philosophy is a positive achievement ascribed to science.

History, rightly understood, means social action of human beings and their consequences, intended as well as unintended. To say that philosophers are engaged only in interpreting history is to reduce them to passive consumers. What is expected of them is that they play an active producer's rôle, re-creating history for mankind and demolishing the one that is *against* mankind.

An element of normativity or ideology is there at the core of human actions, responsible for shaping the course of history.” By



implications, this view of history clashes with the view that identifies history with philosophy of history. Philosophical reflection of history may—in fact, does—bring out the hidden meanings of historical events. Philosophical interpretation of history adds to our intelligibility of it. If primacy is given to philosophy over history, and history itself is made to play the second fiddle to philosophy, the outcome is disappointing. Philosophies of history may interpret the same historical facts in terms so exclusive to one another as to render all facts or findings incapable of establishing their relative superiority or inferiority to one another. This partly accounts for the vacuousness of different philosophies of history.

What is called for to remedy this confusing situation is this. The specifics of history must be allowed to have their say in relation to our proposed interpretations of history.<sup>49</sup> Philosophical interpretations must not be *super* imposed on the details of history. On the contrary, the latter should be allowed to provide character and content to the former. This brings me to my conclusion.

Philosophy as pure reflection on Being or what is there or as attempted self-realisation hardly yields anything live or concrete. However, I do not deny that because of excessive or obsessive cultural determination, it may provide some of us emotional satisfaction of no mean consequence; but in terms of knowledge which has truth-claims and which either grows or decays we are hardly benefited. Unless philosophy is kept engaged in a critical dialogue with specialised sciences or at least with their history, it is likely to fly high on the wings of speculation and lose all touch with things and beings, ups and downs, visible underneath. Speculative or transcendental flight of philosophy should not mean freedom from critical engagement with, and commitment to, what is earthly and human.

#### NOTES AND REFERENCES

- 1 The tradition of historicism is very long and distinguished. In the West it is associated with the name of Heraclitus. In India the Buddhist tradition represented by Nagarjuna and Vasubandhu are well known for highlighting the reality of change.
- 2 In the modern times the importance of historicism has been highlighted, among others, by Vico, Herder and Hegel.
- 3 See, for example, A. Robert Caponigri, *Time and Idea: The Theory of History in Giambattista Vico*, Notre Dame. University of Notre Dame Press, 1968; and Robert A. Nisbet, *Social Change and History: Aspects of the Western Theory of Development*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1970. When history is not self-critical, it tends to degenerate into static sociology.



- 4 The life-situation I am talking of can be viewed both from without and from within. The determinists like Engels are in favour of viewing it from without. The pro-phenomenological thinkers like Dilthey and Croce favour the "internal" approach marked with or without the element of "intentionality".
- 5 When I say this I have in mind the picture theory of proposition developed by Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus*. It is indeed an exercise in constructing a presuppositionless theory of proposition.
- 6 No definition is sacrosanct. On the nature of science there are so many definitions available. Under the circumstances, I think, the historico-descriptive approach is fruitful. For, instead of trying to give an oversimplified definition we get here a little elaborate description of the basic features of scientific activities and their outcome, both theoretical and practical.
- 7 Bacon's advice to the budding scientist to read the Book of Nature, though well-meaning, is somewhat misleading. For it overlooks the fact that the Book of Nature is basically a metaphor and that the writing of the book, without prior introduction and interpretation, are hardly intelligible.
- 8 The history of the modes of production, both economic and intellectual, is marked by increasing knowledge and specialisation. The said "increase" is not necessarily to be taken in a quantitative sense.
- 9 Knowledge by its very nature throws up problems. There is no system of knowledge which contains only solutions of problems, showing no mark of problem. The problematic frontiers of knowledge provide indication of the future direction of the development of knowledge.
- 10 Need is a complex phenomenon. It has both an "inside" and an "outside". It is not merely the *object* needed. It also includes the *sense* of need which "draws" one to the object. The dialectic between the *object* and the *sense* is creative, i.e. grows, and is not repetitive.
- 11 To show intelligible and changing relations between the objects and senses of intellectual needs, influenced by and influencing practical needs, the "same" test is time and again re-interpreted in different contexts.
- 12 This view of science may appear a little extremist in its orientation, but some Marxists, influenced by praxiology, have defended it. Partly it indicates the impossibility of having a universally acceptable view of science.
- 13 This is an old view. Its elements can be found in the Advaita theory of the empirical world. In the modern Europe, Kant is



the thinker who has formulated it very plausibly and attractively.

- 14 Once it is accepted that whatever man does bears the imprint of human nature and there is no exception to this rule, the thesis of complete de-humanisation of science is ontologically ruled out.
- 15 It is difficult to construct a satisfactory theory of the world, leaving man completely out of it. Even when the pre-human past of the world is theoretically pictured by the astronomer or the geologist, for example, the hidden human presupposition is there. It is only through reflection that one can gradually be conscious of this hidden presupposition.
- 16 Unless positivism is pressed to its untenable extremity, we cannot think of any history which is completely de-ideologised. If natural sciences cannot be totally de-humanised it is difficult to imagine how history can be totally freed from the traces of ideology. See, in this connection, my book, *Sri Aurobindo and Karl Marx: Integral Sociology and Dialectical Sociology*, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1988. The concluding chapter, "Ideology and Utopia: A Critique" is relevant to the arguments I am developing here.
- 17 *Ibid.* "Possibility of Ideology: A Marxian Deconstruction".
- 18 Here I have in view the "Double Inversion Thesis" of Karl Marx developed in the *Capital*, Vol. III. Market forces of the capitalist system not only alienate and invert the ideological products of the society but also suppress the alienation and inversion.
- 19 This view of the history of science has been particularly defended by the transcendental phenomenologists like Husserl and his followers. In his earlier writings, Husserl was even unaware of the shortcoming of this approach. It seems that in the *Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* (Evanston, North-Western Press, 1970) he became conscious of the inadequacy of uncompromising transcendentalism.
- 20 For a defence of his view one might look into Ludwig Landgrebe's *Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl*, ed. and intr. by Don Welton, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1981. For a criticism of the view I find Paul Ricoeur's *History and Truth* (trans. and intr. by Charles A. Kelbley, Evanston, North-Western University Press, 1965) very interesting. For my own view on the subject, see the last chapter of my book, *Anthropology and Historiography of Science* (forthcoming).
- 21 D. P. Chattopadhyaya, *Individuals and Worlds Essays in Anthropological Rationalism*, Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1976.



- 22 Both Hegel and Husserl were partly worried over the point. In their anxiety to keep science free from relativism and the remote possibility of scepticism, they felt strongly drawn towards transcendentalism.
- 23 If knowledge, essentially a human phenomenon, however objectively it may be construed and formulated, is stripped of all its humanness, there it left nothing very particular in it which one can be proud of. "Absoluteness" of knowledge is a highly idealised aim of science and it is never achievable.
- 24 Here I have in the back of my mind Tarski's *Semantic Theory of Truth*. It seems to me that Karl Popper's *Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1972, Chapter 9) and Donald Davidson's *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1984, Essay 5), ingenious efforts to salvage Tarski's view and to apply it to natural languages, have more or less failed.
- 25 One of the most heroic efforts to do away with the Theory of Types is to be found in the *Tractatus*. In his own way, Quine has also developed his view on the subject. W.V.O. Quine, *World and Object*, Cambridge, Mass. MLT Press, 1960.
- 26 On this question the views of Carnap, Reichenbach and Suppe are very noteworthy. For a critical re-appraisal see, for example, Frederic Suppe, *The Structure of Scientific Theories*, Urbana University of Illinois Press, 1977.
- 27 In this connection, see, for example, K.C. Bhattacharyya's influential monograph, "The Subject as Freedom" in *Studies in Philosophy*, ed. by Gopinath Bhattacharyya, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1983.
- 28 This is the point I have indicated above under (24) and (25).
- 29 Transcendentalism is the anti-thesis of reductionism. It seems to me that a consistent view of reductionism cannot be worked out. Similarly, a "consistently" worked out transcendentalism turns out to be elegant but empty, See above (20).
- 30 G. W. Leibniz, *New Essays on Human Understanding*, abridged edition, tr. and ed. by Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett, Cambridge University Press, 1982, Chapter 9.
- 31 If the empirical is not accorded a compulsive character, capable of delivering a negative verdict, it leads to a sort of empty apriorism. The possibility of change or re-distribution of truth-values has to be kept open. The point has been persuasively argued, though in different ways, by Popper and Quine
- 32 This distinction is important. Otherwise it is difficult to grasp the import of the neo-Platonic theory of prepositions defended by



thinkers like Bolzano, Frege and Popper, See, for example, D. P. Chattopadhyaya, "Bolzano and Frege: A Note on Ontology" in *Logic Ontology and Action*, eds. P.K. Sen and D.P. Chattopadhyaya, Delhi, Macmillan, 1979. eh. 12.

- 33 That much of traditional epistemology has been assimilated by the contemporary philosophy of language is evident from such works as Mark Platts, ed., *Reference Truth and Reality Essays in Philosophy of Language*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980, and Peter A. French, *et al. Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota, 1981. Earlier we observed that in the continent of Europe epistemology has been largely assimilated under ontology as it is evident from the works of Heidegger and Sartre.
- 34 In this connection, I have in mind the work of Foucault, Derrida and Habermas. I have discussed their views elsewhere (20).
- 35 I mention this point because I do not propose to assimilate epistemology under sociology. For the question of validation is more open-ended than that of discovery.
- 36 The concept of regressive shift is due to Imre Lakatos. Before he worked it out in his subsequent publications like *The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes* (1978) I had the privilege to listen him on the subject in the early sixties.
- 37 These twin traits of scientific theory are consistently highlighted by Karl Popper. But I am afraid, he will not endorse the view as I have briefly delineated here.
- 38 The early positivists of the Vienna Circle accept the thesis of Wittgenstein without much examination. It is mainly due to Popper that the *substantive* nature of philosophical problems has been vindicated.
- 39 This point I have already referred to earlier under (16) above.
- 40 Here I am reiterating the point of importance, rather the **compulsive** import, of the empirical in the context of interpretation. Interpretation may be a dodging device or a justificationist strategy as distinguished from the critical one, I am trying to show that interpretations may be creative and critical and not defensive or "monster-barring" (again a Lakatosian expression) in their intention.



## 2

*World Religion—A Perspective**R. S. Srivastava*

There have been intermixture of religions from the ancient past. Hinduism has always remained in contact with the Zoroastrian religion of Iran, the mother of semitic religions, from 2000 B.C. The vedic religion and culture find close resemblance to those of Iran. The god, mitra, of Rg Veda corresponds to Mithra of the Iranians. The gods of Father Heaven Dyauspitar corresponds to Jupiter, the Dawn, Usas to Aurora are conceived as powers or causes working in nature. In the Vedic age the Greeks had very close contact with India. The Greek civilisation and culture have intimate resemblance with Hinduism in ancient times. "In the Rg Veda the European will find memorials of his own racial inheritance; For a considerable period after their separation from the Western Kinsmen, the Indians and Iranians lived together."<sup>1</sup> The Upanisadic and Buddhistic philosophies constantly influenced Judaism and Christianity. The mysticism of Jesus Christ may be unique but the influence of Hindu religion on him cannot be denied.

There is also a fundamental identity in the Gita and the Quran. The conception of God as the Purusottama, the Creator and Destroyer of the world, heaven and hell, war for the establishment of righteousness, the path of action and devotion to God for salvation have much similarity in these two holy scriptures.

The 'World Religion as we conceive it, is holistic in from and is a unity-in-plurality. It has many aspects. As mankind is heterogeneous in nature, one religion does not cater to the needs of men differently equipped with thoughts and dispositions. There is, therefore, no possibility of any one of the existing religions to be acceptable to all. When joined together they offer a World Religion in which there

<sup>1</sup> Radhakrishnan, *Eastern Religion And Western Thought*, p. 119, Oxford University Press, 1940.



exists fellowship of faiths. No one religion offers the whole truth of God, and in togetherness they embody the different aspects of Him. As religions are partial, finite and complementary to one another, none of them can be a universal religion. Even taken together religions do not exhaust the possibility of growth of new religions. The living religions can only be finite parts of the 'World Religion' of our conception.

The 'World Religion' has absolute-theistic view of the Ultimate Reality wherein the gods of different religions are the varied projections of the Absolute. "The Lord of the Universe, the remover of evil, whom the devotees of Siva worship as Siva, the Vedantins as Brahman, the Buddhists as Buddha, the followers of Jaina doctrine as Arhat, the retualists as Karma, grant us all our heart's desire."<sup>2</sup>

The 'World Religion' incorporates in its holy book all the holy scriptures, namely, the Vedas, Upanisads, Gita, Quran, Bible, Zend Avesta, Talmud, Analects of Confucius, Tripitaka and Guru Granth. These scriptures serve as the revealed books of this religion. It owns all the scriptures as its own and yet keeps its doors open for new revelations. All religious experiences, scriptures, mystics and prophets belong to the World Religion. There can also be new revelations, holy books, prophets and mystic seers in future, and these form part of the great religion. The religion never closes or limits itself. It ever expands and evolves in depth and extension. It is ever growing, widening and bringing into integration all forms of religious principles.

The essential parts of 'World Religion', are worship, prayer, meditation and yoga. Though the form and content of one religion differs from another, they are not contrary in nature, as they have the common aim of realisation of God. The means and methods leading to it cannot be contrary to one another, however, different they appear to be. They are complementary pathways to self-realisation. A holy book states, "Different are the paths laid down in the Vedas. Sankhya, Yoga, Saiva and Vaisnava scriptures; of these, some people take to it and some to another as the best. Devotees follow these diverse paths, straight or crooked, according to their different tendencies. Yet, O Lord, Thou alone are the ultimate goal of all man, as is the ocean of all rivers."<sup>3</sup> Swami Vivekananda also says, "If there is ever to be a Universal Religion, it must be one which will have no location in place or time; which will be infinite, like the God it will preach, and whose sun will shine upon the followers of Krisna and

<sup>2</sup> Inscription on the Belur temple of Swami Vivekananda.

<sup>3</sup> Siva Mahimanh strotra.



Christ, on saints and sinners alike, which will not be Brahmanic or Buddhistic, Christian or Mohammedan, but the sum total of all these and still have infinite space for self-development, which its catholicity will embrace in its infinite arms, and find a place for every human being..... It will be a religion which will recognise divinity in every man and woman, and whose whole scope, whose whole force will be centred in aiding humanity to realise his own during nature."<sup>4</sup>

The 'World Religion' evolves a form of, spiritual humanism'. The spiritual nature of man is expressed in humanism or socialism. The divine Self exists in all human beings and everyone is spiritual. Spiritualism and humanism are the manifest and unmanifest expressions of the infinite God. Socialism is a form of spiritualism. But the aim of spiritual humanism is to perfect man and humanity. Whereas the materialistic form of socialism or communism ignores the perfection of man in his moral and spiritual aspects, the World Religion aims at the total transformation, spiritualisation and divinisation of mankind. "A communism or socialism which, wishing to share and share alike, is truly spiritual and religious at bottom, but is so, very subconsciously and is groping in the dark, and making experiments and grievous mistakes because it is looking in the wrong direction and is not finding the secret of true social organisation, because it does not realise that politics is rooted in economics, economics in domestics, domestics in psycho-physics and that in meta-physics which in its fullness is nothing else than Spiritual Religion".<sup>5</sup>

The 'World Religion' has a social philosophy for the amelioration of mankind. It advocates a form of spiritual humanism in which man finds expression and fulfillment of his physical and spiritual aspirations. It has its centre in man. However divine and blissful his transcendental or other-worldly life may be, the life in the world cannot be sacrificed for that distant end. If there is a life beyond, man's perfection in this terrestrial world will further evolve to its heights in the Kingdom of God. If a person is fully perfect, spiritual and divine, a Jivanmukta or Superman, he is bound to realise the eternal salvation and identity with God, after he leaves his physical body.

The ethics and social philosophy of World Religion adopts the Gandhian principles, viz, fasting, prayer, service to mankind and five cardinal virtues-non-violence, truthfulness, non stealing, continence and renunciation. The ethical path, based on the gospel of the Bhagavadgita, offers a valuable guide to humanity. The righteous

4 The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda, Vol I, p.16

5 Dr. Bhagavandas: The Essential Unity of All Religions, p. 525.



actions performed in selfless manner for mankind achieve self realisation. One who renounces his ego and selfishness, and performs moral duties achieves salvation. The Gita states,

“All self abandon ye who enter here,  
Perform action without attachment,  
Man shall attain the supreme”. 3.18.

The devotion to God must accompany living service to humanity. Those who give up actions are doomed to fall, but those who ceaselessly endeavour, irrespective of the reward, rise above.

The ‘World Religion’ does not differentiate the material from the spiritual ends. The material values, worldly pursuits and the realisation of salvation are not contrary to each other. Mahatma Gandhi rightly observes: “He (the author of the Gita) has drawn no line of demarcation between salvation and worldly pursuits. On the contrary, he has shown that religion must rule our worldly pursuits. I have felt that the Gita teaches us that what cannot be followed out in day-to-day practice cannot be called religious. That is why a religious man is not only a philosopher but an economist, politician, social scientist and a religious seer. “A religious man is not only a philosopher, but an economist, politician and a social scientist. A religious society based on ‘non-violence, renunciation, *sayagraha*, wearing and weaving of hand spun clothes, fast, prayer, removal of untouchability and cottage industry, constitute the social principles of the supreme religion.”<sup>6</sup>

The ‘World Religion’ adopts the ethico-religious system of Mahatma Gandhi on the principles of truth and non-violence. The religion thus offers a complete set of social, economic, political, ethical and religious principles to the masses of man. Religion in its activity exhorts man to fight like a Yogi or a saint against evil economic, political and social systems. It offers a set of values, and socialises, moralises and spiritualises the society. Morality becomes a way of life. It becomes all pervasive and remains united with the economics, politics, sociology and natural sciences. They are all humanised and socialised for they all exist for man. When they are humanised, they have social value. All arts and sciences exist for man and therefore they have to be in service to humanity, which is the main objective of all moral philosophies.

The ‘World Religion’ comprehends science. Science deals with the material, vital and mental principles which constitute the parts of metaphysics of religion. Religion is science in its incomplete,

<sup>6</sup> Harijan, Dated 2.3. 1934, p. 23.



partial and imperfect form, and science is religion when it becomes all comprehensive, universal and infinite. Science is religion in limitation for the former ignores the study of the spiritual, non-spiritual and supra-physical reality. The World Religion incorporates the truths of the physical, biological and para-psychological sciences. It is physical as well as supra-physical science. In it reason and revelation, science and spirituality remain related together as parts are related to the whole.

Science and art are means by which we arrive at the knowledge of the supreme Reality. The physical science unveils the infinite, the Universal and the Divine Intelligence in the material universe. Psychology and the psychic science, which deals with the subtler planes of our being, discover the one mind and soul in all beings. The aesthetics arouses spiritual emotion and leads up to perceive the beauty, the universal and the Divine in nature.

Man is the highest manifestation of nature, in whom it becomes conscious. The highest value for man is not to remain man but to be Superman. He wants to exceed himself to infinity, the Goodhead. God has fully concealed Himself in humanity, and will gradually manifest His Being in it. When humanity and God become one, the former achieves its supreme existence.

The 'World Religion' differs from orthodox religions, which incorporate elements that are primitive, obsolete, ritualistic and superstitious. It comes in direct clash with the evil traditions, customs and laws. It rejects the divisions of castes, cults and hierarchy of men. The traditional religions often become so formal and mechanical that they fail to regenerate mankind, and the spiritual elements become deeply buried in them. The World Religion steers clear from the denominational religions, and offers various philosophies and methods for the spiritualisation of humanity.

The 'World Religion' incorporates methods of diverse faiths for self-realisation. Men are free to choose any path practised by religions other than their own. All methods and means of different religions are good in their own ways, and one may choose anyone from them. The Yogas of Hindu religion, namely, Rajayoga, Karmayoga, Bhaktiyoga, Jnanayoga and Kriyayoga as well as the Buddhist, Christian and Islamic methods achieve salvation in their own ways. The World Religion incorporates all the methods and means that are available for the realisation of salvation.

If Hinduism, Islam and Christianity give up their titles, and if they are taken to be mere religious forms, the dogmatism attached to



## World Religion—A Perspective

the names of religions will come to an end. The World Religion is a synthesis of religions. The religions coming from different sources, associated with different names and forms, following various courses merge in the World Religion. The devotees of different faiths, pursuing different disciplines ultimately free themselves of names and forms, and become one in spirit.

The 'World Religion' incorporates different philosophies of religions based on their sacred books. It comprises of the ethics, principles of morality, economics, social and Political philosophies of religions. It has the different methods and yogas for the realisation of salvation. It is a form of spiritual philosophy catering to the needs of men having diverse attitudes, thoughts and behaviour.



## My Philosophical Perceptions

### Some Glimpses

*S. Vaheeduddin*

One's philosophical perceptions are shaped by many factors. Even though the philosophical quest is directed at universality, the impact of the changing forces of history and cultural milieu cannot be ignored. Again, one's own temperament and the limitations of man's finitude cannot be lightly set aside. The history of philosophy should serve as an eye opener. We find great contradictions and conflicts in the theories presented, and these conflicts do not necessarily mean that human thinking is bound to work through definite and rigid alternatives but serve as challenges to the searching soul to think anew the perennial problems. Problems may persist and no readymade answers can be proffered. Every answer becomes questionable. Philosophy is thus confronted with questions which cannot be understood without taking into account man's own involvement in history and his encounter with himself in loneliness.

Man has always been troubled with question which do not leave him in peace. Who am I ? Why do I exist? What is the purpose of life ? And not the least is the question, Is life worth living ? Philosophical engagement has often been questioned for its futility and for the conflicting conclusions which have been reached in the course of its history. The anarchy of philosophical system has led some thinkers to devise a method which could transform philosophy into rigorous science. Neither the attempt of Descartes to attain complete certainty through universal doubt, nor that of Hegel to construct a system in which all contradictions and conflicts are resolved and transcended, or that of early Husserl to make philosophy a rigorous science, have succeeded. But whatever may be said of the value of the philosophical quest, it is this quest which makes for the specific human situation. Man has to pass through the agony of questioning



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and one is reminded of the view of Lessing, the German critic that if God had held in one hand truth and in the other the quest for the truth, he would opt for quest. There is no doubt a peculiar delight in attempts of the seeker to search, however inconclusive it may remain. Hence while recognising the all tentative character of the philosophical thinking, one has to fill the blanks with insights from the mystics and poets. We can now see the inadequacy of the Kantian esthetics which saw in aesthetic judgements no relation to knowledge as such. We have therefore to transcend the limited conception of knowledge which Kant had projected and extend it to non-conceptual insights as conveyed through mystics and poets.

In the development of any philosophical system it is necessary for its appreciation to know the point of departure, the impelling thrust behind philosophical thinking. What urged philosophers to think and rethink philosophical themes? Every man is struck by certain features of his inner and outer world. Every one suffers and suffers not only physical pain but also on anguish which may overpower one by the unfulfilment of one's ideals, by injustice and frustration rampant in this world. And this may lead him to think what is all about. Gautama Buddha's experience of suffering and his quest for truth born of this suffering is as much religious as philosophical. And in this context Gautama Buddha was the true son of the Indian soil and this feeling of suffering or *dukha* is not only at the root of Buddhist thought but of the whole Indian thought and experience. As against this we find the rise of modern thinking through doubt and the method of universal doubt which Descartes made the point of departure of his philosophy, is characteristic of modern mind. To attain to certainty we have to question every certainty which is handed down to us through tradition and custom, nay even through so-called scientific knowledge.

This position is however not fully characteristic of Western thought but only of a period in which man lost his bearings and was not sure of himself. When we look at the origins of Western thinking we find the Greek spirit moving in a totally different direction. Though it moved in a way which makes philosophy autonomous, a movement in its own right without seeking support from religious inspiration. Yet the very fact that it took wonder as the moving force of the philosophical speculation brings it in proximity to religion, on the other hand Indian thought was nourished by the experience of suffering. Hence Indian and Western thought in their beginnings share more common ground than in their later development. The development of my own thought is sustained not by any studied attempt to call into question all that I know but by bewilderment at the mystery of exis-



tence, Modern philosophical thought is so far removed from its origins that it is difficult to appreciate the significance of wonder today. What is called wonder is not just a passing amazement at something we fail to understand, but bewilderment on every step of one's questioning. The mystery of being, the question why there is something and not nothing and man's Projection to death again assume significance in the thinking of Heidegger but stripped of all its metaphysical implications. The ghost of theology still haunts European thinking and the fear of slipping back into theological morass prevents it from facing the problems squarely. But secularisation and profanisation does not help. It is to the credit of Leibniz that he did not fight shy of problems which have a religious dimension inherent in them and developed his thinking in a way that was most relevant to religion as well as to philosophy. It is interesting to note that in modern existentialist thinking dread (Angst) plays a crucial role, and rightly enough. However this dread may also be interpreted religiously as a nostalgia for something which is lost and the yearning to go back to our source.

It is strange to think how certain words change their meaning. What we now call alienation has lost its metaphysical and mystic accent and assumed a totally different shift in the context of modern profane thought, be it Marxist or existentialist. Formerly alienation was understood as a separation from the transcendental dimension, and a call was made to go back to the origin. This is clearly discernible in the neo-Platonic thought where there is a descent and an ascent, a fall as well as a return. Modern existentialist thought, especially in Heidegger, has shaped itself by the profanisation of religious motives. Dread, loneliness and above all death play a crucial role. But the basic motives of the primordial religious consciousness are conspicuously diluted. Though man is projected to death, death seems to be the possibility without any future. True, future assumes an importance, but it is a future of temporal succession or a future as lived here and now, whereas for religious consciousness "future" transcends time and opens a horizon beyond time as we know it. Recent attempt to transcend existentialism and to give it a more positive profile as that of Bollnow, again, do not leave the empirical horizon and feel shy of metaphysical possibilities. Hope and trust are certainly taken as positive moments of man's experience, without however taking into account man's religious urge and his "divine discontent". What is called alienation is really disavowal of customary stereotypes in life and a demand to re-think all that has been thought. It is the discontent with finitude, discontent with the here and now and a yearning to go beyond. What strikes one most in



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modern philosophy is the studied neglect of the concerns which alone make one's involvement in philosophical speculation worthwhile. The question is not whether we can arrive at any solution as the demand to seek solution itself betrays one's ignorance of the nature of philosophical reflection. Philosophy is a quest and unlike other disciplines its failure itself in finding decisive answers to persistent questions is no less enriching. The philosophical vision demands passionate a'ertness to its distinctive character. To place philosophy in the category of research is also a misnomer. It does not depend on books and references but on one's own inner agitation which involves not only discursive thinking but also existential commitment. My philosophic thinking has been shaped not so much by the study of the philosophers of the East and the West but with the searching of the soul within ones' own-self. Hence in my philosophical vision poetic experience and artistic contemplating as well as reflection on the course of history and on man's own hopes and illusions have played a more decisive rule than logical and conceptual dialectics. What has struck me most is the relation which obtains between religion and art, between religious experience and aesthetic experience as well as some consideration of language without being carried of by the prejudices of linguistic analysis. Language as understood as a verbal communication naturally plays a great role both in poetic creation and mystic religious experience. But it must not be forgotten that language also has a surface dimension, the meaning of which is taken care of in dictionaries. Words have also the life of their own and the shades of meaning which may not have been clear to the poet himself, may come to light later. What we may think as arbitrary interpretations are not really as arbitrary as one would imagine. They are embedded in the words themselves and it is not as odd as we would think of the remark of Dilthey that "we could understand the meaning of the poet better than he himself understood". Words develop different meanings in different historical contexts as well as in different areas of knowledge and experience. They can move in different directions. Once we understand the dynamics of language we can also understand the legitimacy of the hermeneutics applicable to religious texts as well as to poetic and philosophical creations.

To take an example from religion, fundamentalists restrict themselves to the surface dimension of religion whereas in the text we find different indications. It is worthwhile to find out the different layers of a text. Even in poetry, expedially what we may call great poetry, different possibilities of interpretation are available. Hence we cannot remain indifferent to these possibilities condemning them outright as irrelevant and forged constructions. In modern times



Heidegger has given free hand to interpret pre-Socratic thinking as well as some of the modern thinkers and poets like Kant and Holderlin and expose himself to the charge of forged interpretation. Though this is true to some extent, in principle it has a justification of its own, and we can adopt the same attitude, rather cautiously, with regard to our understanding of the religious texts.

In the development of my philosophical quest I have not been preoccupied in the beginning with epistemological problems as has been the case in recent philosophy. The age-old metaphysical question about the nature of existence and the destiny of man has been my main concern. My own thinking has moved into two meaningfully different directions or rather in two different worlds. On the one hand my affinity to sufism has led me to a vision of reality which is saturated with an experience which defies communication. It is the experience of mystery which cannot be communicated through words but gives a glimpse or an inkling of what is all about. First of all it compels man to reflect upon himself and to know that mystery par excellence is found first of all in his own self. My own self though most familiar to me is still least understood by myself. As conjoined to the body it is a part of the material world. But what is matter? The best efforts of the physicist notwithstanding its nature requires much to be understood. It is difficult to subscribe to the view which tries to reduce matter into mind or mind into matter. Hence a kind of dualism cannot be avoided on the empirical level. One may think with Spinoza that matter and mind are only two attributes of reality known to us, while attributes other than these two remain unknown and unknowable. But this is not to deny their transcendental unity. Making use of the theistic model we can say that God is not exhausted in His infinite modes and attributes but surpasses them all. Thus we may make room both for transcendence and immanence the reconciliation of which has baffled religious thought, further I believe that the division of human reality in a dualistic framework may be well replaced by a triple division of mind, matter and spirit. A British thinker professor H.S. Price is led to consider favourably the old tradition according to which man has three parts, body, mind and spirit. "And one would then say that it is the spirit or pure ego which is a substance, though the mind or soul is not".<sup>1</sup> Hence we can be led to a view according to which body and mind are inseparably linked and the destruction and transformation of one leads to the destruction or transformation of the other, while allowing the spirit to survive the destruction of either.

1 Science and E.S.P. by J. R. Synthes, *Psychical Research and Human Personality*, p. 41, London, 1967.



What is disturbing is the fact that modern psychology has placed us in a curious situation. While it has thrown light on the deeper levels of consciousness, it has also brought confusion. It is true that the self cannot be equated with surface consciousness. I remain what I am even when I sleep or when I become un-conscious for any reason whatsoever. Many so called mental diseases can be explained with reference to the suppressed wishes which may not be, of course, of sexual origin. It was the great service of C.G.Jung to have broadened the concept of libido and brought into surface what is called collective unconscious. Even then the unconscious does not exhaust man's transcendental experiences, and mystical visions cannot be considered only pathological deviations from the normal. There may be a form of awareness which leads us to suppose states beyond the unconscious level, a form of higher consciousness. The great American psychologist Willian James was led to a remarkable conclusion: "It is that our normal working consciousness, rational consciousness as we call it, is but one special type of consciousness, whilst all about it, parted from it by the filmsiest of screens there lie potential forms of consciousness entirely different; we may go through life without suspecting their existence".<sup>1</sup> "No account of the universe in its totality", "he continues", can leave these other forms of consciousness quite disregarded".<sup>2</sup> Thus not only psychology but movements like that of existentialism have led us into a blind alley. Heidegger has rightly insisted on one of the basic experiences of human life, that of dread. He has also pointed out the basic difference between dread ('Angst') and fear. We fear something; fear has an object; dread on the other hand is objectless, it is a pervasive feeling which has no object. But still dread is supposed to be a psychologically conditioned experience without needing any explanation. Heidegger refuses to attach any metaphysical significance to dread, whereas in the mystic tradition dread is a true indicator of man's finitude, of his basic insecurity as a finite being, of his longing for the transcendent. In other words, dread is born of man's discontent with his finitude. While man may feel thrown on this earth, his experience of being thrown is so construed as not to lead to the assumption of a 'Thrower'. This experience is intended *sui generis* and stands for itself.

In the attempt to make philosophy down to the earth the main concerns of man's existence have been ignored. Since Kant the theory of knowledge assumed such a dominant role that the problem of 'being' was shelved and when it was again revived in existentialist thought it was completely denuded of its metaphysical thrust. Instead of

<sup>2</sup> As quoted in *Man's concern with Death; Frontiers of Speculation*, p. 94, pub., Hodder and Stoughton, G. Britain, 1980.



metaphysics becoming a science of being qua being it became a science of human existence in isolation from all that is considered non-human. But man's being cannot be considered *per se* without taking into account lower levels of beings as well as the possibility of his translation to the higher spheres as born witness in religious perspectives. It is true that existentialism has done a great service by bringing the concept of authenticity in the forefront of philosophic meditations and showing how man loses his authenticity in social anonymity. He has become only an impersonal pronoun (man), one among many and his identity is completely submerged. But recovery of his authenticity does not tell of course the whole story of man in all its truth. The authentic self does not at all speak of his depth dimension, his monumental status. It only discloses the possibility to understand himself in the leaving the psychological horizon dark corners of his being without. However the self or what is called 'Atma' in Indian philosophy, is not covered in the concept of human existence (*dasein*). It is something which cannot be understood without taking recourse to categories with which modern thought is not familiar.

Lastly, it may be admitted frankly that there needs be an element of confession in philosophical thought as it moves away from possible experience. In spite of the best efforts to make philosophy a rigorous science or a science which yields conclusions with apodictic certainty we are bound to leave open philosophical inquiry and allow alternatives. But a philosopher need not restrict his thought to conclusions which cannot be challenged. Indeed it is the privilege of the philosophical inquiry to allow its conclusions to remain questionable. This is how the philosophical quest developed. In the last analysis, a philosopher is bound to hold a position which may be deemed subjective, though subjectivity on this level may claim a right of its own, a relative relativity, a partial disclosures of reality. In any case philosophy is an encounter with itself and the communication of this encounter through words which are suggestive rather than informative. Thus philosophy has an element of religion and art and here it is that a poet has an advantage over a philosopher. While a philosopher is restricted by the demands of reason and understanding and has to comply with the rules of logic, the poet is not bound by any rules and can give expression to his experience unchecked and thus may come closer to reality than the philosopher. This is again the reason why religion has taken recourse to poetic language in order to give expression to what is in-expressible.



## 4

## A Short Survey of My Views

K. Satchidananda Murty

## I

I was born on 25 September 1924 in a peasant family of Andhra (South India); but in their way of life my grandfather and father had become what in England are known as "gentlemen farmers", though the tract of land they owned was small. My siblings, all born before me, died in very early infancy; so I was virtually the only child of my parents. My father lavished great care and affection in bringing me up and having me educated. Although he did not finish high school, he developed himself intellectually and spiritually through his own effort. Getting interested in culture and religion, he read deeply and extensively the literature on these subjects available in Telugu, a language of over 44 million people, and collected the Telugu translations of the Hindu religio-philosophical classics, of the Bible and the Quran, and the writings of modern Indian religious personalities. My parents were both devotees of God: but while my father knew wisdom, my mother had just simple and sincere inherited faith. Neither adhered to any exclusive creed or ritual. Openness to *Paratpara*, the Supreme Ultimate, in multifarious ways prevailed in our home.

Peasants in the part of Andhra to which I belong have been, like the yeomen of England, independent owners and cultivators of whatever land they have. Our village had no kulaks, serfs or moneylenders. For our families agriculture was a way of life, and not for business and profit. Accumulation of money for its own sake and investing it in any way other than in buying gold and more land was unusual with them. Not to lend for interest and not to be indebted was a virtue. To be covetous and not be satisfied with what one has: both these were not right. They had affection and concern for land, plants and animals; and considered agriculture, government service and the learned professions good. Valuing intellectual and productive work, they led lives characterised by prudence and piety. Attempting to



practise sobriety, decency and decorum, they avoided adventure, passion and violence. Till I was over 20 years old I lived with my parents. So to some extent all this has coloured my axiology.

I married in 1942. Since then, like my father earlier, my wife enabled me to be free from familial and domestic chores, cares and responsibilities. So I have always been like a happy guest in our house, with all the time I needed for reading, thinking and writing.

From the time I was five years old for about 10 years I was taught by Sanskrit pandits trained in the traditional way, while simultaneously receiving education preparatory to admission to high school and in high school. Then I joined a college and after that a university, receiving in due course the degrees of M.A., Ph.D. In short my education was at the same time both classical and modern. At home I had access to my father's small but sufficient library, and made full use of it in my teens and twenties. My pandits were specialists in grammar and logic: the first was a *smarta brahmin* (follower of non-dualism), and the second a *dvaiti brahman* (follower of dualism) who was also a quite well-known poet. One of my university teachers (a student of FADDEGON) was the Indian pioneer in the comparative study of *Navyanyaya* and modern logic, who later translated a great *Advaita* classic; another (a student of RADHAKRISHNAN) was a scholar in Sanskrit, well-versed in Vedantic and Hegelian epistemology and dialectic, who later became an authority on comparative philosophy.<sup>1</sup>

For my philosophy honours degree I chose *Advaita Vedanta* as my special subject, besides the required courses on histories of Western and Indian philosophy, logic and theory of knowledge, psychology, and contemporary Western philosophy with reference to a text. For the last I was taught WHITEHEAD, and later as a teacher for the same course I had to lecture on WHITEHEAD, DEWEY and JASPERS, on each one for 2 or 3 years at different times. Immediately after getting my degree when I worked in a college for about one year, I had to teach DESCARTES' meditations.

In 1954-55 as a young teacher, I went on a sort of *peregrinatio academica* to Europe, during which I had the privilege of meetings and talks with some leading thinkers and visiting a few universities. In subsequent years I could go to Europe, USA, USSR and other countries again and again, and meet many philosophers and visit many institutions. Over the years I was fortunate in becoming intimate with not only the best among the Indian philosophers of my generation, but also with some of the most eminent of the preceding as well as some of the most promising of the succeeding ones. From 1949 to 1984 I was a teacher of philosophy at Andhra University.



## A Short Survey of My Views

My intellectual life has been stimulated, shaped and developed by my father, my home life, my teachers, the thinkers and scholars I came into contact with, as well as by my wide travels and diversified reading. While philosophy is my profession, my passion is for *belles-lettres*; I am an addict of fiction; and I have roamed afar in the fields of religion, history, political science, sociology, cultural anthropology and international relations.<sup>3</sup> Abhorring narrow specialisation and parochialism, in philosophy too I deliberately acquainted myself with Chinese, Japanese<sup>4</sup> and West Asian philosophies, in addition to Indian and Western. My mind has thus become a hybrid of many influences. But, I am neither a disciple of anyone, nor a follower of any school or system.

I do not think of myself as an original philosopher, but only as one testifying to the manifestations of philosophy in different forms in the same as well as in different cultures at different times, and as one who has been and is endeavouring to emphasize the capacity of one type of philosophical thinking<sup>5</sup> to:

- (i) lead to an awareness of *That* or *Suchness*<sup>6</sup> which is inaccessible to common sense and science and illumines the meaning of our existence,
- (ii) suggest modifications and reformulations—or maybe abandonment and substitution—of our ideas, beliefs and values, after subjecting them to discriminating judgment and careful appraisal,
- (iii) give rise to the perception of the *Same* in all through the conviction that as all others are like oneself<sup>7</sup> they must be treated as one treats oneself, and
- (iv) lead to an integration of rationality and feeling, belief and behaviour, in individual and collective life.

## II

In 1939-40 I wrote in Telugu a translation and detailed explanation of the *Bhagavadgita*, which was published in 1941. It contained also an English translation of the verses. It maintained that while the metaphysics or this scripture was non-dualism of the sort later elaborated by SANKARA, its ethics was positive and works-oriented. Non-dual knowledge leads to salvation, but it arises only in a mind: (i) purified by long performance of duty for its own sake in a disinterested way or with the fruits of all actions offered as worship to God, and (ii) exposed to scriptural teaching understood in the right way. After attainment of wisdom one ought to continue to discharge his duties and work for the welfare of the world as long as one lives, making all



one's action worship of the Supreme, because (a) while no one can remain even for a moment without doing anything at all (b) working for the good of all without attachment and desire is real actionlessness. In the explanation of relevant verses it was also shown that the message of the *Gita* was universal and that it did not approve of rights and privileges based on birth. The speciality of this book was that for the first time in clear and simple Telugu prose this kind of interpretation of the great classic was given by so young an author who had knowledge of and respect for tradition, but did not accept what was unjust and regressive in it (in tradition).

My exposition in Telugu of the *Isa Upanisad* appeared in the late forties. In this the metaphysical position adopted was that ultimate reality was neither just an ineffable Absolute, devoid of all attributes, nor just the divine or the spiritual immanent and exhausted in the world or identical with it. It is the Absolute as well as the transcendent Lord (*Isa*), who encompasses the universe and also dwells in it and yet is not limited to it. The world is his creation: it is not an illusion. Wisdom transcends empirical knowledge, but does not negate it. Withdrawal from action is not necessary; a happy life on earth is a value to be realised. The *Upanisad* only enjoins enjoyment through (i) relinquishing the fruits of actions and (ii) freedom from covetousness; and exhorts one to wish for an active life of a hundred years. An elucidation in Telugu of the meaning of this great, profound and the shortest *Upanisad* in this way did not appear before.

In 1962 was brought out in Telugu a one volume encyclopaedia of philosophies and religions, edited by me.<sup>8</sup> It was released by JAWAHARLAL NEHRU in July 1963. It consists of long, historical and systematic surveys of both philosophy and religion, written by me, followed to essays in alphabetical order by scholars from all over the world.<sup>9</sup> There seem to be no such scientific surveys of these subjects in any Indian language by someone who has consciously avoided adopting some standpoint, say, of Vedanta or Buddhism. Marxism or linguistic analysis. All the essays were written by internationally known authorities who had empathy for the subjects they dealt with. The volume covered in its surveys and articles the philosophies and religions of both East and West.

Deeply impressed by DESCARTES' *Discourse on Method*, 'the greatest manifesto of modern man', which depicts him courageously and unreservedly advancing towards conquest of truth, asserts the comprehensibility of nature and the possibility of mastery over it, and prophesies much that science and technology later achieved, in co-operation with a Telugu scholar Dr. K.V.R. NARASIMHAM, I



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translated it into Telugu and wrote an introduction elaborating DESCARTES' life story and thought and setting forth his importance in the world history of ideas. This was published in 1960.<sup>10</sup>

Such has been my contribution to philosophical literature in Telugu, a language of over 44 million people.

## III

My work *Evolution of Philosophy in India: A Brief Sketch* was published in 1952. Under the influence of the psychology and sociology of knowledge, it attempted to briefly trace the development of philosophy in India in relation to sociopolitical conditions. It held that while on the one hand, every thinker and philosophy are the products of their social milieu, and every man's theories and belief are also influenced by his character, upbringing, personality and unconscious motives; on the other hand, thinking and knowledge influence and shape social organization and economic conditions. It also made it clear that psychological and sociological conditioning of thinking and knowledge, while not irrelevant to their validity, does not determine it. It considered a clear distinction between philosophy and religion as the necessary point of departure for a history of philosophy. This work remains the first and only one of its kind by an Indian university teacher.<sup>11</sup>

A collection of essays by me under the title *Indian philosophy since 1498* appeared in 1982. The view found in many writings in English is that there has been either an absence or eclipse of philosophical thinking in India from the beginning of the 16th to the second decade of the 19th century. The first essay in this book shows that the period from 1498 to 1945 was no less creative than the one preceding it or the one succeeding it. Its second essay which places modern Indian philosophy in its sociopolitical setting has been described as "a model piece of writing"... "from a really new point of view", which "covers a vast area with wide learning and deep understanding".<sup>12</sup> In three other essays it presents a critique of Gandhian thought, maybe the only such thing by an Indian academic philosopher. It has an essay on AMBEDKAR (born a pariah), the principal architect of the Indian Constitution. It deals with some other objects also.

My *Philosophy in India*, 1986, was favourably reviewed by Indian, Soviet, German, Czech, Yugoslav, and U.S. journals. For example, the leading Indian philosophical journal commented on it as follows: "The present work from the pen of one of our most eminent philosophers and educationists is a veritable gem. Within a short compass it succeeds not only in lucidly presenting Indian philosophy, past and



present, but also discusses at the same time some of the urgent problems agitating Indian philosophers today... It is brief, unambiguous, quintessential, and comprehensive, a tribute to the author's vast and accurate scholarship, critical judgment and catholic taste".<sup>13</sup>

## IV

*My Revelation and Reason in Advaita Vedanta* was first out in 1954 and reprinted in 1974, Part I of its Book I contains a fairly exhaustive study of the problem of scriptural authority in the Advaita school, after giving a summary of its conception of God and revelation, whereas its Part II deals with the function of reason in it. Part I of Book II critically studies (a) Knowledge of God and (b) the nature of scriptural authority, expounded by the other five Hindu systems. In the last part an independent criticism of Advaita metaphysics, theology and 'Vedic revelation' is attempted and the possibility of more satisfactory solutions to these problems suggested. *The Philosophical Quarterly* (India) in its review remarked that this book "has for the first time... thrown a challenge to some of the philosophical doctrines maintained in Advaita Vedanta... A bold step... A very lucid and comprehensive presentation of the problems... in a very impartial way, based on authoritative texts... The author's own views are contained in Book II ... He applies strict logic to substantiate his position". *The Hindu* described it as "the outcome of a deep scholarship in Indian and Western thought... encyclopaedic in the treatment of these topics (revelation and reason) in all the religions and philosophies of the world". RADHAKRISHNAN hailed it as "interesting and valuable" and "a very learned book" in which views had been stated "in a bold and unfettered way".

*Metaphysics, Man and Freedom*, published in 1963, reprinted 1974, embodies three lectures. In the first is given an explanation of a threefold need for metaphysics, intellectual, linguistic and psychological, and an account of how metaphysics arises. In the second is formulated a conception of man by coordinating the results of reflective analysis on man's being with the findings of psychology, and anthropology. and a phenomenology of man is sketched. In the third is discussed freedom as an escape from finitude through *gnosis* and *askesis*, and the possibility of freedom in the world on the basis of empirical experience and psycho-analysis is indicated.

*The Realm of Between*, 1973, consists of four chapters and two Annexes. The book is mainly about the realm between the transience of things and the Truth of things, the middle state between What-is and the Holy.



Its first chapter deals with man's condition: suffering, evanescence, and finitude' and the second considers possible ways of escaping this condition. A good deal of suffering could be eradicated by radically transforming society through concerted rational human action. Salvation is the experience with certitude of peace, security, and contentment. We are saved by the meaning of our thought and acts and by the sympathy and compassion we feel and evoke.

Its third chapter is concerned with two basic forms of religious action-sacrifice and worship. Sacrifice is giving up of what one has leading to transformation of life, while worship is taking refuge in God with the prayerful thought that one is sinful, naught, and helpless and that He is the only means of salvation. The fourth chapter grapples with the questions of God's existence, non-appearance, silence, absence and death, and the dialectic of atheism and the relation between religion and ethics. A few arrive at an awareness of Being, while to some others it is revealed as a Person; but most of us have to be satisfied with believing what cannot be proved, and it is a glorious risk—a great wager—to have faith in the Unconditioned Being or the Supreme Person. But atheism does not necessarily lead to the deification of man or history, or to immorality; nor is it true that "there is no virtue if there is no immortality". Without a belief in God or immortality some can live, endure, find meaning, and engage themselves in ethical endeavours of the highest type.

#### V

In 1960 was published *Studies in the problems of peace* which I and A.C. BOUQUET authored. He did the first part of it, while I wrote the second part entitled "*phenomenology of peace*" and the first chapter of the third part. In 1986 all that I wrote then has been republished with a 25-page prologue explaining the Hindu, Buddhist and Jain approaches to peace, and alluding to the views of WHITEHEAD, JASPERS, TEILHARD DE CHARDIN and RUSSELL. This new publication has the title *The Quest for peace*. This has 7 chapters and an epilogue. The chapters are: *The Hindu philosophy of Force and Social Equilibrium*; *Critical Reflections on Hindu philosophy*; *The philosophies of Ahimsa and Forgiveness*; *The philosophies of Violence and Terror*; *The philosophies of Liberty and Revolution: The Causes of war: Bases of peace*. John O' London's weekly described the first two chapters as "a comprehensive peace classic"; while the third is "a TOYNBEE-esque historical review of the development of Western thought, both masterly and illuminating."<sup>14</sup> The *Journal of Asian Studies* considered it "a competent philosophical examination of 'the phenomenology of peace'"; and *Justice dans le monde* said it was "not merely a work of scholarship, but of civil courage".



Part I of my *Indian Foreign policy*, 1964 begins with a brief discussion of classical Indian theories, passes on to a consideration of Gandhism, and ends up with an analytical exposition of independent India's foreign policy. Part II discusses some specific issues and the last Part after a review of some problems of international relations offers some suggestions for policy reorientation. The Annexe has, among others, sections dealing with *The Sastras*, *ASOKA* and *GANDHI* and *Ethics and Politics*. HAROLD D. LASSWELL wrote of this work thus "These essays clarify the value goals of national policy... A problem oriented approach of this kind is too mature for fanaticism, too empirical for undisciplined fantasy, too responsible for self-indulgent passivity or despair. ... The most striking contribution of these essays is to locate the challenges of today in the perspective of the enduring conflicts of Indian tradition... (They) contain important suggestions for improving the fundamental instrumentalities of foreign policy... Proposals of a scholar who truly lives in his epoch..."

## VI

*The Indian Spirit*, 1965, has these chapters: *The Indian Spirit: Past and Present*; *India: History and Atavism*; *The Hindu Ethos*; *The Greek Image of Indian Philosophy*; *Philosophical Thought in India*; *Experience, Reason and 'Transcendental Materialism' in Indian Philosophy*; *Religion and Ethical Practices*; *Ethics and Politics in Hindu Culture*. Among a number of unusual and non-stereotyped positions this book seeks to establish are the following: India is not specially spiritual. Basic Hindu scriptures are not opposed to progress and prosperity. Indian culture and civilization are only as much coherent and non-hybrid as the European. India was never totally indifferent to history, nor was it atavistic. No other culture was more concerned with this world, with material prosperity and sensual pleasure than Indian culture, Socialism and socialistic society only would be in tune with the Hindu ethic and attitudes to money, work and State. Classical Indian philosophy has these characteristics: Sense of Infinity, Sense of Human dignity, faith in Moral freedom, and a Tragic sense. Its ideal is integral man. It is traditional. Philosophy is a power and privilege. It is approached through faith. It is a force for preservation of culture. It is largely interpretative. It is a science of salvation, and of review. It is a point of view, a quest for truth, and organicist. On the relationships among religion, ethics and politics in Indian Culture also, the book brings to light facts not widely known, and expresses ideas and evaluations not perhaps found in other books on these. The philosophical Quarterly (India) in its long review described it as "instructive, penetrating and well-documented.....One of the most thought-provoking and formative of recent publications."

The first chapter of *Far Eastern philosophies*, 1976, has these sections: *The Cycles of Cathay*; *Chinese History and Society*, *Some Myths*, *Science in China*; *philosophy in China*; *The Chinese 'Bildung'*. Chapters II and III are on *Ju Chia (The School of the Literati)* and *Tao Chia (The school of the way)*. Chapters IV and V are entitled *Japanese philosophy* and *Shinto (The way of the Numinous)*. HAJIME NAKAMURA eval-



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uated this work thus: 'This work is the first attempt to understand the intrinsic values of Japanese philosophy in the international scope by way of comparative study.....It will make a great contribution to further progress of philosophical thinking in the global setting in the years to come.' WING-TSIT CHAN commented on it as follows: "Now we have for the first time a book-length discussion of Far Eastern philosophy written by an Indian philosopher. I rejoice in its publication. The significance is not merely its own merits—its high level of scholarship, its strictly philosophical approach without sentimentality, its freedom from misunderstandings or the usual clichés, and its many insights... The far greater significance is that it may serve as a starting point of a renaissance of intellectual interchange between India and China".

## VII

Just before he was to be coronated, RAMA was informed he would have to go into exile in the forest for 14 years and that his younger brother would be coronated instead. People noted with surprise that the colour and lustre of RAMA's face was the same while he was clad in auspicious silk robes before coronation and when he wore bark-garments before going to the forest.<sup>15</sup> He exemplified the ideal of equanimity in prosperity and adversity. To be unruffled in happiness and sorrow: this is the ideal that appeals to me most.

## NOTES

- 1 GADIYARAM SIVAYYA SASTRI and PALLE PURNAPRAJNACHARYA.
- 2 SAILESVAR SEN and P. T. RAJU.
- 3 For some results of my interdisciplinary studies, see: *Studies in the Problems of Peace* (in collab.), 1960  
*Indian Foreign Policy*, 1964  
*The Indian Spirit*, 1965  
*Readings in Indian History, Politics and Philosophy* (ed.), 1967.
- 4 Ref.; my book *Far Eastern Philosophies*, 1975.
- 5 I consider this to be superior to other types, but I cannot prove that.
- 6 Tat or Tathata.
- 7 Seeing *samam* (same) everywhere by analogy with self (*atmaupamya*), *Gita*, VI, 32.
- 8 *Vijnana Sarvasvamu, Edava Samputamu, Darsanamulu-Matamulu* (Telugu Bhasha Samiti, Hyderabad etc. 1962),
- 9 Of a total of 86 contributors, 26 are from the West.
- 10 *Pramana Paddhati pai Prasangamu* (Andhra University Press, Waltair 1960).
- 11 My book *Philosophy in India*, p. 49.
- 12 Editor's *Introduction*, quoting reviews.
- 13 G. C. PANDE in the *Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research* (New Delhi, III, 2, Spring 1986, p. 167).
- 14 K. D. D. HENDERSON of the Spalding Trust.
- 15 KALIDASA, *Raghuvamsa*, XII, 8.



## The Malady of the Age

B. L. Atreya

We are living in a very strange age today. Whereas our knowledge of the external world, and our means of securing mastery over it are increasing by leaps and bounds, our acquaintance with the inner nature of man and his aspirations, powers and potentialities is decreasing. We are more worried about wealth, power and possessions than about the right use we should make of them and the purpose they should serve. Although, thanks to science and technology, the world is becoming one and its parts more and more interconnected by economic and political ties, mankind is becoming more and more divided into political blocks, parties and groups. A cold war is going on everywhere. Even families are breaking up. While all nations and communities are talking of peace, goodwill, co-existence and non-aggression, they are preparing for war under the cover of defence, Power-pacts, military aids, and federations for mutual protection are common. There is a keen desire for independence all over the world, still all small and weak countries are becoming more and more dependent on the resources of big ones and appending themselves to more powerful ones, risking their own freedom of thought and action. While old castes and communities are breaking up and vanishing, new political castes and communities in the name of parties and groups are springing up, generating greater difference, hatred and enmity than the older divisions ever did. All kinds of propaganda, mostly false, are made use of for lowering others in the estimation of the ignorant masses and securing support for oneself and one's party. While nation talk of *Panchashila*, individuals and political parties within a nation cast to winds all the time-honoured principles of *sheela* (good conduct).

In place of self-control, control over others' property and resources has become the desired end of clever individuals. In this age when much public harm can be done by negligence of one's duty



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and when countless lives can be jeopardised thereby, negligence of duties has become common. Most accidents in buses, trains, and planes are said to be due to this factor. We care more for rights than for duties. Stability has given place to revolution, obedience to revolt, co-operation to competition, harmony to discord. Contentment and meekness to ambition and aggression. Administration being carried on by those who are appointed on key-posts on account of party-allegiance, and not on account of adequate qualifications, there is mismanagement, partiality, injustice and dissatisfaction everywhere. Even commodities essential for existence and health are becoming rare, difficult to obtain, and costly beyond expectation. Every body tries to put the highest price on what he possesses and can supply to others. Even when it is purchased at the highest price, the buyer is never sure of the genuineness of the article, for adulteration has become a common practice. Food-materials, medicines, and even the free gifts of nature—air and water—are being adulterated and contaminated on account of the cupidity of those who observe no moral principles, and who are neither afraid of God nor of the Law of Karma, simply because they have ceased to believe in their existence and operation.

The common man is now living more or less vegetative and animal life, and is more concerned with food, clothes and house than with any higher and deeper problem of life. And even those he is not able to secure with ease. No one has initiative and freedom to think and live independently. His thoughts and life are controlled by party-affiliation, and unconsciously guided and determined by newspapers, radio and cinema. Life has lost value and sanctity. Regimentation, conscription, and compulsion are coming into vogue in every country. Man has lost faith in religion, in morality, and even in himself. He is pessimistic, pleasure-seeking, secular, party-minded, money-minded, amoral, confused, nervous, quarrelsome, explosive, exploitative, and restless. He has little respect for life, private property, age, wisdom and woman. Life is meaningless, purposeless. Its only business is to eat, drink and be merry. Money being able to purchase all pleasures and comforts, it has become the only object of pursuit throughout life. Our happiest moments are only those when we enjoy the pleasures of senses. Those who are not fortunate enough to secure them continuously and in abundance try to forget their very existence by the help of anaesthetic drugs. Much of our vital and nervous energy having been exhausted on account of over-work and over-enjoyment, we seek the help of stimulants. Our social life is in a chaotic condition. All respect for parents, teachers and administrative authorities has vanished. Either there is too much of regimentation and police control or every individual is a law unto himself. Where the



former exist fear and anxiety are common, and where the latter, social anarchy prevails.

### CAUSE AND REMEDY SUGGESTED BY SOME WESTERN WRITERS

Some western thinkers attribute the present unsatisfactory state of the world to modern science and technology. Tyrrell, for example, writes in *Man the Maker*, "The scientific perspective is hopelessly out of focus with reality and the philosophy to which it has given rise is useless as a guide in life" (p. 291). "The central feature of the modern outlook is, however, the belief that the universe is without purpose or meaning, without directing factors, without anything which transcends the range of our senses and our powers of intellectual investigation. Man, it is asserted, owes his origin to the forces in the physical world which lie within the range of his observation. There is nothing beyond this. There is nothing teleological or supra-teleological", (p. 293). About the advance made by technology he says, "These achievements are not simple steps to paradise: They are blessings; but they have repercussions... They make life too complex for peace of mind, They have increased the speed of living to such an extent that there is no time to look beneath the rapidly moving surface and to reach firm foundations". (p. 27). "The urgent need of our times is not for more and more science but for clarity of vision which will enable us to raise our eyes from the foreground and to realize something of the importance of those things which lie in the shadow... We must see the whole in true perspective and not any longer build on the flat screen which the specialized technique of science has created" (p. 304). Alexis Carrel similarly writes in his well-known book, *Man the Unknown* "No advantage is to be gained by increasing the number of mechanical inventions. It would perhaps be well not to accord so much importance to the discoveries of physics, astronomy, and chemistry. Man must now turn his attention to himself, and to the cause of his moral and intellectual disability... There is no shadow of doubt that mechanical, physical and chemical sciences are incapable of giving us intelligence, moral discipline, health, nervous equilibrium, security and peace" (p. 50). Gerald Heard writes, in his *The Source of Civilization*; "The ship of our civilization goes now with so great and so growing a list that we are compelled to throw any ballast we can on the other side" (p. 239). "Our dangerously disproportionate advance in physical knowledge and power over means" (p. 239), "must be counterbalanced by psychological knowledge, knowledge of that complementary aspect of reality which can only be obtained through our subjective, common, integrated depth of consciousness (p. 391)". "A psychological revolution



is therefore our only escape from material destruction and mental derangement (p. 421).

### ZEAL FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN INDIA

We have to consider these opinions very seriously in view of the fact that in our country, where science and technology are not yet sufficiently advanced, there, is a cry for more and more of science and technology; and science, scientists and science teachers are being patronised by our state in the same way as poets and philosophers were patronised by kings in the past.

### TECHNOLOGY A DOUBLE EDGED WEAPON

There is no doubt that technology has given unimagined and unprecedented power to man; and this power is a double-edged weapon. It can be used both for good and evil; and it has been used in the recent history of the world more for evil than for good. Automobiles, aeroplanes, atomic power, telephone, film, fire-arms, anaesthetic drugs, bacteria, hypnosis, suggestion, scientific methods of propaganda—all are capable of being used with equal advantage by the benefactors of mankind and by antisocial individuals and groups. The police and criminals vie with each other in making use of the same means in trying to defeat each other's purpose. If to-day the world is enjoying the benefits of technology, it is as much suffering from its harmful effects. It is, however, not the fault of technology that it is misused. It is that of those who misuse it. Neither power nor possession of it is evil. It is but natural for man to crave for power. The evil lies in the misuse of it. As Shakespeare said long ago, "It is excellent to have a giant's strength; but it is tyrannous to use it like a giant".

### GREAT ACHIEVEMENTS OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Technology is science in use and action. It is a natural outcome of the present day advancement of science. All knowledge is power. Much more the scientific knowledge of nature. There is nothing wrong with science as such. Science has penetrated deep into the secrets of nature and life, and has given us exact knowledge of most of the things and happenings around us. Knowledge being power, man is more powerful to-day than ever before. He has conquered space and time: neither oceans nor mountains, nor even clouds offer any barrier to him. He can fly not only to any place on the earth, but also to any place within the earth's atmosphere. Nay, he is likely soon to land on the Moon or the Mars. His voice can be heard instantaneously at any place in the world, and even far away from it. He has at his disposal enormous electrical, atomic and solar energy



with which he can reshape the world or destroy it in no time. Medicine and surgery are now capable of performing miracles, and no disease is now regarded as incurable. Large areas of earth which were formerly sterile have been made fertile and habitable. In short, science has given us mastery over nature. How can man part with the knowledge and power he has acquired? How can he cease to have a craving for more and more knowledge and power?

### THE NATURE OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE

It is really not science, pure or applied, that is to blame for our miserable plight, but a particular outlook or philosophy of life based on the findings of some of the physical sciences. The great success science has achieved is due to the self-imposed limits within which it has worked. Science has confined itself to the knowledge of impersonal facts of objective experience and has tried to formulate a working thought-model of the world around us with the help of the intellect working on the data collected by verifiable and shareable observation and experiments. It is satisfied with description, classification, and explanation of one phenomenon in terms of other intelligible phenomena. It tries to avoid all reference to unverifiable ultimate realities and to human feelings and values. It tries to reduce the variety of its data to a common denominator which may be amenable to mathematical calculation and formulization. Our objective world, which is in itself an abstraction from our total experience, being vast and varied, scientists had to approach it piecemeal; and this division of labour gave rise to a large number of sciences dealing with the different aspects of nature but following more or less the same method of investigation. Success was inevitable and humanity came to possess greater and greater theoretical and practical knowledge in narrower and narrower fields of experience. Thus we have today experts and specialists, who have greatest acquaintance with minutest things and who know very little about other things in the world. They are apt to see the whole world with the glasses coloured by their experience in the narrowest field of nature.

### LIFE—PROBLEMS UNSOLVED BY SCIENCE

Scientists, students of science, and common men affected by science, are, after all, human beings. They have problems, theoretical as well as practical, which extend beyond the narrow limits of science and which press for their solution. There are certain questions which every human being, unless he is an idiot, likes to be answered. Some of them are: What am I? How am I related to the world and to other beings in the world? What happens to a person when he dies? Is my birth an accidental coming into being? Why



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inequality and differences in men? Is there any purpose of goal which I should strive to attain here or here-after? Are some actions right and others wrong, and do they affect me favourably or unfavourably? Am I free to make a choice between two courses of action open to me? Is nature or the universe hostile, in different, kind or benign to man? Is there any intelligence behind the processes of nature? Was the world ever created by some intelligent being? If so, what is its nature and power, and how is it disposed towards its creation and the creatures therein? What is the ultimate nature of the stuff of which the world is made? Is it one, two, or many? If two, or many, how are they related? If one, how has the plurality and variety been created? What is knowledge? How is the subject of knowledge related to objects? When is knowledge regarded as valid? Is there anything like Truth, Goodness, and Beauty? Is life worth living? What is happiness? Can it be attained? If so, how?

### SCIENTIFIC SUPPORT TO MATERIALISTIC VIEW OF LIFE

Genuine scientists who are experts and specialists in their own particular fields and who are too busy with their special problems plead ignorant and refuse to answer such questions. Pseudoscientists, fanatic admirers of science, and scientists who go out of their way, do attempt to answer them or some of them. But their answers are coloured by and soaked in the limited knowledge of a particular aspect of nature or life, with which they are specially acquainted. The basic sciences—mathematics, physics, chemistry and biology—ideal with only physical entities, forms, qualities and the laws governing them; and, therefore, an outlook of life and universe built around their findings cannot but be materialistic. All questions of life and death are answered in this science-ridden age in terms of the known laws of these sciences, and it is forgotten that there is in man something which defies materialistic and mechanistic explanation. Materialism, which in some form or other, has always existed in the world, has now gained great status, and is the most popular outlook today on account of a false belief common to mankind that it is the only outlook which science supports.

### THE MATERIALISTIC OUTLOOK ON LIFE AND ITS COSEQUENCES

According to materialism man is a product of nature and is wholly governed by mechanical laws. There is nothing like a soul or spirit in him. Even the mind is not anything immaterial. Consciousness and other mental processes and activities are either movements or products or functions of the brain and the nervous system. Life and consciousness are accidental, and recent phenomena in the history



of the world, originating out of material forces, which have been in operation for an incalculable period of time. In such a material and blindly and mechanically working universe there is no place for God, and there is no possibility of survival or immortality. An individual is nothing more than an effect of natural causes, heredity and environment. He has no power and freedom to carve out a destiny for himself. There is no final meaning or purpose of life which is governed by blind forces of nature. Individual life begins with birth and ends in death. Nature is indifferent to life, which it produces in abundance and destroys ruthlessly.

Serious consequences have followed from this doctrine. It has made man sceptic about all that was formerly regarded as valuable, sacred and holy. It has exploded belief in the spiritual ends of life. It has crushed faith in Truth, Goodness and Beauty, as the highest values of life. It has deprived man of the support of the Deity, and of the hope of Heaven. Under its influence man now thinks of truth as expediency, of goodness as prudence, and of beauty as attractiveness. Under its spell man insists upon "the right to the unfettered enjoyment of the pleasures of moment". Spiritual life is regarded as an escape, religion as an opiate, and mystic experience as an illusion. There can be no doubt that our present day malady is due to the wide-spread of such an outlook on life.

### INDIA NEEDS MORE AND MORE OF SCIENCE

What then is the remedy from which the world suffers today? Certainly not bidding a good-bye to science and technology. It is not possible nor even desirable. Scientific method, the great knowledge that science has given us, and the technical skill and gadgets we now possess, are great achievements of human intellect; and we should be proud of them. We should make greater and greater use of them, particularly in India which lags behind other countries in having them. What is actually to be given up is the narrow, incomplete and wrong outlook which has been built on the basis of a few physical sciences.

### HISTORICAL RELIGIONS NOT HELPFUL

Will the revival or acceptance of any one or all of the historical religions help? Certainly not. Simply because there is much in all religions which is in conflict with the findings of science, and which the modern man cannot accept and believe. Most of them are based on wrong concepts of history, geography, physics, chemistry, geology, astronomy, biology, psychology, anthropology, and sociology. Most of them require blind faith in prophets and scriptures. Most of the



doctrines of the same religion are self-contradictory, and all the religions are at variance with one another on the major issues of life. They need not be revived in their old historical forms, simply because they do not suit man in the age of science. A scientific age needs a scientific religion, which is yet to be born.

### ETHICAL TEACHINGS OF ANCIENT SAGES ARE INEFFECTIVE

Can the ethical teachings of great saints and sages of history help the modern man? Certainly not. Most of them are merely exhortative, self-conflicting, unsystematic, unnatural and irrational. Often they are based on wrong religious beliefs or on unproved or unprovable assumptions. Their demands are impracticable; and often they demand too much of sacrifice from the individual without giving any satisfactory reason. Modern man needs a scientific, secular and rational ethics based on complete scientific data about man.

### NEED OF A MORE COMPREHENSIVE AND SOUNDER PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE

There is a well-known proverb: Iron alone cuts iron. We have seen that our present malady is due to a wrong outlook on life based on the findings of a few physical sciences. To counteract the effect of a wrong philosophy of life we need building up a correct one on the basis of all that the various branches of science have upto this time discovered about man and the universe, and also on the basis of all other aspects of human experience which have not yet been studied by science of account of the method to which science is avowed being incapable of noticing and investigating them.

### PHILOSOPHY SHOULD BE BASED ON DEEPER UNDERSTANDING OF MAN.

All scientists now admit that science has not investigated all the aspects of the universe and man, and that it is incapable of doing so by virtue of its selfimposed limitations. In formulating a complete and comprehensive and, therefore, satisfactory view of the world, we shall have to take into consideration all the facets of experience, and particularly all sides of human life. Man being a part and product of the universe, a proper and full understanding of man must be regarded as a key to the understanding of the universe. And particularly so, because it is only in man that most of the potentialities of the world seem to have become actualised, he being the last evolute; and also because it is in himself alone that man, the creator of all sciences, is conscious and can be conscious of all the facets of reality. We know the external world only through our senses, but we know ourselves in many more ways.



It is, therefore, wrong to interpret man in terms of the knowledge of the external world alone gained through the senses. On the other hand, it is right to interpret the universe and nature in terms of the knowledge gained by understanding man as deeply and comprehensively as possible. It is no use criticising this method as anthropomorphic. All knowledge being ultimately human and to a great extent subjective, all science is anthropomorphic. Hence the only remedy of our present day troubles is a deep and comprehensive understanding of man and thereupon building a more healthy philosophy of life than the one which prevails today. Most of our problems today being human problems—the misuse of science and technology being one—a right understanding of man and building our society and government accordingly is the only way out of the present trouble.

One may ask here : Is complete and correct understanding of man possible in view of the fact that we know so little of him yet ? Yes, much of what man completely is remains unknown and may remain so far a long time to come; and so a complete understanding of him is not possible on incomplete data. But more and more knowledge of man gathered from all possible scientific data and from other sources, yet untapped by science, shall certainly enable us to correct our false view constructed on the basis of very scanty data collected by only a few sciences which do not have man as their chief concern. To be rid of false views, to know that we are deluded, is itself a great achievement, and a great step towards building a more comprehensive, and, therefore, more correct view.

With this purpose in view, let us have a brief survey of all that we have come to know about man through the piece-meal attempts of various scientific, empirical and analytical approaches hitherto made.

### PHYSICS AND MAN

*Physics* deals with and confines itself to matter, its constitution, its forces and forms. It tries to understand the nature of time, space, energy, light, heat, electricity, magnetism, and sound etc., and discovers laws of their action, reaction, and interaction. Human body, being a physical object, and, as such, a part of the physical world, is an object of the study of physics. It regards the body as a form of matter, which has come out of matter and goes back to matter. It is subject to the influences of all the material forces of nature. For example, the body can thrive only within a certain range of temperature of the earth depends upon the radiation of the Sun, the distance of the earth from the Sun, and the rate of the rotational speed of the earth. The extent and density of the atmosphere around the earth, the



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tiltage of the earth's axis, the distance of the moon from the earth and the gravitational pull of the earth affect our very existence. Physics, therefore, holds that man is a part of nature, and is completely determined by natural forces. It has no interest in anything else in man. It does not try to observe, understand, and explain vital, mental and spiritual aspects of man.

### CHEMISTRY AND MAN

*Chemistry* studies and confines itself to the various kinds and composition of matter, the amount and kind of energy required for bringing about changes in the forms of matter, and the laws which govern the changes. Human body is material and is composed of parts which have chemical properties and undergo changes which affect their properties. Recent discoveries in chemistry have brought to light chemical changes in the body which affect the life-processes, determine instinctive and emotional reactions in the body, mould its frame, and determine the temperament and character of individuals. Man cannot exist, grow and work without taking in required amount of proteins, fats, carbohydrates, minerals, water, oxygen, and vitamins, which are all chemical compounds. To digest foods certain enzymes, which have strong chemical reaction, are required, and they are generated within the body by the internal chemical factories, called glands. There is a special kind of glands—pineal, pituitary, thyroid, thymus, adrenal, and gonads—which secrete certain strong chemical substances, called hormones, which directly fall into the blood-stream and produce marvellous effects on the temperament, behaviour and personality of the individual. Drugs which have stimulating or depressing action on the organs of the body and on the body as a whole, are great chemical agents which greatly affect the health and character of the individual. Medical science is a branch of chemistry, and medicines play a very important role in bringing about extra-ordinary changes in the personality of man. Chemistry, therefore, claims to hold the key to understanding, changing and controlling human personality, which is chemical in its structure and function. There is, however, much more in man than what is known to chemistry and which cannot be explained in chemical terms.

### BIOLOGY AND MAN

*Biology* distinguishes the living from the non-living among the being in the universe, and studies the countless forms and functions of the former. Some biologists who are not biased towards physical and chemical explanations of life-phenomena and their functions, think that life is *sui generis* and cannot be understood and explained in terms of physical forces and chemical changes and properties alone.



Man is a highly complex living being; hence an object of biological study. All living beings, including man, differ from non-living ones in having the following characteristics: (a) Metabolism, which consists in digestion, dissimilation, and assimilation of food, (b) growth and development, and (c) reproduction of its own kind. The smallest unit of life is a cell which is made of protoplasm, a unique kind of chemical compound. Animals are unicellular and multicellular. All multicellular animals, including man, perform the following functions with specialised organs and systems: holding and protecting the vital organs movement and locomotion, digestion, respiration, circulation of blood, excretion of unrequired material, conduction or transmission of impulses from one part in the body to another, sensation, internal secretion of hormones, and reproduction. Biologically man is only a more complicated animal with greater unification of the systems of organs. He seems to have appeared late in the pageant of life. The laws of heredity of parental biological traits are almost the same in all those living beings which multiply by the union of male and female. Physiology, a branch of biology, which specializes in the study of the functions of the organs and systems of the body, has come to the conclusion that all mental activities of man are correlated with and therefore dependent upon the functions of the brain and the nervous system. The human brain is a very complicated organ and therein lies, according to physiology, the secret of entire human behaviour. A little malfunctioning of any part of the brain may cause serious aberrations in human conduct. Brain surgery and medicines which bring about chemical changes in the brain are now regarded as effective treatment of all mental troubles of man. Biology does not postulate the existence of mind or soul as something apart from the body. Biology leaves many aspects of human personality unexplained, they are observed by psychology and other sciences of man.

### SCIENTIFIC PSYCHOLOGY AND MAN

*Psychology* is the science of the mental aspects of man. It aims at understanding how men know, feel and act. Mental processes not being open to scientific observation and experiment, self-observation or introspection and its report are admitted as a part of psychological method. Psychology claiming to be a science, an attempt, however, is made to make it as objective and experimental as possible and to avoid the use of introspective report. So, strictly scientific psychology now avoids all reference to subjective states and confines itself to observable and measurable reactions of the organism as a whole. As there is no final agreement on some principal issues among psychologists, there are several schools in contemporary psychology.



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Watson, the founder of Behaviourism, has tried to make psychology, a purely objective science like physics, chemistry and biology, discarding the use of all subjective **terms** like sensation, attention, thought, consciousness, feeling, emotion, intention, and will etc. He considers man as a highly complex machine, governed by mechanical, chemical and biological laws. All human behaviour which is the subject-matter of psychology, however complex and organised, is built up by reflexes and conditioned reflexes. All learning is conditioned behaviour.

Gestalt Psychology does not proceed by analysing complex mental phenomena into parts. It studies all mental and even psycho-physical processes as unanalyzable wholes. For, it is not the component parts that determine the character of the whole and indivisible mental states by the addition or fusion of functions and qualities; the wholes have their own specific qualities and functions. These determine the nature and functions of the component parts. Personality, with which psychology is mainly concerned, is the development of the psycho-physiological organism as a "peculiar kind of system" (Koffka), which maintains its own orderly equilibrium and special and temporal unity as it evolves and interacts with the world. The nucleus of the personality is the ego, which represents and incorporates the peculiar needs and ambitions of the individual.

McDougall led a reaction against the material, mechanistic and non-purposive view of animal and human behaviour and founded a new school of psychology, called **Hormic** or **Purposive Psychology**. Although psychology is still defined by him as the science of behaviour, all behaviour, according to him, is purposive; and it begins not with reflexes but with complex and unanalyzable instincts. An instinct is a purposive reaction of the individual as a whole. It is defined as an innate disposition which determines the organism to perceive any object of a certain class, and to experience in its presence a certain emotional excitement and an impulse to action which finds expression in a specific mode of behaviour in relation to that object." All instincts serve some purpose of the organism, no matter whether it is conscious or unconscious. They combine with other instincts and give rise to complex behaviour and sentiments. All sentiments and behaviour patterns organised around the sentiment of self-regard constitute a personality.

Although a few psychologists still retain the name of self as a necessary subject of all our mental processes, psychology in general nowadays does not talk about the soul, self, mind or consciousness. It only deals with the concrete personality and the way in which



it is formed and organised, and how it develops and undergoes changes under the influence of heredity and environment. A typical definition of personality given by Morton Prince is "The sum-total of all the biological innate dispositions, impulses, tendencies, appetites and instincts of the individual, and the acquired dispositions and tendencies, acquired by experience". (*The Unconscious*; p. 532). Warren and Charmichael say, "Personality is the entire mental organization at any stage of its development. It embraces every phase of human character, intellect, temperament, skill, and every attitude that has been built up in the course of one's life". (*Elements of Personality*, p. 48).

Psychology, although originally a science of soul (psyche), leaves many a problem of human life in the dark in its zeal to become an objective science. It does not give any satisfactory explanation of awareness, of identity and continuity despite constant changes in the psycho-physical organism, of memory and recognition, of the feeling of being a free agent of one's actions, of dreams, of differences in intelligence, of performances of geniuses, of mystic experiences, and of paranormal phenomena, which are facts of human experience.

### SOCIOLOGY AND MAN

*Sociology* reveals a very important and essential aspect of man, namely, social. Most of what man is built on the contribution from the society in which he lives; and most of his behaviour depends upon the particular social situation in which he is placed. What a man eats, thinks, and aspires for; the way in which he speaks and dresses; the gods he worships; his attitude and behaviour towards the members of the other sex; and the knowledge he acquires—all are determined by the group or community of which he is an insignificant member. His own thoughts and actions, in their turn, and particularly those of great and powerful individuals, produce their indelible influence on society. Communities and their *weltenshaung* live longer, and continue to determine the thoughts and behaviour of generations of individuals.

### MAN AS KNOWN TO PSYCHOANALYSIS

*Psychoanalysis* and its offshoots, Individual Psychology and Analytical Psychology, all now going by the name of Depth Psychology, have gone far deeper into the nature of man than the orthodox scientific psychology has been able to do. They regard man as a purely mental structure governed by its own laws, which are quite different from physical, chemical and biological ones. Depth psychology has discovered that man is not confined to what he is conscious of with-



in himself at any time. His personality extends to unknown and unfathomed depths of which he himself is not aware. The psychic causes of many happenings in our conscious life lie and function in this deeper region. Our personalities are like ice-bergs only a little of which is seen above the surface of water. According to psychoanalysis of Sigmund Freud our minds have three strata of existence, namely, the conscious, the foreconscious, and the unconscious. The conscious is that of which we are usually aware and with which we identify ourselves. The foreconscious is that which retains those impressions of our past experience which can easily be recalled and used. The unconscious is the deepest layer of our mind far removed from the conscious. The contents of this region can be brought to consciousness with great difficulty and by special methods devised by psychoanalysis. Or they come to consciousness by their own laws of expression.

As our conscious life is more or less a life adapted to reality which consists of our natural and social environment, and of moral ideals and restraints, all that is in the unconscious and seeks for expression cannot be allowed to enter consciousness. A kind of censorship is exercised at the threshold. There are moments and occasions, however, when the censor is not on its guard, when it is weak or slackened, or when it does not function at all. At such times the unconscious contents rush to consciousness, singly or in groups, called complexes, systematically or chaotically. Some very strong and persistent complexes or single contents do not wait for such occasions, and therefore take a disguised form, and escape through the censor, and thus force themselves upon consciousness. Thus we have dreams, slips of pen and tongue, undue forgetfulness, obsessions, unaccountable fears and anxiety, compulsions, neuroses, psychoses, hallucinations, illusions and delusions etc. Very often the unconscious complexes continue to be underground, but their effects are experienced in the conscious mind.

From the point of view of the contents and their qualities the total personality of man is regarded as composed of three factors, namely, Id, Ego and Super-ego. The id is our primitive nature consisting of all sorts of irrational and animal urges, illogical affects, selfish, aggressive, sexual, amoral and antisocial wishes which characterise a baby. It is governed by pleasure-principle. Under the pressure of the external world and environment, a part of the id gets organised in the form of the ego, whose activities are governed by the reality-principle. Under the influence of the exhortations and fear of the parents, and under social pressure and demand, a super-ego



or moral conscience develops out of the ego and the id both. It is partly conscious and partly unconscious in its operation. The realm of the id is not governed by rational, moral or aesthetic considerations. Judged from the standard of a cultured and socially developed man, the baby in whom the id functions in its original form, is "polymorphously perverse", according to the discoveries of Freud.

The most predominant urge in the id is that of love or sex; Freud calls it Libido. In the life of a baby it finds expression in a number of "component instincts" associated with sensitive parts and organs of the body and with aggression. The young baby takes pleasure in exercising them. In the course of normal development the component instincts get co-ordinated and organised under the leadership of the genital instinct. With regard to the object of the libido, during its development, three main stages have been discovered, viz, auto-erotic, narcissistic, and allo-erotic. The chief feature of the all-erotic stage at an early age is the oedipus complex, i.e., affectionate attachment to the parent of the opposite sex. After a period of sexual latency before puberty, there comes a stage of homosexuality, which is normally followed by hetero-sexuality (love for the opposite sex), which is the normal feature of sex-life. On account of various difficulties and frustrations an individual may either get fixated at a particular stage or may regress to an earlier one and thus may not grow into a normal heterosexual individual. A correct knowledge of one's libido-development gives a clue to one's character.

Thus, according to psychoanalysis man is, at his very base, selfish, hedonistic, aggressive, sexual, asocial, if not immoral and antisocial, and irrational. We start in life as "polymorphously perverse" and in our unconscious we ever remain so. Our civilization and culture are only skin deep and built under the pressure of reality, which originally we never like to face. Under stress and strain, under insurmountable difficulties and frustrations, and under the influence of unconscious factors, we tend to revert to our original nature of brute-instincts.

### SUPERNORMAL POWERS OF MAN DISCOVERED BY PARAPSYCHOLOGY

*Psychical Research* gives us a glimpse of another aspect of man which has not yet been studied and investigated by any other science. It is a scientific investigation into those strange in human life and those extraordinary powers and faculties of man which have always been regarded as matters of fact by the common man, but which were never before seriously studied and examined by investigators trained in modern scientific method. Prefixed by a number of stray and in-



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dividual investigations which had brought to light many a strange phenomenon, a Society for Psychical Research was organised in England in 1882 to make a systematic and scientific investigation into the alleged and reported strange occurrences. Within the last 76 years this Society, and many others in other countries with the same end in view, and also many individual scientific investigators, have been able to collect such varied and important data as cannot be ignored by serious investigators of human nature.

The most important and startling discovery of psychical research now also called Parapsychology, is that man, and some men particularly and in greater degree, is capable of acquiring knowledge of objects, and of thoughts and feelings of others, without the usual means of knowledge, by the direct action of mind. This supernormal kind of knowledge, formerly called clairvoyance, lucidity and cryptesthesia, is now called Extrasensory Perception (in short ESP) by Dr. Rhine of the Duck University in U.S.A. It finds expression in various forms and manners such as Telepathy (communication of thoughts, experiences, and feelings of one mind to another at a distance without the use of normal means), Clairvoyance (in a restricted sense meaning seeing, without the use of eyes, events taking place at a distance), Clairaudience (hearing sounds and words which convey information of distant events without the use of ears), Precognition (non-inferential knowledge of future happenings), Retro-cognition (direct knowledge of events that happened in the distant past), Psychometry (power of acquiring knowledge of event of a person's life by simply holding or handling some object used by him), Dowsing (divining the presence of water or minerals underneath the earth), Crystal-gazing (seeing veridical scenes in a brilliant reflecting surface), Automatic Writing (scribing without volition or consciousness veridical) information, Inspirations of Geniuses, Veridical Statements made by Entranced Persons and verifiable Reminiscences of "Previous life" expressed by babies. All these types of supernormal cognition (ESP) have been very carefully, empirically and experimentally investigated, and have been established as facts by scientifically trained investigators all over the world. ESP or supernormal cognition has been found to have four peculiar features which distinguish it from the normal cognition. (1) It does not stand in need of the use of sense-organs, physical or physiological contact with the object, or even the immediate presence of the object concerned; (2) It does not work under the limitations of space. Distance does not affect its operation; (3) Its function is not limited in time. It operates equally well in the present past and future; (4) It is not always under the conscious control of the person who exercises it.



Another class of very important supernormal phenomena studied and investigated by psychical research is what was called Telekinesis by earlier investigators and is now called Psychokinesis by Dr. Rhine. The former term literally means production of movements at a distance and the latter means movements effected by mind. The idea underlying both the terms is that the mind is capable of moving or lifting thing at a distance from the body without any physical contact between one's physical body and the external material object. This power of mind is symbolised by Dr. Rhine as PK. He brings both ESP and PK under one symbol PSI. According to him and many other investigators, Psi capacity is not very rare. It is potentially possessed by all human beings and perhaps by animals too. In his latest work, *Parapsychology*, Dr. Rhine writes, "The capacity is, therefore, a normal equipment of the species".

A third type of paranormal, rather unknown normal, phenomena, investigated by psychical researchers and other investigators is what may be called super-normal psycho-physiological effects, which are observed in miraculous cures of physical ailments, effected by suggestion, hypnosis, prayer and creative imagination; in extra-ordinary control over the autonomic nervous system and the organs controlled by it, found in case of *yogis* and *fakirs*; in cases studied by psychosomatic medicine; and in all treatments brought about by Christian Science, New Thought, and the use of *mantras* (incantations). All such cases evince a remarkable power of the mind over the body.

Still more and perhaps the most remarkable facts investigated by psychical research are Astral Projection, Materialization, Ghosts, Apparitions, Haunted Houses, Trance-personalities and Remembrance of Previous Life. In astral projection, a person can, while alive, temporarily go out of the physical body, roam about, show himself to his friends and relatives, and return with memories of his sojourn. In materialization, temporary living forms of human body or its limbs, like face, hands and larynx, are created and formed out of a strange substance, called ectoplasm, supplied by the body of an individual present near by. These materialized forms do often resemble those of some persons no longer present in the world. Prof. Richet, in his *Thirty Years of Psychical Research*, writes about materialization, "Absurd, but no matter it is true" (p. 544). In the phenomenon of ghosts and apparitions, and haunted houses we see visions of persons are either already dead, or are still living elsewhere. In trance-personality we have a very strange phenomenon of a person passing into a trance or temporary and partial or complete suspension of consciousness, and his body and speech being apparently used by those who no lon-



ger exist in the world. In cases of memories of the previous life we find young children remembering some events which occurred in the lives of persons who died long ago and with whom identity is claimed. Such cases are quite common in India.

On the basis of these data psychical researchers, many of whom are great scientists and philosophers of the world, have come to a conclusion that man is not the physical body alone, that his mental activities are not merely the functions of his bodily organs and systems, that in his deeper nature he is not merely the unconscious and brutish id, but, on the other hand, some very superior type of psychic principle. This psychic principle, call it mind or soul, is capable of existing and functioning independently of the physical body. As such, it survives the death of its physical body with which it was temporarily associated. Before getting associated with the present body, it must have been associated with some other body, now dead and gone, whose life it sometimes recalls. Potentially, this psychic principle has great powers of knowledge and action. It is capable of effecting a lot of changes in the physical body. This psychic principle is not governed by mechanical laws of matter and is not limited in its operations by time and space. It is not born with the body, nor does it perish with it. It has got a life and being of its own, and perhaps, in a psychic world different from the physical one.

### EXPERIENCE OF MYSTICS

*Mysticism* is an attempt to withdraw from the affairs of the external world and from the activities of the physical body into the being of the psychic principle in order to understand and realize its nature and potentialities. In this attempt the mystic comes to have very strange and fascinating experiences within himself. When the mystic passes into the deepest recesses of his being, he experiences a state of inner illumination in which all sense of individuality is lost, in which no kind of duality or multiplicity is experienced, and in which there is a feeling of supreme delight which was never experienced in the enjoyment of sense-pleasures. In the literature on *Yoga*, Indian mysticism, this unique experience is called *Samadhi*. Here we touch the very essence of our being, and, in the words of Patanjali, exist as "*Swarupmatra eva*" (pure Self alone).

Mystic experiences of various kinds and grades and experience of *Samadhi* are not mere hallucinations. They are facts which can be experienced by all those who follow the particular disciplines which lead the seeker to them. In a complete understanding of man we cannot afford to neglect them. Mystic training is important from an-



other point of view also. As a mystic proceeds alone the path of Self-realization, he automatically gets most of the supernormal powers (*siddhis*) which Psychical Research has discovered some persons to possess sporadically. Great miracles have been performed by the great mystics of the world. In Chapter III of *Yogasutras*, Patanjali makes a mention of the great powers that a yogi comes to acquire in the course of his training in *yoga*.

## EPISTEMOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF HUMAN EXPERIENCE BY ADVAITA VEDANTA

*Epistemological Analysis* of Man by the Advaita Vedanta, which takes note of all the aspects and forms of human experience, and of all the epistemological factors involved in it, is, therefore, capable of doing greater justice to the understanding of man than any science so far has done. Vedantic analysis of human experience is thoroughly systematic, rational and comprehensive. Taking the entire human experience in view, the Vedantist discovers and points out four distinct types in it, namely, Waking, Dream, Deep Dreamless Sleep (slumber) and Mystic Trance (Samadhi).

In the waking experience the subject of experience (Self) is associated and identified with the physical body which functions in the physical world. In this state he is aware of external objects as existing independently of him and of himself as one of the objects of world, all governed by the laws of nature operating in objective and stable, time and space.

When a man is physically tired and goes to bed, his waking experience vanishes and he begins to experience a world of dreams. Here he has a different body to use and a different world to live in. Although the dreamer does not know it, the stuff of the dream world is thought. Everything therein is ideal in structure. The time-space order of the dream is quite different from that of wakefulness. Stability, identity and causality of dream are quite different. Objects and persons, time and space, cause and effect change in no time in dream. The body experienced in dream is quite also different and perform different functions and acts, from the physical body of the wakeful experience and its functions.

In the third state of experience, namely the deep dreamless sleep, both the worlds and bodies of dream and wakefulness pass into nothing, vanish from the experience of the sleeper. Still there is some experience, for on waking we remember to have been in deep sleep when we experienced nothing objective. There we are aware of *no-*



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thing. This experience is characterised by intense pleasure, and every person desires to enjoy it. We do not cease to exist or to be aware in sleep.

Quite different from and perhaps superior to all these states of experience is the fourth state (*turiya*), *Samadhi*, for mystic trance. The deepest state of *Samadhi* is that of objectless and thoughtless experience characterised by supreme delight. Time, space, objectivity, duality, plurality and individuality, all vanish, leaving awareness (consciousness) alone shining in its pristine purity and native joy. There is a feeling of infinity, fullness and satisfaction, which is beyond all description.

Having discovered that man is capable of experiencing these four states of existence, the Vedantist tries to understand the necessary epistemological and metaphysical implications of human experience. Despite variation and changes in the states of experience and their objects, the ultimate experient (subject of experience) remains identically and unalterably the same. It is one and the same subject who experiences all the states and objects or absence of objects therein. Otherwise how could it be said that all the four states are those of the experience of the same subject. That which changes not and remains identically the same in the midst of changing circumstances and environment must certainly be regarded as something different from and independent of them. It is, therefore, clear that the witnessing Self (awareness or consciousness) is something different from the witnessed states and their objects, and it exists in its own right. It is always the subject, and never an object, for to know it as an object we have to presuppose it as the subject of our knowledge.

The Self cannot be a mere series or stream of changing ideas and feelings, for in that case the feeling of personal identity and sameness from birth to death would not be experienced. Consciousness of succession implies a non-successional principle. To experience all the changes from birth to death an unchanging witness is necessary. A continuous and identical principle is presupposed by the fact that we remember past experiences of our life. The consciousness of personal identity and continuity that we all have implies the existence of an identical and unchangeable Self.

This Self cannot be identified with any object experienced in any of the states nor can it be said to have any objective quality, for in the fourth state (*turiya avastha*) it exists as bereft of all objective contents and qualities. The objects and their qualities changing with



the change in states, how could the unchanging Self be identify with any one of them ?

The real nature of the Self, therefore, can only be that which persists unaltered throughout the entire experience. But as we are too much engrossed with the objects and have established identity with some of them, our own existence and nature are thrown out of focus. It is only when we try to discover the Self by analytic thinking and when we have a glimpse of it in samadhi that we come to know what we really are. From the above mentioned considerations we come to a conclusion that the Self in us, whatever it be in its own nature, is one and the same throughout our existence from birth to death, and throughout the changing states of experience.

The question of all questions, however, namely, "Does the Self come into existence at the birth of the physical body and does it perish at its death?" still remains to be answered. The vedantic epistemology gives a very clear and convincing reply: It says that there can be no proof of the birth and death of the Self, for nobody has ever experienced them. Births and deaths of physical bodies alone are witnessed by us, but never of the Self. The Self not being a physical object, no body can perceive it being born or dying. The self alone can be a witness to what happens to itself. It cannot witness its birth for it must pre-exist to witness the event. It cannot witness its death for it must exist at the same time when it is dead. The Self has actually never intuited its birth and death. Its existence has never been touched by myriad changes in its experience. So the Vedanta concludes that the Self, the ultimate subject of our Experience, is eternally present. It transcends time.

That the self is immortal witness of all the states of experience and of all the changes in the physical body, and that in its purest existence it is characterised by joy, is the least that can be said about it. Its real nature in its fullness remains beyond our present state of knowledge. The powers and potentialities of the Self are incalculable and unimaginable, as the yogis who are able to withdraw into the Self by meditation and contemplation come to possess many miraculous powers, some of which have come to the notice of Psychological Research.

The Vedantist further points out that the deeper we go into the experience of the Self the nearer and closer we are to one another (as some of the paranormal experiences indicate), and in the deepest state of Samadhi all differences and distinctions of individuality are obliterated, and a feeling of fullness and perfection is enjoyed



by every one. This indicates that ultimately we are all rooted in the same Self which is the very root, heart and core of the entire world-experience, the Universe. Thus, in Samadhi, we touch the Ultimate Reality in which we are all rooted. It is possible to make this realization perpetual in our every day life.

### VALUE JUDGMENTS, ETHICAL URGE, AND RELIGIOUS ASPIRATIONS OF MAN

*Value Judgments, Ethical Urge, and Religious Aspirations* of man throw still more light on the nature of man. Whatever the particular concepts of truth, goodness and beauty, every man aims at truth in knowing and thinking, at goodness in conduct, and at beauty in creation and appreciation. For the attainment of these he is prepared to undergo hardships and to make sacrifices; and in pursuing them he feels that he is acting like a man. Truth, goodness, and beauty, therefore, seem to be the highest values for man, in comparison to which worldly goods and pleasures are much inferior.

Similarly, men may, and do, differ among themselves in judging whether a particular action is right or wrong, but all men agree that they *ought* to do the right. We seem to have a power of discriminating between right and wrong, and also freedom and power to choose and do the right. No man feels happy after having done wrong. Despite all their sacrifices and sufferings, the righteous alone seem to be happy.

In the same way, men differ in their religious beliefs and practices, but the longings and aspirations which find expression in religion are the same or similar in all men. In spite of all this is contrary in experience, every man desires that his desires should be fulfilled. He longs for immortality, for security, for happiness, for omniscience, for justice in life, for love and goodwill, for victory over suffering, old age and death, and for some secret to get all his desires fulfilled. He has an inner and unshakable faith that he can be what he longs to be with the help of a teacher, prophet or God. All religions are expressions of this faith, hope and imagination. One may agree with Freud that all religions are illusions, but it is difficult to deny that man needs religion to save him from despair, frustration and neuroses. Either nature tantalises and mocks at man or man's innermost longings must be fulfilled here or hereafter.

### WHAT THEN IS MAN ?

Thus, taking all the data about man into consideration, we conclude that man is too deep, too complex, and too many-sided to be



fully understood in terms of any of the objective and physical sciences; and that the materialistic, mechanistic, chemical and biological conception of man is very superficial, partial, and unsatisfactory. A life lived in accordance with this view is a life partially lived, lived on the surface, or on mere fringe, and, therefore, to a great extent, wasted.

Although our knowledge of man is still very meagre, vague and shallow, there is no doubt that in addition to being physically embodied, man is mental and spiritual, and his potentialities which can be actualised here and now are unimaginably great. The highest purpose of life seems to be the unfoldment and realization of spiritual potentialities here and hereafter, for want of which man is miserable. All our social, economic, religious and political institutions and organisations should be conducive and instrumental to this supreme purpose. At present it is not so, simply because the present-day leaders of humanity are ignorant of the real nature and deeper needs of man, and are, therefore, concerned with superficialities of life alone.

### HOW MAN SHOULD LIVE IN THE NEW AGE

Our society, education, economics, politics and religions have to be completely overhauled *to suit the conditions brought about by science and to serve the highest purpose of human life*; We cannot properly and happily live in the new world of today with our old prejudices of race, creed, community, caste, colour or country. Every one of us should cultivate a sense of world-citizenship and human fellowship. We have to realise and feel that the entire earth is our home and all human beings our brothers and sisters. The welfare of entire humanity and not that of a particular group of people should be our guiding principle in all our activities, and organizations. All individuals, groups, communities, nations and races should follow the time-honoured golden rule of conduct, namely, that we ought to behave with others as we wish them to behave with us, and that we ought not to do to any one what we do not want to be done to us. Truth, honesty, justice, non-violence, kindness, goodwill, tolerance, and forgiveness are universally liked by all and should, therefore, be followed in life by all. Our social life should be built on the basis of mutual help, service, co-operation and not on conflict and competition. Right men should be placed in right places irrespective of other considerations. The society should try to safeguard the rights of individuals and the individuals should be mainly concerned with the performance of their duties. Men and women should have the same freedom and privileges, although their functions and duties may be different. Woman should not only have economic independence but she should



## The Malady of the Age

be regarded as the head of the family. She should be free to decide with whom to live and how much progeny she should have. A patriarchal family alone can suit the modern age, if the institution of family is to survive. Although a casteless society is the demand of the age, the occupations of people should be determined by their vocational aptitudes, fitness and training. Once a profession is chosen, a discipline suited to and required by the profession should be strictly observed and followed. Individual life should be planned in accordance with the changing conditions of the body and mind, and in such a manner that all the demands of life—physical, mental, and spiritual—may be satisfied within a life-span. A scientific way of living which will ensure physical, mental and spiritual health should be adopted. The world should have a world-federation on a hierarchical basis, the lowest rung of which should be village and city self-governments. Each higher stage in the hierarchy should be concerned with the management of only those problems which concern it : the world-government should be concerned with world problems alone. Democratic socialism without party system, in which people will elect their representatives of their own free choice, is the most suitable form of government for the present age. Party-system leads to national neurosis and distintegration. The only way to make the world follow the above mentioned suggestions is that the leaders of mankind live by them and educate the masses, not by precept but by example, to follow them. Otherwise there is little hope for mankind.



## *The Philosophy of Values*

*N. K. Devaraja*

### THE ONTOLOGICAL STATUS OF VALUES

There is a general prejudice generated by the empirical scientific temper of our time, that value judgments of all sorts are non-factual—or non experiential—and subjective, to be contrasted with empirical, i.e. experience-based, factual judgments. The prejudice stems mainly from the phenomenon of widespread differences in the valuational perceptions and attitudes among people belonging to diverse culture groups divided by time and space. Thus, while the value perceptions of the people differ in some important respects from one geographical region to another, from continent to continent and country to country and from one racial and religious unit to another, they also tend to change within the same regions or racial and religious communities with their changing historical vicissitudes, if only because important historical changes are often due to emerging new contacts between people brought together by wars of conquest, by newly discovered trade routes and by developments in various spheres of communication including travel and exchange of cultural commodities of varied kinds.

However, at the level of common sense bound up with day-to-day experience, the complementary phenomenon of mutual understanding among peoples of the world cannot be denied. This understanding includes (1) mutual appreciation of basic needs and interests; and (2) acceptance of some norms of propriety and fairness which alone makes passible business transactions of all sorts. Even conflicts centre around commodities desired and claimed by two or more rival and warring parties. (3) Some moral attitudes seem to be fairly common this is revealed by common precepts present in the codes of conduct laid down and accepted by peoples belonging to diverse historical traditions, e.g. the moral code of Hammurabi; the ten command-



ments of Moses, laws of Manu; teachings of Confucious; etc. Sentiments of gratitude and revenge, appreciation of kindness and generosity; attitudes of fear of the powerful, respect for learning and wisdom, admiration for courage and bravery are fairly common in most of the known societies. At higher cultural levels we find shared admiration for some literary classics, e.g. the *Panchatantra*, the *Arabian Nights*, great epics like the *Illiad*, the *Ramayana* and the *Mahabharata*, the *Shahnama* of Firdausi, the *Rubaiyat* of Umar Khaiyyam and the like. Here it may be remembered that literary works embody not only aesthetic values but also moral attitudes of and towards various characters heroes and heroines, villains, men and women exhibiting virtues of courage, kindness, rectitude and the like on one side and the vices and shortcomings such as cowardice and cruelty on the other side. As one author observes. We do not know of societies in which bravery is despised and cowardice help up to honour, in which generosity is considered a vice and ingratitude a virtue.<sup>1</sup> Other writers have drawn our attention to the linguistic universals that characterize the human languages in all the societies, e.g.; the characteristics of number (singular-plural), gender (masculine-feminine), person (first, second, third), tenses (past, present, future, and the like.<sup>2</sup> Phenomena like these seem to justify our belief in a common humanity or human nature, the variety of expressions of that nature being due to two factors; the malleability of that nature and the facts of creativity and freedom of man, coupled with the plurality of interests, that find expression in his exercise of choice in regard to both ends and means on different occasions in his individual and group life.

Having indicated, in brief, the fact of the commonality or shareability of some value perceptions in men that cuts across their historical and cultural divisions we shall try to ascertain their ontological statue or mode of being. That makes it necessary for us to compare and contrast values or value perceptions with facts or factual perceptions. Briefly, the apprehension of both facts and values interpretation, which consists in assigning *meanings* to the phenomena directly encountered in experience. These constitute the raw material of experience on which the interpretive activity of men is directed.

Two great thinkers of India and the West, the Buddhist logician Dinnaga and the German philosopher Immanuel logician Dinnage

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- 1 See Soloman E. Asch, "A Critique of the Psychology of Cultural-Relativism" in (ed) Richard B. Brandt, *Value and Obligation* (New York : Harcourt Brace and World, Inc., 1961), p. 483.
  - 2 For reference see the present writer's *Freedom Creativity and Value* (New Delhi—27 : Indus Publishing Co., 1988), pp. 212-13.



and the German philosophers Immanuel Kant, stressed the fact the the raw material of sensations or sense data is converted into perceptions of meaningful objects by the application of various categories. In this connection Dinnaga refers to the processess of naming and the application of class terms. Kant, as is well known, draws a table of twelve categories whose application generates several types of logical judgments, i.e. those of quality, quantity, relation and modality. It is generally recognised that the derivation of the categories from the traditional logical table of judgements is critically unjustified. Also the table of categories, including the concepts of space and time is incomplete in as much as it does not cover all aspects of human experience, e.g. moral—aesthetic and religious. Kant was thinking primarily about sense-experience that presents physical objects while enumerating his categories and types of judgment in the first *Cretique*. What, then is the source of these and other broader categories of thought? I may here add that, in my scheme of ideas, application of categories to what is immediately given in experience is termed interpretation. The interpretive activity, according to us, is involved in the apprehension of both facts and values. Before, however, I proceed to explain the mechanism involved in the said activity I shall try to explain the nature and significance of that activity.

### A theory of Communication

We are constantly engaged in conversational and other forms of communication with fellow humans. What is it that we communicate through the use of words? Not the raw sensations or sense data which are essentially private and so incommunicable. What we succeed in conveying through symbols or combinations of symbols, linguistic numerical and other kinds of them, are—I venture to suggest—meanings of diverse sorts. The meaning of a symbolized aspect of a thing is the relevance it indicates or has relative to one or other interest or purpose deriving from an interest, that prompts conversation or other forms of communication. Now these interests and or purposes may be pragmatic or utilitarian, aesthetic or moral, and the like. Notice that the term “meaning” in the present context is not identical with or assimilable to the semantic meaning indicated by a word or symbol. To begin with the semantic or denotative meaning is assigned to a word or symbol by ostensive definition: it is intended to facilitate the identification of an object, a quality or a relation by ostensive or direct reference, ‘Gradually, it comes to refer to a class of objects, qualities or relations or even processes, which tend to serve a common purpose, by indication of an aspect or function of the members of the said class relevant for the purposes



of the concerned speaker and the hearer. This relevant aspect or function is what is here being called "meaning"; that meaning is what the symbols used between the speaker and the hearer are intended to convey and actually succeed in conveying. It may be noted that the same word may convey different meanings in different contexts. Thus, normally the word 'chair' means an object with a certain shape and form which, though not invariant, serve an identical purpose of accommodating a person in the sitting posture. But in the sentence, 'he hurled that heavy chair on the assailant', the characteristic of the chair that would be of interest to all concerned will be its size and weight and the capacity to hurt or injure all depending on the material of which it happened to be made. The example also shows how the same object or situation may be put to different uses by the persons pursuing different ends. Since identification of an object is the pre-condition of putting it to some use, identifying marks of an object, force or process loom large in their scientific description.

As the case of chair's being hurled at an adversary or assailant shows, the meaning of an object relevant to a situation may be *suggested* to a person enabling him to make a novel, purposeful use of it in a given situation. At a different level the poet makes a novel use of word-symbols while combining them in a manner productive of a new pattern of meanings or a new meaningful whole having, among others, the quality of strangeness or *chamatkara*.

Now facts arise in consequence of the interpretation put on objects in-relation in the first instance. At higher levels of abstraction conceptual entities, too, come to be viewed as objects to which qualities and relations may be attributed thus giving rise to a more abstract level of facts. In any case factual discourse is discourse about meanings relevant for a particular purpose in a given context.

I shall now explain the nature of values with special reference to moral values. Moral valuations are put on behavioral phenomena viewed as bearers of pragmatic meanings. A pragmatic meaning is one that is seen as productive of utility or disutility for a conscious being. The conscious being in question may be an agent or a patient in relation to an action or a series of acts. *Only such a series of acts qualifies for description in moral terms.* A series of voluntary movements qualifies to be called an action if it is directed towards the production of a tangible utility or value; it qualifies for description as a moral action when the utility (or disutility) produced affects a conscious being or group of such beings other than the agent as a result of course, of the intentions of the agent concerned. The moral value



attributed to an action is a characteristic that is sense as qualifying the action in consequence of an interpretation given to its utilitarian aspect.

Thus the perception of a value involves twofold or rather threefold interpretation: of a series of movements as voluntary and meaningful; interpretation of those movements as productive of tangible, intended utilities or disutilities; and interpretation of the utilities as affecting another party that deserved or did not deserve the utilities (or disutilities) accruing to it as the result of the movements in so far as it was intended by the agent concerned.

### OBJECTIVITY OF FACTS AND VALUES

The present writer holds with Nietzsche that facts are (arise out of) interpretations. I try to define interpretation as consisting in assigning meaning to (1) the data of direct sensory experience; and (2) the conceptual complexes fashioned out of meanings and held before the mind's eye as it were hypostatised as entities. In fact, even physical science deals mostly with such entities, though it seeks contact with the directly seen or observed in the process of verificatory predictions. The meaning component of the seen and observed being subjective, I have characterised facts as being subjectively objective. In this context objectivity can only mean the capability to figure in inter-subjective experience. Such experience can, properly speaking, relate only to meanings, and not to raw material presented in sensations which, taken in the sense both of the process of awareness and the object there of, is purely subjective.

The assignment of meanings to the sense-data is determined by some fundamental interests that are ultimately rooted in human constitution. These interests are being a pervasive feature of man as a distinct species of living beings escape notice as determinants of the interpretive process, particularly in the initial stages of sense experience or even in observation. However, as human experience gets more complicated, the primary interests get mixed up with derivative or secondary interests of diverse kinds, and the interpretive process diversifies into distinct, now related, now disparate, modes of perception and conceptual comprehension in different cultures or cultural regions separated by space and time. Within the same culture or tradition, it may be noted, different classes and even individuals tend to see and interpret things and situations differently. This phenomenon of differences gives rise to different modes and grades of objectivity which concept can only be defined with reference to shareability, depending on commonality or community of interests



and perspectives determining perceptions of things and their inter-relations.

Viewed in this light the notion of the absolutely objective or absolute objectivity is meaningless, though it has some as a limiting concept.

The point will bear some elaboration. A distinction had been drawn, particularly by scientists like Galileo, between the so-called primary and secondary qualities; it was assailed by Bishop Berkeley and later on by F. H. Bradley. Recently the concepts of absolute space and absolute time were undermined by Einstein's theory of relativity. The notion of perspectivism, elaborated by sociologists like Karl Mannheim, extends the conception of relativity, or relationism, to the phenomena perceived or conceptualized by men and women belonging to different societies and diverse culture groups within same societies. Thus the world as seen by an uneducated or little educated peasant or labourer is appreciably different from that perceived by well-educated men and women. Even among the latter, there are marked differences of perception as determined or conditioned by their several perspectives. Nor would a modern physicist, or a modern philosopher of science, claim that there are facts or factual data absolutely objective and ultimate givens even in the most carefully conducted experiments. The conclusion is inescapable that the objectivity of facts of all sorts is relative to the instruments used by observers and the perspectives or viewpoints from which the observations are made and recorded by those observers.

This relativistic, diluted conception of objectivity applies *a fortiori* to our perceptions of values. As a matter of fact, in the final analysis, the concept of perspective can not be understood except in terms of one or other purpose or group of inter related purposes. In the circumstances all that we can aspire to attain by way of knowledge or truth or knowledge valid for the universal man, so to say, as distinguished from man as a member of a particular group, class, society or nation.

### The Pre-theoretic Consciousness

The question, "how to achieve or reach the so-called universal human truth?" may be linked up with the idea of pre-theoretic consciousness. For one thing this consciousness is not to be taken to be prelinguistic consciousness for all consciousness, at any rate conceptual consciousness that can be communicated and shared, is bound up, as the great grammarian-philosopher Bhartrihari averred, with the use of words or symbols. That being so the pre-theoretic conscious-



ness may be described as the consciousness that precedes the conscious formulation of ideas and hypothetical schemes of ideas designed as instruments or devices for the organisation or unification of items lying more or less in an unorganised mass in the continuum called the pre-theoretic consciousness.

In principle, the pre-theoretic consciousness, being associated with obvious interests of interest-governed purposes, should be universally shareable, which means that the phenomena apprehended in that consciousness should be formulable as undisputed facts, but several factors interfere to obstruct this development. The most important of these is the unnoticed influence of cultural determination of the perceptions of groups as well as of individuals relating to both factual and axiological phenomena. The cultural heritage of a people embraces their linguistic habits, customary responses relating to various forms of social behaviour, mores and morals, their cosmological and religious beliefs, and the like. All these tend to become parts of common sensical knowledge masquerading as theory free consciousness. The general acceptance of a scientific theory or belief, e.g. the theory of evolution or the belief in the law-governed character of natural phenomena, also effects men's perception and behaviour at the common sense level. Thus the wide spread belief in a creator god, in the theory of reincarnation and in the law of karma according to which our present lot is due to past karma, determine the way the common man in our land tends to view and talk about matters affecting our worldly fortunes, under the circumstances the area of pre-theoretic consciousness tied in its expression to what may be called primary urges, and interests stemming from them tends to reduce to only a fraction of what passes for common sense in knowledge all judgment.

And yet it is this relatively more general or universal stock of commonsensical perception and knowledge that lies at the basis of the possibility of mutual understanding and intercourse among societies inhabiting different region of the earth; it also constitutes the basis of our understanding of relatively more primitive societies. All our historical understanding, too, which implies a degree of agreement in moral perception as well, is made possible by the continuity of at any rate parts of commonsensical comprehension of human affairs.

The pre-theoretic consciousness relates not only to perception and knowledge of facts but also to the perception-call it mental perception or apprehension or knowledge of values. Now the core of the apprehension of values, according to us, is constituted by the perception of *preferability* of one situation or state of affairs, as expressed



in relational complex of meanings of one or other kind, to another. The preferred relational complex may, in a particular case, be known to exist somewhere else or it may be visualisable by imagination; Such sense of preferability determines and goads human creativity in all its form, in social work and socio-economic and political organisation no less than in various fields of symbolic construction, e.g. in painting and poetic composition, in the fashioning of conceptual schemes in various fields, and the like. A careful study of the judgments of preference that are commonly accepted, or seem to be so acceptable, leads to the formulation of the standards and ideals or the criteria of evaluation in the several spheres of values.

The starting-point for organised factual knowledge, as also for organised understanding of values, is the pre-theoretic consciousness of the primary data available respectively in the domains of factual and valuational experience. All forms of sophisticated and more refined understanding achieved by investigators and thinkers at later stages in their work, must ultimately be traceable to that consciousness. In the last analysis, the pre-theoretic consciousness appears as both the starting-point or foundation as well as the final court of appeal for the higher levels of theoretic awareness attained by man through various investigative and speculative processes.



## *Man's Search for Eternal Truth*

*I. C. Sharma*

The purposive force behind world civilization has been man's unquenchable desire to probe—from the outer reaches of the universe to the depth of his own personality. To fathom the secrets of eternal nature and experiences of the inner Self, to glimpse the intimate relation of the spatio-temporal destructible matter and the transcendental indestructible psyche, has been the motivation for our Cultural evolution. The inner urge of man to understand the immutable laws of natural forces, and to overcome the limitation in human mastery of space and time disease, old age and even death, is indicative of the presence of that, which is infinite and eternal,— the soul, self, or Atman, in the finite personality of an individual. When worldly pleasures and sensual enjoyment do not satisfy the inner urge of self-realization then man is in anguish. It is so because he has been separated from his Creator (God), and nothing else than union with God can satisfy his heart's hunger, eternal bliss cannot be experienced at any stage. Man is in search of that eternal Truth.

The analysis and comparison of the vast-fields, covered by scientists, sages and seers are no doubt studies in themselves. But man is mainly concerned to understand Truth, which is eternal, though it appears in many forms, in different relations and dimensions.

Facts suggest that the gradual progress of human knowledge in the fields of science, religion and philosophy, which seems to bringing man nearer the whole Truth, is hinting at the integration of all the specialized branches of knowledge, into one organic pattern, the concept of 'unity in diversity.'

There is no doubt that specialization, which is a recent development in science and technology has been of tremendous practical use to man. The present progress of human society and the growth of social, political and cultural institutions, could not exist without the



specialization of research. It is because of specialization that contemporary society has the advantage of technology for happier life, free from want hunger and disease. The average man in today's affluent society has all the amenities of comfort and ease. Because of specialization in physical, biological and social sciences unprecedented progress has been witnessed in our time. But that same specialization has also created the urgent need to coordinate and compare discoveries of all the particular disciplines and to disseminate the findings through public communication media. Whatever synthesis has been done has pointed to one exciting fact—that all the ways of the search for Truth are converging at one point.

Man is slow in recognizing the unity of Truth and teleology of evolution, being inclined to overemphasize differences at the cost of intuitive vision of unity. Even so, glimpses of the eternal Truth, whether experienced by scientists, philosophers sages or mystics have again and again indicated that the ultimate Truth is one and man is in search of that Truth.

We need here to consider briefly the history of philosophy, which originally encompassed the areas of science and religion, to see how the tower of Babel has been reflected in the history of western thought. The castism in religion, science and philosophy in the Western culture (which is applauded as more progressive and dynamic than oriental) is a strange phenomenon. Though philosophers and scientists disavow tenacity in truth-seeking, a large majority in the West has refused to give up routine methods of research, and has adhered to theories, even at the cost of facts. The same is true of many Western theologians, who have not shed conservatism, even though many honest attempts have been made to reinterpret the theories of philosophy and religion in the light of scientific discoveries. At the other extreme, some have repudiated even the basic truth of religion, even though creative scientists are accepting its possibility. The basic fact, of course, is the existence of God, as supreme Reality, as the unmoved Mover, immanent, as well as transcendent force, ground of all that exists. It is really the greatest anomaly of our age that in the west, there are Godless theologians, affirming "the death of God" as the doctrine.

At the very face of it the statement that "God has died in our own time" and that this death of God is 'ontological' a real death of his Being is logically absurd. One cannot use the term God and also state that He is mortal. It is not clear what the Godless theologians mean by the term God, when they make their aspirations, or what their motives may be, but sensational provocative statements, even



illogical ones, are sure attention getters. Actually, this anomalous attitude is more than likely the outcome of that trend in Western culture, which has effectively isolated philosophy, science and religion from one another.

Research and scientific discovery in the second half of the twentieth century illuminates this blundering bifurcation of knowledge.

Like historians in general, historians of philosophy are prejudiced by one theory or another. The account they give is partial and biased. Only by studying ancient Greek thinkers, from the original sources and reserving judgement, can we discover their errors. A dispassionate study of the philosophers of Greece would show that their sole purpose was to understand the nature of cosmos and the true meaning of human life. For them, especially the great thinkers—Heraclitus, Pythagoras, Socrates Plato and Plotinus, cosmos and man God and on individual soul has intimate relation with each other. In order to understand the purpose of life, the analysis of the physical world and of the relationship of human consciousness to God was necessary. Even the great philosopher Heraclitus is often wrongly depicted, as the philosopher of purely physical change. Enthusiastic modern philosophers have frequently neglected the theological aspect of ancient Greek philosophy. The ancient Greek philosophers were not mere theorists. They existed prior to the prejudices of naturalism, monism, pluralism and realism etc. Their main interest was the expression of their innermost experience.

Today it is popular to say that Socrates was the founder of a theory of knowledge, but unlike Plato had little concern for metaphysical systems. The prejudice of these observations becomes apparent, when Socrates words are studied and one finds that Socrates only expressed the visions and ideas, which were the outcome of his thinking, meditation and intuition. His life demonstrated more than a theoretical belief that man's goal was to rise above worldly limitations. His courageous speeches at the time of his prosecution, his refusal to attempt to escape punishment are the facts of significance. The contemporary historians of philosophy overlook the great emphasis, which Socrates laid on "Taking care of the soul" and the importance of his spiritual experiences—the source of his own beliefs and the source of inspiration to his pupil Plato.

Intuitions and dreams guided Socrates throughout his life. He refused to exchange poison for exile by pleading guilty, not merely because he thought it unethical, but because of prompting from his divine source. Plato's dialogue 'Phaedo' which records the last words of socrates in prison, expresses his life's spiritual and metaphysical



basis. The pupils are astonished at Socrates' courage and calm, who emphatically dwells on the immortality of soul and declares that death is not evil. He further says, "A philosopher must die happily in the cause of truth; because only by death can he hope to attain the greatest good in the other world". According to this great philosopher, pure knowledge is attained, when the soul separates from the body and when God Himself is pleased to release the individual. His intellectual approach in the clarification of concepts and the significance of virtue was always inspired by his inner spiritual urge.

Plato's philosophy has been accepted as primarily spiritual, perhaps even mystical by most of the scholars and the foundation laid by him still stand strong. In the areas of metaphysics of sociology, political sciences and even theology, the profundity of Plato's thought and the depth of his insight are unsurpassed, and the remark of Whithead that "the development of Western philosophy is but a series of footnotes to Plato" is not without foundation. However what most Western philosophers have neglected, is the fact that Plato's theory of "recollection" in which the soul has the potentiality, for all knowledge within itself, and all learning is merely remembering, implies strongly the theory of reincarnation of souls.

Plato's greatest contribution to philosophy is the clarification of the relationship between the spatio-temporal world and the supreme transcendental God. For Plato the soul is like a two-faced mirror, on the one hand, it reflects the world of objects, and on the other and the transcendental Reality or God.

A true philosophy can only arise from spiritual experience, because spirit or soul is the essence of all existence. The term 'spirit' is applied to the infinite basis, both of human personality and of the cosmos. All great philosophers have had access to the power of the spirit and have tried to express their experiences without reservation, as did Plato. Such an expression should be judged in its wholeness, not analyzed or isolated from its context, as contemporary scholars attempt to label Plato a realist, or an idealist, or a monist, or a combination of all these ideologies. We should never forget that the eternal truth is not bound by any limitations or isolated viewpoints. For this reason the findings of such a great philosopher cannot effectively be studied from any particular theoretical point of view. Philosophy is always inspired by the spirit and is inseparable from religion.

Plotinus, who is called a neo-platonist is another victim of the historians of philosophy of Plotinian philosophy primarily was the outcome of his personal inner experience and spiritual development. His own intuitive experiences and meditation led him to his fundamental convictions, concluding that God is the source of all existence.



A multitude of logical proofs for the existence of God, were propounded and Aristotle's theory of causation was commissioned to prove that God is the final and efficient cause of the world. Philosophers in their eagerness to justify theology, ignored the fact the reason is finite and no intellectual exercise can comprehend the nature of an infinite God completely.

Reason can neither prove, nor disprove the concept of God, as the final cause any more than it can resolve whether the hen or egg is first cause. In the middle ages philosophy was subordinated to theology and the reason, in the Aristotelian sense was subjected to faith. Aristotle had admitted with Plato that reason in man was the reflection of the divine element and stressed its practical utility in understanding the physical world. He purposely neglected the spiritual aspect of human personality and thus started a trend toward the dichotomy between the empirical and spiritual worlds.

As a result, theologians in the middle Ages learning secular intellectual growth subordinated philosophy to religious tradition. Prior to this philosophy had been inspired by the spirit of true religious experience. The attempt of the theological philosophy was to derive inspiration from philosophy to establish a stronger foundation for traditional religion. Philosophers forgot that reason is finite, while God is infinite. The truth of reason and the truth of faith nurtures a split personality. The segregation of the truth, the division of the basis reality into any kind of dualism is bound to be abortive in the end. But when intuition is honoured and when the inner experience corroborates the external observation, the diversity is understood in the right perspective. Although differences and duality are not abolished, yet an insight into the underlying unity weaves a coherent and consistent pattern into the differences. Truth is then established as an organic whole of various interrelated parts, which are neither mutually exclusive, nor absolutely independent. Reality is fundamentally one and essentially eternal.

The realization of the spiritual, or the blissful self leads to God-realization, having attained which, the individual rises above all contradictions and antinomies. The self-realization or Moksha, or Jivan Mukti, the liberation attained, while living in the physical body and the Vidhe mukti, or the final release after the physical death is the final goal of every individual for which he takes birth in the human form.



## My Philosophical Outlook

V. A. Devasenapathi

The B. A. Honours course I took during the years 1932-35 at Madras Christian College consisted of seven subjects (a) Indian philosophy; (2) European philosophy (Descartes to Kant); (3) General psychology; (4) Logic and Theory of Knowledge; (5) (Special Subjects): Kant to Hegel; (6) A Prescribed Philosophical works W.R. Sorley's Moral Values and the Idea of God; (7) Essay relating to the above subjects and also of a general character. Lectures on *Introduction to philosophy* were generally on metaphysical problems. Except Indian philosophy, the other five subjects were with reference to Western Philosophy and Western Psychology (ie: Textbooks like those by R.S. Woodworth, Pillsbury, G.F. Stout, William McDougall). My early fascination was for *Advaita*. Absolute Idealism of the West also had its attraction. The popular works of James Jeans and Arthur Eddington weighted the scale in favour of Idealism. After I took my Honours Degree, I joined the Research Department of the University to study a text in Tamil on "Saiva Siddhanta", with six commentaries. I studied Indian Philosophy at College under the guidance of Professor P.N. Srinivasachari (attending inter-collegiate Lectures at Pachaiyappa's College). He was a Visistadvaitin; But he was liberal-minded in his outlook and offered *ADVAITA* as a special subject to his students. It was a great lesson to me during my formative years that commitment to one's system should not exclude study and appreciation of other systems. The University Professor S.S. Suraya Narayana Sastri under whom I did research says in his Principal Millar Lectures that his early attraction was for Pluralism, with a pronounced antipathy to Absolutism whether of the West or of India (Viz. *ADVAITA*) His teacher at Oxford, Prof. Joachim seems to have encouraged him to go the entire way of pluralism so that he could find out himself its limitations and try Absolute Idealism. Professor Sastri says that his conversion to *Advaita* (Absolutism) was neither quick nor easy. When



he guided my research, he encouraged me to think for myself. Thanks to the study of *Sorley's Moral Values and the Idea of God* and, perhaps the unobtrusive but strong influence of Dr. A. G. Hogg, who took the *Kant to Hegel period* and who was himself a student of A. S. Pringle pattison (whose Gifford Lectures were entitled, *The Idea of God*), the theistic trend was slowly developing in my mind. I was feeling that Absolute Idealism, with all its intellectual rigour or perhaps, because of it, did not speak to my condition. Besides, an earlier thesis on *Saiva Siddhanta* written under Professor Sastri's guidance was critical of the theism of *Saiva Siddhanta*, suggesting that its limitations could be overcome only by its acceptance of *Advaita*. When Professor Sastri asked me for my reaction to this thesis, I replied, almost in a whisper, that I would like to defend the theism of *Saiva Siddhanta*. Professor Sastri patted me on the back and from that moment till his passing away in 1942, he always called my attention to books like to *The Philosophical Basis of Theism* (Dawes Hicks), *Towards a Religious Philosophy* (De Burgh) etc., Till the restoration of Ph.D. in 1944 after its abolition in 1935, I had to mark time. My thesis got the award but my regret is that Professor Sastri was not alive to scrutinise the chapters with his critical but sympathetic eye. In subsequent years I have been reading such of the Gifford Lectures as have been available. As a member of the teaching staff of Pachaiyappa's College, Madras, I had to guide Honours students to study F. H. Bradley's *Appearance and Reality* for two consecutive years. Studying it line by line with the students was a rewarding experience. Attending lecturers on *Advaita* and reading expository works through the years has made me move from youthful fascination to respectful admiration for *Advaita*. I must confess that my exposure to Logical Positivism, Linguistic Analysis, Existentialism and Phenomenology has been less than minimal. This is a sad deficiency in my philosophical training.

I fondly hope that my theism is not a formal acceptance due to my Saivite birth. I have had to examine, time and time again, the Saiva Siddhantin's position in regard to the perennial problems of God, soul and the physical world. I may say straight away that I do not share the enthusiasm of Indian thinkers in general and Saiva Siddhantin's in particular that modern science endorses their respective systems. Being an avowedly empirical study, a scientist is at perfect liberty to give up one theory and formulate another when confronted by new findings. Hence I do not feel like claiming that the Saiva Siddhantin's concept of *Maya* is exactly what the contemporary scientist describes as "Matter". Suffice it to say that there is a primordial stuff out of which the material universe and our psycho-physical equipment emerge through various stages.



Now for the other two problems: viz., God and soul, perhaps a word may be said about the esistemological position. What is the ultimate *praman* (means of valid knowledge)? Perception, inference and verbal testimony are the means which will be helpful only as illumined by Jiva Citsakti which in turn is illumined by Sivacitsakti. This is not to write off ordinary perception or inference or the scriptures. They help us only when our understanding is illumined by God's Grace. Of the traditional theories of error, *Anyathakhyati* appeals to me. In other words, if one thing is mistaken for another, both must be real, and one of them must be similar to the other in some respects to cause error. As for theories of truth, coherence theory appeals to me. The two features of coherence are: (1) inclusiveness and (2) harmony. Philosophical systems are *darsanas*, views of Reality. Each one of them deserves attention as an actually experienced view, not just an exercise in intellectual speculation. Thus from the materialist (*carvaka*) to the absolute idealist (*Advaita*) view, all have to be brought into one's focus. All of them, however, are not to be piled up in a heap. They have to be arranged into a system characterised by harmony. In this endeavour, modern Western systems (if the word system is apt) also may claim their share.

To proceed now to the problems of soul and God: Arguments are advanced in support of belief in the existence of individual souls and God. They cannot be taken as proofs in the sense that they are conclusive beyond doubt and dispute. They may clear the ground for belief or, strengthen belief, if belief exists already.

*Self*: (Soul). Unless one is a total sceptic, one cannot doubt one's own existence in some sense. One argument (the first among others) given by the Siddhant in is brief and forceful. The soul exists, even because it is denied. It is elaborated thus: (1) Who or what is it that denies its existence? Something must exist at least to make the denial. (2) The denial is not a *mere* denial but a denial of claims that the physical body, sense organs etc., are the soul. That which rejects each of these and that which is not the supreme Reality is the soul, (Jiva or pasu). It cannot be the Supreme Reality in as much as it (the soul) is subject to ignorance, weakness of will and narrowness or lack of love.

As for the existence of God, the traditional arguments whether of Indian systems or of Western systems, have been challenged. Yet they come alive when one goes through accounts of the experience of sages and saints recorded in devotional works. These experiences have a stamp of authenticity.

The traditional Hindu beliefs in *Karma* and transmigration carry conviction to me. The inequalities of life are traceable to *Karma*.



Far from leading to fatalism, belief in *Karma* calls for action. This is precisely the reason why our present action should be free from self-interest and self-centredness. In other words, motive force for one's life must be not "I" and "mine" but God and the well-being of His universe of animate and inanimate nature. Political, economic and social theories will be effective only to the extent to which individuals endeavour to free themselves from desire to put themselves first in every situation and to claim everything for themselves and for their kith and kin.

How is one to overcome the tendency to make everything self-centred? May be, it is here that one's view of the self or ego, or the answer to the question, "Who am I?" becomes important. All the answers, different though they are, become meaningful at different levels. Analysing physical and mental states, one may conclude that there is no permanent entity called the self. Yet, if we grant that there persists something which continues with a unity or self-identity, what is this entity? Is it the Absolute, the unchanging Reality that alone is ultimately true and abiding, the various intelligent and material manifestations having only a relative reality like the reflections of the sun or moon seeming real only so long as there is a reflecting medium like water and disappearing when the water dries up leaving only the sun or moon as final reality—or like rooms and halls appearing real only so long as there are walls separating them and when the walls are pulled down, imparts space alone remaining as the basic and ultimate reality? The many change and pass. The One alone remains as the abiding Reality. Relative reality is accorded recognition only so long as the Ultimate Reality is not realised in experience. Such Absolutism or monism or non-dualism, call it by what name one likes, has had a long history, both in the West and in this country. Another trend of ancient and continuing history is the theistic one. God is the Supreme Reality. Souls are intelligent, eternal entities, dependent on the Supreme Being. Likewise a third trend, of equal ancestry and continuing persistence is the humanist one, avoiding metaphysical speculation about God, soul immortality etc., and concentrating on human welfare and progress.

These three traditions, need not be exclusive in their commitments or allegiance. Each may accommodate suitably, the other two traditions, Cultivation of a philosophical temper, characterised by tolerance and a sense of humour will enable one to pursue one's own and help others to pursue their respective views, thus enriching all.



## The Impact of Neo-Platonism on Western Civilisation

Paulos Mar Gregorios

Scholars like Prof. A. H. Armstrong hold that Plotinus, the Master of what we moderns call Neo-platonism, was totally unaffected by Oriental thought.<sup>1</sup> The weight of the evidence, however, is heavily to the contrary. But since Plotinus and neo-platonism in general have such a pervasive influence on western civilisation and culture, this reluctance on the part of a western scholar to acknowledge obvious cultural debts can be accepted as further evidence of human weakness, observable in India as well as in the west and elsewhere.

Our purpose in this paper is simply to look at Neo-platonism with Indian eyes, to see what is kindred to the "Oriental Spirit" in it, as well as to see how this has affected western civilisation. The treatment here is by no means meant to be exhaustive, but merely as an invitation to further research.

### I. Neo-platonism—quick survey

Neo-platonism is a modern word. Those who followed Plotinus (ca 205-270) or Proclus (d 485) would not have thought of such an expression.

It should not be forgotten that Proclus was a *diadochos*—the last Acharya of Plato's academy, and the last major official commentator on Plato's writings. Proclus' *Elements of Theology* breathe an atmosphere quite different from Plotinus' *Enneads*, but both trace their teachings back to Plato.

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<sup>1</sup> On the dust-cover of the Loeb edition of Plotinus, translated by A. H. Armstrong, we read, "There is no real trace of Oriental influence on his thought".



Neo-platonism is a dialectical synthesis of Platonism and its subsequent criticism. If Plotinus is somehow regarded as the founder of neo-platonism—and this can be questioned, — he was not out to build a new school. More likely Plotinus sought to synthesize the manifold criticisms and counter-criticisms of Plato Aristotle and the stores that had confused the Greek scene for generations.

Aristotle (384 b.c to 322 b.c) had already questioned Plato's key ideas, as for example the world of ideas. Then with Alexander's return from India and his death in 323 B. C. there was in Hellenism what could be called creative chaos or turbulent ferment.

On the one hand, Aristotle's disciple Pyrrhon (ca 360 b.c.—270 b.c.), who had accompanied Alexander to India, returned a master of the rhetorical art, reproducing the Buddhist Mahdyamika dialectic in its Greek form of Skepticism—a far cry in intention from that which it imitated.

A revival of Pythagoreanism (Pythagoras died in 497 bc) was a perennial phenomenon in hellenism and at the time of Plotinus was the greatest rival, in the form of neo-Pythagoreanism, of neo-Platonism.

The Stoics or the people of the Porch, had reacted to all other-worldly philosophical speculation, and had settled down to find their meaning and their god within the cosmos itself—not apart from it. They had seen the world, both Greek and Roman, going to pieces, and Zeno (335-263 bc) and Diogenes (fl 2nd century b.c.) sought to bring some tough discipline into the dissolute Graeco-Roman society.

To follow the classification of Professor Plott<sup>2</sup>, the “Axial Age of Philosophy” was over. There is little evidence of primordial creativity in religion or philosophy—only reactions and recodifications. Such is the age of Plotinus—an age of interiority, of seeking unity within, away from the maddening disunity without.

Professor Plott compares the Egyptian Greek Plotinus (ca 205-270) to the Indian Buddhist Vasubandhu (4th century AD) in an engaging study. We shall concentrate on Plotinus and his effort, and its later modification by Iamblichus and Proclus.

Plotinus takes over much of the synthesis worked out by Numenius (fl ca 175). Numenius had attempted a survey of the development of ‘doctrine’ since Plato (long before Cardinal Newman in the 19th century tried the same with Christian doctrine). Numenius set down some norms for development faulting the skeptics like Pyrrho and schismatics like Philo of Larissa. Numenius tried to give also a

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2. John C. Plott, *Global History of Philosophy*, Vol. II, Motilal Banarsidass, 1979.



compendium of views of "famous nations which agree with Plato" among whom he included the "Brahmans"<sup>3</sup>

But Numenius does not bring in Nagarjuna's skepticism as Pyrrho understood it, but rather the *Vijnanavada* of the Indian Buddhists. In Numenius we see not only the foundations of the new Platonism, but also the striking parallelism between neo-platonic and Indian thought. Numenius builds on the synthesis worked out by Poseidonius the Stoic (fl 51 bc) a man of the stature of an Aristotle, and the teacher of Cicero. (died 43 bc).

Numenius reinstates the religious intent of philosophy which Plato had affirmed and Aristotle obscured. Focussing on Plato's "Second Letter", Numenius would begin with a doctrine of ultimate reality as Triad, a line followed by Plotinus and Proclus.

This Triad of ultimate reality bears striking resemblance, not to the Christian Trinity (from which it could not have been derived) but to the Buddhist and Hindu understandings.

The first God of Numenius as well as Plotinus and Proclus, corresponds to the *Sunya* or *Madhyamika* Buddhism and the *Nirguna Brahman* of Vedanta. One could almost say that Plotinus' "One" is the same as Mahayana Buddhism's *Dharmakaya* or *Tathata*,

In Proclus' language, the One (*to hen*), the First (*he prote*), the First cause of All (*aitia prote ton onton*), the one first principle (*mia arche*)<sup>4</sup>, is the self-constituted Good (*agathon authupostaton*).

This total identity of Being and the Good in the One in Neo-platonism is what has always attracted me to it. If being and good are inseparable, then so are fact and value, is and ought, science and morality. It is the hiatus between these two which lies at the base of the contemporary malaise.

Equally important to me is Proclus' affirmation of holism in proposition 66, which says :

*Panta ta onta pros allela e hola estin e mere e tauta e hetera.*

All the existents are to each other either whole or part or same or different".

The following propositions make clear that for Proclus, each part derives its meaning from participation in the whole, and that the whole pre-exists the parts. This affirmation seems so important for our age of ecological crisis.

3 Plott. *op. cit.*, p. 127.

4 Proclus, *The Elements of Theology*, Prop. 11, English Translate E. R. Dodds, Second Edition, Oxford, 1963/71, p. 12-13.



## II. The Idea of Hierarchy in Neo-platonism

The Numenian-Pythagorean structure of the cosmos, based on Plato's "second letter"<sup>5</sup> and co-ordinated with the Madhyamika views coming from India, was perfected by Plotinus.

Central to this structure was the perception that the Soul (*psuche*) of man is syngenous with the World-Soul. But the world-soul itself comes at a certain stage in the hierarchy of being, third in rank after the One, or after *to hen* (*monas* in Numenius) which is beyond all being and beyond all form and determination, and after the second entity, which is consciousness or *nous* (translated 'intellect' by Armstrong and 'Intellectual Principle' by Mackenna).

The true being of the world-soul is in the levels above it, i.e. in *nous* and in the *One*. Similarly our own souls have also a three-fold structure, being grounded in Being and *nous*.

The world-soul (*tou pantos psuche*) creates the world of differences; our soul has the same form (*homoeides*), but does not create the world. The world-soul looks to the *nous* as a whole, whereas our soul looks only to a part of the *nous*.<sup>6</sup>

But our souls have descended into the world of matter, caught in that formless nothing. Some have descended too far and are more deeply caught. Others retain greater capacity to rise, because they have not gone too far down. (IV : 3 : 12) And they keep going from body to body. This Plotinian doctrine of *samsara* and *metempsychosis* may be traced back to Pythagoras, but could also find confirmation in the Indian *Punarjanmavada* which had become known in Alexandria by that time.

While Plotinus advances no doctrine of Karma to justify the differences in the plight of the individual souls, he states that these differences are according to a rational principle (*Kata logon gignesthai* IV:3:16). Plotinus speaks of former faults which justify these differences (*e oude adikou ek ton prosthen echon ten dikaiosin*).

In any case all things are organized logically around a centre (*Kentron*), the circle "receiving light from the centre, and from this another circle, light from light" (IV : 3 : 17).

This dynamic hierarchy of circles is not an authority-structure, but an energy-structure. We should not press the circle analogy too far, for it is a spatial image. The soul is not a body, according to Plotinus, nor in a body. It is not present like form in matter either (IV : 3 : 20). There is no analogy, says Plotinus, to describe the

<sup>5</sup> also based on *Timaeus* 39e.

<sup>6</sup> *Enneads* IV: 3.6. Armstrong pp. 48 ff.



relation of the soul to the body (IV : 3 : 21). Not even Plato's charioteer would do.

### III. The Way of Liberation

The Soul is a power. It is not passive; it does not receive sense impressions; it actively grasps objects.

The world-soul, with which the individual Soul is syngenous, has a double activity. On the one hand it is the *demiurgos*, the craftsman, the creator, the shaper of all things; on the other it is the *hegemonikon*, the captain or ruler of all things (IV : 4 : 10).<sup>7</sup> Both these aspects of the world-soul come from the *nous* on which it is dependent. It does not come from nature (IV : 4 : 13), nor is it affected by nature. Nor is the *nous* affected by what happens in nature.

The way of emancipation for the human soul is to get the *hegemonikon* or ruling power so in control that no event of nature or experience affects the soul. It is from this union with the One that the *hegemonikon* also attains perfect unity and control, and withdraws itself from its entrapment in the objects of sense which are many and dis-orderly.

Contemplation (*theoria*) alone is the way to achieve this disenchantment with things (IV : 4 : 44). In it the soul is antonomous, detached from all things. To be self-disposed is to live above the states of the body (VI : 8 : 3). The spring of freedom is the *nous*, the highest in our being. To be centred in the *nous* is to be free and virtuous. Virtue or good is a mode of the *nous* as it is of being itself.

The unembodied is the free. The soul becomes free when it can move freely without constraint, through *nous*, towards the good.

### IV. Proclus and the Theurgic Revolution

Plotinus is still respectable in the West. Iamblichus and Proclus are not. Plotinus may believe in praying to the Sun and in magic spells (IV : 4 : 40ff). He still remains a philosopher. He is a European (?) Iamblichus (ca 250—ca 330) the Syrian, and Proclus are after all, not Europeans.

Yet the Neo-platonism that affected Augustine and the Christian fathers did not come directly from Plotinus alone. The Plotinian discipline was too elitist and a Syrian *Malcho* (that is Porphyry's real name) fighting against the Christians armed with the *Enneads* was unable to prevail. With Iamblichus and Proclus New-platonism com-

7 This seems to be the source for the Frankfurt School's division of reason into technical reason and ontological or emancipatory reason.



bines with Neo-Pythagoreanism to become a most powerful rival movement for Christianity.

Once neo-platonism takes on cultic elements, western scholars think, it becomes no longer philosophically respectable. The fact of the matter is that it is in this cultic or theurgic form that neo-platonism had its massive impact on western civilisation. It was the Athenian version of Neo-platonism as developed by Iamblichus and Proclus that Dionysius the Pseudo-areopagite christianized and bequeathed to the western monastic movement and to the medieval western church, and through these to western civilisation.

There are three channels (besides others, I am sure) through which neo-platonism penetrated the Western tradition. First there was Augustine of Hippo (354-430) the North African who through Cicero came first to Manicheism and then to neo-platonism. His theology has many more elements than recognized that could be traced to Numenius and Plotinus. He probably knew Iamblichus also, Augustine is the towering figure of western theological thought, totally unrecognized, thank God, in my own Eastern Christian tradition.

The second channel through which neo-platonism penetrated the west was through the terse and seminal writings of Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite (ca 500 AD). Since he was indentified with a first century disciple of St. Paul the Apostle, (Dionysius, the philosopher of Areopagus in Athens), his writings came to have high authority in the oriental as well as in Byzantine and Latin churches. All the leading medieval Greek and western theologians wrote commentaries on Dionysius, whose works show the unmistakable influence of Proclus.

The third channel was the writings of Proclus himself. Both Johannes Philoponus of Alexandria and Procopius of Gaza wrote christian refutations of Proclus. But Proclus' commentaries on Plato and other works were translated into Syriac, Armenian, Arabic and Georgian. The Middle Eastern civilisation paid a lot of attention to Proclus and used him to keep Plato alive. *The Elements of Theology* was translated into Latin from the Arabic in the 12th century, and was used by Albertus Magnus and Dante. In the European Renaissance, the works of Proclus played a major role.

The main contribution of Iamblichus and Proclus was to add the element of worship to neo-platonism, fully within a pagan context. In place of Plotinus' *theoria* as way of salvation, *theurgia* or the ritual acts of worshipping the One were introduced as means of liberation.

Usually western scholars are full of scorn for anything the smacks of cult or ritual. Plotinus' magic and prayers to the Sun are



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bad enough. Here are these Asians bringing in cult and ritual into the realm of the rational !

If however Iamblichus and Proclus had not replaced or capped *theoria* with *theourgia* neo-platonism would probably have collapsed completely. The parallels with the "mystery religions" of Egyptian and Iranian origin seem so obvious. But if anyone assumes that Porphyry and Plotinus had nothing to do with cult and ritual, he would be sadly mistaken. Porphyry wrote *On the Philosophy of the Oracles*, earlier in his life, but that was before he knew Plotinus, and besides Porphyry is also very much an Asian.

The *Chaldean Oracles* was the liturgical text-book of many a pagan in the fourth and fifth centuries, and possibly well before that. This mysterious work had a great impact also on the Christian fathers as well. For Proclus particularly, who regarded Philosophy as a sort of High Priest of the Religions, the cultic-religious element was essential to true philosophy.<sup>8</sup> At this point Iamblichus and Proclus are more Vedic than Vedantic. Where Plotinus asked the human will to discipline itself out of its illusions and rise to the One by mind and will, the Asian Neo-platonicians recommended cultic acts, or a theurgic liturgy—with mantras and incantations, sacrificial acts and rituals.

Plotinus has his Triad of the One, the Nous, and the All-Soul—but no gods as such. Proclus brings in "divine intelligences" (*theioides*), as distinct from 'ordinary intelligences' (*hoi noes monon*).<sup>9</sup> God is One, for Proclus too, and the One is identified also with the Good. His definition of God is "that beyond which nothing is and to which all adhere" (*hou gar meden estin epekeina kai hou panta ephietai Theos toutoi*—proposition 113). And the Good is "that from which are all things and to which all things move" *aph' hou ta panta kai pros ho,touto de tagathon.*, *ibid*).

The numerous Gods participate in this unity of the One and the Good; but every god is a self-complete henad (*pas theos enas estin autoteles*), and is above being (*hyperousios*) above life (*hyperzoos*) and above nous (*hupernous*)—(see props 114 and 115). And every god (except the One) is participable (*methektos*), though ineffable (*arrheton*) and unknowable (*agnoston*) by secondary beings, but apprehendable by participation, unlike the One (propositions 116, 123).

8 See Eusebius : *Praeparatio Evangelica* 1. V. c. VIII, IX Migne Patrologia Graeca XXI: 333C. See also *Mystery of the Egyptians* probably by one of the disciples of Iamblichus.

9 See Proclus, *Elements of Theology* Prop 111.



The gods, finite in number, mediate the energies and operation of the One to the whole universe and leads the whole cosmos to divine perfection (prop 153), through the process of return in *epistrophe* (proposition 31) back to the source. This life of the universe, as a diastole-systole, an expiration-inspiration, as a procession-recession, is a circle without beginning or end, the end being assimilated to the beginning (*ta tele pros tas heauton archas homoiotai*, prop 146).

Proclus affirms thus a sort of trinity in unity of the world process—immanence-in-the cause (*arche*) as identity, procession from the cause (*pro-odos*) as difference, and reversion (*epistrophe*) to the cause as overcoming of difference by identity. Proclus cites Iamblichus as saying that the cause of identity is the monad, the introducer of procession the diad, and the origin of reversion or recession the triad. The three are inseparable for Plotinus as for Proclus. (see prop. 35).

But the *epistrophe* for us humans, according to Proclus, is through the gods, and hence the rationale for the theurgy.

But the theurgy or mantra one does not write about. It is not for the eyes of the uninitiated. This must be the reason why so little on the subject is available that is written.

It was this theurgic neo-platonism that the Pseudo-Areopagite then bequeaths to the medieval western Church and becomes its most decisive intellectual heritage,<sup>11</sup> through John Scot Eriugena, Chalcidius, Boethius, John Philoponos, John of Damascus, Alexander of Hales, Bonaventura, Albert the Great, Hugo of St. Victor, even Thomas Aquinas himself. Nicolas of Cusa, and Meister Eckhart were both inspired by neoplatonic writings.

The Arabs and Jesus also took to neo-platonism in a big way in the 12th and subsequent centuries, quite often mistaking the works of Porphyry or Plotinus for those of Plato. Al-Farabi and Iban-Sinai (Avicenna) are profoundly influenced by neo-platonism. Proclus' work *de causis* was taken to be Aristotle's and avidly studied by Christians, Arabs and Jews.

10 in *Timaeus* II: 215.5. see E. R. Dodds, tr. *Elements of Theology*, pp. 220-221.

11 See H. Koch. *Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita in Seinen Beziehungen zum Neuplatonismus und Mysterienwesen*.



## CONCLUSION

The 19th century European Enlightenment brought a reaction against Plato and neo-platonism. If Western philosophy up to the European Enlightenment was a footnote to Plato and neo-Platonism, the so-called modern Philosophy of the West is an attempt to break the ties with Plato Aristotle and the Stoics and to start anew. But in that new start, the influence of Plato and the Neo-Platonists is still traceable in Hegel, Kant, Descartes, Husserl, Bergson, Whitehead and many other so-called moderns.

We can no longer go back to the pre-modern, pre-Enlightenment philosophical innocence. But modern philosophy and Enlightenment thought are now at a stage where they need a little encouragement—mostly to confess their failure, so that we can begin again the perennial quest, but with some understanding of the way we have come.

That is the sense in which I stand committed to the international Society for Neo-platonic studies.





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